June 2026
This publication outlines the Canadian National Aviation Safety Plan, which describes Canada’s strategy for managing aviation safety risks and improving aviation safety.
Aussi disponible en français sous le titre : Le Plan national de sécurité aérienne du Canada (C-NASP)
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© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Transport, 2026.
Cat. No. T52-4/313-2026E-PDF (Electronic PDF, English)
Cat. No. T52-4/313-2026F-PDF (Electronic PDF, French)
TP 15706E
ISBN 978-0-662-03994-5
Table of contents
- Land acknowledgement
- Statement from the Director General of Civil Aviation
- Introduction
- The C-NASP in context
- Canada’s State Safety Program
- Roles and responsibilities
- Aviation in Canada
- High risk categories (HRC)
- Other risk categories
- Operational safety issues (OPS-SI)
- Organizational safety issues (ORG-SI)
- Appendix – Planned safety enhancements and monitoring
- SEI Related to HRC-1: Loss of control in flight (LOC-I)
- SEI Related to HRC-2: Mid-air collision/loss of separation (MAC)
- SEI Related to HRC-3: Controlled Flight into/Toward Terrain (CFIT)
- SEI Related to HRC-4: System component failure/malfunction (SCF)
- SEI Related to HRC-5: Runway excursions (RE)
- SEI Related to ORC-1: Collision with Obstacles During Take-Off or Landing (CTOL)
- SEI Related to ORC-2: Runway incursions (RI)
- SEI Related to OPS-SI 1: General aviation safety
- SEI Related to OPS-SI 2: Air taxi safety
- SEI Related to OPS-SI 3: Unruly passenger incidents
- SEI Related to OPS-SI 4: New entrants
- SEI Related to ORG-SI 1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPS
- SEI Related to ORG-SI 2: Safety intelligence capabilities
- SEI Related to ORG-SI 3: SMS Obligations
- SEI Related to ORG-SI 4: Governance of Canada’s State Safety Program
Land acknowledgement
Canada respectfully acknowledges the longstanding relationship, grounded in deep cultural knowledge and stewardship, that First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Peoples maintain with land, water, and sky.
Aviation plays a key role for many Indigenous communities, especially those in remote, Northern, and fly-in regions where air transportation is often the only reliable link to services like health care, education, food security, and emergency responders.
Indigenous People use the aviation system and are important partners in keeping it safe and sustainable.
Statement from the Director General of Civil Aviation
I’m pleased to publish the inaugural Canadian National Aviation Safety Plan (C-NASP). The plan sets out Canada’s strategy to manage aviation safety risks, advance aviation safety performance and monitor progress towards objectives.
Led by Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), with input and support from our stakeholders and State partners, including:
- the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
- NAV CANADA
- the Department of National Defence, and
- industry groups and associations
This plan identifies Canada’s most important aviation safety issues, the safety enhancements planned to address them and how we will measure results.
The C-NASP will serve as an important tool in Canada’s State Safety Program. It will help us prioritize safety enhancements across the civil aviation system, spark important conversations about where efforts need to be focused, and provide an opportunity to increase awareness of safety initiatives. In this way, the C-NASP will contribute to the development of a positive safety culture by encouraging leadership and fostering collaboration and innovation that will help make Canada’s aviation system increasingly safer.
Thank you for your commitment. Let’s continue working together to improve aviation safety in Canada.
Felix Meunier
Director General
Civil Aviation
Introduction
The Canadian National Aviation Safety Plan (C-NASP) presents Canada’s strategy for managing aviation safety risks and advancing aviation safety. It identifies priority safety concerns, defines clear objectives and describes targeted initiatives to enhance safety performance across the aviation system. The plan is based on 5 principles:
- Positive and proactive safety culture
- Leadership commitment
- Safety risk management
- Collaboration across the entire aviation community, and
- Continuous improvement in safety standards, practices, and oversight
The plan identifies the most important safety issues for Canada. It uses international and regional safety strategies to guide this work. These include the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the North American, Central American, and Caribbean Regional Aviation Safety Plan.
The plan aligns Canada’s actions with global and regional priorities. It does this by identifying safety enhancement initiatives to address Canada’s most important safety issues.
This plan will be reviewed and updated in step with ICAO’s three-year publication cycle of the ICAO GASP. Updates will be released about one year after each new edition of the GASP. This will help keep Canada’s plan current and aligned with changes in the aviation sector.
The C-NASP in context
The Canadian National Aviation Safety Plan (C-NASP) aligns with the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the North American, Central American, and Caribbean Regional Aviation Safety Plan (RASP). It supports cooperation between national and regional safety work.
The C-NASP is also informed by Government of Canada strategies for national transportation modernization, climate and environmental action plans, innovation and digital transformation strategies, and critical infrastructure and security frameworks. This coherence ensures that aviation safety actions support broader national objectives.
- GASP
-
A roadmap for States to ensure aviation safety. Includes the development of robust regulatory frameworks, the promotion of safety-oriented cultures, the implementation of safety management systems, and the effective sharing of safety information among relevant stakeholders.
- RASP
-
Sets forth the strategic direction for the management of safety at the regional level, acknowledging the diverse safety concerns, priorities, and operational circumstances of each region and State.
- NASP
-
A State-level plan designed to help ICAO Member States systematically manage and enhance aviation safety risks within their jurisdiction.
More information on the NASPs and how they relate to GASPs and RASPs.
Canada’s State Safety Program
Canada’s State Safety Program (SSP) is an integrated set of laws, regulations and activities aimed at managing aviation safety in Canada. It provides a systematic approach to hazard identification, risk analysis, risk mitigation, and performance monitoring consistent with Annex 19 of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The SSP sets safety performance indicators and targets. It also requires regular reporting to ICAO to make sure Canada fulfills its international safety management obligations under Annex 19.
The C-NASP is a key tool for SSP implementation, driving national SEIs and reinforcing Canada’s commitment to the highest safety standards.
Get more information on Canada’s State Safety Program.
Roles and responsibilities
The State Safety Program (SSP) and Canadian National Aviation Safety Plan (C-NASP) cover Canada’s civil aviation system. Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) leads the development and continual improvement of the C-NASP in collaboration with a range of partners from both government and private sectors. SEIs are implemented by TCCA and Canadian aviation organizations according to defined responsibilities. Progress and risk performance are monitored through national governance structures, notably Canada’s State Safety Programme Advisory Council (CSSPAC). Strategic accountability resides with the Director General of Civil Aviation, who serves as executive sponsor and accountable executive.
Key stakeholders who contributed to the C-NASP:
- TCCA
- Department of National Defence
- Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)
- NAV CANADA
- CSSPAC, and
- Industry partners, through various safety information sharing forums
We sincerely thank all stakeholders for their help developing this plan. Your commitment and work play a key role in improving aviation safety across Canada.
Transport Canada Civil Aviation
Transport Canada’s Civil Aviation Directorate oversees civil aeronautics in Canada and is responsible for Canada’s state safety oversight system. TCCA ensures adherence to the Chicago Convention puts in place International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices (SARPs).
Department of National Defence
The Department of National Defence (DND) plays an important role in Canada’s aviation system, especially where military and civil aviation activities overlap. Including DND in this plan helps improve safety by supporting coordination in shared airspace, joint-use airports, and other areas of joint activity.
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigates civil aviation occurrences in Canada and areas under Canadian air traffic control. It can also investigate events outside of Canada if they involve an aircraft operated by someone who holds a Canadian aviation document under Part I of the Aeronautics Act.
The board:
- conducts independent investigations
- reports publicly on investigations, the causal or contributing factors that contributed to the occurrence, and the safety deficiencies that need to be addressed
- makes and follows up on recommendations designed to eliminate or reduce safety deficiencies found during investigations
- collects data on aviation accidents and incidents in Canada
TSB information plays a critical role in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks in the Canadian context. The TSB recommendations and Watchlist Items also informed many of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this plan.
Canada's State Safety Programme Advisory Council
The council brings together regulators, government bodies and industry stakeholders involved in aviation safety in Canada. It coordinates work on Canada’s State Safety Program, supports communication, avoids duplication and promotes effective action.
The council gives advice and recommendations to Transport Canada on this plan. The Director General of Civil Aviation approves updates and, when needed, sends them to senior leaders or the Minister for approval.
Aviation in Canada
Snapshot of aviation in Canada
Canada’s civil aviation system is large and complex. Stakeholders work together to keep air travel safe and efficient across the country.
The table below covers some key figures from Canada’s aviation system from fiscal year 2024-2025.
| Civil Aviation and Drones | Numbers |
|---|---|
| Canadian registered aircraft | 37,290 |
| Licensed pilots | 25,007 |
| Aircraft maintenance engineers | 16,234 |
| Approved maintenance organizations | 861 |
| Air carriers operating | 1,781 |
| Certified aerodromes (airports + heliports) | 554 |
| Registered drones (remotely piloted aircraft systems [RPAS]) | 114,580 |
| Basic Pilot Certificates issued (drones) | 95,097 |
| Advanced Pilot Certificates issued (drones) | 12,095 |
| Aircraft movements at major and select small airports | 2,184,609 |
Legal and operational framework
The Aeronautics Act is Canada’s primary enabling aviation legislation. It allows the Government of Canada to create and update regulations needed to put in place the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) standards and recommended practices (SARPs).
Related laws include the:
- Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada Act
- Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, and
- Privacy Act
The Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) operationalize ICAO SARPs across key areas, including licensing, airworthiness, flight operations, and air traffic services.
TCCA carries out Canada’s ICAO obligations. We monitor changes to ICAO Annexes and take part in ICAO working groups and regional safety bodies.
Canada undergoes oversight under ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme – Continuous Monitoring Approach (USOAP-CMA).
Aviation occurrences and casualties
Canada has made steady progress in aviation safety, through advances in technology, a strong regulatory system, and ongoing safety promotion. Despite the strides made in enhancing aviation safety in Canada, it is important to acknowledge that, like any complex system, accidents and incidents can still occur.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) monitors aviation accident and incident statistics in Canada. More information about the TSB’s 2024 statistical summary.
While Canada’s accident rate, measured against total aircraft movements, remains near historic lows and the rates of fatal accidents and fatalities remain stable, there remains work to be done to achieve further improvements and ensure Canada continues to benefit from this high level of aviation safety.
Aviation safety strategy
National safety issues, goals and targets
The safety initiatives in Sections 3 to 5 of the C-NASP focus on 4 national aviation safety areas:
- High risk categories (HRC): 5 categories of occurrences identified globally and within Canada as needing coordinated safety efforts. These represent the most pressing operational risks based on accident data, severity, and emerging trends.
- Other risk categories (ORC): 2 additional occurrence categories that present a lower risk but would benefit from additional mitigation. These reflect additional important operational risks based on accident data, severity, and emerging trends.
- Operational safety issues (OPS): 4 industry sectors or issues that have been identified as requiring a coordinated effort to address existing or emerging risks. These reflect sector-specific or emerging threats that require targeted mitigation by diverse stakeholders.
- Organizational safety issues (ORG): 4 areas that have been identified as being important to supporting Canada’s efforts to strengthen its State Safety Program. These reflect systemic gaps, such as oversight challenges or regulatory misalignment, that affect the State’s ability to manage risk effectively.
These categories ensure the C-NASP is evidence-based, responds to operational realities and systemic enablers and aligns with Canada’s obligations under the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Global Aviation Security Plan (GASP) and Annex 19.
The tables below explain how we chose the categories and issues.
Operational safety risk categories
| High Risk Categories (HRC) | Other Risk Categories (ORC) |
|---|---|
|
HRCs come from Canada’s safety risk management work, including TCCA Strategic Safety Risk Management (SSRM) process. This process helps identify, assess, prioritize, and manage safety risks across Canada’s civil aviation system. We use the following criteria to identify Canada’s national HRC:
|
Other risk categories (ORCs) are different from HRCs because of their risk profile. ORCs may have lower accident or fatality rates but are still frequent enough or severe enough to call for action. We use the following criteria to identify Canada’s ORC:
|
Operational safety issues (OPS)
Operational safety issues (OPS-SI) are safety challenges that affect specific operational contexts or segments of the civil aviation system. These problems can lead to a variety of unsafe outcomes.
Criteria used to identify OPS-SI for Canada include:
- accident and occurrence trends, especially within specific sectors like air taxi or general aviation
- data from a service providers’ safety management system (SMS)
- sector-specific risk factors, for example the operational challenges faced by air taxi operators (for example, remote flying, limited infrastructure)
- independent safety investigations and recommendations, for example those from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada
- emerging hazards/threats or behaviors, for example increases in unruly passenger incidents or integration challenges related to drones and advanced mobility technologies
- input from stakeholders, including industry consultations and safety forums
- alignment with ICAO guidance, specifically ICAO DOC 10131, Sections 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, which emphasize risk prioritization based on both quantitative and qualitative considerations
Organisational safety issues (ORG)
Organizational safety issues (ORG) are systemic, governance-related, or infrastructure-level hazards/threats that impact the State’s ability to manage aviation safety. ORG safety issues target the enablers of safety, such as regulatory alignment, data infrastructure, and safety oversight governance.
We use the following criteria to identify ORG-SI in Canada:
- findings from the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) and State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA)
- program risk identification and quality assurance activities within Transport Canada
- gaps or challenges related to safety oversight, State Safety Program (SSP) implementation, regulatory modernization, or information management
- alignment with ICAO’s strategic goals, especially those in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Global Aviation Safety Roadmap, like improving SSP performance and data-driven decision-making
- stakeholder engagement and advisory groups like Canada’s State Safety Programme Advisory Council (CSSPAC)
- legislative gaps, like the need for data protection provisions to support voluntary reporting
Safety enhancement initiatives
Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEI) are actions to control or address the safety issues in the C-NASP. They are based on data and analysis.
SEIs draw on information from:
- the GASP, RASP, and other States’ approaches
- Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) Watchlist items and other recommendations from the TSB stemming from incident and accident investigations
- Canada’s safety risk management process and safety data collection and processing systems
- work carried out by service providers in their safety management systems (SMS)
SEIs can include activities like:
- rulemaking
- policy work
- targeted surveillance activities
- safety data analysis and research
- safety promotion and education
- State Safety Program (SSP) enhancements
The appendix lists all SEIs and explains how we will track their progress.
Operational safety risk categories
This section presents the 5 high risk categories (HRC) and 2 other risk categories (ORC) included in this plan. It explains why they’re included, describes how they appear in Canada, and outlines actions to improve safety in these areas.
To understand the Canadian context, we reviewed reportable occurrences from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) for the last 5 complete years (2020-2024). We used the occurrence type categories developed by the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT). The TSB assigns these categories and records them in the Aviation Safety Information System (ASIS).
Two reviews were conducted:
- Occurrence frequency and sector analysis: We examined the frequency of occurrence types and the sectors in which they are occurring. We identified sectors by activity type and aircraft mark. This included recreational aviation for all privately registered aircraft or the CARs subpart for commercially registered aircraft (406, 702, 703, 704, 705) or privately registered aircraft operated under CAR 604.
- Aviation safety investigations: We analyzed all Class 2 and 3 aviation safety investigations conducted by the TSB to identify the factors contributing to these occurrence types in Canada.
The results provide a profile of the sectors experiencing certain occurrence types and factors that are contributing to them. A description of the results is provided in the background section for each operational safety risk category.
High risk categories (HRC)
High risk categories (HRC): Five categories of occurrences identified globally and within Canada as needing coordinated safety efforts. These represent the most pressing operational risks based on accident data, severity, and emerging trends.
HRC 1 – Loss of control - Inflight (LOC-I)
Background
Loss of Control - Inflight (LOC-I) is one of five global HRC’s included in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). These occurrences involve a departure from controlled flight that is not recoverable, and they have a high fatality risk. Worldwide, the number of fatalities linked with LOC-I accidents in transport category aircraft has prompted closer examination of crew training practices, including upset recovery training.
The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (GASR) highlights enhanced crew training requirements—such as upset recovery training in full flight simulators—among the potential mitigations. It also calls on States to monitor occurrence reports to identify additional causes and contributing factors.
In Canada, a review of 5 years of accident data shows that LOC-I accidents occur mainly in visual flight rules (VFR) operations in recreational aviation, flight training, aerial work, and air taxi operations (aeroplanes and helicopters). During this period, commuter or airline operations had no fatal LOC-I accidents.
These types of accidents are happening in Canada when pilots flying under VFR lose control of their aircraft. TSB safety investigations identified several contributing factors, including continued flights in marginal visual conditions, loss of airspeed and stall when conducting aerial work or when managing aircraft emergencies (system component failures) and following pilot incapacitation.
Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise also noted potential or emerging factors related to LOC-I. These include availability of aviation weather information and de-icing equipment (particularly in context of icing conditions in northern or remote locations).
Vision
Reduce LOC-I accidents with targeted mitigations depending on the sector of concern.
Action plan (SEIs)
Because the causes and contributing factors differ between instrument flight rules (IFR) and VFR operations, safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) focus on 2 priority areas.
To address the potential for LOC-I accidents in the airline sector, Transport Canada is developing standards for upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) requirements. These will be introduced for Subpart 705 operations initially and will focus on providing crews with ongoing training to recognize and recover from aircraft upset events.
To address these types of accidents in VFR operations, we will raise awareness of the conditions and practices that contribute to LOC-I accidents and their prevention through initiatives including the General Aviation Safety Program and the Air Taxi Safety Campaign.
Pilot incapacitation can also lead to these types of accidents. To address this risk, we’re also updating guidance for Civil Aviation Medical Examiners (CAMEs) and developing screening tools to help identify and assess pilot incapacitation risk factors.
Monitoring
We will monitor frequency of LOC-I accidents in relevant sectors. We will also review contributing factors in new accidents and compare them with those over the last 5 years.
HRC 2 – (Near) Mid-air collisions/Loss of separation (MAC)
Background
Mid-air collision (MAC) is one of five global HRCs included in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). These occur when two aircraft collide while airborne.
Requirements for Traffic Collision and Avoidance Systems (TCAS) and Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS) have greatly reduced the number of MAC. However, when they occur, they carry a high fatality risk.
The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap recommends technological solutions including requirements for airborne collision-avoidance, air traffic control systems and improved communication systems. It also calls on States to analyze their own occurrences in this category to identify appropriate mitigations.
In Canada, the few MAC accidents reported in the last 5 years involved:
- 2 recreational aeroplanes
- 2 flight training aeroplanes
- 1 flight training aeroplane and a helicopter conducting aerial work
- 1 flight training aircraft and a drone
The greatest concern in Canada related to MAC occurrences are in areas of concentrated recreational aviation and flight training activity under visual flight rules (VFR). Areas with increasing and high traffic density increase this risk.
Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise has also highlighted emerging issues that may contribute to MAC risk, including:
- global navigation satellite system (GNSS) radiofrequency interference (RFI)
- diversity and density of traffic at controlled and uncontrolled aerodromes
- language proficiency of student pilots
Vision
Reduce MAC accidents (and its precursors like loss of separation occurrences) with targeted mitigations and collaboration among stakeholders.
Action plan
Safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to address MAC accidents are focused in two priority areas.
A key contributing factor to MAC accidents is the density of the airspace in some flight training areas. A risk assessment was conducted in one high-traffic training area, with systemic risk controls planned. These controls include measures to improve airspace safety, strengthen air traffic management, encourage collaboration among flight training units, and support sustainable growth in training operations.
Risk reduction in General Aviation (GA) will be advanced through the General Aviation Safety Program, a collaborative program between Transport Canada and industry. Controls designed to manage airspace density in flight training areas will also benefit general aviation aircraft. Efforts are underway to establish a voluntary reporting system in GA in Canada.
Risk reduction will also be pursued through the Electronic Conspicuity Working Group. Led by Transport Canada, with participation from industry associations and other stakeholders including NAV CANADA, the working group aims to provide recommendations on the required guidelines, standards and regulations required to support the use of electronic conspicuity devices by all users of the airspace system. This working group is paused for fiscal year 2026-2027.
Monitoring
We will monitor frequency of MAC accidents across relevant sectors. We will also analyze contributing factors in new accidents and compare them with trends from the past five years.
Safety information will be collected and mapped through feedback from flight training safety action teams and the General Aviation Safety Program with close attention to MAC risk and near-misses.
HRC 3 – Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
Background
Controlled Flight Into/Toward Terrain (CFIT) is one of five global HRCs included in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). CFIT accidents occur where an aircraft is flown toward or into terrain in a controlled manner, regardless of the crew’s level of situational awareness. When these accidents occur, they often have catastrophic consequences and there is a high fatality risk.
Globally, significant progress has been made in reducing CFIT accidents, particularly through the use of ground proximity warning systems in commercial air transport. The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap calls for continued improvements, including enhanced aircraft and ground-based altitude warning systems, and procedural defences such as continuous descent final approaches. These mitigations largely target commercial, transport category aircraft.
In Canada over the past five years, no CFIT accidents occurred in airline operations. One commuter (704) aircraft was involved in a CFIT accident after striking terrain shortly after departure. Other CFIT accidents in Canada involved recreational aviation, aerial work, air taxi, and flight training, a mix of fixed wing and helicopters, all operating under visual flight rules (VFR). Contributing factors identified for those accidents included poor visibility or visual cues (flat light, glassy water or whiteout conditions).
Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise highlighted additional emerging factors related to CFIT, including:
- global navigation satellite system (GNSS) radiofrequency interference (RFI)
- limited access to aviation weather condition information
- flight in adverse conditions
- loss of situational awareness, especially during night VFR operations
Vision
Reduce CFIT accidents through targeted mitigations in sectors with higher risk.
Action plan
Safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to address CFIT risks focus on the following areas:
- VFR operations: Increase awareness of conditions and practices that contribute to CFIT accidents through programs like the General Aviation Safety Program and the Air Taxi Safety Campaign
- Air taxi operations: Advance collaborative efforts with industry through the Air Taxi Safety Campaign. This work includes developing strategies, tools, and publications to address the acceptance of unsafe practices and improve hazard management. One initiative is developing air-taxi specific case studies for crew resource management (CRM) training
- General aviation: Strengthen safety through the General Aviation Safety Program. Work is underway to establish a voluntary reporting system for GA in Canada, which will provide valuable safety insights given the limited data available from accidents without cockpit voice or flight data recorders.
- Regulatory improvements: Amend Canada’s approach ban regulations to simplify visibility requirements and align with international standards, thereby reducing CFIT risk.
Monitoring
Monitor frequency of CFIT accidents by relevant sectors. Analyze the nature of the contributing factors in new accidents and compare them with those identified over the past five years.
HRC 4 – System component failure/malfunction (SCF)
Background
System Component Failure/Malfunction (SCF) is one of the three other global risk categories identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). While these may not carry the same fatality risk as other high-risk categories, they are highlighted in the GASP as they are either increasing in frequency or figure prominently in the most frequent types of accidents and serious incidents across International Civil Aviation Organization regions.
SCF occurrences involve the failure of an aircraft system or component. The failure may involve the power plant (SCF PP) or another system not related to the power plant (SCF NP). These failures can be early steps in an accident sequence.
The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap recommends that States strengthen safety defences by:
- ensuring that operator maintenance programs consider operator experience, the operating environment, and condition-based maintenance when appropriate
- setting requirements for defect control and deviation from the minimum equipment list (MEL)
- enhancing oversight of supplier quality assurance programs; and,
- having States analyze their own occurrences in this category to identify appropriate corrective actions.
In Canada, most SCF-related accidents over the past five years involved aerial work and recreational aircraft, operating small airplanes and helicopters.
Investigations from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) identified several contributing factors, including:
- defects in a material
- failure of material
- handling and emergency differently than prescribed in the aircraft flight manual
- incorrect installation of parts
- maintenance task design
- routine tasks
- use of checks that cannot detect a problem
- quality control and quality assurance processes in component manufacturing processes
Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise also identified emerging concerns related to SCF, including:
- oversight of Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) 561 suppliers
- reduced technical capability in aircraft design, manufacturing, certification and continuing airworthiness
- safety concern involving ultralight and advanced ultralight aircraft
Vision
Reduce accidents involving system component failures by improving data collection, applying targeted mitigations, and enhanced monitoring. Work will focus on higher-risk sectors such as aerial work and recreational aviation.
Action plan
Safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to address system component failures will focus on raising awareness of the conditions and practices that contribute to SCF accidents and promoting prevention through the following programs:
- General Aviation Safety Program: Includes a maintenance and airworthiness working group that reviews issues such as owner maintenance and deferred maintenance
- Air Taxi Safety Campaign: Provides information and tools to pilots and operators. Many air taxi operators also conduct aerial work, so improvements in safety management practices will benefit both sectors
Monitoring
Monitor frequency of SCF-related accidents across relevant sectors and analyze the contributing factors identified in new accidents. This analysis will help determine whether emerging causes differ from, or align with, trends observed over the past five years.
HRC 5 – Runway excursions (RE)
Background
Runway excursions (RE) are one of five global high-risk categories in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). These events occur when an aircraft overruns or veers-off the runway during takeoff or landing. They usually result in fewer fatalities than other high-risk categories, but they can still cause significant risk of serious injury or death depending on the circumstances.
Because many RE events involve transport category aircraft, they are a global priority for safety action. Internationally, efforts have focused on preventing excursions, such as through stabilized approach criteria, and reducing the severity of outcomes through measures like runway end safety areas.
The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap recommends several actions for States, including:
- establishing runway safety programs and teams
- promoting stabilized approach procedures, go-around policies, and weather limits
- improving reporting on weather and runway surface conditions
- implementing runway overrun areas or arresting systems
In Canada, runway overruns are on the Transportation Safety Board of Canada’s (TSB) Watchlist. The TSB has noted progress, including:
- establishing crew resource management training requirements for all commercial operators
- implementing the Global Reporting Format (GRF), which provides better, more internationally harmonized, information with respect to the expected braking action in calculating landing performance
- updating requirements (since January 2022) for runway end safety areas (RESA) or alternative systems for all runways serving more than 325 000 commercial passengers annually
The TSB closed Recommendation A07‑06 on RESA, assessing the response as “satisfactory in part.” While Canada’s regulations differ from International Civil Aviation Organization standards, the approach balances enhanced protection for most passenger traffic with the need to avoid undue burden on smaller airports.
REs, both overruns and veer‑offs, remain a priority for all aviation stakeholders. Over the past five years, RE events have occurred across all sectors, from recreational flying to airline operations, with the highest numbers in flight training and air taxi operations. Contributing factors identified by the TSB include:
- inadequate information about runway surface conditions
- landings conducted in challenging weather (visibility, crosswinds)
- distractions during checklist execution leading to thrust imbalance and loss of directional control during takeoff
Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise also highlighted emerging concerns, including unstable approaches that continue to landing.
Vision
Maintain a strong focus on addressing the underlying factors that lead to REs, such as unstable approaches and poor-quality runway or weather information to reduce the number of RE events across all sectors.
Action plan
Canada is simplifying our approach ban regulations and aligning them with international standards. This will make the rules easier for pilots to apply and reduce approaches being flown in visibility conditions that contribute to lateral excursions and runway overruns.
Prevention efforts in recreational aviation will focus on raising awareness of conditions and practices that contribute to these types of events. The General Aviation Safety Program will support this work, including its working group on stabilized approaches and loss of control on ground.
Monitoring
We will monitor the number of runway excursion incidents and accidents across all sectors. We will analyze contributing factors in new events and compare them with trends from the past five years to identify changes, emerging risks, and areas for further action.
Other risk categories
Other risk categories (ORC): Two additional occurrence categories that present a lower risk but would benefit from additional mitigation. These reflect additional important operational risks based on accident data, severity, and emerging trends.
ORC 1 – Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing (CTOL)
Background
Collision with obstacle(s) during take-off and landing (CTOL) occur when an aircraft makes contact with obstacles including vegetation, structures, wires, antennae, offshore platforms, maritime vessels or other waves or debris when operating from the water.
Between 2020 and 2024, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) conducted full investigations into two CTOL accidents:
- one involved a commercial aircraft that struck a snowbank after experiencing directional control problems on landing
- one involved an air taxi float equipped aircraft that collided with a vessel
Contributing factors in the first accident were similar to those seen in runway excursions. In the second, the TSB identified the limitations of ‘see and avoid principles’ in a busy harbour with no designated take-off or landing areas for aircraft.
CTOL is not included in the Global Aviation Safety Roadmap. However, Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise also identified several emerging conditions that may increase CTOL risks, including:
- operations in poor weather or low visibility
- congestion and infrastructure challenges near airports
Vision
This category is included for monitoring purposes.
Action plan
This item has been included in this plan to help us monitor it.
To address specific infrastructure challenges near airports, Transport Canada will consult stakeholders and develop policies to better protect airport operations and instrument flight procedures from nearby development.
Monitoring
We will monitor the frequency of CTOL accidents across relevant sectors and analyze the contributing factors identified in new accidents to compare with those from the past five years.
ORC 2 – Runway incursions (RI)
Background
Runway incursions (RI) are included in the Global Aviation Safety Plan’s (GASP) high-risk categories. Transport Canada’s annual risk identification exercise also identified them as an area to monitor.
A runway incursion happens when an aircraft, vehicle, or person is incorrectly situated on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of an aircraft. While few incursions result in collisions, the potential for a high energy collision between two aircraft poses a significant risk of fatalities.
Because RI events involve multiple parts of the aviation system, effective risk management requires close coordination among airports, aircraft operators, and air navigation service providers. The Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (GASR) calls on States to:
- establish runway safety teams
- strengthen policies and training that support situational awareness for controllers, pilots, and airside vehicle operators, and
- promote technologies and airport infrastructure that enhance runway awareness
In Canada, no RI-related accidents occurred during the five-year period reviewed. However, the rate of RI incidents has been increasing, and runway incursions remain on the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) Watchlist.
The TSB has emphasized the need for tailored, airport-specific approaches—bringing together local stakeholders to identify hot spots and develop targeted mitigations—as well as technological improvements in both the cockpit and airport environment to enhance situational awareness.
Both ICAO and the TSB note that addressing the risks of RI requires sustained local action, particularly through local runway safety teams. In Canada, airports with high levels of flight training activity experience the greatest number of incursions. The mitigations needed to reduce the risk of RI at these locations will be different from those at major airports dominated by airline operations.
The need for coordinated action at the local level reinforces the importance of SMS for all certificate holders. SMS provides the structure and processes needed to identify hot spots and to develop effective mitigating strategies.
Transport Canada’s annual risk identification cycle also highlighted emerging conditions that may contribute to RI risk, including:
- poor weather and low visibility
- complex aerodrome layouts
- diverse and dense traffic patterns, and
- the use of more than one language in air traffic control communications
Vision
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) has stated that runway incursions will remain on the Watchlist until effective defences are implemented at known hot spots and there is sustained reduction in the number of incursions and the rate of high-risk incursions.
Reducing RI risk requires a collaborative approach involving aircraft operators, airport operators, and air navigation service providers. Throughout the duration of this plan, Transport Canada will continue to encourage the establishment and strengthening of local runway safety teams.
Action plan
Canada will promote runway safety teams to identify and address local risks.
Key issues contributing to runway incursions. Several resources are available to support this work, including:
- Advisory Circular 107-003, which encourages the development of runway safety programs and outlines the benefits of involving all stakeholders who influence runway operations
- guidance and tools from NAV CANADA to help set up runway safety teams
Adopting these best practices across airport operators, aircraft operators and air traffic services units will effectively address the risks associated with runway incursions.
Monitoring
We will monitor the frequency of runway incursion incidents and accident. We will analyze contributing factors in new accidents and compare them with trends from the past five years.
We will also track how many aerodromes have runway safety teams and share feedback on best practices.
Operational safety issues (OPS-SI)
Operational safety issues (OPS): Four industry sectors or issues that have been identified as requiring a coordinated effort to address existing or emerging risks. These reflect sector-specific or emerging threats that require targeted mitigation by diverse stakeholders.
OPS-SI 1 – General aviation safety
Background
In this plan, general aviation includes privately registered aircraft in all categories like aeroplanes, helicopters, ultralights, etc., except those operating under Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) Subpart 604. It also includes flight training aircraft operating under CAR Subpart 406.
Canada has many privately registered aircraft, including aeroplanes, helicopters and ultralights (basic and advanced), and the number of privately registered amateur-built aircraft is increasing. These, along with flight training aircraft, figure prominently in several high-risk categories including:
- loss of control in flight (LOC-I)
- controlled flight into terrain (CFIT)
- mid-air collisions (MAC)
- system component failures power plant and non-powerplant (SCF-PP and SCF-NP)
Reducing the frequency and severity of general aviation (GA) accidents requires a coordinated effort with all stakeholders. Important work is already underway, as outlined below.
A focus on flight training has particular long-term benefits. Safety promotion in this sector supports pilots at the beginning of their aviation careers and strengthens safety practices across both GA and commercial operations.
Vision
The goal for GA safety is to achieve a sustained reduction in both fatal and non-fatal accidents, with a particular focus on:
- abnormal runway contact (ARC)
- runway excursions (RE), and
- loss of control in flight (LOC-I)
Achieving this outcome will require collaboration and engagement from multiple stakeholders. Between publication of this plan and 2027, steps will be taken to strengthen communication and coordination within the GA Community. These efforts aim to increase awareness of key safety issues and promote greater use of safety products developed to support GA operations.
Action plan
Safety enhancements in this area form a core component of Canada’s General Aviation Safety Program, which is coordinated through the Canadian General Aviation Joint Safety Committee. The committee is co-chaired by Transport Canada and the Canadian Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) and includes representations from 31 industry associations and stakeholders.
At the time of writing, eight working groups operate under this committee:
- Maintenance and Airworthiness Working Group (WG) – This WG has developed four safety seminars to increase awareness of owner responsibilities related to maintenance and airworthiness. Topics include maintenance scheduling, and compliance with airworthiness directives and service bulletins. These materials aim to reduce system component failure accidents in GA.
- Seaplane WG – This group focuses on safety in privately operated seaplane operations. Current initiatives include recommendations on seaplane rating requirements and qualifications for seaplane instructors, analysis of 1005 privately registered seaplane accidents in Canada from 1990 to 2022, updated seaplane instructor guidance (rewrite of TP12668 – Instructor Guide Seaplane Rating), and improved Aeronautical Information Manual guidance on the Maritime Collision regulations to reduce the risks of collisions between seaplanes and other vessels while on the water.
- Ultralight WG – This WG promotes ultralight safety through safety promotion, development of guidance and best practices.
- Safety equipment – This group promotes the voluntary adoption of safety equipment, such as shoulder harnesses, airbag systems, and personal flotation devices for seaplane operations that have the potential to reduce the severity of personal injuries in survivable accidents.
- Stabilized approach/Loss of control - ground (LOC-G) - This work aims to reduce common GA occurrences related to approach, landing and ground handling. Activities include assessing stabilized approach criteria, recommending improvements to training and testing standards for approach and landing and promoting the normal use of go-arounds while ensuring pilots maintain the skills required to perform them safely.
- Mental Health WG - Recently established, this group promotes understanding of mental health issues, disclosure requirements and support processes for pilots.
- Rotary Wing WG - This group develops promotional materials to improve safety in privately operated helicopter and gyroplane operations. Topics include night operations, helmet use, white-out and flat light conditions. Information is shared through articles in the Aviation Safety Letter (ASL) and Aeronautical Information Manual guidance.
- Voluntary Reporting – This group works to expand safety information sharing within the GA and flight training communities including through an information sharing proof of concept project with the University Aviation Association.
Monitoring
We will monitor progress on GA safety will be monitored by tracking the number of accidents and fatal accidents involving privately registered aircraft and aircraft operating under Subpart 406 (flight training operations).
Particular attention will be paid to high-risk categories of occurrences (LOC-I, CFIT, MAC) as well as other key areas of concern for GA (ARC, RE, SCF).
Engagement and outreach will also serve as indicators of progress. Increased publication and use of guidance material and safety promotion materials will provide an indicator of increased awareness of important safety issues in this sector.
OPS-SI 2 - Air taxi safety
Background
In Canada, air taxi (CAR 703) operations include air transport services using aeroplanes (other than turbo-jet aeroplanes) and helicopters that carry nine or fewer passengers and have a maximum certified take-off weight of 19,000 pounds (8,618 kg) or less.
Air taxi operations has been recognized as an additional OPS-SI in response to a safety issue investigation (SII): Raising the Bar on Safety: Reducing the Risks Associated with Air-taxi Operations in Canada. This investigation examined the safety challenges in the sector using data and information from:
- 716 air taxi accidents reported to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) from 2000 and 2014, including 162 accident investigations and 5 incident investigations
- mandatory reportable occurrence summaries
- interviews with air-taxi operators and Transport Canada inspectors, and
- previous studies from Transport Canada, the TSB, the United States Federal Aviation Administration, the Chief Coroner of British Columbia, and several Canadian federal organizations
Air taxi operations function in a unique and often demanding environment. The sector includes activities like helicopter operations, both instrument and visual flight rules (IFR and VFR) flights, heli-skiing, and medical evacuations. Many flights operate without set schedules and fly into remote areas in uncontrolled airspace where aerodromes, navigation aids, and weather information are limited.
These conditions expose operators to different hazards than other types of commercial aviation operations, requiring tailored mitigations to reduce risk.
The safety issues investigation identified 19 safety themes and two key underlying factors:
- acceptance of unsafe practices
- the inadequate management of operational hazards
The air taxi sector has more accidents and fatalities than any other commercial aviation sector in Canada. According to the TSB investigation from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2017, there were 789 accidents in the air‐taxi sector, resulting in 240 fatalities. This accounts for 55% of all accidents in commercial air services in Canada and 62% of the fatalities in this period.
Vision
Work with the air taxi industry to:
- increase awareness of risks linked to unsafe practices
- promote safe practices
- strengthen the management of operational hazards, and
- reduce safety risks in the air taxi sector
Action plan
Reducing air-taxi accidents requires all stakeholders to help create an environment where operational hazards are proactively managed and unsafe practices are considered unacceptable.
Safety improvements will be advanced through active engagement with the aviation community as part of the Air Taxi Safety Campaign.
The Air Taxi Safety Campaign will:
- bring stakeholders together through focus groups and working groups to develop strategies, tools and publications
- publish and share materials that support operators and their clients in identifying and eliminating unsafe practices
- deliver national seminars, participate in association events, and support other learning activities to promote safety awareness
- collect data to assess the campaign’s effectiveness and measure progress against safety objectives
- carry out a national targeted inspection campaign to increase awareness of safe practices and regulatory expectations
Monitoring
We will measure progress by tracking the use and uptake of safety promotion materials and through the TSB’s assessment of Transport Canada’s response to the related aviation safety recommendation.
OPS-SI 3 - Unruly passengers
Background
Most passengers follow aviation rules and treat airport and airline personnel with respect. However, disruptive passenger behaviour has increased in both frequency and severity in recent years and can occur at any stage of air travel.
Disruptive behaviour can include:
- refusing to follow safety instructions
- verbal abuse
- interfering with crew duties
- physical aggression, and
- threats involving weapons
These actions compromise the safety and security of flight operations and affect the well-being of passengers and crew. They can also lead to flight diversions, delays, injuries or damage to property.
Effectively addressing unruly passenger behaviour requires coordinated action among stakeholders, strengthened regulatory tools, and consistent enforcement.
Vision
To foster a safe and well-coordinated aviation environment where:
- the roles of all stakeholders related to unruly passengers are clearly defined
- regulatory frameworks are effective and consistently enforced, and
- collaboration across stakeholders is strong
This vision aligns with the safety goals and targets set out in the global and regional aviation safety plans.
Action plan
Enhancing incident response
Develop national guidance material to support effective responses to unruly passenger incidents, including clear roles, responsibilities and procedures.
Develop national guidance on de-escalation strategies to help resolve incidents safely.
Sharing unruly passenger information
Assess options and feasibility for stakeholders to share information about unruly passengers to enhance safety.
Strengthening the regulatory framework
Explore amendments to the regulatory framework to improve enforcement tools for addressing unruly passenger behaviour, including the potential use of Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs) for non-compliance with the Aeronautics Act or the CARs.
Safety Promotion
Develop a public education and awareness campaign to inform travellers about the consequences of unruly behaviour.
Monitoring
We will monitor unruly passenger incidents in collaboration with stakeholders to identify trends and inform safety actions.
OPS-SI 4 - New entrants
Background
The integration of new entrants into Canada's national aviation system, including remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), advanced air mobility (AAM), and commercial space launch (CSL), is creating new and distinct safety challenges. These technologies feature high levels of automation, plans for autonomy, and design and operational characteristics that differ significantly from traditional aircraft. They also require new pilot competencies, new types of infrastructure and updated approaches to airspace use.
RPAS use has grown quickly in Canada for recreational, research, and commercial purposes. More than 112,000 RPAS are currently registered in Canada, compared to approximately 37,000 traditional aircraft. Because RPAS are generally smaller and operate at a lower altitude than most traditional aircraft, new regulations, standards, and digital services are required to safely integrate these aircraft into the aviation system.
AAM aircraft introduce additional complexities. Many are electric and feature novel designs, such as electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) vehicles. These aircraft require different piloting skills and certification approaches from traditional aircraft.
CSL activities add further challenges. Space launches are infrequent, highly specialized, and require coordination across multiple federal departments to ensure hazard areas are safely managed.
These new entrants also differ in their technological maturity:
- RPAS are the most advanced and are progressing quickly, supported by evolving regulations and air traffic integration efforts to support integration into national airspace by 2030
- AAM technologies are still in early development, with significant research and development investment but certification and infrastructure needs slowing their entry into service
- CSL remains least mature, with an evolving regulatory framework and highly specialized operational requirements
Because of these differences, Canada requires an adaptive policy and regulatory approach informed by continued consultation and collaboration with industry, government partners, and other stakeholders.
Vision
To integrate new entrants into the national aviation system without negatively impacting the overall safety performance of the system. This objective is linked with ICAO’s GASP Goal #1, which aims to continuously reduce operational safety risks maintain a decreasing global accident rate.
Action plan
Modernizing the regulatory framework
Develop and implement a modern regulatory framework to support the safe integration of larger and more complex RPAS into the national aviation system.
Research and development
Conduct collaborative research and development to strengthen Transport Canada’s capacity to assess, certify and oversee new RPAS and AAM technologies.
Harmonization
Engage with domestic and international stakeholders to share best practices and advance alignment and harmonization across the RPAS, AAM and CSL sectors, where appropriate.
Monitoring
We will monitor and measure the implementation of SEIs using internal and external reporting mechanisms. Assess the impact of SEIs by evaluating accident and incident rates associated with new entrants.
Organizational safety issues (ORG-SI)
Organizational safety issues (ORG): Four areas that have been identified as being important to supporting Canada’s efforts to strengthen its SSP. These reflect systemic gaps, such as oversight challenges or regulatory misalignment, that affect the State’s ability to manage risk effectively.
ORG-SI 1 – Consistent implementation of ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs) at the national level
Background
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) develops standards and recommended practices (SARPs) that form the basis of global aviation safety. As a signatory to the Chicago Convention, Canada must adopt ICAO SARPs.
The convention and its 19 Annexes cover all aspects of civil aviation operations and serve as the foundation of Canada's safety oversight responsibilities. When Canadian regulations and practices differ from ICAO Standards, Canada must inform ICAO of these differences.
ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) assesses how effectively a State implements the critical elements of a safety oversight system. This evaluation helps States ensure consistent implementation of ICAO’s SARPs, procedures and guidance material.
Canada’s 2023 USOAP audit identified a decline in the country’s effective implementation score and identified several areas requiring improvement. Canada must address these gaps to strengthen safety, maintain international confidence and avoid potential consequences. Canada has committed to ensuring that its legislation, regulations and guidance are aligned with ICAO SARPs.
Vision
To achieve measurable improvements in aviation safety through increased and sustained implementation of ICAO SARPs.
Action plan
Enhance Oversight Mechanisms
- Strengthen Transport Canada’s oversight processes to ensure they evolve in line with ICAO SARPs
- Enhanced oversight will support effective monitoring and enforcement across all aviation sectors, improving safety and regulatory compliance
Implement Corrective Action Plans in response to USOAP audit
- Continue implementing corrective action plans (CAPs) to address USOAP findings
- This will improve Canada’s ability to oversee and manage its aviation safety system and respond to identified risks
Strengthening the Regulatory Framework
Regularly review and modernize the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) to maintain full alignment with evolving ICAO SARPs. Key actions include:
- incorporating common industry practices into the regulations
- ensuring consistency across regulatory sections
- integrating ICAO terminology and standards
This proactive approach will support compliance with international standards and enhance overall safety performance.
Compliance checks will measure the frequency and effectiveness of oversight activities. Ongoing reviews of CARs will ensure the regulations remain current and aligned with evolving ICAO standards.
Monitoring
Transport Canada will track progress using process and outcome measures.
Process measures will include:
- regular self-assessments to monitor alignment with ICAO SARPs
- number of regulatory updates completed
- feedback from industry stakeholders
Outcome measures include:
- improvement in Canada’s effective implementation score before the ICAO Coordinated Validated Mission.
- compliance rates among Canadian aviation operators to ensure updated regulations are applied effectively
ORG-SI 2 – Safety intelligence capabilities
Background
Safety intelligence is foundational to the State Safety Program (SSP) and is the systemic process that collects, analyzes, interprets and shares safety data and information to support evidence-based decision making. (Safety intelligence manual DOC 10159, section 1.1). It is a foundational element of an SSP and supports the other four components of an SSP:
- Component 1: State safety policy, objectives and resources
- Component 2: State safety risk management
- Component 3: State safety assurance
- Component 4: State safety promotion
Safety intelligence helps stakeholders identify and understand risks, develop effective mitigations and monitor whether those mitigations are working. To meet its international obligations, Canada must continually strengthen its capacity to generate safety intelligence and encourage the exchange of safety insights across the aviation system.
This safety issue focuses on three key areas:
- Improving safety intelligence capabilities. This includes data governance, data analysis, data visualization, and the infrastructure required to collect and report safety data effectively.
- Removing barriers to information sharing. Stakeholders can exchange safety data in a protected and trusted environment.
- Building collaborative relationships and structures that bring stakeholders together to share information and jointly develop mitigations. Addressing the risk categories and safety issues in this plan requires a coordinated and system wide approach.
This issue links closely to ORG-SI 3 (safety management system obligations). Stronger safety management systems across the aviation sector will improve the quality and availability of safety intelligence across the aviation system.
Vision
Improve access to high-quality safety intelligence in Canada by 2027.
Action plan
Implement a safety intelligence strategy
Implement a safety intelligence strategy that enables the use of safety data and information from multiple organizations and stakeholders to better identify risks, understand safety issues and develop mitigations.
For Transport Canada, this includes:
- enhancing data analytics capabilities
- improving access to aviation safety data
- aligning organizational structures to better support aviation safety intelligence
- increasing data literacy across the department
- addressing data quality issues
Strengthen data protection
Advance amendments to the Aeronautics Act to establish stronger protections for the sharing of data. These protections will support a positive safety culture and enable the safe, voluntary exchange of safety information among stakeholders.
Support collaboration
Support collaborative forums that promote the exchange of information and encourage joint action on key safety challenges.
These forums include, but are not limited to, the:
- the 705 Collaborative Analysis Group
- the General Aviation Safety Program
- the 703 Air Taxi Safety Campaign
- the Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT) and local runway safety teams
- the Canadian Commercial Aviation Safety Team (C-CAST)
Monitoring
We will measure progress through:
- legislative progress: Amendments to the Aeronautics Act that provide protections that support the voluntary sharing of safety information
- improved safety intelligence within Transport Canada: Increased availability of reliable data and analytical tools to support evidence-based decision making
- enhanced collaboration: ongoing sharing of safety information and collaboration on safety issues with SSP partners
ORG-SI 3 – SMS Obligations
Background
A safety management system (SMS) is an explicit, comprehensive and proactive process for managing risks that integrates operations and technical systems with financial and human resource management, for all activities related to a civil aviation document.
Under its obligations to the International Civil Aviation Organization, Canada must require SMS is implemented for all service providers so they can continuously improve safety performance by identifying hazards, collecting and analyzing data, and assessing and managing safety risks. Implementing SMS helps organizations strengthen their safety culture across all aspects of their operations.
Since SMS was first introduced in Canada in 2005, global aviation standards and practices have evolved significantly. Challenges have emerged in fully implementing SMS and expanding its applicability across the Canadian aviation sector. Strategic changes are required to align Canada with international standards and recommended practices for SMS and address recommendations from the longstanding Transportation Safety Board of Canada recommendations related to SMS.
Vision
Transport Canada is implementing a phased, risk-based strategy to:
- modernize the regulatory framework for SMS
- extend SMS regulations to more sectors
- enhance Transport Canada oversight of SMS
- develop guidance material to help stakeholders understand, implement, evaluate, and oversee SMS
Action plan
SMS Regulatory Initiatives
Phase one of the mitigation strategy involves amendments to the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs). On January 4, 2024, Transport Canada published Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2024-002 through the Canadian Aviation Regulatory Advisory Council (CARAC).
The regulatory proposal:
- consolidates SMS requirements under Subpart 107 of the CARs
- aligns Canada’s regulatory structure and terminology with ICAO Annex 19, and
- extends SMS requirements to certain design and manufacturing organizations
Phase two will expand SMS requirements to more sectors. This will better align Canada with international standards and address a key recommendation from the TSB that all commercial air operators have an SMS (TSB recommendation A16-12).
Oversight Transformation
TCCA has launched an initiative to renew its safety oversight program to ensure full alignment with ICAO requirements, including SMS oversight.
The Oversight Renewal Project will address systemic issues within the surveillance and certification programs, improve oversight methodologies, processes, and guidance, while emphasizing standardization and efficiency.
Monitoring
Transport Canada will monitor progress on the implementation of both phases of the action plan. This includes regulatory updates and the expansion of SMS requirements to more sectors.
This monitoring will help ensure Canada’s SMS framework stays aligned with international standards and continues to enhance aviation safety across the system.
ORG-SI 4 – Governance of Canada’s State Safety Program (SSP)
Background
Canada’s State Safety Program (SSP) is a core requirement for meeting ICAO obligations and managing national aviation safety. However, evolving ICAO standards and recommended practices, increasing operational complexity, and emerging safety risks, mean the current SSP needs modernization to remain effective.
A modernized SSP will:
- better support risk-based oversight
- strengthen the use of safety data and intelligence, and
- enhance Canada’s performance under ICAO’s USOAP
A refreshed and well-implemented SSP also supports strategic resource planning. It enables Transport Canada and its State partners to focus oversight efforts where risks are highest, improving both efficiency and safety outcomes.
Strong leadership from Senior Management is essential to guide implementation, ensure accountability, and maintain focus across the department. Active engagement by other State partners is also critical to support collaboration, monitor progress, and drive continuous improvement.
ICAO guidance, including the Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (GASR DOC 10161), the Safety Management Manual (DOC 9859), Manual on the Development of Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans (DOC 10131), and the Safety Oversight Manual (DOC 9734) all emphasize that States must work collaboratively to identify and mitigate safety issues. Meaningful participation by key stakeholders, appropriate resource commitments from all partners, and strong leadership from a designated lead organization are identified as essential components of a successful SSP.
In support of this approach, the State Safety Programme Advisory Council (CSSPAC) was launched in 2022. Its Terms of Reference (May/June 2022) identify Transport Canada as the lead organization for Canada’s SSP and require a senior Transport Canada manager to chair the committee. The CSSPAC is responsible for guiding the development and publication of the Canadian National Aviation Safety Plan (C-NASP) on a three-year cycle and may create working groups or sub-groups to address specific safety issues.
As of the publication of this plan, the CSSPAC has met three times with participation from a broad range of stakeholders (i.e. TCCA, DND, ALPA ISC, ATAC, NAV CANADA, NACC, TSB, HAC). Discussions have focused on approving the CSSPAC Terms of Reference and discussion roles related to the SSP and the C-NASP.
Vision
Ensure the SSP is fully operating by formally strengthening the role of the CSSPAC as the central coordinating body. CSSPAC will lead the implementation and integration of SSP activities, promote stakeholder alignment, and support strategic safety decision-making.
Action plan
By 2027, we will have:
- A clearly established executive champion and dedicated secretariat within Transport Canada to lead and coordinate State safety planning efforts for the SSP and the C-NASP
- A strengthened role for the CSSPAC as the central coordinating body with active participation from key stakeholders in the development and monitoring of the C-NASP
- Demonstrated evidence of risk-informed oversight and resource allocation, fully aligned with the objectives and priorities outlined in the C-NASP
Monitoring
Progress on this organizational safety issue will be monitored through the activities of the CSSPAC and its associated groups. Success indicators include a clearly defined structure for the coordination of safety activity at the State level and active participation in the implementation of the safety enhancement initiatives identified in this plan and plans in the future.
Appendix – Planned safety enhancements and monitoring
SEI Related to HRC-1: Loss of control in flight (LOC-I)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the GASP (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of LOC-I accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Better training |
Create regulatory requirements and standards for upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) for Canadian operators, starting with airlines |
Transport Canada Air operators |
All operators implement UPRT training requirements for pilots and crew members All commercial pilots and flight crew members complete UPRT training Inspections |
|
Improve understanding of the precursors to LOC-I accidents in the general aviation sector |
Refer to OPS SI-1. |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Increase understanding of the precursors to LOC-I accidents in the air taxi sector |
Refer to OPS SI-2. |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Improve screening tools to reduce the risk of pilot incapacitation leading to LOC-I |
Update the Handbook for Civil Aviation Medical Examiners (CAMEs) New screening tools for heart disease |
Transport Canada |
Handbook updates are published |
SEI Related to HRC-2: Mid-air collision/loss of separation (MAC)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for the high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of MAC accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
We will monitor progress as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Assess areas of greatest risk for MAC accidents and develop a mitigation plan |
Implement mitigations from the lower mainland risk assessment to improve, technology use, airspace and safety awareness Apply this approach to other high-traffic areas |
General Flight Standards Transport Canada’s Pacific Region Flight Training Units NAV CANADA |
Details of MAC Risk treatment plan from lower mainland risk assessment is implemented and monitored quarterly |
|
Electronic Conspicuity Working Group |
Transport Canada will lead a working group to develop guidance and rules for electronic conspicuity to reduce mid-air collision risks |
Transport Canada leads Supported by:
|
Final report of working group with recommendations. |
SEI Related to HRC-3: Controlled Flight into/Toward Terrain (CFIT)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of CFIT accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Update Canada’s approach ban regulations |
Changing Canada’s approach visibility minima from advisory to prescribed approach visibility minima |
TCCA Air Operators NAV CANADA |
Progress in implementing updated approach ban regulations |
|
Increase understanding of the precursors to CFIT accidents among the general aviation (GA) community |
Refer to GA safety campaign OPS SI-1 |
Safety Promotion |
Revised State Safety Program (SSP) |
|
Increase understanding of the precursors to CFIT accidents among the air taxi community |
Refer to air taxi safety campaign OPS SI-2 |
Safety Promotion |
Revised SSP |
SEI Related to HRC-4: System component failure/malfunction (SCF)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for the high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of SCF accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Introduce SMS requirements for design organizations |
Safety management systems (SMS for Design Organizations): Introduce requirements for aircraft design organizations and manufacturers to have SMS |
TCCA Canadian design and manufacturing operators |
SMS requirements for design organizations published |
|
Improve awareness of the precursors of system component failure accidents in the general aviation community |
Publicize availability of 4 safety seminars designed to increase awareness of aircraft owner responsibilities related to maintenance and airworthiness, including maintenance scheduling, compliance with airworthiness directives and service bulletins |
General Aviation Safety Program - Maintenance and manufacturing working group |
Safety seminars adopted and delivered |
SEI Related to HRC-5: Runway excursions (RE)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for the high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of RE accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Updating Canada’s approach ban regulations |
Changing Canada’s approach visibility minima from advisory to prescribed approach visibility minima |
TCCA Air Operators NAV CANADA |
Updated approach ban regulations published |
|
Increase understanding of the precursors to runway excursion accidents among the General Aviation Community |
Within the General Aviation Safety Campaign, continue the work of the Stabilized approach/Loss of Control on ground (LOC-G) working group |
General Aviation Safety Program Stabilized Approach / Loss of Control on Ground working group |
Working group outputs including stable approach criteria for general aviation, recommendations for improved training and testing standards for approach and landing phases of flight |
SEI Related to ORC-1: Collision with Obstacles During Take-Off or Landing (CTOL)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for the high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories
This category is included for monitoring only. No specific SEIs have been identified.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of CTOL accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Monitor |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Development around airports. Airport zoning regulations and airspace protection for instrument flight procedures. |
Transport Canada will conduct the policy work, including consultation with stakeholders, required to initiate changes to the regulatory framework needed to better protect the airspace around airports from development that would infringe on airspace required for instrument flight procedures |
Transport Canada |
Identification and initiation of regulatory options |
SEI Related to ORC-2: Runway incursions (RI)
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) for the high and other risk categories of occurrences are related to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks
- GASP Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Related safety indicators include:
- number of accidents (accident rate)
- number of fatal accidents (fatal accident rate)
- percentage of occurrences related to high-risk categories
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of RI accidents by industry sector and analyzing the contributing factors to these occurrences to identify any changes in trends that require specific mitigations.
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Promotion of runway safety programs |
Continue to the establishment of local runway safety teams through the publication of guidance material and safety promotion efforts |
Transport Canada NAV CANADA Runway Safety Action Team (RSAT) All aerodromes and operators |
Number of airports with established local runway safety teams Feedback from airport operators on experience establishing local runway safety teams |
SEI Related to OPS-SI 1: General aviation safety
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area are not directly to the goals and targets in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004) but have been identified as an important issue for aviation safety in Canada.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of accidents and fatal accidents involving privately registered aircraft and aircraft operating in the flight training sector (CAR 406). Specific attention will be paid to the high-risk categories of occurrence (LOC-I, CFIT, MAC) and those other occurrences that are a particular area of concern for general aviation (ARC, RE, SCF).
Progress against specific SEIs will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Various |
Continue work of the General Aviation Safety Program through its 8 working groups:
Voluntary reporting |
General Aviation Safety Program Multiple |
Level of engagement and outreach as indicated by publication and use of guidance materials and safety promotion materials |
SEI Related to OPS-SI 2: Air taxi safety
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area are not directly related to the goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004) but have been identified as an important issue for aviation safety in Canada.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by monitoring accidents and incidents in this sector of the industry.
Progress against specific safety enhancement initiatives will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Collaborate with the air taxi industry to raise awareness of the risks associated with the acceptance of unsafe practices, support the adoption of safe practices, better manage operational hazards, and reduce the risks in the air taxi sector |
Air taxi safety campaign will involve focus groups to develop strategies and tools, publications to communicate these strategies and seminars and other learning events |
TCCA |
Focus groups held and outputs published Safety seminars and learning events |
SEI Related to OPS-SI 3: Unruly passenger incidents
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area are not directly related to the goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004) but have been identified as an important issue for aviation safety in Canada.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of unruly passenger incidents in conjunction with stakeholders.
Progress against specific safety enhancement initiatives will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Unruly passengers |
Unruly Passenger Enforcement program review – AMPs to deter unruly behaviour |
TCCA Air Operators Law Enforcement Agencies Passengers |
Decrease in unruly passenger incidents Increase in enforcement activity for unruly passengers Reports from operators |
|
Unruly passengers |
Improve coordination between law enforcement and air operators |
Air Industry TCCA Air Operators Law Enforcement Agencies Passengers |
Decrease in unruly passenger incidents Increase in enforcement activity for unruly passengers Reports from operators |
|
Unruly passengers |
Unruly Passenger Public Awareness campaign |
TCCA Passengers |
Decrease in unruly passenger incidents Reports from operators |
|
Unruly passengers |
Unruly passenger mandatory reporting modernization |
TCCA Air Industry Air operators |
Increase compliance against reporting requirements Reports from operators |
SEI Related to OPS-SI 4: New entrants
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area are not directly related to the goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004) but have been identified as an important issue for aviation safety in Canada. The goal and target related to these SEIs is as follows:
- Goal: Allow new entrants into the national aviation system without negatively impacting the system’s safety performance.
- Target: National accident rates do not increase due to the presence of new entrants in the aviation system.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored by tracking the number of accidents and incidents involving new entrants.
Progress against specific safety enhancement initiatives will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Develop and implement a modern regulatory framework for RPAS |
Implement lower risk Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) regulations |
TCCA (AARV) RPAS sector |
RPAS registrations Increase in pilot certificates issued for BVLOS operations Drone Management Portal (DMP) dashboard statistics |
|
Conduct collaborative R&D related to RPAS and AAM |
Conduct research projects with the National Research Council on RPAS and AAM to support regulatory development |
TCCA (AARV) RPAS and AAM sectors |
Number of R&D projects completed Number of multi-year R&D projects in progress Online publication of completed projects (NRC site, next fiscal) Internal reporting mechanisms for projects in progress |
|
Engage with domestic and international stakeholders |
Participate in ICAO AAM Study Group Participate in ICAO RPAS Panel Work with RPAS, AAM and CSL stakeholders to support regulatory development and implementation |
TCCA (AARV) RPAS sector and associations CSL sector |
Number of FTEs present at ICAO meetings Number of meetings held Internal reporting mechanisms |
SEI Related to ORG-SI 1: Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPS
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area will contribute to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 2: Strengthen States’ safety oversight capabilities
- GASP Target 2.1: All States improve their effective implementation score of the critical elements (CEs) of the State’s safety oversight system to 85% by 2026
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be tracked through regular self-assessments against ICAO SARPs.
Progress against specific safety enhancement initiatives will be monitored as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Strengthen oversight mechanisms |
Enhance TCCAs oversight framework to ensure progressive alignment with ICAO SARPs, enabling effective monitoring and enforcement across all aviation sectors |
TCCA – Standards, and International Aviation Branch (IAB) – ICAO Compliance Office (ICO) |
% of program areas assessed as aligned with ICAO SARPs |
|
Implement Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) in response to USOAP audit |
Execute targeted CAPs addressing USOAP findings; document and monitor closure through ICAO’s CMA portal |
TCCA – International Aviation Branch-ICO with Standards |
% of CAP actions closed and accepted by ICAO Improvement in Effective Implementation (EI) score post ICVM |
|
Modernize and align regulatory framework |
Review and amend the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) to align with evolving ICAO SARPs Evolve the process for tracking SARP differences |
TCCA – Regulatory Affairs, Standards Branch, and International Aviation Branch-ICO |
# of CAR amendments implemented to address ICAO SARPs % of ICAO Annex differences filed and resolved within 2 years |
|
Advance regulatory alignment monitoring process |
Track the degree of alignment with ICAO SARPs, including frequency and success of sector monitoring |
TCCA – International Aviation Branch-ICO |
Frequency of self-assessments (≥ 1). % of findings addressed within 12 months post ICVM Stakeholder feedback on clarity and effectiveness of updated regulations |
SEI Related to ORG-SI 2: Safety intelligence capabilities
Safety intelligence is a foundational element to a State Safety Program (SSP) and enhancements in this area will have significant benefits to Canada’s ability to identify and monitor risks in the aviation system. Safety Enhancement Initiatives (SEIs) in this area will contribute to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 5: Expand the use of industry programmes and safety information sharing networks by service providers
- GASP Target 5.1: Maintain an increasing trend in industry’s contribution in safety information sharing networks to States and regions to assist in the development of NASPs and RASPs
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored against specific SEIs as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Improve protections for the use of safety data |
Bring forward amendments to the Aeronautics Act to provide protections for the sharing of data for safety purposes to support a positive safety culture and the sharing and exchange of safety information between stakeholders |
TCCA |
Data protections published |
|
Support collaborative forums that facilitate the exchange of information and ideas to address the most challenging safety issues and further improve aviation safety |
Support collaborative forums for the sharing of safety information including:
|
TCCA Collaborative group members |
Collaborative group activity |
|
Implement Safety Intelligence Strategy to support the SSP |
For Transport Canada, this means improving data analytics capability to streamline access to aviation safety data, addressing organizational structure to better focus on aviation safety intelligence, improving data literacy throughout the organization, and addressing data quality issues. |
TCCA |
Data availability Data quality Ability to make data informed decisions |
SEI Related to ORG-SI 3: SMS Obligations
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area will contribute to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 3: Implement effective SSPs
- GASP Target 3.3: All States to work toward an effective SSP, including the indicator: “Number of States that require applicable service providers under their authority to implement an SMS”
The SEIs planned to develop Canada’s capabilities related to meeting SMS obligations focus on 3 areas:
- Aligning SMS requirements with ICAO Standards and implementing SMS requirements in all identified sectors
- Strengthening regulatory oversight of SMS
- Increasing inspector capabilities related to performing oversight in an SMS environment
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored against specific SEIs as outlined in the tables below.
ORG SI-3: SMS Obligations Area 1: SMS Requirements
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Align Canadian SMS regulatory framework with ICAO SARPs |
Publication of regulatory amendment to align Canadian regulations with ICAO SMS framework |
TCCA Canadian traveling public Canadian air traffic services (CAR 801) Canadian airline operators (CAR 705) Canadian private air operators (CAR 604) Canadian approved maintenance organizations (AMO) maintaining CAR 705 operators (CAR 573) Approved training organizations (CAR 407) Canadian airports (CAR 302) Certain design organizations (CAR 521) Certain manufacturing organizations (CAR 561) |
a. Publication of SMS regulatory amendment in The Canada Gazette, Part I (Gazette I) b. Publication of SMS regulatory amendment in The Canada Gazette, Part II (Gazette II) |
|
Standardize SMS requirements across all sectors in Canada |
Publication of regulatory Amendment to harmonize SMS requirements under CAR 107 |
TCCA All Canadian Air Operators, Airports and other certificate (CAD) holders required to have an SMS. TC Civil Aviation safety inspectors. |
a. Publication of SMS regulatory amendment in Gazette I b. Publication of SMS regulatory amendment in Gazette II |
|
Expand SMS requirements to identified sectors |
Publication of regulatory amendment to extend SMS applicability – SMS Package 1 |
TCCA, Standards Canadian Design and Manufacturing Organizations (CAR 521 and 561) Approved Training Organizations |
a. Publication of SMS regulatory amendment in Gazette I b. Publication of SMS regulatory amendment in Gazette II |
|
Explore expanding SMS requirements to additional identified sectors |
Notify industry and begin consultations on intention to regulate/further extend SMS applicability – SMS Package 2 |
TCCA Aerial Work (CAR 702) Air Taxi (CAR 703) Commuter Operators (CAR 704) All Approved Maintenance Organizations (CAR 573) Flight Training Units (CAR 406) |
Publication of Notice of Proposed Amendment on extending SMS applicability. |
ORG SI-3: SMS Obligations Area 2: Regulatory Oversight of SMS Requirements
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Improving oversight activities to monitor compliance and performance of Service Providers’ SMS |
Enhance oversight tools, processes and procedures used to assess SMS |
TCCA Canadian Aviation Inspectors Canadian Air Operators and airports requiring an SMS |
Compliance rates # of SMS inspections Continuous improvement process outlined in State Safety Program Section 2.3.1 |
|
Consistent implementation of ICAO SARPs related to SMS oversight |
Address all priority protocol questions (PQs) of the USOAP Continuous Monitoring Approach related to CE 7 – Surveillance Obligations |
TCCA Canadian Aviation Inspectors Canadian Air Operators and Airports requiring an SMS Canadian traveling public? |
Effective implementation score Gap analysis / internal evaluation Internal review by TC’s ICAO compliance office Future USOAP audits |
ORG SI-3: SMS Obligations Area 3: Inspector Capabilities Related to SMS Requirements
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Enhanced SMS Technical Training for Inspectors |
Review and update current SMS training to align with regulatory changes |
TCCA Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors (CASI) Multimodal Integrated Technical Training department (MITT) |
% of active inspectors involved in SMS oversight to have completed/updated SMS training Update training requirement for CASI in CAD ADM-005 to reflect SMS requirement. |
|
New guidance material for inspectors on SMS implementation and inspection procedures |
Amend staff instructions related to SMS oversight activities |
TCCA Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors TCCA Standards branch |
Updated Staff Instruction published |
SEI Related to ORG-SI 4: Governance of Canada’s State Safety Program
The safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) in this area will contribute to the following goals and targets identified in the Global Aviation Safety Plan (2023-2025) (ICAO DOC 10004):
- GASP Goal 3: Implement effective SSPs
- Gasp Target 3.3: All States work towards and effective SSP
- GASP Goal 5: Expand the use of industry programmes and safety information sharing networks by service providers
- GASP Target 5.1: Maintain an increasing trend in industry’s contribution in safety information sharing networks to States and regions to assist in the development of NASPs and RASPs
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Progress in addressing this safety issue will be monitored against specific SEIs as outlined in the table below.
| SEI | Action | Who’s responsible? | Monitoring |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Establish clear structure for leadership of SSP at Transport Canada |
Identify an executive champion for the SSP and C-NASP within Transport Canada Establish an SSP Secretariat withing Transport Canada to coordinate the SSP and C-NASP |
Transport Canada |
SSP Champion and Secretariat identified |
|
Fully implement the Canadian State Safety Advisory Council (CSSPAC) as the coordinating body for the SSP and C-NASP in Canada |
Establish regular meetings of Canadian State Safety Program Advisory Council (CSSPAC) Implement C-NASP working group within CSSPAC to lead the development and monitoring of the C-NASP going forward |
Transport Canada SSP Secretariat All CSSPAC members |
Regular meetings held C-NASP KPI monitored CSSPAC plays active role in development of 2027 C-NASP CSSPAC Terms of Reference updated 2027-30 C-NASP published |
|
Establish relationship between the CSSPAC and other collaborative safety initiatives (like runway safety, GA, air taxi, safety collaboration forum) |
Update CSSPAC Terms or Reference to make clear links with other initiatives and working groups and open lines of communication with SSP Secretariat |
Transport Canada SSP Secretariat CSSPAC |
CSSPAC Terms of Reference reflect role of other groups |
