Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) Operational Evaluation Report

Revision: 2
Date: 2021-10-04

The Boeing Company
Boeing 737

Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS)*	TCDS Identifier/Master Series	Marketing Name	Pilot Type Rating
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-100 B-737-200 B-737-200C	Boeing 737 (B-737)	B73A (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A-146 A16WE (FAA)	B-737-300 B-737-400 B-737-500	Boeing 737 Classic (CL) (B-737CL)	B73B (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A-146 A16WE (FAA)	B-737-600 B-737-700 B-737-800 B-737-800SFP	Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) (B-737NG) Boeing 737-800SFP (B-737-800SFP)	B73C (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-700 B-737-800	Boeing Business Jet (BBJ 1 / BBJ) (BBJ 2)	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-800BCF	Boeing 737-800BCF (B-737-800BCF)	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-700C B-737-900 B-737-900ER	Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) (B-737NG) Boeing Business Jet 3 (BBJ 3)	B-737 (FAA)
A-146 A16WE (FAA)	B-737-8	Boeing 737 MAX 8 (B-737 MAX 8)	B73C (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-8	Boeing Business Jet MAX 8 (BBJ MAX 8)	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-8200	Boeing 737-8200 (B-737-8200)	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-9	Boeing 737 MAX 9 (B-737 MAX 9)	B-737 (FAA)

Approved: Original signed by F. Meunier

Approved by: Félix Meunier, Director Standards
Transport Canada, Civil Aviation, Standards Branch (AART)

Date:

Management Co-ordination Sheet

Office of Primary Interest (OPI):

Roman Marushko
Program Manager, Flight Technical and Operator Certification (FTOC);
Chairman B73C, TCCA Operational Evaluation Board
Transport Canada Civil Aviation
Commercial Flight Standards (AARTF)
330 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N8
Tel: 613-698-5433
E-mail: roman.marushko@tc.gc.ca

Original approved by Roman Marushko

Date:

Deborah Martin
Chief, Commercial Flight Standards
Transport Canada, Civil Aviation
Standards Branch
Commercial Flight Standards Division (AARTF)

Original approved by Deborah Martin

Date:

1. Record of revisions

Revision Number	Sections(s)	Date
Initial Issue	All	2017/11/30
1	All except Appendix 1	2020/12/17
2	Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14 and Appendix 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8	2021/10/04

2. Introduction

2.1 General

The Transport Canada Flight Technical and Operator Certification (FTOC) section of the Civil Aviation Standards Branch is responsible for the TCCA Operational Evaluation (OE) program. FTOC’s objectives during the operational evaluation of a new or modified aircraft are to determine:

The acceptability of a manufacturers training program for use by Canadian operators;
Pilot qualification and type rating requirements including training, checking, and currency requirements, and;
The operational suitability of an aircraft type.

This report lists those determinations for use by:

TCCA Inspectors who approve training programs;
TCCA inspectors; Approved Check Pilots (ACPs) who conduct Pilot Proficiency Checks (PPCs) and Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) Evaluators who conduct Line Operational Evaluations (LOEs); and
Aircraft operators and training providers, to assist them in developing their flight-crew member training, checking and currency programs.

Determinations made in this report are based on the evaluations of specific B-737 series made in accordance with current regulations, standards and guidance. Modifications and upgrades made to the series described herein, or introduction of new related aircraft, may require amendment of the findings in this report.

Note:

This report does not grant TCCA training program Approval. It is incumbent upon the air operators to ensure their B-737 training program is approved by the Minister in accordance with the Commercial Air Service Standards and with the material indicated in this report.

2.2 Regulatory Requirements / Language

This OE report uses mandatory terms such as “must”, “shall” and “is/are required” in order to convey the intent of the Regulatory requirements and other guidance documents. The term “should” is to be understood to mean that the proposed method of compliance must be used, unless an alternate means of compliance has been determined and approved.

Note:

The terms “Pilot” and “Flight Crew” may be used interchangeably within this report, and should be used specifically when dictated by the context of their use.

3. Highlights of change

This Operational Evaluation Board (OEB) Report Revision 2 adds the Boeing 737-8200, re-instates differences tables for the Boeing 737-800SFP from a previous FAA FSB revision and adds the new Appendix 8. This OE Report revision updates content, incorporates minor editorial updates and more closely harmonizes with the FAA Flight Standardization Board Report (FSBR) Revision 18.

The following are highlights of changes in the report:

Cover page – Table updated;
Table of Contents updated
Section 1 – Record of Revisions updated;
Section 2 – Editorial updates;
Section 3 – Highlights of Change updated;
Section 4 – Editorial updates;
Section 5 – Acronyms added and removed;
Section 6 – Editorial updates;
Section 8 – Table 1 and content updated;
Section 9 – Editorial updates;
Section 10 – Editorial updates;
Section 13 – Editorial updates;
Section 14 – References updated;
Appendix 1 – Editorial updates;
Appendix 2 – Master Differences Requirements (MDR) Table updated;
Appendix 3 – Difference Tables (DTs) updated and added;
Appendix 4 – Supervised Line Flying (SLF) terminology replaced by Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI);
Appendix 5 – Editorial updates;
Appendix 7 – Editorial updates;
Appendix 8 – New Appendix titled Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE report for B-737

4. General

4.1 Scope of Report

This OE report applies to all series of the Boeing 737 (B-737). The contents of this report are harmonized with the FAA, EASA, and ANAC (Brazil) to the maximum extent possible.

Note:

This report refers to B-737 aircraft by their TCDS/ Master Series identifier (e.g. B-737-800 or B-737-8), by their marketing names (e.g. B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG or B-737 MAX) or by their Pilot Type Rating designators (B73A, B73B or B73C) as necessary for convenience and clarity.

4.2 Guidance Material

The TCCA OE evaluations were conducted in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 120-53B, Guidance for Conducting and Use of Flight Standardization Board (FSB) Evaluations, and the JAA/FAA/TCCA Common Procedures Document (CPD) for Operational Evaluation Boards.

4.3 OE Report Effectiveness

Provisions of this report are effective until amended, superseded, or withdrawn by subsequent OE findings.

TCCA reserves the responsibility and authority to re-evaluate and modify sections of this report based on new or revised advisory material, amended Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs), aircraft operating experience, or the evaluation of new or modified aircraft under the provisions of the CPD or FAA AC 120-53B.

4.4 Application of OE Report

All relevant parts of this report are applicable on the effective date of this report.

4.5 Alternate Means of Compliance

The OEB Chairman, the Program Manager of FTOC and/or the Program Manager Airline Standards should be consulted when alternate means of compliance, other than those specified in this report, are proposed. An applicant will be required to submit a proposed alternate means that provides an equivalent level of safety to the provisions of the CARs and this OE report. Analysis, demonstrations, proof of concept testing, differences documentation, and/or other substantiation may be required.

In the event that alternate compliance is sought, training program credits, simulator approvals, and device approvals may be significantly limited and reporting requirements may be increased to ensure equivalent levels of training, checking, and currency are maintained. TCCA will generally not consider relief through alternate compliance means unless sufficient lead-time has been planned by an operator to allow for any necessary testing and evaluation.

4.6 AQP/OEB Report relationship

Where an air operator has an approved AQP, differences between this report and an operator’s proposed training, checking, and currency requirements under an AQP should be substantiated and documented as part of the operator’s AQP approval process. Program approvals under AQP need to ensure the provisions and requirements of this report have been addressed, and where necessary, coordination with the OEB has been completed.

4.7 Boeing 737 MAX Initial Type Training, STAR and PEC course evaluations

TCCA conducted a joint operational evaluation with the FAA (lead authority) and EASA of three separate B-737-8 type training courses in March and April of 2017 in Miami, FL and Seattle, WA using a T5 evaluation process.

The three courses included an initial type training course, an FAA Shortened Transition and Rating (STAR) course and an EASA Previous Experience Credit (PEC) course.

The initial type training course had a 26 day footprint, while the STAR/PEC courses had an 18 day footprint. The reduced footprint of the STAR and PEC courses was achieved by giving credit to pilots qualified on other Boeing types for commonality in flight deck layout, operational philosophy, and similar handling characteristics. Pilots from all three authorities with B-757 and B-787 experience evaluated the STAR and PEC courses.

The three courses were found to be acceptable by TCCA for use as the basis of an air operator’s or private operator’s training program.

4.8 Differences between Boeing 737 MAX and Boeing 737NG

In August 2016, TCCA participated jointly with the FAA (lead authority) and EASA to evaluate differences from the Boeing 737NG (B-737-800) to the Boeing 737 MAX (B-737-8) using a T2/T3 evaluation process.

Note:

The B-737-800 (Serial Number YT951) used to compare differences with the B-737-8 incorporated the Short Field Performance (SFP) enhancements of the B-737-800SFP.

Master Training and Checking Differences of B/B respectively were established in the transition from the Boeing 737NG to the Boeing 737 MAX. The same B73C Pilot Type Rating as the Boeing 737NG was assigned to the B-737-8.

In September 2017, TCCA, the FAA and EASA jointly evaluated differences from the B-737 MAX (B737-8) to the B-737NG (B-737-800) using a T2/T3 evaluation process. Master Level B/B differences were established in the transition from the B-737 MAX to the B-737NG.

4.9 Differences between B-737-8 and B-737-9

In September 2017, TCCA, the FAA and EASA jointly evaluated differences from the B-737-8 to the B-737-9 using a T1 evaluation process. Master Level A/A differences were established between the B-737-8 and B-737-9. The B-737-9 is incorporated into the B-737 MAX family aircraft into the Appendix 2 MDR Table.

Note:

The B-737-9 has not been type certified in Canada and is therefore not included on the TCCA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.

4.10 Boeing 737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF)

TCCA has validated by analysis the differences established by the FAA FSB between the B-737-800 and B-737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF). The FAA analysis identified that the B-737-800BCF is functionally equivalent to the B-737-800. The B-737-800BCF is incorporated into the B-737NG family aircraft into the Appendix 2 MDR Table. The B-737-800BCF, as well as the associated AFM change, was found to be operationally suitable by the FAA.

Note:

The B-737-800BCF has not been type certified in Canada and is therefore not included on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.

4.11 Rockwell Collins right seat Head Up Display (HUD) installation

In April 2018, the FAA FSB conducted flight evaluations of the Rockwell Collins right seat Head-Up Display (HUD) installation. The FSB found the right seat HUD and the use of dual HUD operations to be operationally suitable. This Operational Evaluation Board Report has been revised to add the optional equipment training requirements where necessary.

4.12 Boeing 737-8 Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) MAX 8

TCCA has validated by analysis the FAA FSB determination established in April 2018 that the BBJ MAX 8 is functionally equivalent to the BBJ 2 (Boeing 737-800 BBJ) aircraft. The BBJ MAX 8 is incorporated into the B-737 MAX family aircraft into Appendix 2, MDR Table. The BBJ MAX 8, as well as the associated AFM change, was found to be operationally suitable, by the FAA.

Note:

The Boeing Business Jet series (BBJ1/BBJ, BBJ2, BBJ3 or BBJ MAX 8) have not been type certified in Canada and are therefore not on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.

4.13 Revised Flight Control Computer (FCC) software evaluation

In March 2019, the FAA FSB with TCCA and EASA conducted a T2 handling quality evaluation of revised Flight Control Computer (FCC P11.1) software between the B-737-800 and the B-737-8. This operational evaluation determined that the handling qualities between the B-737-800 and the B-737-8 validated the original T2 evaluation results conducted in August 2016. Subsequently in March 2019, the FAA FSB conducted an additional T1 functional equivalence evaluation with the new FCC software version P12.1. This evaluation determined functional equivalence between software versions FCC P11.1 and P12.1 with regards to airplane handling qualities and pilot training.

4.14 Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB) Evaluation of Boeing 737 MAX design changes

In September 2020, TCCA, EASA and ANAC conducted a Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB) under the leadership of the FAA FSB to evaluate the updated 737-8 FCC software version P12.1.2, revised Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs), and all proposed pilot training in support of B-737-8 and B-737-9 design changes. The JOEB determined the updated software version FCC P12.1.2 was operationally suitable. In addition, the JOEB determined that the Boeing training evaluated, was acceptable for use by Canadian Operators. Specific training requirements are listed in Appendix 7 of this OEB Report.

4.15 Boeing 737-8200

TCCA has validated by analysis the FAA FSB determination established in January 2021 that the B-737-8200 is functionally equivalent to the B-737 MAX 8 aircraft. The B-737-8200, as well as the associated AFM change, was found to be operationally suitable, by the FAA. Master Level A/A differences were established between the B-737-8 and the B-737-8200. The B-737-8200 is incorporated into the B-737 MAX family aircraft into the Appendix 2 MDR Table.

Note:

The Boeing 737-8200 has not been type certified in Canada and is therefore not on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.

4.16 Appendix 8 - Purpose

The title of the Appendix 8 is Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE report for B-737.

The purpose of Appendix 8 is to provide guidance on new training incorporated into Section 9 and Appendix 7 of this OE report.

5. Acronyms

AC: Advisory Circular
ACP: Approved Check Pilot
ACFT: Aircraft
ADV: Advanced
AFCS: Automatic Flight Control System
AFDS: Autopilot Flight Director System
AFM: Airplane Flight Manual
AGL: Above Ground Level
ANAC: Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (Brazil)
ANCDU: Alternate Navigation Control Display Unit
ANS: Alternate Navigation System
AOA: Angle of Attack
AOC: Air Operator Certificate
AP: Autopilot
APU: Auxiliary Power Unit
AQP: Advanced Qualification Program
AT: Auto Throttles
ATC: Air Traffic Control
AV: Audiovisual Presentation
AWM: Airworthiness Manual
BBJ: Boeing Business Jet
BCF: Boeing Converted Freighter
CAR: Canadian Aviation Regulation
CASS: Commercial Air Service Standard
CAT: Category
CBT: Computer-Based Training
CDS: Common Display System
CDU: Control Display Unit
CFIT: Controlled Flight Into Terrain
COM: Company Operations Manual
CPD: Common Procedures Document
CPT: Cockpit Procedures Trainer
CRM: Crew Resource Management
DA: Decision Altitude
DH: Decision Height
DR: Difference Requirements
DU: Display Unit
EASA: European Union Aviation Safety Agency
EDFCS: Enhanced Digital Flight Control System
EDS: Emergency Descent Speedbrakes
EEC: Electronic Engine Control
EFIS: Electronic Flight Instrument System
EFVS: Enhanced Flight Vision System
EGPWS: Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
EGT: Exhaust Gas Temperature
ER: Extended Range
ETOPS: Extended Range Twin-Engine Operations
EVS: Enhanced Vision System
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
FAF: Final Approach Fix
FANS: Future Air Navigation System
FAR: Federal Aviation Regulation
FCC: Flight Control Computer
FCOM: Fight Crew Operations Manual
FCTM: Flight Crew Training Manual
FD: Flight Director
FFS: Full Flight Simulator
FLT CHAR: Flight Characteristics
FMA: Flight Mode Annunciator
FMC: Flight Management Computer
FMS: Flight Management System
FPV: Flight Path Vector
FSB: Flight Standardization Board (FAA)
FSBR: Flight Standardization Board Report
FSTD: Flight Simulation Training Device
FTD: Flight Training Device
FTOC: Flight Technical and Operator Certification (TCCA)
GLS: Global Positioning System Landing System
GS: Glideslope
HAT: Height Above Threshold
HGS: Head-Up Guidance System
HO: Handout
HUD: Head-Up Display
ICBI: Interactive Computer-Based Instruction
ILS: Instrument Landing System
IMC: Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IOE: Initial Operating Experience
IR: Infrared
IS&S: Innovative Solutions and Support
ISFD: Integrated Standby Flight Display
JOEB: Joint Operational Evaluation Board
LAM: Landing Attitude Modifier
LCD: Liquid Crystal Display
LOC: Localizer
LOE: Line Operational Evaluation
LOFT: Line-Oriented Flight Training
LOS: Line-Operational Simulation
LPV: Lateral Approach Procedures with Vertical Guidance
MCAS: Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
MCDU: Multi-purpose Control and Display Unit
MDA: Minimum Descent Altitude
MDR: Master Differences Requirements
MDS: MAX Display System
MEL: Minimum Equipment List
MFD: Multifunction Display
MFF: Mixed Fleet Flying
MLW: Maximum Landing Weight
MTOW: Maximum Takeoff Weight
MTW: Maximum Taxi Weight
MZFW: Maximum Zero Fuel Weight
N₁: Rotational Speed of the Low-Pressure Compressor in a Dual-Spool Gas Turbine Engine
NAV: Navigation
ND: Navigation Display
NG: Next Generation
NM: Nautical Mile
NNC: Non-Normal Checklist
NPA: Non-Precision Approach
NUCC: Non-Uniformity Correction Calibration
OE: Operational Evaluation
OEB: Operational Evaluation Board
OEM: Original Equipment Manufacturer
PEC: Previous Experience Credit
PF: Pilot Flying
PFD: Primary Flight Display
PIC: Pilot In Command
PM: Pilot Monitoring
PMS: Performance Management System
POI: Principal Operations Inspector
PPC: Pilot Proficiency Check
PROC CHNG: Procedural Changes
PSEU: Proximity Switch Electronic Unit
PTT: Part Task Trainer
QRH: Quick Reference Handbook
RC: Rockwell Collins
RCAS: Roll Command Alerting System
RNP: Required Navigation Performance
RNP AR: Required Navigation Performance Authorization Required
RSAT: Runway Situational Awareness Tools
RVR: Runway Visual Range
SA: Special Authorization/Specific Approval
SELCAL: Selective Calling
SFP: Short Field Performance
SIC: Second In Command
SMGCS: Surface Movement Guidance and Control System
SMYD: Stall Management & Yaw Damper
SOP: Standard Operating Procedure
STAR: Shortened Transition and Rating
STC: Supplemental Type Certificate
STS: Speed Trim System
SU: Stand-Up Instruction
TASE: Training Area of Special Emphasis
TCAS: Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TCBI: Tutorial Computer-Based Instruction
TCCA: Transport Canada Civil Aviation
TO/GA: Takeoff/Go-Around
TCDS: Type Certificate Data Sheet
TLI: Transition Line Indoctrination
TTL: Technical Team Leader
UPRT: Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
UTC: Universal Coordinated Time
V₁: Takeoff Decision Speed
VOR: Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range
VMC: Visual Meteorological Conditions
V_REF: Reference Landing Speed
WAAS: Wide Area Augmentation System
VSD: Vertical Situation Display

6. Definitions

These definitions are for the purposes of this report only.

6.1 Base Aircraft – An aircraft identified for use as a reference to compare differences with another aircraft.

6.2 Current – A crewmember meets all requirements to operate the aircraft under the applicable CAR or CASS.

6.3 Differences Tables – Describe the differences between a pair of related aircraft, and the minimum levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members. Difference levels range from A to E.

6.4 Master Differences Requirements (MDR) – Specifies the highest training and checking difference levels between a pair of related aircraft derived from the Differences Tables.

6.5 Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) program – A program permitting the operation of a base aeroplane and one or more variant of the same, common or different type by one or more flight crew member, between training or checking events in accordance with an approved process based on the recommendations of an OE report that is acceptable to the Minister.

6.6 Operational Evaluation – A TCCA evaluation of the pilot qualifications requirements of an aircraft type (pilot type rating, minimum flight crew member training, checking and currency requirements, and unique or special pilot qualification requirements (e.g., specific flight characteristics, no-flap landing)), operational suitability of an aircraft type and the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) training program.

6.7 Operational Suitability – A determination during an operational evaluation that an aircraft or system may be used in the Canadian airspace system and meets the applicable operational regulations (e.g., CAR subparts 604, 605, 701,702,703,704 and 705 as applicable).

6.8 Qualified – A flight crew member holds the appropriate licenses and ratings as required by the applicable operating regulations.

6.9 Related Aircraft – Any two or more aircraft of the same make with either the same or different type certificates that have been demonstrated and determined by TCCA to have commonality.

6.10 Seat Dependent Tasks – Maneuvers or procedures using controls that are accessible or operable from only one flight crew member seat.

6.11 Specific Flight Characteristics – A maneuver or procedure with unique handling or performance characteristics that TCCA has determined must be checked.

6.12 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE) – A training requirement unique to the aircraft, based on a system, procedure, or maneuver, which requires additional highlighting during training. It may also require additional training time, specialized training devices or training equipment.

7. Pilot type rating

7.1 The pilot type rating designator for the B-737-100/-200/-200C (Boeing 737) is B73A.

7.2 The pilot type rating designator for the B-737-300/-400/-500 (Boeing 737CL) is B73B.

7.3 The pilot type rating designator for the B-737-600/-700/-800/-8 (Boeing 737NG and Boeing 737 MAX) is B73C.

8. Related aircraft

Table 1 - B-737 TCDS/Master Series, Marketing Name and Pilot Type Rating names
Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS)*	TCDS Identifier/Master Series	Marketing Name	Pilot Type Rating
A16WE (FAA) ^{Footnote 1}	B-737-100 B-737-200 B-737-200C ^{Footnote 1}	Boeing 737 (B-737)	B73A (TCCA) B-737 (FAA) ^{Footnote 3}
A-146 A16WE (FAA)	B-737-300 B-737-400 B-737-500	Boeing 737 Classic (CL) (B-737CL)	B73B (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A-146 A16WE (FAA)	B-737-600 B-737-700 B-737-800 B-737-800SFP ^{Footnote 4}	Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) (B-737NG) Boeing 737-800SFP (B-737-800SFP)	B73C (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-700 B-737-800	Boeing Business Jet (BBJ 1 / BBJ) ^{Footnote 2} ^{Footnote 5} BBJ 2 ^{Footnote 2} ^{Footnote 5}	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-800BCF ^{Footnote 2}	Boeing 737-800BCF (B-737-800BCF)	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA) ^{Footnote 2}	B-737-700C ^{Footnote 2} B-737-900 ^{Footnote 2} B-737-900ER ^{Footnote 2}	Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) (B-737NG) Boeing Business Jet 3 (BBJ 3) ^{Footnote 2} ^{Footnote 5}	B-737 (FAA)
A-146 A16WE (FAA)	B-737-8	Boeing 737 MAX 8 (B-737 MAX 8)	B73C (TCCA) B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-8	Boeing Business Jet MAX 8 BBJ MAX 8 ^{Footnote 2} ^{Footnote 5}	BB-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-8200 ^{Footnote 2}	Boeing 737-8200 (B-737-8200)	B-737 (FAA)
A16WE (FAA)	B-737-9 ^{Footnote 2}	Boeing 737 MAX 9 (B-737 MAX 9)	B-737 (FAA)

Footnotes

Footnote 1

The B-737-100/-200/-200C series aircraft are not included on TCDS A-146. These aircraft were accepted by TCCA prior to 1970, under the terms of the Canada/U.S. Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement.

Return to first footnote 1 referrer

Footnote 2

The B-737-700C/-900/-900 Extended Range (ER) series, the Boeing Business Jet Aircraft (BBJ1, BBJ2, BBJ 3 and BBJ MAX 8, and the B-737-8200/-9) have not been type certified in Canada and are therefore not included on TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.

Return to first footnote 2 referrer

Footnote 3

The FAA has assigned the B-737 Pilot Type rating to all series of the Boeing 737, but have grouped the series by marketing names (Boeing 737, Boeing 737CL, Boeing 737NG and Boeing 737 MAX), which correspond to the TCCA pilot type ratings (B73A, B73B and B73C).

Return to footnote 3 referrer

Footnote 4

The B-737-800SFP is a Short Field Performance enhancement to the B-737-800. The B-737-800SFP has differences in auto-slats, flap load relief, flap/slat sequencing and spoiler deflection compared to the “standard” B-737-800. This enhancement is basic to the B-737 MAX.

Return to footnote 4 referrer

Footnote 5

The BBJ 1 is a B-737-700 series with Primary Flight Display (PFD)/Navigation Display (ND) and HUD. The BBJ 2 is a B-737-800 series with PFD/ND and HUD. The BBJ 3 is a B-737-900ER series with PFD/ND and HUD. The BBJ MAX 8 is a B-737-8 series with HUD.

Return to first footnote 5 referrer

8.1 Related Aircraft on same TCDS

The B-737-300/-400/-500 (B73B) and B737-600/-700/-800/-800SFP/-8 (B73C) are related aircraft on TCCA TCDS A-146.

8.2 Related Aircraft on different TCDS

The B-737-100/-200/-200C (B73A) and B737-700C/-800BCF/-8200/-900/-900ER/-9 (B-737 (FAA Type Rating)) are related aircraft on FAA TCDS A16WE.

9. Pilot training

9.1 Previous experience

The provisions of this section apply to all B-737 training programs for pilots who have experience in CAR 705 airline, CAR 604 private operator or equivalent operations in multi-engine transport turbojet aeroplanes. Pilots receiving B-737 training should have experience in high altitude operations, highly integrated avionics systems with electronic flight displays, AFCS, AT, and FMS. Pilots without this experience may require additional training.

The STAR course requires that pilots have prerequisite experience on transport category aeroplanes equipped with EFIS, FMS and Autoflight systems. The basic EASA PEC course requirements are a current EASA type rating on B-737-300-900, B-747-400, B-757/767, B-777 or B-787 and 500 hours experience on type.

9.2 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)

Note:

References to “pilots” in this section include both Pilot In Command (PIC) and Second In Command (SIC) unless otherwise specified.

Pilots must receive special emphasis training in the following areas:

9.2.1 TASE - Ground Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during ground training:

9.2.1.1 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

Training is required for instances where a single malfunction results in multiple flight deck alerts and must include flight crew alert prioritization and analysis of the need to conduct additional Non-Normal Checklists (NNC). This training must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent training.

9.2.1.2 Automatic landings

When an operator is authorized for autoland operations, ground training is required during a preflight briefing prior to flight training. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

The B-737NG and B-737 MAX autoland systems are identical and do not require differences training unless transitioning between the Fail Passive system and the Fail Operational system.

9.2.1.3 Enhanced Digital Flight Control System (EDFCS)

When an EDFCS that supports Fail Operational autoland operations with a Fail Passive Rollout system is used, ground training is required during a preflight briefing prior to flight training. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

The B-737NG and B-737 MAX autoland systems are identical and do not require differences training unless transitioning between the Fail Passive system and the Fail Operational system.

9.2.1.4 B-737 MAX Flight Control System

The Elevator Jam Landing Assist system and the Landing Attitude Modifier (LAM) ground training must address the system functions and associated flight spoiler deployments. These items must be included in initial, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

9.2.1.5 B-737 MAX Flight Control Computer (FCC)

MCAS ground training must address the latest FCC system description, functionality, and associated failure conditions to include flight crew alerting. This training must be included in initial, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

9.2.1.6 HUD

Training must address appropriate ground training elements for both HUD and non-HUD operations as specified in Appendix 5, Head-Up Guidance (HUD) qualification program. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

9.2.1.7 B-737 MAX gear handle

Gear handle operation to address normal and non-normal procedures. This item must be included in initial, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during flight training:

9.2.2.1 Automatic landings

When an operator is authorized for autoland operations, flight training must occur with the appropriate Autopilot (AP) autoland systems (e.g., Fail Operational vs. Fail Passive). This training can occur in either a full flight simulator (FFS) or aeroplane. Flight training must ensure appropriate AFM limitations are addressed and complied with. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

The B-737NG and B-737 MAX autoland systems are identical and do not require differences training unless transitioning between the Fail Passive system and the Fail Operational system.

9.2.2.2 EDFCS

When an EDFCS that supports Fail Operational autoland operations with a Fail Passive Rollout system is used, flight training can occur in either an FFS or airplane and should address dual channel AP approaches. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

The B-737NG and B-737 MAX autoland systems are identical and do not require differences training unless transitioning between the Fail Passive system and the Fail Operational system.

9.2.2.3 HUD

When HUD is installed and an operator is authorized HUD operations, training must address appropriate flight training elements for both HUD and non-HUD operations as specified in Appendix 5, Head-Up Guidance (HUD) qualification program. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

9.2.2.4 Stabilizer trim

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

9.2.2.4.1 Training must emphasize the following during manual and electric trim operations:

a) Manufacturer recommended procedures for the proper use of main electric stabilizer trim during normal and non normal conditions, and manual stabilizer trim during non-normal conditions;
b) The different manual trim techniques recommended by the manufacturer;
c) The effects of airspeed and aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer and the resulting trim forces in both the nose-up and nose-down directions during operations at low and high airspeeds and/or mach number; and
d) Use of manual stabilizer trim during approach, go-around, and level off.

9.2.2.4.2 This item must be included in initial or transition training and must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training.

9.2.2.5 Runaway stabilizer

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

Training must emphasize runaway stabilizer recognition and timely pilot actions required by the Runaway Stabilizer NNC:

i. Demonstrate control column functionality and its effect on a runaway stabilizer condition;
ii. Emphasize the need to reduce control column forces with main electric stabilizer trim prior to selecting Stab Trim cutout.

This item must be included in initial or transition training and must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training.

Note:

Runaway Stabilizer flight simulator training must be conducted using the ATA 27 malfunction titled Stabilizer Runaway (also known as the Dual Wire short malfunction). Use of the ATA 27 malfunction, Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (also known as the Electric Trim Switch Malfunction) is not permitted for use in Runaway Stabilizer flight training. Operators should ensure that the appropriate Runaway Stabilizer malfunction is incorporated into their FFS, prior to Runaway Stabilizer training. The TCCA National Simulator Evaluation Program (NSEP) should be consulted on the incorporation of malfunctions into the FFS and the subsequent qualification of the FFS for training.

9.2.2.6 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

Flight crew training must include scenario-based training for initial, upgrade, transition, and recurrent flight crew training where a single malfunction results in multiple flight deck alerts that require timely pilot actions to include:

Recognition and interpretation of the non-normal condition.
Prioritization of the required pilot actions

9.2.2.7 Unreliable airspeed

This training applies to pilots flying the B-737NG, B-737 MAX, or conducting B-737NG/B-737 MAX Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF).

Training must include erroneous high angle of attack (AOA) malfunctions. This training must also include a demonstration of Flight Director (FD) behavior (biasing out of view) during a go-around or missed approach.

Training must include the discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in accordance with Airspeed Unreliable NNC.

This item must be included in initial, transition, and differences training and must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training. Either pilot may serve as pilot flying (PF) for this training task.

Recurrent training may be accomplished in either a B-737NG or B-737 MAX FFS.

9.2.3 Tail strike avoidance

Each operator’s training program should address tail strike potential during takeoff and landing. The B-737-400/-800/-900/-900ER/-8 and -9 series aircraft are slightly more susceptible to tail strike due to their increased fuselage lengths.

9.2.4 Two position Tail skid

The B-737-900ER, B-737-800 SFP, B-737-8, and B-737-9 have a dual tail skid configuration to protect the aft fuselage during landings (the dual tail skid is optional for the B-737-800SFP, and -8). Approach speeds may be reduced with the protection provided by the two-position tail skid. The resultant approach speeds and body attitudes of the B-737-800SFP, -8, and -9 with the two position tail skid are similar to that of the 737-700.

9.2.5 Landing de-rotation

The B-737-800SFP has been found to have greater than normal landing de-rotation rates (i.e. higher than normal nose gear sink rate). In the interest of commonality with all series of the B-737s, pilots should be trained to fly the nose wheel smoothly onto the runway without delay on landing, and avoid attempting to hold the nose-wheels off of the runway.

9.3 Specific flight characteristics

There are no specific flight characteristics.

9.4 Seat dependent tasks

Pilots must receive initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training in these seat dependent tasks:

a) HUD (left seat (right seat, when installed)); initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training.
b) Nosewheel steering (left seat, right seat, when installed); initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training.
c) Manual Landing Gear Extension (right seat); initial, transition and recurrent training.

9.5 Training requirements not applicable to the B-737 series

9.5.1 Tuck and Mach buffet training

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG, and B-737 MAX do not exhibit any Mach Tuck tendency and therefore no training is required for this flight maneuver. Demonstration of the aircraft’s overspeed protection capabilities is an acceptable substitute.

9.5.2 Fuel Jettisoning

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG, and B-737 MAX do not have fuel jettisoning capability.

9.6 Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD)

An approved Level C of D B-737 FFS equipped with day and night visual scenes that is representative of an operator’s specific B-737 configuration is required for flight training.

The flight training for the B-737 MAX required in Appendix 7 of this report must be conducted in a in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS, that meets Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements. The FFS must have installed a Binary Simulation Load revision 3.23.4_3 or higher and FCC software version P12.1.2 must be assured to be active. For B-737 MAX pilots conducting B-737NG/B-737 MAX MFF, some flight training exercises may be conducted in a suitably qualified B-737NG Level C or D FFS only where indicated in the Appendix 7.

Stabilizer Trim and Runaway Stabilizer training for all B-737s requires a FFS that has the required flight deck effects for this training. The manual stabilizer trim system must be representative of proper control forces and travel system operation.

Note:

The FFS requirements for Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) training is provided in Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report.

9.7 Training equipment

There are no specific systems or procedures that are unique to the B-737 series that require specific training equipment.

9.8 Differences Training between Related Aircraft

Pilots must receive differences training between the B-737 and B-737CL, B-737CL Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) and B-737CL non-EFIS, B-737CL and B-737NG, certain variations of B-737NG, B-737NG and B-737 MAX, and variations of B-737 MAX.

Note:

Pilots transitioning from one B-737 Pilot Type Rating to another (e.g. B73B to B73C) or conducting Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) with different B-737 Pilot Type Ratings (e.g. B73B and B73C) require exemptions to specific provisions of CAR 705.106, CASS 725.106 and CAR 705.113. Appendices 2, 3 and 4 provide the training, checking and Transition credits between various B-737 series.

9.8.1 B-737NG to B-737 MAX Ground Training

Ground training is required for differences between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX. See Appendices 2, 3, and 7.

9.8.2 B-737NG to B-737 MAX Flight Training

Flight training is required for differences between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX. See Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 7.

9.8.3 B-737CL (EFIS/Non-EFIS) aircraft to/from B-737NG (PFD/ND) aircraft differences

Applicable from the B-737CL (Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS) and non-EFIS) aircraft to B-737NG (PFD/ND) aircraft only:

PFD/ND differences require a minimum of 12 hours in an interactive CBT, 6 programmed hours in a level 6 FTD, and supervised line flying as described in Appendix 4. Pilots must be trained in accordance with the difference levels specified in Appendix 2. The ND is an expansion of the MAP mode and the CBT needs to only demonstrate the differences in display selections and capabilities (e.g. Center Map). The following elements should be included in the training curriculum:

a) FMA Differences
b) AFDS Status Annunciator
c) Vertical Speed Display
d) Airspeed Bugs and Flap Maneuvering Speeds
e) Compass Rose
f) Pitch Limit Indicator
g) Airspeed Trend Vector
h) Minimum and Maximum Speeds
i) Landing Altitude Reference Bar
j) Altimeter Setting
k) LOC And GS Deviation
l) Selected Altitude Indication (Bug)
m) Ground Speed Display
n) Radio Altitude Display
o) TCAS Resolution Advisories
p) Time Critical Warnings
q) Approach Reference Area
r) Marker Beacon Indication
s) System Failures and Flags
t) No “Compact Display” (DU Switching only)

9.8.4 Blended, Split-scimitar and the MAX Advanced Technology winglet

Operators engaged in Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) (i.e. MFF 737CL and/or 737NG and/or 737 MAX) with and without winglets must address differences at the A/A level including:

a) Physical/dimensional differences, with emphasis on lower strake ground clearance considerations during ground operations
b) Takeoff crosswind guidelines
c) Landing crosswind guidelines
d) Ground contact angles for normal landings

9.8.5 Roll Command Alerting System (RCAS)

RCAS is optional equipment on the B-737NG and standard on the B-737 MAX. Level B training is sufficient for initial, transition, and upgrade training in that series aircraft.

9.8.6 Runway Situational Awareness Tools (RSAT) system

RSAT consists of On-Ground Overrun Warning, In-Air Overrun Warning, and a Speedbrake Warning. RSAT is optional equipment on the B-737NG and B-737 MAX. The FAA FSB found Level B training to be sufficient for differences.

9.8.7 Rockwell Collins Head-Up Guidance System (HGS) HGS-4000 and HGS-6000

The HGS-4000 and HGS-6000 is optional equipment on the B-737NG and B-737 MAX. The FAA FSB found for pilots already qualified on one system that Level A differences training is sufficient to qualify on the other Rockwell Collins HGS.

9.8.8 Integrated Standby Flying Display (ISFD)

Training for ISFD may be satisfied with Level B differences training for all B-737 aircraft. No flight training required.

9.8.9 Display Installation

Applies to Universal avionics flat panel display/FMS installations (Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) No. ST03355AT/ST03356AT) into B-737-300 series or Innovative Solutions & Support (IS&S) flat panel display installation (No. ST03125NY) into the B-737-400 series. The FAA FSB found Level D differences training to be sufficient.

9.8.10 FMS for B-737-200 series

Applies to Universal avionics FMS installations (STC No. ST03362AT) into the B-737-200 series. The FAA FSB found Level C differences training to be sufficient.

9.8.11 Future Air Navigation System (FANS)

Differences training for FANS 1 and/or FANS 2 may be satisfied with Level C training in accordance with FAA AC 90-117, Data Link Communications (as amended) for all 737 aircraft. Flight crew who have completed FANS 1 training may qualify on FANS 2 with Level A training.

9.8.12 Alternate Navigation System (ANS)

The ANS consists of use of the ISFD and Alternate Navigation Control Display Unit (ANCDU) as a means to provide alternate navigation guidance in the event of an all Flight Management Computer (FMC) fail situation. It is standard equipment on the 737 MAX BBJ. The FAAFSB has determined Level A training to be sufficient for differences.

9.8.13 FMS

Pilots qualified on the B-737 MAX with FMC U13 may qualify on a B-737 MAX with FMC U14 with Level A training.

9.9 B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

Completion of the ground and flight training specified in Appendix 7 is required before flying the B-737 MAX.

9.10 Landing from a No flap or Non standard flap approach

The probability of flap extension failure on the B-737 is extremely remote due to system design, therefore a demonstration of a no-flap approach and landing is not required during training.

A partial flap approach and landing, with the leading edge devices in either the extend or full extend position, and trailing edge flaps less than 15, is required during initial flight training.

10. Pilot checking

10.1

Reserved

10.2 Specific flight characteristics

There are no specific flight characteristics.

10.3 Seat dependent tasks

During initial, transition, and upgrade checking, pilots must be checked in these seat dependent tasks:

a) HUD (left seat; right seat when installed).
b) Nosewheel steering (left seat; right seat when installed)

10.4 Other checking items

10.4.1 Precision approach using HUD and EFVS.

When HUD and/or EFVS use is approved, checking must include suitable demonstration of HUD and/or EFVS use for modes and phases of flight authorized.

10.4.2 HUD vs. FD and Raw Data

When HUD and/or EFVS is installed, PPC maneuvers, Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), Line Oriented Simulation (LOS) or other demonstrations may be completed using HUD at the check pilot’s/inspector’s discretion. However, periodic assessment of non-HUD skills should be demonstrated, and at any time a check pilot/inspector may at their discretion request that authorized maneuvers be performed without use of HUD (e.g. if manual CAT I FD operations are authorized, the pilot being checked may be requested to perform the maneuver without HUD).

10.5 FSTD

An approved Level C of D B-737 FFS equipped with day and night visual scenes that is representative of an operator’s specific B-737 configuration is required for checking.

The FFS requirements for Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) checking is provided in Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report.

10.6 Equipment

There are no specific systems or procedures that are unique to the B-737 series aircraft that require specific equipment.

10.7 Differences Checking between Related Aircraft

10.7.1 Alternating PPC for B73A, B73B and B73C

For mixed-fleet-flying between different pilot type ratings, PPCs should alternate each six months for PICs, and annually for other flight crew members.

When such alternating checks are accomplished, the differences assessment of other series applicable to that pilot type rating being checked (e.g. either B-737-100/-200 (B73A), B-737-300/-400/-500 (B73B) and/or B-737-600/-700/-800 and/or B-737-8 (B73C)) may be satisfied by ground training, written questionnaire, oral review, or other method approved by the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) or Technical Team Leader (TTL). However, such simplified programs may not be approved if they result in progressive loss of knowledge or skills related to particular differences over successive recurrent periods.

Note:

10.7.2 FMS demonstration of competency/checks

Checking for differences related to a series having FMS must include a demonstration of competency covering both an oral/written exam and demonstration of proficiency with both normal and non-normal procedures. FMS proficiency should be demonstrated with “hands-on” operation, and address each applicable FMS mode or function. Specific items and flight phases to be checked may include initialization, takeoff, departure, cruise, arrival, precision and Non-Precision Approach (NPA), missed approach, holding, diversion to an alternate or route re-clearance, and pertinent non-normal scenarios. Scenarios used should include routes, airports, ATC situations, and other factors, which are representative of, or present equivalent complexity to those anticipated for that operator. FMS competency may be demonstrated in conjunction with other checking.

11. Pilot currency

There are no additional currency requirements for the B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX other than those already specified in CAR 705 and CAR 604.

11.1 Differences Currency between Related Aircraft

Not Applicable

12. Operational suitability

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX are operationally suitable for operations under CAR 705 and CAR 604.

13. Miscellaneous

13.1 ETOPS

The B-737-600/-700/-800 and B-737-8 meet TCCA certification criteria for 180-minute ETOPS operations. TCCA operational approval is required to conduct ETOPS.

13.2 FAA approvals for ETOPS

The B-737-200 and B-737CL aircraft are approved for 120-minute ETOPS.
The B-737NG aircraft are approved for 180-minute ETOPS (see note below).
The B-737 MAX aircraft are approved for 180-minute ETOPS.

Note:

The B-737-800BCF is not approved for ETOPS.

13.3 Forward Observer Seat

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX forward center observer seat has been evaluated by the FAA and determined to meet the requirements of FAR 121.581(a), FAR 125.317(b), FAR 135.75(b) and Advisory Circular (AC) 120 83. TCCA has accepted the findings of the FAA in the absence of any TCCA regulatory criteria regarding a forward observer seat.

13.4 Landing Minima categories

Approach Category for B-737 series aircraft is as follows:

Aircraft	Category
B-737	C
B737CL	C
B-737-600/700	C
B-737-800/900/900ER	C or D
B-737 MAX	C or D

Note:

Due to the numerous maximum landing weight options among the B-737NG and the B-737 MAX, determining an aircraft approach category may be done using the certificated maximum flap setting of 40º and the particular airplane’s AFM maximum certificated landing weight.

13.5 Normal landing flaps

The B-737, B-737CL, B-737NG and B-737 MAX series normal “final landing flap setting” is Flaps 15º, 30º, and 40º. Flaps 15º is primarily used for non-normal situations (e.g. engine out approach) or atypical operations (e.g. high altitude airport operations).

14. References

FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) Report for the Boeing 737 Revision 18 dated 03/03/2021 (March 03, 2021) or later revision (http://fsims.faa.gov/).
FAA Advisory Circular AC120-53B, Change 1, Guidance for Conduction and Use of Flight Standardization Board Evaluations, dated 10/24/16 (October 24, 2016) or later revision (http://fsims.faa.gov/).
FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) A16WE Revision 68 dated 07/19/2021 (July 19, 2021) or later revision (http://fsims.faa.gov/).
JOEB OPS/FCL Common Procedures For Conducting Operational Evaluation Boards, dated June 10, 2004
Transport Canada Advisory Circular, AC 700-035, Special Authorization for Take-off Operations below RVR 600 down to and including RVR 300, at Issue 01, dated 2016-02-12 or later Issue
Transport Canada Policy Letter, PL 173. Flight crew Member Qualification Credits for Transition Programs and Mixed Fleet Flying Programs, dated July 25, 2007
Transport Canada Publication (TP) 6327, Safety Criteria for Approval of Extended Range Twin-Engine Operations (ETOPS) dated June 2007
TCCA Type Certificate Data Sheet A-146, Issue No. 197, dated June 30, 2021 or later issue.
Interim Order (IO) Respecting Certain Training Requirements (B-737-8 and Other), No. 3 dated February 26, 2021, or later revision.

Appendix 1 – Differences Legends

Training Differences Legend
Differences Level	Type	Training Method Examples	Conditions
A	Self-instruction	Operating manual revision (HO) Flight crew operating bulletin (HO)	Crew has already demonstrated understanding on base aircraft (e.g. updated version of engine). Minor or no procedural changes required. No safety impact if information is not reviewed or is forgotten (e.g. different engine vibration damping mount). Once called to attention of crew, the difference is self-evident.
B	Aided instruction	Audiovisual presentation (AV) Tutorial computer-based instruction (TCBI) Stand-up instruction (SU)	Systems are functionally similar. Crew understanding required. Issues need emphasis. Standard methods of presentation required.
C	Systems Devices	Interactive (full-task) computer-based instruction (ICBI) Cockpit procedures trainers (CPT) Part task trainers (PTT) Level 4 or 5 flight training device (FTD 4-5)	Training can only be accomplished through systems training devices. Training objectives focus on mastering individual systems, procedures or tasks versus highly integrated flight operations or “real-time” operations. Training devices are required to assure attainment or retention of crew skills to accomplish more complex tasks usually related to aircraft systems.
D	Maneuvers Devices	Level 6 or 7 flight training device (FTD 6-7) Level A or B full flight simulator (FFS A-B)	Training can only be accomplished in flight maneuver devices in a real-time environment. Training requires mastery of interrelated skills versus individual skills. Motion, visual, control loading and specific environmental conditions may be required.
E	Level C/D FFS or Aircraft	Level C or D full flight simulator (FFS C-D) Aircraft (ACFT)	Motion, visual, control loading, audio and specific environmental conditions are required. Significant full task differences that require a high fidelity environment. Usually correlates with significant differences in handling qualities.

Checking Differences Legend
Differences Level	Checking Method Examples	Conditions
A	None	None
B	Oral or written exam Tutorial computer-based instruction (TCBI) self-test	Individual systems or related groups of systems.
C	Interactive (full-task) computer-based instruction (ICBI) Cockpit procedures trainers (CPT) Part task trainers (PTT) Level 4 or 5 flight training device (FTD 4-5)	Checking can only be accomplished using systems devices. Checking objectives focus on mastering individual systems, procedures or tasks.
D	Level 6 or 7 flight training device (FTD 6-7) Level A or B full flight simulator (FFS A-B)	Checking can only be accomplished in flight maneuver devices in a real-time environment. Checking requires mastery of interrelated skills versus individual skills. Motion, visual, control loading and specific environmental conditions may be required.
E	Level C or D full flight simulator (FFS C-D) Aircraft (ACFT)	Significant full task differences that require a high fidelity environment.

Appendix 2 – Master Differences Requirements (MDR) Table

These are the minimum levels of training and checking required, derived from the highest level in the Differences Tables in Appendix 3. Differences levels are arranged as training/checking.

Pilot Type Rating	From Base Aircraft	B73A	B73B	B73B	B73C (^{Footnote 4})	B73C (^{Footnote 5})
To Related Aircraft	Marketing Name	B-737	B-737CL (NON-EFIS)	B-737CL (EFIS)	B-737NG	B-737MAX
B73A	B-737	A/A NAV - B/B PMS - C/B AFCS - C/B (^{Footnote 1}) ADV-B/A	C^{Footnote }/C^{Footnote }	C^{Footnote }/C^{Footnote }	D/D	Not evaluated
B73B	B-737CL (NON-EFIS)	C^{Footnote *}/C (^{Footnote 2}) Limited FMS - C/B	A/A	C/B	(^{Footnote 3}) C/B	Not evaluated
B73B	B-737CL (EFIS)	C^{Footnote }/C^{Footnote } (^{Footnote 2}) Limited FMS - C/B	C/B	A/A	(^{Footnote 3}) C/B PFD/ND - D/C	Not evaluated
B73C	B-737NG	D/D	(^{Footnote 3}) C/B PFD/ND – D/C	(^{Footnote 3}) C/B PFD/ND – D/C	A/A (^{Footnote 3}) EFIS to PFD/ND - C/B PFD/ND to EFIS – D/C EDFCS – C/C	B/B
B73C	B-737MAX	Not evaluated	Not evaluated	Not evaluated	(D^{Footnote *}) B/B	A/A

Footnotes to MDR table

Footnote C*

Level C training or checking, which requires use of a Level 5 FSTD or higher.

Return to first footnote C* referrer

Footnote D*

Prior to operating the 737 MAX aircraft with FCC software version P12.1.2 or newer, each pilot must complete the required training outlined in Appendix 7. Appendix 7 serves as special training for ground and flight training requirements for 737 MAX pilot qualification. The asterisk MDR annotation, “(D*) B/B” is intentionally used in the table to call attention. Level C or D full flight simulator (FFS C-D) is required for the D* training.

Return to first footnote D* referrer

Footnote 21

All Model 737-200 series airplanes having serial numbers 20492 and subsequent are the -200 advanced (737-200 ADV) series airplane and require Level B differences training when transitioning from the 737-100/-200. All earlier airplanes can be kit-modified to the advanced configuration.

Return to footnote 1 referrer

Footnote 22

Limited FMS pertains to B-737CL aeroplanes which retain partial FMS functions.

Return to first footnote 2 referrer

Footnote 23

C level training requirement may be satisfied by interactive CBT.

Return to first footnote 3 referrer

Footnote 4

The B-737-700C/-800BCF/-900/-900ER/-BBJ1/-BBJ2/-BBJ3 are not type certified in Canada and are not included in the B73C pilot type rating designator. Refer to Note 2 in Section 8.0, following Table 1.

Return to footnote 4 referrer

Footnote 5

The B-737-8200/-9/BBJ MAX 8 are not type certified in Canada and are not included in the B73C pilot type rating designator. Refer to Note 2 in Section 8.0, following Table 1.

Return to footnote 5 referrer

Appendix 3 – Difference Tables

This Design Differences table, from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8, was proposed by The Boeing Company and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-800

To Related Aircraft: B-737-8
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Configuration	Nose Landing Gear Lengthened 8 inches. Dual Tail Anti-Collision/Position Lights	No	No	A	A
Panel Layout	New Max Display System (MDS)	No	No	B	B
Panel Layout	New 2 Position Landing Gear Control Lever	No	Yes	B	B
Limitations	Size/type/system limitations	No	No	A	A
Limitations	Ground wind operating envelope	No	No	A	A
Weights	Increased to: Max Taxi Weight (MTW) - 181,700 lb. Max Takeoff Weight (MTOW) - 181,200 lb. Max Landing Weight (MLW) - 152,800 lb. Max Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW) - 145,400 lb.	No	No	A	A
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Packs: Electronic Pack Flow Control System	No	No	B	B
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Packs: Revised Pack light logic	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Equipment Cooling: EQUIP Smoke light and Detection System	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Added MCAS (See Appendix 7)	No	No	B	B
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC AFDS functionality logic (See Appendix 7)	No	No	B	B
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Revised Stab Out Of Trim light logic (See Appendix 7)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Revised Speed Trim Fail light logic (See Appendix 7)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 24 Electrical Power	Relocated 4 circuit breakers from aisle stand to P-6	No	No	A	A
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems Fly by Wire Spoiler System	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems Maneuver Load Alleviation	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems LAM	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems Elevator Jam Landing Assist	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	FLAPS/SLATS Position indicator relocated to MDS	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Emergency Descent Speedbrakes (EDS)	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Speedbrake Extended light logic	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Spoilers light added	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Assist On light added	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Stabilizer Trim: Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature	No	No	B	B
ATA 28 Fuel	Controls and Indicators: Additional System Alerts (see ATA 34 Navigation)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 28 Fuel	Controls and Indicators: Revised fuel Filter Bypass light logic	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 29 Hydraulic Power	Controls and Indicators: System indications relocated to MDS Systems Page	No	No	A	A
ATA 30 Ice And Rain Protection	Engine Anti-ice Additional ENG Anti-ice alert	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 30 Ice and Rain Protection	Engine Anti-ice Revised Cowl Valve Nomenclature and Color (Amber)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 30 Ice and Rain Protection	Wing Anti-ice L / R Valve Alerts Color (Amber)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Incorporation Of Max Display System (MDS) 4 Large Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) Units	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Lighting Controls Updated and Relocated Engine Display Control Panel	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Lighting Controls Revised Display Brightness, Display Select Switch Panels, Master Dim and Test	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Engine Display Control Panel Added Engine Transfer Switch	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Engine Display Control Panel Added Multifunction Display (MFD) Info Switch	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Engine Display Control Panel Revised N₁ and Speed Set Selectors	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	PFD Expanded Sky Ground and Compass Display	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	EFIS Control Panel Dedicated Vertical Situation Display (VSD) switch	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	EFIS Control Panel ND/Weather (WXR) Range Selector- revised functionality	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Standby Flight Instruments ISFD basic	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	AUX Display Added Information Displayed	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	AUX Display Added Flight number, Transponder, Selective Calling (SELCAL), Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), Date and Elapsed time	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	AUX Display Added Clock start/stop switches relocated to glareshield	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	MAINT Light (replaces Proximity Switch Electronic Unit PSEU light)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear, Brakes	Nosewheel Steering Switch relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear, Brakes	Brake accumulator pressure indicator relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear, Brakes	Autobrake switch relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear, Brakes	Landing Gear Warning Cutout switch relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear, Brakes	Revised landing gear lock override switch	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMS FMC Software U13 basic	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMS Variable Takeoff Rating function	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMS Fuel Alerting and Fuel Management	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	Control Display Unit (CDU) Pages New or Revised: Perf Init page 1/2	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	CDU Pages New or Revised: N₁ Limit	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	CDU Pages New or Revised: Fuel Progress page 5/5	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages: Using RSV Fuel	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages: Fuel Disagree	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages: Insufficient Fuel	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	Fuel Flow (engine display only)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 36 Pneumatic	Bleed Air Control Panel Removed Ram Door Full Open lights	No	No	A	A
ATA 36 Pneumatic	Bleed Air Control Panel Revised Bleed Trip Off nomenclature to Bleed	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 36 Pneumatic	Bleed Air Control Panel Revised Bleed light logic	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 49 APU	System Operation Removed Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) MAINT light	No	No	A	A
ATA 49 APU	System Operation Removed APU Exhaust Gas Temperature EGT gauge	No	No	A	A
ATA 49 APU	System Operation Added retractable door	No	No	B	B
ATA 49 APU	System Operation Added Door light	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Engines: New LEAP-1B engines	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Electronic Engine Control (EEC) System Removal of Overboost rating	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	EEC System Addition of Icing Idle speed	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Indicators Revised Display Format	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Indicators Compact engine display removed	No	No	A	A
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Indicators Added Thrust alert	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Indicators Added Motoring indication for bowed rotor logic	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Thrust Reverser System Added Reverser Command and Reverser Air/GND alerts	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73,77,78,80 Power Plant	Thrust Reverser System Replaced Reverser alert with Reverser Limited	No	Yes	B	B

This Maneuver Differences table, from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8, was proposed by The Boeing Company and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-800

To Related Aircraft: B-737-8
Maneuver	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Preflight inspection	Optional installation of two-position tailskid	No	Yes	A	A
Climb	After take-off checklist – Landing gear handle	No	Yes	B	B
Non-normal	Checklist changes due to annunciation and system changes listed in DESIGN difference tables. (See Appendix 7)	No	Yes	A	A
Cross-FCC Trim Monitor	See Appendix 7	No	No	D^{Footnote *}	A
Demonstration of MCAS Activation	See Appendix 7	No	No	D^{Footnote *}	A
Erroneous High AOA during Takeoff	See Appendix 7	No	No	D^{Footnote *}	A

Note:

Refer to Appendix 7 for additional training requirements.

This Design Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-800/-900 to the Boeing 737-800SFP, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: 737-800/-900

To Related Aircraft: 737-800SFP
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Configuration	Added two-position tail skid (option requires APU drain mast re-position).	No	Yes	A	A
Configuration	Changed and relocated aft pressure bulkhead.	No	No	A	A
Limitations	Changes related to limitations differences for improved performance as defined in the AFM and FCOM	No	No	A	A
Performance	Changes related to design differences for improved performance as defined in the AFM and FCOM.	No	No	A	A
Weight	Increased operating weights	No	No	A	A
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Added sealed leading edge slats	No	No	A	A
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Increased on-ground spoiler deflections	No	No	A	A
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Changed speed brake handle detent	No	No	A	A
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Changed SMYD software for improved performance	No	No	A	A
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Revised CDS for improved performance	No	No	A	A
ATA 34 Navigation	Revised FMC for improved performance	No	No	A	A
ATA 73 Engine Fuel and Control	Revised EEC software for performance credit	No	No	A	A

This Maneuver Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-800/-900 to the Boeing 737-800SFP, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: 737-800/-900

To Related Aircraft: 737-800SFP
Maneuver	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Preflight Inspection	Added check for two position tailskid (optional).	No	Yes	A	A
Supplemental Procedures	Procedural changes due to system changes listed in the DESIGN differences tables.	No	No	A	A

This Design Differences table, from the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-800BCF, was proposed by The Boeing Company and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-800

To Related Aircraft: B-737-800BCF
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
General	Added Main Deck Cargo capability	No	No	A	A
Configuration	Added Main Deck Cargo door control panel Added Rigid Cargo Barrier and Supernumerary area	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Removed Recirculation Fans	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 26 Fire Protection	Added Main Deck smoke detectors Added Main Deck indications and controls to Cargo Fire Control Panel	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 29 Hydraulic Power	Added Main Deck Cargo Door to System A	No	No	A	A
ATA 33 Lights	Added Main Deck Cargo Door not secure to takeoff configuration warning	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 35 Oxygen	Added Supernumerary Masks	No	No	A	A
ATA 52 Doors	Added Main Deck Cargo Door flight deck indication Flight Deck door removed All overwing Type III emergency exits deactivated Both flight deck No. 2 windows can be opened from outside the aircraft	No	No	A	A

This Design Differences table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-800, was proposed by The Boeing Company and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-8

To Related Aircraft: B-737-800
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Configuration	Nose Landing Gear 8 inches shorter Single Tail Anti-Collision/Position Light	No	No	A	A
Panel Layout	Changed to Common Display System (CDS)	No	No	B	B
Panel Layout	Three Position Landing Gear Control Lever	No	Yes	B	B
Limitations	Size/type/system limitations	No	No	A	A
Limitations	Ground wind operating envelope removed	No	No	A	A
Weights	Decreased to: MTW - 174,700 lb. MTOW - 174,200 lb. MLW - 144,000 lb. MZFW - 136,000 lb.	No	No	A	A
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Packs: Simplified Electronic Pack Flow Control System	No	No	B	B
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Packs: Revised Pack light logic	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 21 Air Conditioning	Equipment Cooling: EQUIP SMOKE light and Detection System removed	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Removed Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)	No	No	A	A
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Changed Autopilot Flight Director System (AFDS) functionality logic	No	No	A	A
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Revised Stab Out of Trim light logic	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 22 Autoflight	FCC Revised Speed Trim Fail light logic	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 24 Electrical Power	Relocated four circuit breakers from P-6 to aisle stand	No	No	A	A
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems Mechanical Spoiler System	Yes	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems Maneuver Load Alleviation removed	Yes	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems LAM removed	Yes	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flight Control Systems Elevator Jam Landing Assist System removed	Yes	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Flaps/Slats Fixed position mechanical indicator	No	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers EDS removed	Yes	No	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Speedbrake Extended light logic	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Spoilers light removed	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Speedbrakes/Spoilers Assist On light removed	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 27 Flight Controls	Stabilizer Trim: Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature	No	No	B	B
ATA 28 Fuel	Controls And Indicators: Fewer System Alerts (see ATA 34 Navigation)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 28 Fuel	Controls And Indicators: Revised fuel Filter Bypass light logic	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 29 Hydraulic Power	Controls And Indicators: System indications relocated to Lower Display Unit (DU)	No	No	A	A
ATA 30 Ice and Rain Protection	Engine Anti-ice ENG Anti-ice alert removed	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 30 Ice and Rain Protection	Engine Anti-ice Revised Cowl Valve Nomenclature And Color (Blue)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 30 Ice and Rain Protection	Wing Anti-ice L/R Valve Alerts Color (Blue)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	CDS Six DUs	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Lighting Controls Updated and Relocated Engine Display Control Panel	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Lighting Controls Revised Display Brightness, Display Select Switch Panels, Master Dim, and Test	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Engine Display Control Panel Engine Transfer Switch removed	No	No	A	A
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Engine Display Control Panel MFD Info Switch removed	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Engine Display Control Panel Revised N₁ and Speed Set Selectors	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	PFD Sky Ground and Compass Display changes	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	EFIS Control Panel Dedicated VSD switch removed	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	EFIS Control Panel ND/WXR Range Selector - revised functionality	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	Standby Flight Instruments Three Standby Flight Instruments basic	No	No	B	B
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	AUX Display – Removed Information Displayed	No	No	A	A
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	AUX Display- Removed Flight number, Transponder, Selective Calling (SELCAL), Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), Date and Elapsed time	No	No	A	A
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	AUX Display - Removed Clock start/stop switches relocated from glareshield	No	No	A	A
ATA 31 Indicating/Recording Systems	PSEU light (replaces MAINT light)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear	Nosewheel Steering Switch relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear	Brake accumulator pressure indicator relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear	Autobrake switch relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear	Landing Gear Warning Cutout switch relocated	No	No	B	B
ATA 32 Landing Gear	Revised landing gear lock override switch	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMS FMC Software U13 not basic	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMS Variable Takeoff Rating function	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMS Fuel Alerting and Fuel Management	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	CDU Pages Removed or Revised: Perf Init page 1/2	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	CDU Pages Removed or Revised: N₁ Limit	No	No	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	CDU Pages Removed or Revised: Fuel Progress page 5/5	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages Removed: Using RSV Fuel	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages Removed: Fuel Disagree	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	FMC and Engine Display Alert Messages Removed: Insufficient Fuel	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 34 Navigation	Removed Fuel Flow message (engine display only)	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 36 Pneumatic	Bleed Air Control Panel Added Ram Door Full Open lights	No	No	A	A
ATA 36 Pneumatic	Bleed Air Control Panel Changed Bleed light to Bleed Trip Off light	No	Yes	A	A
ATA 36 Pneumatic	Bleed Air Control Panel Revised Bleed Trip Off light logic	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 49 Airborne Auxiliary Power	System Operation Added Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) MAINT light.	No	No	A	A
ATA 49 Airborne Auxiliary Power	System Operation Added APU EGT gauge	No	No	A	A
ATA 49 Airborne Auxiliary Power	System Operation Removed retractable door	No	No	B	B
ATA 49 Airborne Auxiliary Power	System Operation Removed Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Door light	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Engines: CFM56-7 engines	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	EEC System Added Overboost rating	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	EEC System Removed Icing Idle speed	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Indicators Revised Display Format	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Indicators Added compact engine display	No	No	A	A
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Indicators Removed Thrust alert	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Indicators Removed Motoring indication for bowed rotor logic	No	No	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Thrust Reverser System Removed Reverser Command and Reverser AIR/GND alerts	No	Yes	B	B
ATA 72, 73, 77, 78, 80 Powerplant	Thrust Reverser System Replaced Reverser Limited light with Reverser light	No	Yes	B	B

This Maneuver Differences table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-800, was proposed by The Boeing Company and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-8

To Related Aircraft: B-737-800
Maneuver	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Preflight Inspection	Optional installation of two-position tailskid	No	Yes	A	A
Climb	After takeoff checklist - Landing gear handle	No	Yes	B	B
Non-normal	Read and do Checklist changes due to annunciation and system changes listed in Design difference tables	No	Yes	A	A

This Design Differences table, from the BBJ 2 to the BBJ MAX 8, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

This table in conjunction with the Design Differences and Maneuver Differences tables for the Boeing 737-800 to the Boeing 737-8 list the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: BBJ 2

To Related Aircraft: BBJ MAX 8
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
General	Height: 41 feet, 2 inches (12.55 meters)	No	No	A	A
ATA 28 Fuel	Auxiliary fuel controls and indications	No	No	A	A
ATA 32 Landing Gear	Combined Tire Pressure Indication and Brake Temperature Monitoring System	No	No	A	A
ATA 33 Lights	Flashing landing lights	No	No	A	A
ATA 34 Navigation	ANS Overrun Warnings (ORW) Perspective Runway Indications (HUD)	No	No	A	A

This Design Differences table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-9, was proposed by The Boeing Company and validated by the TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-8

To Related Aircraft: B-737-9
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
General	Turning radius and passenger capacity	No	No	A	A
Configuration	Two- position tailskid standard	No	No	A	A
Dimensions	Length: 138 feet, 2 inches (42.11 meters)	No	No	A	A
Limitations	Revised flap placard speeds	No	No	A	A
Weights	Increased to: MTW - 195,200 lb. MTOW - 194,700 lb. MLW - 163,900 lb. MZFW - 156,500 lb.	No	No	A	A
ATA 31 Indicating / Recording Systems	Added Mid Exit Doors to the takeoff configuration warning	No	No	A	A
ATA 52 Doors	Added Mid Exit Doors and flight deck indications * For the specific overwing emergency exit training requirements, refer to CAR 705.124(2)(a)(iv)(C), 604.143(1)(d), 604.169(2)(b) for flight crew or 705.124(2)(b)(iv)(C), 604.145(a), 604.179(z)(iii) for flight attendants.	No	Yes	A*	A

This Maneuver Differences table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-9, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: B-737-8

To Related Aircraft: B-737-9
Maneuver	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Preflight Inspection	Installation of two-position tailskid	No	Yes	A	A
Non-normal Procedures	Added MID Exit Door NNC	No	Yes	A	A

This Design Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-8200, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: 737-8

To Related Aircraft: 737-8200
Design	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
ATA 31 Indicating / Recording Systems	Added Mid Exit Doors to the takeoff configuration warning	No	No	A	A
ATA 52 Doors	Added Mid Exit Doors and flight deck indications and associated Non Normal Checklist * For the specific overwing emergency exit training requirements, refer to CAR 705.124(2)(a)(iv)(C), 604.143(1)(d), 604.169(2)(b) for flight crew or 705.124(2)(b)(iv)(C), 604.145(a), 604.179(z)(iii) for flight attendants.	No	Yes	A*	A

This Maneuver Differences Table, from the Boeing 737-8 to the Boeing 737-8200, was proposed by Boeing and validated by TCCA. It lists the minimum differences levels operators must use to conduct differences training and checking of flight crew members.

From Base Aircaft: 737-8

To Related Aircraft: 737-8200
Maneuver	Remarks	Flt Char	Proc Chng	Training	Checking
Non-normal Procedures	Added non-normal checklist for mid Exit Doors	No	Yes	A	A

Appendix 4 – Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI)

Operating Experience for flying multiple series may be accomplished in any B-737 series aircraft. Additional Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI) must be accomplished in accordance with the table below for those flight crews flying the series listed. When differences training relates to qualification for FMS, TLI must also include use of FMS. Such FMS required STLI pertinent to each flight crew member must be obtained while serving in a flight crew position and include FMS operation. However, LOFT involving FMS operation in an appropriately configured Level C or Level D FFS may be substituted.

When differences training relates to qualification for PFD/ND, TLI must also include use of PFD/ND. Such PFD/ND required TLI pertinent to each flight crew member must be obtained while serving in a flight crew position and includes PFD/ND operation. For flight crew members with previous EFIS experience, a 4 hour LOFT session involving PFD/ND operation in an appropriately configured FSTD (minimum of a level 5 FTD), may be substituted for 2 TLI Legs as specified in the table below.

Transition Line Indoctrination (TLI) Table
To Related Aircraft	From Base Aircraft
To Related Aircraft	B73A B-737	B73B B-737CL (Non-EFIS)	B73B B-737CL (EFIS)	B73C B-737NG	B73C B-737 MAX
B73A B-737	Not Required	2/5	2/5	2/5	Not Evaluated
B73B B-737CL (Non-EFIS)	2/5	Not Required	2/5	2/5	Not Evaluated
B73B B-737CL (EFIS)	2/5	2/5	Not Required	2^{Footnote *}	Not Evaluated
B73C B-737NG	2/5	2/5	2^{Footnote *}	Not Required	Not Required
B73C B-737 MAX	Not Evaluated	Not Evaluated	Not Evaluated	Not Required	Not Required

Note:

Appendix 5 – Head Up Display (HUD) qualification program

1.0 Background

The B-737NG and B-737 MAX (B73C) may be equipped with an optional single or dual HUD, available through a Rockwell Collins (RC) STC. The B-737NG may be equipped with RC HUD models HGS-2850 (early B-737-700) and HGS-4000. The B-737 MAX may be equipped with the RC HGS-6000 HUD. Both the RC HGS-4000 and HGS-6000 HUDs are equivalent in functionality. The RC HGS-4000 HUD is capable of supporting an Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS).

This appendix provides the training, checking and currency requirements for the operational use by operators of a single or dual HUD for all phases of flight the HUD is certified for and the operator is authorized to conduct. Annex 1 provides additional pilot qualification requirements for the EFVS.

Notes:

For the purposes of this appendix, the term HUD is used generically to refer to a Head Up Display. The term HGS refers to a Head Up Guidance System (HGS), which is a RC HUD equipped with flight guidance for low and reduced visibility operations. This appendix refers to the terms HUD or HGS as applicable.
This appendix does not apply to the RC HGS-2850 HUD.
The use of an HGS for low visibility take-off, approach and/or landing by Canadian operators requires a Transport Canada Special Authorization/Specific Approval (SA). Sections 9.0 and 10.0 of this appendix provides the training and checking requirements for conducting taxi and take-off operations using the HUD (HGS) during reduced and low visibility operations.

2.0 HUD training – General

The HUD qualification requirements of this appendix are necessary to meet the requirements of CAR 705 or CAR 604, for the initial type training of Canadian pilots to operate the B73C using a single or dual HUD in a commercial air service or by a private operator.

The HUD pilot training requirements consist of those related to initial and recurrent ground and flight training. Unless covered concurrently during an initial or transition type rating course, a prerequisite to beginning this course of training is prior training, qualification and currency on the B737C.

Note:

For single HUD operation, training focuses principally upon training events flown in the left seat by the Pilot-In-Command (PIC) as Pilot Flying (PF). SIC indoctrination and training is essential. HUD training of Pilot Monitoring (PM) Second-In-Command (SIC) duties in the right seat is required, when there are SOP differences for the PM, when the PF is heads up (compared to heads down). SIC HUD familiarization flown in the left seat is recommended.

2.1 General requirements

2.1.1 The operator should develop procedures in its Company Operating Manual (COM) for the guidance of its personnel; including:
1. Normal, non-normal and emergency procedures for all phases of flight for which the HUD is intended to be used;
2. Procedures for use of the HUD should include crew Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), duties and responsibilities that are specific to each crew position.
2.1.2 Ground and Flight Training should be provided in the operation of the aeroplane using the HUD in all phases of flight and weather conditions for which the operator is authorized in the operator’s Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and the HUD system is certified in the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) or supplement.
2.1.3 A TCCA approved Level C or higher B73C Full Flight Simulator (FFS) equipped with the operator’s specific HUD configuration with day and night visual displays, is required for HUD flight training and checking.

3.0 HUD Initial Ground Training

3.1 General requirements

Training for air operators should be conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of CAR 705.124. Training for private operators should be conducted with the applicable training requirements for CAR 604.

The initial ground training program should include instructor led instruction and/or CBT training of the following elements:

3.1.1 HUD operational concepts, crew duties and responsibilities and operational procedures including preflight, normal and non-normal operations, and associated indications.
3.1.2 HUD symbology including characteristics and indications of limit conditions and failures and differences to PFD symbology.
3.1.3 Inter-relationship of HUD symbology with aeroplane aerodynamics, inertial factors and environmental conditions.
3.1.4 Function and operational use of HUD controls.
3.1.5 All modes of HUD operation during normal, abnormal and emergency operations.
3.1.6 HUD indications and alerts for low airspeed and high angle of attack, excessive airspeed, windshear, TCAS, EGPWS/TAWS and other indications and alerts.
3.1.7 Applicable publications including AFM (Supplement) limitations and procedures, FCOM and HUD pilot training manual content.
3.1.8 SOPs including, all normal, non-normal and emergency operations applicable to the use of the HUD Crew procedures.
3.1.9 Flight Crew duties and responsibilities specific to each pilot position including a clear delineation of PF and PM duties, responsibilities, procedural call-outs and responses during the phases of flight for which HUD operations are anticipated.
3.1.10 Aircraft system and navigation failures and Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items affecting HUD operation.
3.1.11 Procedures for unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than minimum Runway Visual Range (RVR) encountered during approach, flare, and rollout.
3.1.12 Demonstration of expected visual references with weather at minimum conditions.
3.1.13 Expected sequence of visual cues during an approach in which visibility is at or above landing minima.

4.0 HUD Initial Flight Training

Unless integrated with initial or transition type rating training, flight training dedicated to HUD familiarization and proficiency is in addition to other required training.

Note:

The flight training requirements within this appendix should not be construed to dictate or limit the scope or content of the course of instruction. Each operator has their own unique requirements, route structure, fleet composition and operations policies to consider in developing their training program. Therefore, what follows is to be considered a guide to operators who are tailoring a HUD training program to fit their own needs.

4.1 Ground operations

Flight training for ground operations using HUD should include:

4.1.1 HUD deployment, set up and stowage.
4.1.2 Proper pilot eye reference position.
4.1.3 HUD Pre-flight checks including selection of required modes.
4.1.4 Setting of appropriate HUD brightness levels using all brightness controls.
4.1.5 Appropriate and effective use of HUD during ground operations and maneuvers;
4.1.6 Taxi using HUD under day, night, reduced and low visibility conditions.

4.2 Airborne training

Flight Training for in-flight use of HUD should include:

4.2.1 Incorporation of HUD into instrument scan and integration of conventional displays into scan.
4.2.2 Demonstration and explanation of unique HUD symbology and commonality with head down displays.
4.2.3 Demonstration of effects of cross-wind including indications of drift and non-conformal displays.
4.2.4 Manual control of the aircraft including climbs, descents, turns, steep turns, accelerations and decelerations.
4.2.5 Recognition and recovery from an excessive angle of attack including stall warning and low airspeed.
4.2.6 Recognition and recovery from flight at excessive airspeed.
4.2.7 Recognition and recovery from an aeroplane upset/unusual attitude.
4.2.8 Use of HUD with an approved sunvisor or sunscreen under various daytime lighting conditions.
4.2.9 Vectors to intercept and track selected courses.

4.3 Visual take-offs, Circuits, approaches and landings

Sufficient maneuvers should be flown in visual conditions to demonstrate HUD symbology and use in relation to glide path, centerline control and crosswind conditions. All visual approaches should be flown from no closer than approximately 1,000 feet AGL (3 - 4 NM) to the runway threshold. Flight Training for visual take-offs, circuits, approaches and landings using HUD should include:

4.3.1 Take-off, circuit, approach and landings. Take-offs and landings should be with no wind and repeated with 10 knots crosswind day and night.
4.3.2 “Black hole effect” landings; i.e. Landing on a moonless or overcast night, over water or over dark featureless terrain where the only visual stimuli are lights on and/or near the airport.
4.3.3 Appropriate use of HUD symbology to establish desired descent angle.
4.3.4 Rejected landing and/or Low energy go-around
4.3.5 Visual Approaches (VMC mode) to include:
1. One approach showing deviations above and below glideslope for symbology/runway relationship
2. Straight-in landings with no wind, and repeated with 10 knot crosswind and at night.
3. Circling approaches and landing (for operators authorized to conduct circling approaches) with 10 knot crosswind.
Notes:
- 1. One half of these (VMC mode) approaches should be flown at different airports which have dissimilar approach and runway lighting systems.
- 2. Special emphasis should be placed on optimizing circling approach techniques and procedures, for operators authorized to conduct circling approaches.
- 3. Approaches with the aircraft in a non-normal flap configuration should be included.

4.4 Instrument Procedures and Approaches

Sufficient precision and non-precision instrument approaches, missed approaches and landings with appropriate weather minimums should be flown to gain proficiency in these maneuvers. All required approaches should be flown from no closer than the final approach fix (FAF). Use of the HUD for circling approaches should be trained (for those operators conducting circling approaches.)

Flight Training for instrument procedures incorporating the use of HUD should include:

4.4.1 Instrument approaches and landing to include the following conditions:
- 4.4.1.1 CAT I ILS approach to 200 foot Decision Altitude, 2400 RVR visibility and calm winds.
- 4.4.1.2 Demonstrate failures and incorrect settings on approach (i.e., missed runway elevation, airspeed, selected course).
- 4.4.1.3 Illustrate unique characteristics of symbology in windshear conditions (i.e., erratic wind speed and direction, flight path, flight path acceleration, and speed error).
- 4.4.1.4 Non-ILS approach to 600 foot ceiling and 2 mile visibility and 15 knot crosswind.
4.4.2 Setting of appropriate HUD brightness for different approach lighting systems.
4.4.3 Demonstration of failures and incorrect settings on approach; i.e., miss-set runway elevation, airspeed, selected course, etc.
4.4.4 Missed approaches from IFR minimums in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) flown using published Missed Approach.

4.5 Non-normal/Emergency operations

Flight Training for Non-normal and Emergency conditions using HUD should include:

4.5.1 Recognition and recovery from an aeroplane upset/unusual attitude.
4.5.2 Recognition and recovery from Windshear alerts and indications, including a demonstration of symbology indications in wind shear conditions, i.e., erratic wind speed and direction, flight path, flight path acceleration and speed error, etc.
4.5.3 Recognition and recovery from EGPWS/TAWS warning alert.
4.5.4 Recognition and recovery from TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA).
4.5.5 One Engine Inoperative Take-off with engine failure at or above V₁ at the lowest authorized take-off visibility.
4.5.6 Rejected Take-off with an engine failure prior to V₁ at the lowest authorized take-off visibility.
4.5.7 One Engine Inoperative Instrument Approach and Missed Approach
4.5.8 Aircraft system and navigation failures affecting HUD operation.

4.6 Rockwell Collins HGS-6000 Head-Up Guidance System (HGS) with HCP interface

The HGS-6000 is optional equipment on the B-737-NG and B-737-MAX. Level A Differences Training is sufficient for pilots already qualified on the Rockwell Collins HGS-4000 Head-Up Guidance System.

4.7 HUD Training Areas of Special Emphasis

4.7.1 Crew coordination, briefings, call-outs.
4.7.2 Duties of PF and PM.
4.7.3 The availability and limitations of visual cues encountered on approach both before and after minimum altitudes. This would include:
1. Procedures for unexpected deterioration of conditions to less than minimum RVR encountered during approach, flare and rollout.
2. Demonstration of expected visual references with weather at minimum conditions.
3. Expected sequence of visual cues during an approach in which visibility is at or above landing minima.
4.7.4 HUD unique symbology, i.e. Flight Path Vector (FPV), flight path acceleration symbol, airspeed error tape, Angle Of Attach (AOA) limit bracket, and excessive pitch chevrons. When this training is complete, the trainee should have a thorough understanding of the relationship between aircraft flight path parameters and the HUD symbology.
4.7.5 Appropriate use of the aircraft symbol vs. the FPV during stall, unusual attitude and aeroplane upset recoveries.

5.0 HUD initial Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC)

5.1 Minimum checking manoeuvres

The HUD should be used to the maximum extent possible during the initial Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC). The following manoeuvres using the HUD should be specifically evaluated during the PPC:

5.1.1 Engine failure on take-off (V₁ cut).
5.1.2 Instrument approach and missed approach with One Engine Inoperative (OEI).

6.0 HUD initial line training

6.1 General

HUD initial line training should be under the supervision of a line qualified training or ACP.

HUD line training should include the PF using the HUD to complete:

6.1.1 Three HUD assisted takeoffs;
6.1.2 One visual approach; and
6.1.3 Three instrument approaches in visibility not less than 1800 RVR.

7.0 HUD consolidation period

7.1 Requirements

Air operator’s pilots require line training and consolidation after initial qualification on the HUD. A consolidation period should apply prior to utilizing the HUD for instrument approach operations in IMC. Upon completion of the consolidation requirements, the pilot should be qualified to conduct HUD takeoffs and approaches to the approach minima authorized for the air operator.

During consolidation training, the HUD should be used by the PF to complete:

7.1.1 Five takeoffs;
7.1.2 Five manually flown approaches and landings. (The approaches may be flown in VMC.)

8.0 HUD recurrent training and checking requirements

8.1 Recurrent Ground Training

Recurrent HUD ground training should be completed as part of recurrent training or as part of the continuing qualification curriculum, as applicable. Selected HUD related ground training subjects should be reviewed on a recurrent basis.

8.2 Recurrent Flight Training

Recurrent flight training should be completed as part of recurrent training or as part of the continuing qualification curriculum, as applicable. Recurrent flight training should be in accordance with the procedures established in the operator company operations manual and should include:

8.2.1 Review of HUD system and normal operation;
8.2.2 Review of HUD operating limitations;
8.2.3 Review of selected non-normal and emergency procedures;
8.2.4 One Take-off with crosswind at the lowest authorized take-off minima using HUD Take-off guidance;
8.2.5 Engine Inoperative Take-off with engine failure at V₁;
8.2.6 Rejected take-off;
8.2.7 Straight-in, ILS and Non ILS approach and landing with crosswind to the lowest authorized landing minimums;
8.2.8 Approach and Missed Approach with crosswind at the lowest authorized landing minimums in IMC;
8.2.9 One Engine Inoperative Approach and Landing;
8.2.10 Selected non-normal and emergency procedures;

8.3 HUD Recurrent PPC

The HUD should be used to the maximum extent possible during the recurrent PPC. The required manoeuvres on recurrent PPCs should include a sample of operations requiring the use of the HUD.

Recurrent PPCs should include an evaluation of PM duties related to the use of the HUD in accordance with SOPs, and in consideration of whether the aircraft is equipped with a single or dual HUD.

The following manoeuvres using the HUD should be specifically evaluated during the recurrent PPC:

8.3.1 Engine failure on take-off (V₁ cut); and
8.3.2 Instrument approach and missed approach with OEI.

9.0 HUD currency requirements

An air operator’s 90-day takeoff, approach and landing currency requirements apply to each pilot position occupied.

A PF should have completed at least three takeoffs, approaches and landings using the HUD, in a B73C aeroplane or a TCCA approved Level C (or higher) B73C FFS with day and night visual displays, within the previous 90 days before acting as PF using the HUD.

10.0 HUD reduced visibility and low visibility taxi, take-off, approach, landing and roll-out

The B73C HUD is capable of providing take-off guidance in visibilities as low as 300 ft (75 m) RVR. The HUD is capable of providing guidance to Category III ILS manually flown instrument approaches.

The following training and checking requirements for reduced and low visibility operations in are in addition to the HUD training, checking and currency requirements provided in the preceding.

Note:

The training low and reduced visibility training, checking and currency requirements are derived from the FAA FSB report for the B-737. These requirements apply to an operator authorized to use the HUD to conduct take-offs at 300 RVR and CAT III ILS approaches.

10.1 Ground Training

Ground training for low and reduced visibility HUD operations should include:

10.1.1 The certified capability of the HUD for take-off, approach, landing and roll-out for low and reduced visibility operations in terms of RVR and Category of ILS Approach.
10.1.2 The operational characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of the HUD and aircraft systems for low and reduced visibility operations. Training should include the arming and activation of HUD and AFCS flight guidance and all associated controls, indications and annunciations.
10.1.3 The operational characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of ground facilities (i.e. Instrument approach systems, lighting systems, Surface Movement Guidance Control System (SMGCS), aerodrome procedures etc.) supporting low and reduced visibility operations.
10.1.4 Operator’s policies and procedures concerning reduced and low visibility operations, including the operator’s reporting process, MEL issues, operational considerations following an RTO or missed approach, Initial Operating Experience (IOE)/Initial line indoctrination and currency requirements.
10.1.5 For low and reduced visibility operations predicated on the HUD, a video demonstration complete with sound, of all modes of HUD operation, including narrative descriptions and several low weather approach demonstrations with procedural call-outs and responses. All critical procedural call-out possibilities should be covered.
10.1.6 An emphasis on the need for rigorous crew discipline, coordination and adherence to procedural guidelines for use of the HUD as a CAT II/CAT III approach and landing system.

10.2 Flight training

10.2.1 Low Visibility Take-off

Training predicated on the use of HUD for low visibility take-off to 300 RVR should include the following conditions:
1. Normal takeoff, clear and calm, repeated with gusty winds
2. Takeoff, 600 foot RVR; 5 knot crosswind
3. Takeoff, 300 foot RVR; 5 knot crosswind, engine failure prior to V₁
4. Takeoff, 300 foot RVR; 5 knot crosswind, engine failure after V₁
5. Takeoff with HGS failure; 300 foot RVR
10.2.2 Low Visibility Instrument Approaches

Training predicated on the use of HUD for low visibility approaches should include the following conditions:
1. CAT II ILS approach to 100 foot DH, 1200 RVR, 5 - 10 kts crosswind
2. CAT III ILS approach and landing from a 30 degree intercept to the ILS, below glideslope, weather clear and calm.
3. CAT III ILS with 700 RVR, wind calm - another ILS with a 10 knot crosswind.
4. CAT III ILS with various reasons for a missed approach (system downgrade, “APCH WARN”, etc.).
5. CAT III ILS with various RVRs and crosswinds, include light turbulence.
Notes:
1. Several of the instrument approaches should include a variety of ground and airborne system failures requiring pilot recognition and appropriate procedural actions.
2. Demonstration of system/component failures could include flap asymmetry problems, engine out operations, HGS sensor failures, etc.
3. Demonstration of how HUD failure modes can reduce precision and increase pilot workload unless PF/PM duties and responsibilities are clearly delineated and understood.

10.3 Initial Operating Experience (IOE)/Initial line indoctrination

10.3.1 SICs should be observed performing Category II/III PM duties by an appropriately qualified check pilot upon satisfactory completion of the HUD training program.
10.3.2 Prior to utilizing the HUD in IMC conditions below RVR 1800, each PIC must accomplish at least twenty-five manually flown HUD approaches to Category II/III minima in VMC conditions. Each approach must terminate in a manually controlled HUD assisted landing or HUD assisted go-around. In addition, each PIC must accomplish at least twenty-five HUD assisted takeoffs in VMC conditions prior to using the HUD mode in IMC conditions. Upon completion of this requirement the HUD qualified pilot should then be observed to conduct HUD approaches to company authorized minima.
10.3.3 Pilots must complete their IOE/Initial line indoctrination for HUD CAT II/III operations within 60 days of completion of their HUD training. All previously qualified (in aircraft) pilots should be certified upon satisfactory completion of the HUD ground and flight training programs.

10.4 Recurrent Training and Checking

In addition to regular training and checking requirements, the following low visibility operations should be performed during the six-month recurrent training and PPC:

Approach and landing, 700 foot RVR, 10 knot crosswind.
Approach, 700 foot RVR, 10 knot crosswind, light turbulence with missed approach.
Takeoff, 300 foot RVR, 10 knot crosswind.
Takeoff, 300 foot RVR, engine failure either before or after V₁.
Selected ground training subjects should be reviewed annually.

Appendix 5 – Annex 1
HGS 4000 EFVS qualification program – Not for landing credit

1.0 General

The Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) may be equipped with an HGS 4000 HUD with EFVS capability. The HGS 4000 EFVS provides the capability for descent below published minima using an Infrared (IR) sensor for the acquisition of the required visual references to continue the approach to a landing. The HGS 4000 EFVS is not certified for landing credit based on the EFVS image.

Notes:

Operators seeking credit to use the EFVS for descent below published minima to acquire the required visual references to continue the approach to a landing require an exemption to the applicable provisions of CAR 602.128, Landing Minima. In addition, operators also require a Special Authorization/Specific Approval (SA) to use the EFVS for credit for descent below published minima.
The Boeing Business Jet aircraft (BBJ1/BBJ, BBJ2, BBJ3 or BBJ MAX 8) have not been type certified in Canada and are therefore not on the TCCA TCDS A-146, nor assigned a TCCA Pilot Type Rating designator.

2.0 EFVS Ground and Flight Training – General

Successful completion of HUD training on the B73C is required as a prerequisite for EFVS training. HUD and EFVS training can be conducted concurrently.

A TCCA approved Level C or higher B73C Full Flight Simulator (FFS) equipped with day and night visual displays and able to display a representative IR image, is required for EFVS flight training and checking.

The EFVS pilot training requirements consist of those related to initial and recurrent ground and flight training. The EFVS training program should focus upon training events flown in the left seat by the PIC (PF). EFVS training of PM duties in the right seat is required. SIC EFVS familiarization flown in the left seat is recommended.

Operators authorized to descend below published minima using the EFVS must conduct ground and flight training on low visibility and CAT II ILS procedures specific to the B73C.

3.0 EFVS Initial Ground Training

The initial ground training program should include a minimum of four hours of classroom instruction or Computer-Based Training (CBT) to include:

EFVS operational concepts and IR theory
EFVS system architecture
EFVS specific HUD symbology and format
EVS videos of flight scenarios
EVS operating procedures & limitations
FAA Part 91.176 criteria applicable to EFVS
Runway markings and lighting
Design eye position for proper EVS image
Transition from EVS imagery to non-EVS imagery, visual conditions.
EFVS specific visual characteristics including: noise and "blooming", roman candle effect – rain, burlap effect, burn-in and elimination, NUCC, weather conditions (fog & visual reference).
Flight crew qualification & training.
Crew duties and responsibilities including duties of PF and PM crew coordination.
Operational procedures including normal and non-normal operations.
Crew briefings and callouts
All applicable EFVS AFM, pilot training and FCOM material

Note:

Completing the HGS 4000 EFVS Computer-Based Training (CBT) completes the basic ground school.

4.0 EFVS Initial Flight Training

The initial flight training program must include a minimum of 2 hours for the PF (left seat).

Note:

The required initial ground training must be summarized during the pre-flight briefing prior to flight training.

The following initial flight training should be provided:

4.1 Ground Operation

Initialization, system use, checks and tests.
Displays, modes, annunciations
Design eye position
Use of ON/OFF switch and "clear" mode
Taxi using EFVS under various lighting and visibility conditions.

4.2 Airwork

The airwork required in Appendix 5, Head-Up Guidance (HUD) qualification program is sufficient.

4.3 Visual take-offs, circuits and approaches

Flight training should include various daylight and night takeoffs and landings including:

Normal Take-off and Landing with crosswind
Visual approaches to runways at night with minimal lighting (“black hole” approaches) and use of FPV to achieve desired descent angle.

4.4 Instrument Approaches

ILS, GLS, WAAS/LPV approach and landing (At least one of these approaches as applicable).
ILS, GLS, WAAS/LPV missed approach (At least one of these approaches as applicable).
Non-ILS approach and landing.
RNP approach and landing – if applicable

4.5 Non-normal/Emergency operations

Failure of EFVS, or
Failure of the EFVS preventing continued approach when below published minima on a Category 1 ILS.

4.6 Special emphasis training

Special training emphasis should be placed in the following areas:

Crew briefings, callouts and SOPs, PF and PM duties, SOPs and CRM.
Transition from EFVS imagery to the unaided scene, visual conditions and runway acquisition
Instrument failures and warning systems
Recognition of EVFS malfunctions and misleading images

5.0 Initial EFVS line indoctrination

For air operators, PICs should complete line indoctrination employing the EFVS. This should include at least three EFVS assisted takeoffs at night, one visual approach at night, and two instrument approaches in VMC.

6.0 EFVS consolidation period

For air operators, a consolidation period should apply prior to utilizing the EFVS for instrument approach operations in IMC, to qualify a PIC to conduct EFVS takeoffs and approaches to the authorized minima as set forth in the operator’s operations specifications.

PICs should accomplish at least three manually flown EFVS assisted night takeoffs, approaches, and landings to the lowest authorized minima in VMC conditions. Each approach should terminate in a manually controlled EFVS assisted landing or EFVS assisted go-around.

7.0 EFVS recurrent training and checking requirements

The recurrent training requirements applicable to the HUD apply with the addition of the following requirements using the EFVS:

Instrument approach and landing, or
Instrument approach and landing with acquisition of EFVS image before published minima and acquisition of image without aid of the EFVS above 100 ft HAT, to provide required visual references to permit a landing; and
Instrument approach with acquisition of EFVS image before published minima and failure of EFVS below published minima requiring a missed approach above 100 ft. HAT.

Selected ground training subjects should be reviewed on a recurrent basis.

For PICs, the required maneuvers on subsequent PPCs should include a sample of operations requiring the use of the EFVS. For SICs, the required maneuvers on subsequent PPCs should include a sample of PM duties related to the use of the EFVS.

8.0 EFVS currency requirements

An air operator’s PICs should have completed at least one night takeoff, approach and landing as PF using the EFVS; or have completed at least one night takeoff, approach and landing as PF using the EFVS in a TCCA approved Level C (or higher) B73C full flight simulator with day and night visual displays and able to display a representative IR image, within the previous 90 days before acting as PF using the EFVS. The EFVS currency requirement can be credited to the HUD currency requirements.

Appendix 6 – Alternate go-around flaps training

1.0 Requirements

Alternate go-around flaps operations require a separate Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Appendix, a supplementary procedure defining flight crew actions, and a TCCA operational approval. Alternate go-around flaps for B-737NG and B-737 MAX aircraft certified to conduct Flaps 30 approaches using Flaps 5 during go-around requires flight crew training. The FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) conducted an operational suitability evaluation and found no handling quality differences between the B-737NG and the B-737 MAX when conducting the alternate go-around flaps operations in accordance with the AFM Appendix. A flight crew member who completed training on either the B-737NG or the B-737 MAX does not need to repeat training in the other series aircraft.

2.0 General

The use of Flaps 5° for go-around provides for a substantial increase in approach climb weights in hot and/or high environments. The Flaps 30 approach speeds for Flaps 5 go-around operations require minor model specific speed additives to the standard Flaps 30 V_REF speeds in order to maintain the performance requirements of FAR 25.121(d) /AWM Chapter 525.121(d).

Alternate Go-Around Flaps operations require a separate AFM Appendix, and a supplementary procedure defining flight crew actions.

Operators are encouraged to develop an approach review and briefing card for use by flight crews when conducting any Alternate Go-Around Flaps operation.

3.0 Ground Training

Ground training for flight crews current in the B-737NG or the B-737 MAX aircraft is established at Level B. Training may be administered via computer-based training (CBT), stand up lectures, or video and should include performance requirements, speed additive use, and effect on maneuver margins, alternate go-around procedures, flight crew callouts, and engine failure procedures. This item must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

4.0 Flight Training

Flight training for flight crews current in the B-737NG or the B-737 MAX aircraft is established at Level D. Training must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training.

Flight training should include the following:

A two engine flaps 30° approach to a flaps 5° go-around;
A two engine flaps 30° approach to an engine failure during a flaps 5° go-around; and
A two engine flaps 30° approach in icing conditions to an engine failure during a flaps 5° go-around.

Appendix 7 – B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

The purpose of this appendix is to describe ground and flight training requirements associated with pilot qualification on the 737 MAX modified with Flight Control Computer (FCC) software version P12.1.2. The MDR Table makes reference to this appendix with the use of an asterisk (shown as D*).

No pilot may operate the B-737 MAX unless the ground and flight training documented in this appendix has been completed. References to “pilots” in this section include both PICs and SICs unless otherwise specified. These Special Training segments can be stand-alone or embedded into another training curriculum. New TASE have been added to section 9.2 in support of the required training detailed in this Appendix. The required training is as follows:

1. Ground Training

1.1 Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs)

Training on the following NNCs:

Runaway Stabilizer
Speed Trim Fail
Stabilizer Out of Trim
Stabilizer Trim Inoperative
Airspeed Unreliable
ALT Disagree
AOA Disagree

1.2 FCC software version P12.1.2 for the B-737 MAX

Training in this section emphasizes the design differences associated with FCC software version P12.1.2 for the B-737 MAX. This training also emphasizes necessary ground training between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX with FCC software version P12.1.2 or newer. Pilots may complete this training by accomplishing the applicable B-737 MAX CBT provided by Boeing or a TCCA approved equivalent.

1.2.1 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – MCAS function
- MCAS function description (as part of the STS).
- Conditions for operation.
- Erroneous FCC trim commands.
- Flight deck alerting of the failure of the MCAS function.
1.2.2 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – AFDS
- Automatic AP disengagement.
- Temporary FD removal.
- AFDS pitch mode changes following stick shaker.
- Inhibiting of AP nose up trim.
1.2.3 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – Stab Out of Trim
- Alert illumination logic (ground vs. flight).
- Revised NNC.
1.2.4 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – Speed Trim Fail (Speed Trim function)
- Speed Trim function description (as part of the STS)
- Functionality of the Speed Trim Fail light.
- Revised NNC.

1.3 Boeing recommended procedures

Training on the following bullet points that emphasize Boeing recommended procedures. Pilots may complete this training by accomplishing the applicable B-737 CBT provided by Boeing or a TCCA approved equivalent.

1.3.1 B-737 manual trim operation.
- Manual stabilizer trim operation.
- Manual stabilizer trimming techniques.
- Effects of airspeed and aerodynamic loads on manual stabilizer trim operation.
1.3.2 B-737 Unreliable Airspeed – Determining a Reliable Airspeed
- Recognition of flight deck effects of an unreliable airspeed condition.
- Memory pitch and thrust settings.
- Determination of reliable airspeed indication.

2. Flight Training

Flight training must be conducted in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS that meets Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements. The FFS must have installed a Binary Simulation Load revision 3.23.4_3 or higher and FCC software version P12.1.2 must be assured to be active. The manual stabilizer trim system must be evaluated for proper control forces and travel system operation.

The following sub-sections provide and emphasize the training objectives of each maneuver. This training applies to pilots flying the B-737 MAX, or conducting B-737NG/B-737 MAX MFF. A suitably qualified B-737NG Level C or D FFS may be used for some conditions only where noted below.

2.1 Demonstration of MCAS activation for each pilot acting as PF.

2.1.1 MCAS activation during an impending stall (or full stall) and recovery demonstration during manual flight in a clean configuration.
2.1.2 Demonstrate MCAS activation stabilizer trim responses:
- Stabilizer trim in the nose down direction when above threshold AOA for MCAS activation during stall.
- Stabilizer trim in the nose up direction when below threshold AOA for MCAS activation during recovery.

2.2 A runaway stabilizer condition that requires the pilots to use manual stabilizer trim accomplished by each pilot acting as PF.

2.2.1 Runaway stabilizer training as described in subparagraph 9.2.2.5.
2.2.2 Operation of each manual trim technique (as defined by Boeing).
2.2.3 This training can be completed in a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.

Note:

Runaway Stabilizer flight simulator training must be conducted using the ATA 27 malfunction titled Stabilizer Runaway (also known as the Dual Wire short malfunction). Use of the ATA 27 malfunction, Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (also known as the Electric Trim Switch Malfunction) is not permitted for use in Runaway Stabilizer flight training. Operators should ensure that the appropriate Runaway Stabilizer malfunction is incorporated into their FFS, prior to Runaway Stabilizer training. The TCCA National Simulator Evaluation Program (NSEP) should be consulted on the incorporation of malfunctions into the FFS and the subsequent qualification of the FFS for training.

2.3 Use of manual stabilizer trim during approach, go-around and level off accomplished by each pilot acting as PF.

2.3.1 Use of manual stabilizer trim as described in subparagraph 9.2.2.4.
2.3.2 This training can be completed in a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.

2.4 A Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation demonstration accomplished by either pilot acting as PF.

2.4.1 Condition must terminate in a landing in order to demonstrate the updated STAB OUT OF TRIM light functionality.

2.5 Erroneous high AOA during takeoff that leads to an unreliable airspeed condition accomplished by either pilot acting as PF.

2.5.1 Demonstrates flight deck effects (i.e. aural, visual and tactile) associated with the failure.
2.5.2 The discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in accordance with Airspeed Unreliable NNC.
2.5.3 Fault occurring during the takeoff procedure.
2.5.4 Must include a go-around or missed approach flown with erroneous high AOA condition.
- 2.5.4.1 Special emphasis placed on FD behavior biasing out of view upon selecting Takeoff/Go-around (TO/GA).

Appendix 8 – Supplemental training guidance to TCCA OE report for B-737

1.0 Purpose
2.0 Application
3.0 Background
4.0 Overview
5.0 Format
Annex A – TCCA OE Report Guidance
Annex B – Flight Training requirements matrix

1.0 Purpose

The purpose of this appendix is to provide additional guidance and interpretations of the training requirements within this TCCA Boeing 737 Operational Evaluation (OE) Report.

2.0 Application

The guidance within this appendix applies to all series of the B-737 or the specific series of the B-737, as identified within this appendix.

The Return to Service (RTS) of the B-737-8 (MAX) requires that specific training requirements of the TCCA B-737 OE Report, be complied with. This compliance requirement was mandated by an Interim Order (IO) Respecting Certain Training Requirements (B-737-8 and Other Aircraft), No. 3 dated February 26, 2021, or later revision. Training mandated by the IO includes Appendix 7 of the OE Report, B-737 MAX Special training for flight crews, and specific Training Areas or Special Emphasis (TASE), and Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD) requirements as outlined in this OE report.

Operators of B-737 series, other than the B-737 MAX, should provide training in the TASE areas added to the OE report by January 1, 2024, including the subsequent recurrent training. FSTDs should meet the requirements of the OE report to support this training.

3.0 Background

Additional training requirements applicable to the B-737 MAX (B-737-8/-9) and specific series of the B-737 were established by the Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB) activity, in support of the RTS of the B-737 MAX. These training requirements were published in the TCCA B-737 Operational Evaluation (OE). These additional training requirements apply to the B-737 MAX and other B-737s as identified in the OE report.

TCCA has identified the need to provide guidance in greater detail than that provided by the OE report (main body) to ensure that pilots qualified on the B-737 MAX and other series of the B-737 clearly understand the purpose of the training requirements provided in the OE report.

The focus of this appendix is to provide specific guidance to Appendix 7 of the OE Report which applies to the B-737 MAX, and guidance on new Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE) and Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD) requirements of the OE report. This appendix also provides guidance applicable to the revised NNCs and the TCCA accepted Boeing Company ground and flight training.

The guidance provided in this appendix includes technical background and recommendations applicable to the training requirements stated in the OE report. This guidance is intended to assist Canadian Operators in developing their approved training programs for the B-737 MAX Return to Service (RTS) and for B-737 specific series training.

4.0 Overview

Annex A of this appendix provides specific guidance on Ground and Flight Training, for the B-737 MAX RTS and guidance on the Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE) applicable to specific series of the B-737. The guidance is focused on the Boeing Company Ground and Flight Training for B-737 MAX RTS accepted by TCCA and associated OE Report requirements. The B-737 MAX RTS Flight Training is based upon the Boeing Company flight training profile accepted by TCCA.

Annex B of this appendix provides a matrix of Initial and Recurrent training requirements applicable to specific B-737 series.

5.0 Format

The guidance within this appendix applies to content of the OE report as specified, and guidance applicable to the required ground and flight training content. Extracts from the OE report (Main body) are provided in italic font and the applicable guidance provided immediately adjacent to it. All guidance material is preceded by the Header “Guidance”.

Annex A – TCCA OE Report Guidance

A1.0 OE Report - Appendix 7 - Purpose

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

Appendix 7 – B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

(OE Report – Main Body)

9.9 B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

Completion of the ground and flight training specified in Appendix 7 is required before flying the B-737 MAX.

Guidance

The special training requirements of Appendix 7 were established following a Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB) activity led by the FAA, with TCCA, EASA, and ANAC (Brazil). The aim of the JOEB was to jointly evaluate the ground and flight training proposed by the Boeing Company in support of the Return to Service (RTS) of the B-737 MAX (B-737-8/-9). This training was accepted by TCCA and was initially published in Revision 1 of the TCCA OE Report for the B-737, dated Dec 17, 2020. The training requirements within the OE report are intended for incorporation by Canadian operators into their approved B-737 training programs.

This special training must be completed by pilots prior to being authorized to fly the B-737 MAX, as stated in the opening statement of Appendix 7, and Section 9.9 of the OE Report, and mandated by an Interim Order (IO).

Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE) related to Appendix 7 and specific B-737 series are provided in the main body of the OE report at section 9.2.

A2.0 Ground Training requirements

A2.1 OE Report – Ground Training - General

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

1. Ground Training

Guidance

Section 1. Ground Training of Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report for the B-737 provides the requirements for Ground Training for the RTS of the B-737 MAX.

Sub-section 9.2.1 of the main body of the OE report provides the TASE requirements corresponding to this Ground Training. Some TASE - Ground Training has been added in support of the required training for Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report.

The Ground Training requirements in Appendix 7 includes both Level A and B training content.

Level A training content for the B-737 MAX RTS includes seven revised Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs), and new and revised Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) and Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) content, QRH Checklist instructions and RTS simulator training information and Flight Operations Technical Bulletins (FOTB).

Level B training includes Computer Based Training (CBT) content applicable to B-737 MAX RTS design changes, manual stabilizer trimming techniques, and Airspeed Unreliable procedures.

A2.2 Ground Training - NNCs

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

1.1 Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs)

Training on the following NNCs:

Runaway Stabilizer
Speed Trim Fail
Stabilizer Out of Trim
Stabilizer Trim Inoperative
Airspeed Unreliable
ALT Disagree
AOA Disagree

Guidance

Seven B-737 NNCs have been revised for the B-737 MAX. Training on the NNCs, may be accomplished as Level A (Self-study). The training for the Stab Out of Trim and Speed Trim Fail NNCs also requires Level B training (e.g. CBT).

Changes to the B-737 MAX NNCs in this document may be identified by the blue and magenta colored text.

Operators conducting Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF) operations with the B-737 MAX and B-737NG (B73C) should amend their B-737 NNCs to align with those of the B-737 MAX for commonality, and should apply to their TTL/POI for approval. (Consultation with the TCCA Commercial Flight Standards (CFS) Division may be required).

A2.2.1 Runaway Stabilizer NNC

Guidance – Runaway Stabilizer NNC - Text version

Condition statement

(Figure 1)

The condition statement has been expanded, so that the Runaway Stabilizer NNC should be used whenever the horizontal stabilizer movement occurs in a manner not appropriate for the flight conditions.

Note:

The Runaway Stabilizer NNC is an unannunciated NNC. Pilots must be trained to recognize stabilizer trim movement in a manner not appropriate to the flight conditions.

Ground and Flight training should ensure that pilots are familiar with normal stabilizer trim movement, stabilizer trim rates associated with flap setting, and when stabilizer trim movement should (and should not) be anticipated.

In a suitably qualified B-737 MAX and B-737NG Level C or D Full Flight Simulator (FFS), the runaway stabilizer (using the Dual Wire short malfunction (see section A3.3 OE Report – FSTD requirements)) will be accompanied by the disengagement of the autopilot (A/P) (with the associated A/P disengagement alerts), Master Caution and Speed Trim Fail light illumination.

Note:

The Speed Trim Fail light may or may not illuminate on the B-737NG. For more details, refer to section A3.5.2 – Flight Training guidance – Runaway Stabilizer.

The Pilot Flying (PF) should be vigilant for any uncommanded stabilizer trim movement following any A/P disengagement and illumination of the Master Caution light.

The Pilot Monitoring (PM) is expected to respond to the Master CautioN and Speed Trim Fail lights per training. Good crew coordination and CRM will be required to positively identify a runaway stabilizer condition.

Figure 2 Runaway Stabilizer NNC – Memory items — **Figure 2: Runaway Stabilizer NNC – Memory items**

Guidance – Runaway Stabilizer NNC (Cont’d) - Text version

Steps 1 to 7 Memory items

(Figure 2)

The memory items have been revised to align with certification assumptions, and steps have been added to include the disengagement of the Autothrottle (A/T), and use of thrust levers and Main Electric Stabilizer Trim.

Step 1 - Control Column…..Hold Firmly

The first step is for the PF to take control of the aircraft using the Control Column when a runaway stabilizer condition is identified.

Step 2 - Autopilot (if engaged)….Disengage

This step disengages the autopilot if still engaged. If the autopilot is the source of uncommanded stabilizer movement, disengaging the autopilot may eliminate the uncommanded stabilizer movement.

Step 3 - Autothrottle (if engaged) … Disengage

This step is required for the PF to establish manual control of thrust, and to prevent the autothrottle from providing thrust commands that may cause undesirable airspeed or pitch deviations.

Step 4 - Control column and thrust levers……Control airplane pitch attitude and airspeed

This step has been expanded to add the use of thrust levers with control column to control airplane pitch attitude and airspeed. The flight crew should also remain aware of thrust lever position for situational awareness of the aircraft state.

Airspeed should be controlled to minimize deviations from the airspeed at which the runaway stabilizer occurred. Increased airspeeds will result in increased aerodynamic loads and out of trim control column forces.

Should runaway stabilizer movement be allowed to continue, the control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches (control column cutout switches) will stop the uncommanded stabilizer trim movement, but will not reverse it. Any release of the control column, will allow the uncommanded stabilizer movement to resume.

Note:

The control column cutout switches will stop any uncommanded stabilizer movement, except an aeroplane nose-down stabilizer movement commanded by MCAS. The incorporation of FCC P12.1.2 SW has eliminated the failure conditions that resulted in uncommanded MCAS activation. Any such MCAS activated stabilizer movement should be considered to be valid, and control column forces should be reduced to avoid increasing the Angle of Attack (AOA) further (since MCAS activation logic is a function of elevated AOAs.)

Step 5 - Main Electric Stabilizer trim….Reduce control column forces

The Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches will stop and reverse the runaway stabilizer condition. When released, the runaway will continue.

The PF is expected to actively use the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches, to reduce out of trim control column forces prior to activating Stab Trim cutout switches. Control column forces should be reduced as much as possible, using the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches prior to engaging the Stab Trim cutout switches. This will aid in reducing subsequent manual trimming forces.

If use of the control column cutout switches is necessary to stop runaway stabilizer movement, the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches should be used to reduce stabilizer miss-trim to minimize the required control column input.

With proper use of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches to reduce stabilizer miss-trim prior to the activation of manual trim, flight crews should seldom encounter high forces that require a two pilot effort, or require maneuvers to momentarily reduce aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer to aid in manual trimming.

Step 6 - If the runaway stops after the autopilot is disengaged…

A runaway stopping after the autopilot is disengaged indicates the runaway may have originated from the autopilot. For this reason, the autopilot should not be reengaged. The autothrottle should not be engaged if the autopilot is not engaged.

If the runaway stabilizer condition no longer exists, the checklist is complete.

Step 7 - If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged….

The runaway continuing after the autopilot is disengaged indicates that the autopilot is not the source of the runaway stabilizer.

Setting both Stab Trim cutout switches to Cutout removes power to the horizontal stabilizer trim motor, and permits manual trimming of the horizontal stabilizer using the Stabilizer trim wheel.

The proper trimming of the horizontal stabilizer using the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim to reduce control column forces prior to activating the Stab Trim cutout switches is important in minimizing subsequent manual trimming forces.

The step to Grasp and hold the Stabilizer trim wheel is required for older B-737 series (Pre B-737NG) where this step was required to control a failed horizontal stabilizer trim brake for a continued runaway. This step has been retained in the NNC by Boeing for commonality.

Guidance – Runaway Stabilizer NNC (Cont’d) - Text version

(Figure 3)

The proper execution of Step 5 is important in correcting an out of trim condition, and therefore minimize manual trim forces.

Both pilots may need to use Stabilizer trim wheels if manual trim forces are too difficult for one pilot to trim manually.

Manual trim forces reduce with a reduction in airspeed. Control column and thrust levers can be used to reduce airspeed. Manual trim inputs will be required as necessary to reduce control column forces as airspeed is reduced.

The PF should anticipate manual trim input requirements when changing airspeed, thrust or configuration.

A2.2.2 Speed Trim Fail NNC

Guidance – Speed Trim Fail NNC - Text version

(Figure 4)

This NNC has been revised to include the explanatory Note.

No adverse handling issues were identified during certification and operational evaluations where the aircraft was flown within the Practical Operational Flight Envelope (POFE). The POFE encompasses airspeeds and normal airspeeds expected during normal operations and anticipated maneuvers consistent with flight training.

Pilots should strive to maintain the aircraft in trim condition with the Speed Trim Fail light illuminated to ensure they continue to experience normal control column force gradients.

During the flight training exercise of Runaway Stabilizer malfunction (Appendix 7 of the OE report), pilots will experience manual flight (A/P not engaged) with the Speed Trim Fail light illuminated. There is no requirement to conduct additional flight training manoeuvers with the Speed Trim Fail light illuminated.

A2.2.3 Stabilizer Out of Trim NNC

Guidance – Stabilizer Out of Trim NNC - Text version

(Figure 5)

This NNC has been revised to describe the illumination of the Stab Out of Trim light.

This light will illuminate on the B-737 MAX on landing when below 30 knots ground speed, following an FCC partial failure in flight. The ground and flight training is intended to ensure that flight crews understand that maintenance action must be taken prior to any subsequent flight, if this light illuminates on landing.

This condition is demonstrated during the B-737 MAX flight training during the demonstration of the Cross Flight Control Computer (Cross-FCC) Trim Monitor activation.

A2.2.4 Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC

Guidance – Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC - Text version

(Figure 6)

The Condition Statement has been revised to further describe this condition.

This malfunction represents a loss of function of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches. This malfunction should not be confused with a Runaway Stabilizer malfunction.

Note:

The Runaway Stabilizer procedure should be executed for any inappropriate movement of the horizontal stabilizer (Ref. A2.2.1)

Control column forces may develop because of airspeed, thrust or configuration changes made from the original trim setting. Appropriate manual trimming techniques will be required depending on the magnitude of the column forces. It may be necessary to reduce airspeed to reduce manual trimming forces.

A2.2.5 Airspeed Unreliable NNC

Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC - Text version

(Figure 7)

An erroneous AOA may trigger unreliable airspeed, Mach and altitude indications. An intermittent or continuous stick shaker may be associated with an erroneous AOA. The Additional Information section referenced in the Condition Statement lists potential causes of unreliable airspeed. This section should be consulted after completion of the NNC.

The pitch and thrust settings in Step 4 of this NNC are based upon the landing gear being retracted. The landing gear should therefore be retracted (if extended) to ensure that a sufficient climb performance capability associated with the pitch and thrust settings identify in Step 4 can be achieved.

Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC - Text version

(Figure 8)

An erroneously high AOA may trigger the continuous activation of the Stick Shaker. The autopilot engagement logic will not permit the engagement of the autopilot after 5 minutes of continuous stick shaker activation. It may be possible to engage the autopilot for a short period of time, but it will subsequently disengage without command. The autopilot will not be available for the remainder of the flight.

Flight crews should be aware of this engagement logic and avoid continuous repeated attempts to re-engage the autopilot, if unable to engage it after this step of the NNC.

Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC - Text version

(Figure 9)

Steps 20 to 23 have been added to the NNC to provide a procedure to disable a nuisance stick shaker at the pilot’s discretion. The disabling of a continuous stick shaker will remove a significant distraction from the flight deck and aid in the effective recognition of a valid stall warning on the unaffected side.

An erroneously high AOA will activate the Elevator Feel Shift (EFS) module. Control column forces may be increased by the EFS activation.

Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC - Text version

(Figure 10)

The Stick Shaker Circuit Breakers (CBs) are identified by CB collars. The Stick Shaker CBs should be carefully identified and verified prior to pulling.

Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC - Text version

(Figure 11)

The Note under Deferred Items has been revised to identify DA/MDA aural callouts are not provided if BARO minimums are set only on the First Officer’s PFD.

The flight crew should obtain the appropriate pitch attitude and thrust setting in accordance with the tables indicated in the Performance Inflight chapter of the QRH.

Guidance – Airspeed Unreliable NNC - Text version

(Figure 12)

The flight crew should anticipate the uncommanded removal of the Flight Director (F/D) pitch bar during a go-around when TO/GA is pushed (a.k.a. biasing out of view). The flight crew should be prepared to select an appropriate vertical F/D mode (E.g. LVL CHG) to get appropriate vertical guidance.

The crew should be aware that the NNCs for the IAS Disagree alert, the AOA Disagree alert and the ALT Disagree alert accompanied with the IAS Disagree alert will refer the crew to the Airspeed Unreliable NNC. It is expected that the PF will action the memory items for the Airspeed Unreliable NNC for the above referenced alerts.

A2.2.6 IAS Disagree NNC

Guidance – IAS Disagree NNC - Text version

(Figure 13)

The IAS Disagree alert will likely illuminate in the case of an erroneous AOA. The flight crew should therefore action the Unreliable Airspeed NNC per the IAS Disagree NNC.

Note:

The IAS Disagree NNC has not been revised.

A2.2.7 ALT Disagree NNC

Guidance – ALT Disagree NNC - Text version

(Figure 14)

The IAS Disagree and ALT Disagree alerts will likely both illuminate in the case of an erroneous AOA. The flight crew should therefore action the Unreliable Airspeed NNC per the Alt Disagree NNC.

A2.2.8 AOA Disagree NNC

Guidance – AOA Disagree NNC - Text version

(Figure 15)

The IAS Disagree alert will likely illuminate in the case of an erroneous AOA. The flight crew should therefore action the Unreliable Airspeed NNC per the IAS Disagree NNC.

A2.3 Level B Ground Training

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

1.2 FCC software version P12.1.2 for the B-737 MAX

1.2.1 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – MCAS function

MCAS function description (as part of the STS).
Conditions for operation.
Erroneous FCC trim commands.
Flight deck alerting of the failure of the MCAS function.

1.2.2 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – AFDS

Automatic AP disengagement.
Temporary FD removal.
AFDS pitch mode changes following stick shaker.
Inhibiting of AP nose up trim.

1.2.3 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – Stab Out of Trim

Alert illumination logic (ground vs. flight).
Revised NNC.

1.2.4 ATA 22 – Autoflight – FCC – Speed Trim Fail (Speed Trim function)

Speed Trim function description (as part of the STS)
Functionality of the Speed Trim Fail light.
Revised NNC.

Guidance

Pilots are required to successfully complete the Level B ground training referenced in Section 1.2 of Appendix 7 of the OE Report, prior to being authorized to fly the B-737 MAX.

The ground training content focuses on differences between the B-737NG and B-737 MAX under the topics covered.

Pilots may take the ground training developed by the Boeing Company or take TCCA approved equivalent training.

A2.4 Ground Training – Boeing Recommended Procedures

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

1.3 Boeing recommended procedures

1.3.1 B-737 manual trim operation.

Manual stabilizer trim operation.
Manual stabilizer trimming techniques.
Effects of airspeed and aerodynamic loads on manual stabilizer trim operation.

1.3.2 B-737 Unreliable Airspeed – Determining a Reliable Airspeed

Recognition of flight deck effects of an unreliable airspeed condition.
Memory pitch and thrust settings.
Determination of reliable airspeed indication.

Guidance

Pilots are required to successfully complete the Level B ground training referenced in Section 1.3 of Appendix 7 of the OE Report, prior to being authorized to fly the B-737 MAX.

The Boeing Company has developed Level B Ground training with video demonstrations on manual trim operation and determining a reliable airspeed during an Airspeed Unreliable condition because of an erroneous AOA.

Pilots may take this ground training developed by the Boeing Company or take TCCA approved equivalent training.

A2.5 Ground Training – Training Areas of Special Emphasis

(OE Report (Main Body))

9.2 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)

Note:

References to “pilots” in this section include both Pilot In Command (PIC) and Second In Command (SIC) unless otherwise specified.

Pilots must receive special emphasis training in the following areas:

9.2.1 TASE - Ground Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during ground training:

9.2.1.1 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts During Non-Normal Conditions

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

9.2.1.5 B-737 MAX Flight Control Computer (FCC)

Guidance

TASE - Ground Training has been added in support of the required training for Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report.

The TASE in Ground Training for Flight crew Non-Normal Situations with Multiple alerts (Sub-section 9.2.1.1 of OE Report) should be considered a prerequisite for the same TASE for Flight Training (Sub-section 9.2.2.6 of the OE Report).

Operators should ensure that the required emphasis is provided during Ground Training on TASE topics that apply to Flight Training. This includes the following TASE applicable to Flight Training (in the applicable Sub-sections of the TCCA OE Report):

9.2.2.4 Stabilizer Trim
9.2.2.5 Runaway Stabilizer
9.2.2.6 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions
9.2.2.7 Unreliable Airspeed

Operators should refer to Section A3.0 Flight Training, of this document for guidance applicable to flight training, to ensure that pilots have the required knowledge and understanding of systems and procedures for effective flight training.

A3.0 Flight Training

A3.1 OE Report – Flight Training - General

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

(OE Report - Main Body)

9.2 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

Guidance

Section 2. Flight Training of Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report for the B-737 provides the requirements for Flight Training for the RTS of the B-737 MAX.

Sub-section 9.2.2 of the main body of the OE report provides the TASE requirements corresponding to this Flight Training. Training Areas of Special Emphasis have been added in support of the required training for Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report. In addition, these Training Areas of Special Emphasis apply to other series of the B-737 as indicated.

A3.2 Flight Training Profile

Figure 16: Boeing Flight Training Profile for Appendix 7 Flight Training

Guidance – Boeing Flight Training Profile for Appendix 7 Flight Training - Text version

(Figure 16)

The flight profile for the Appendix 7 Flight training is depicted in Figure 16 above. The Boeing Company’s flight training profile is comprised of the following four scenarios:

Stall Identification and Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) activation
- Full stall – MCAS activation
Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim operations during an approach and go-around
Cross Flight Control Computer (Cross-FCC) Trim Monitor
Airspeed Unreliable NNC
- Erroneous high AOA on takeoff – unreliable airspeed condition

Note:

Pilots may be trained in accordance with the flight profile depicted in Figure 16 (above) developed by the Boeing Company or take TCCA approved equivalent training.

TCCA recommends that the following principals be followed to ensure the maximum effectiveness of this flight training:

The focus of this flight training is for pilots to gain a thorough understanding of the design changes, through a demonstration of system functions, and associated flight deck effects and indications;
A focus on training to proficiency should prevail over a focus on grading;
Pilots should be given the maximum opportunity to interact with the aircraft controls to get a hands on practical understanding;
Any mistakes made during training, when effectively identified and corrected, should be considered to be valuable learning opportunities;
An emphasis on the strict adherence to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) during this training may be relaxed to support the achievement of the training objectives of further increased understanding of the systems; and
Discussion and questions should be promoted at appropriate opportunities.

A3.3 OE Report – FSTD Requirements

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

(OE Report - Main Body)

9.6 Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD)

An approved Level C of D B-737 FFS equipped with day and night visual scenes that is representative of an operator’s specific B-737 configuration is required for flight training.

Note:

The FFS requirements for Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) training is provided in Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report.

(OE Report - Main Body)

10.5 FSTD

An approved Level C of D B-737 FFS equipped with day and night visual scenes that is representative of an operator’s specific B-737 configuration is required for checking.

The FFS requirements for Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) checking is provided in Annex 1 of Appendix 5 of this report.

Guidance

Flight Simulator Training Device (FSTD) Requirements

For B-737 MAX pilots training, the Full Flight Simulator (FFS) must be qualified to meet Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) requirements, because of the necessity to enter a full stall to demonstrate MCAS activation.
Flight training for Runaway Stabilizer and use of the manual stabilizer trim as outlined in Appendix 7 of the OE Report, may be conducted in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX or B-737NG Level C or D FFS. The specified Binary Simulation Load provides the basis for 737 MAX and B-737NG FFS programming and the resulting operating characteristics. Boeing has issued Simulator Data Bulletins as follow:
- SDB-737-006: The U.S. FAA has found Boeing Simulator Data Bulletin SDB-737-006 as an acceptable means for FSTD sponsors to validate manual stabilizer trim wheel forces. The FSTD sponsors must not allow use of the FFS to conduct training on manual stabilizer trim wheel, if the control forces are not adequate to meet the training objectives.
- SDB-737-008: Boeing has issued a Simulator Data Bulletin SDB-737-008 in order to provide the same runaway stabilizer condition for 737NG simulators.
Flight training for Runaway Stabilizer applicable for all series of B-737 required specific FFS requirement and are address below.

Three malfunctions are now available to train Runaway Stabilizer malfunctions on the B-737 MAX and/or B-737NG as provided in the table below:

ATA	Malfunction Title	Malfunction Description	Also Known As (AKA)
blank space	FFS – Runaway Stabilizer Malfunctions
22	FCC Stabilizer Runaway	Flight Control Computer NU (Nose Up) Stabilizer Runaway Flight Control Computer ND (Nose Down) Stabilizer Runaway	n/a not applicable
27	Stabilizer Runaway	Stabilizer Runaway	Dual Wire Short malfunction
27	Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch	Stabilizer Runaway	Electric Trim Switch malfunction

The ATA 22 Malfunction titled; FCC Stabilizer Runaway, is specific to the B-737 MAX and is used for training of the third scenario, Cross Flight Control Computer (Cross-FCC) Trim Monitor.

The two ATA 27 malfunctions available to train a Runaway Stabilizer are titled; Stabilizer Runaway and Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch. TCCA has prohibited the use of the Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch malfunction for training on all series of the B-737, because this specific malfunction is not consistent with the certification assumptions for the Runaway Stabilizer NNC, and may lead to negative transfer of training and is of an extremely low probability of occurring on the B-737.

Note:

FFS Runaway Stabilizer malfunctions that prevent the use of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim per the NNC are prohibited for training on all series of the B-737. Operators should ensure that the appropriate Runaway Stabilizer malfunction is incorporated into their FFS, prior to Runaway Stabilizer training. The TCCA National Simulator Evaluation Program (NSEP) should be consulted on the incorporation of malfunctions into the FFS and the subsequent qualification of the FFS for training. Pilots, other than those flying the B-737 MAX, must complete this training no later than January 1, 2024.

Additional guidance on the ATA 27 malfunctions is provided in Section A3.5 Flight Training – Runaway Stabilizer.

A3.4 Flight Training – Recovery from full stall

Figure 17: Boeing Flight Training profile – MCAS demo/full stall

A3.4.1 OE Report requirements - MCAS activation

(OE report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

2.1 Demonstration of MCAS activation for each pilot acting as PF.

2.1.1 MCAS activation during an impending stall (or full stall) and recovery demonstration during manual flight in a clean configuration.

2.1.2 Demonstrate MCAS activation stabilizer trim responses:

Stabilizer trim in the nose down direction when above threshold AOA for MCAS activation during stall.
Stabilizer trim in the nose up direction when below threshold AOA for MCAS activation during recovery.

Guidance

Stall Identification and Maneuver Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) activation

Recovery from a full stall – clean configuration – manual flight - both pilots

This Stall Identification and MCAS activation training must be completed by pilots before they may be authorized to fly the B-737 MAX. The training function must be accomplished by each pilot acting as PF and only in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX FFS as described in section A3.3 above.

TCCA recommends an additional demonstration of the Speed Trim Function, to enhance pilot understanding of the Speed Trim System (STS).

There are no recurrent training requirements for this training. Although not required, TCCA recommends that all B-737 MAX operators incorporate this training into their recurrent training profiles no later than 36 months after initial training.

A3.4.2 Flight Training Guidance - MCAS Activation

Guidance

Scenario purpose:

The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate the behaviour of the MCAS function (of the STS) during a stall.

This scenario may also be used to provide additional demonstrations of the normal operation of the Speed Trim Function (of the STS) during a manually flown climb and during a stall with flaps extended.

Scenario guidance:

STS Demonstration during Manually Flown Climb

The aircraft is flown manually to 10,000 feet, immediately after take-off. During the climb the crew may observe normal operation of the Speed Trim function while in manual flight.

This demonstration may be accomplished by stabilizing the aircraft in a climb in the take-off configuration and trimming out any control column forces. Speed should be changed by a small amount using control column only (no sooner than 5 seconds after the last stabilizer trim input or 10 seconds after take-off, to allow the Speed Trim function to work per STS logic.) Stabilizer trim wheel motion, in a manner to increase control column forces, and proportional to the speed deviation, should be observed.

The control column forces can then be relaxed to return to the original trim speed and allow the Speed Trim function to reverse the stabilizer trim input. The PF should avoid making any stabilizer trim inputs during this demonstration.

A key teaching point of this demonstration is to show the Speed Trim function is intended to discourage speed deviations through increased control column forces, during the conditions that this function is active.

When the aircraft has been stabilized back to the original trim speed, control may be transferred to allow the other pilot to complete this demonstration. Flaps may be retracted after this training event, to clean up the aircraft for the remaining climb.

MCAS Demonstration during stall

The demonstration of the MCAS function is accomplished by conducting a power off stall in the clean configuration, and recovering at the activation of the Elevator Feel Shift (EFS). Pilots will be instructed to not trim below the Flaps UP maneuver speed, and should avoid making any further stabilizer trim inputs during this demonstration.

This demonstration must be conducted at the elevated angles of attack, associated with a stall and in the clean configuration, in order to activate the MCAS function. The pilots during the demonstration, should observe all indications associated with increasing AOA and an impending stall, including stabilizer trim wheel motion rates and characteristics associated with the MCAS function.

During the deceleration to the stall, the pilots will be instructed to intentionally disregard the indications of an impending stall, including the Low Airspeed alert, appearance of the Pitch Limit Indicator (PLI), Stick Shaker, increasing airframe buffeting until EFS activation. Pilots will initially observe the operation of the Speed Trim function, through the nose-down motion of the stabilizer trim wheel.

Note:

The pilot’s should observe that the STS commands the stabilizer trim motor to operate at a low trim rate with flaps retracted, compared to a high trim rate with the flaps extended.

As AOA continues to increase the STS will transition from the Speed Trim function to the MCAS function. Following activation, of the EFS, pilots will recover from the stall and observe the STS (MCAS and Speed Trim functions) remove (“unwind”) the nose-down horizontal stabilizer inputs until the original trim reference speed is reached.

Speed Trim System (STS) functions

While this flight training focuses on a demonstration of the MCAS function, pilots should clearly understand that the MCAS function is one of the two functions of the Speed Trim System (STS), with the other function being the Speed Trim function. The MCAS and Speed Trim functions have different activation logic, but have a similar purpose of commanding stabilizer trim movement to discourage a speed deviation (and associated Angle Of Attack (AOA) deviation as the case may be) through increasing control column forces, while in manual flight (autopilot disengaged).

The STS provides nose down stabilizer trim inputs as the aircraft decelerates from a reference speed or AOA, and nose up inputs as the aircraft accelerates, to deter the pilot from further speed deviations through control column forces. Although the rate and characteristics of stabilizer motion in response to STS commands may vary with flap setting and acceleration/deceleration, pilots should understand that the MCAS and Speed Trim functions are fundamentally a Speed Trim System.

Note:

The control column cutout switches will stop any uncommanded stabilizer movement, except an aeroplane nose-down stabilizer movement commanded by the MCAS function. The incorporation of FCC P12.1.2 SW has eliminated the failure conditions that resulted in uncommanded MCAS activation. The new software introduced a new layer of redundancy called the “Software Column Cutout Function” to mitigate a latent column cutout switch failure. Any such MCAS activated stabilizer movement should be considered to be valid, and control column forces should be reduced to avoid increasing the Angle of Attack (AOA) further (since MCAS activation logic is a function of elevated AOAs.)

Pilots should gain a fundamental understanding that their first action in response to any STS stabilizer motion (whether through the Speed Trim or MCAS function) is to relax control column input to return to the original trim speed, or re-trim as necessary. When the control column forces are relaxed pilots should observe the STS reversing the stabilizer trim inputs from the original speed deviation.

Recommended demonstration - Speed Trim Function

The ground training for the STS describes both the Speed Trim and the MCAS functions of the STS. Although outside the scope of the training requirements of the OE report, TCCA recommends that an additional demonstration of the Speed Trim function in a full stall be provided to enhance pilots understanding of the STS.

TCCA therefore recommends repeating a manually entered full stall with flap extended (e.g. Flap 5) and thrust greater than 60% N₁ to activate the Speed Trim function. The objective of this demonstration is for pilots to recognize how and when the STS is functioning and for pilots to understand the basic similarity between the MCAS and Speed Trim functions, while seeing differences with regard to stabilizer trim rates associated with flap position and characteristics of stabilizer trim wheel movement.

Notes:

1. As explained earlier, the STS controls the stabilizer trim motor at a high trim rate with flaps extended and low trim rate with flaps retracted.
2. Although the MCAS function controls the stabilizer trim motor at the flaps extended Speed Trim function rate (high rate), the MCAS function will not activate with flaps extended.

This demonstration is also intended to show the pilots, that aft Control Column input (through the control column cutout switches) will stop stabilizer motion associated with the Speed Trim function (unlike the MCAS function as described earlier).

Full stall training

Pilots may not be familiar with the indications of an impending stall, beyond stick shaker activation, unless they have had full stall or Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT). Pilots will need to be familiar with the indications of a stall beyond those of the stick shaker, including the activation of the EFS, to effectively observe the operation of the MCAS function. Demonstrations of AOAs beyond the activation of the stick shaker requires that the FFS is suitably qualified for this training, and must meet UPRT training requirements. Pilots must also understand the appropriate stall recovery inputs, when recovering from a stall beyond stick shaker activation. Aggressive thrust application should be avoided, since on the B-737 MAX, this may result in an undesirable pitch up tendency and aggravate the stall recovery or lead to an aeroplane upset condition. Smooth and deliberate pitch and thrust inputs will be necessary to avoid a secondary stick shaker activation, stall or upset.

Training applicability and FFS

Training for MCAS activation is applicable to all B-737 MAX pilots and must be conducted in a B-737 MAX FFS meeting the simulator qualification requirements stated in Section A3.3 above.

Recurrent Training

Training for MCAS activation is a “one-time” special training event to qualify pilots to fly the B-737 MAX. There are no recurrent training requirements in the TCCA OE report.

B-737 operators however are encouraged to incorporate recurrent training at least every 36 months, to demonstrate MCAS and Speed Trim functions and B-737 stall identification features, because of the important value of this training.

A3.5 Flight Training – Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim operations during approach and go-around

Figure 18: Boeing Flight Training profile – Runaway Stabilizer/Manual Trimming

A3.5.1 OE Report Requirements – Runaway Stabilizer

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

2.2 A runaway stabilizer condition that requires the pilots to use manual stabilizer trim accomplished by each pilot acting as PF.

2.2.1 Runaway stabilizer training as described in subparagraph 9.2.2.5.

2.2.2 Operation of each manual trim technique (as defined by Boeing).

2.2.3 This training can be completed in a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.

Note:

(OE Report - Main Body)

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during flight training:

9.2.2.5 Runaway stabilizer

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

Training must emphasize runaway stabilizer recognition and timely pilot actions required by the Runaway Stabilizer NNC:

Demonstrate control column functionality and its effect on a runaway stabilizer condition;
Emphasize the need to reduce control column forces with main electric stabilizer trim prior to selecting Stab Trim cutout.

This item must be included in initial or transition training and must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training.

Note:

Guidance

The OE Report Appendix 7 Runaway Stabilizer training must be completed by pilots before they may be authorized to fly the B-737 MAX. The training event must be accomplished by each pilot acting as PF and only in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX or B-737NG Level C or D FFS as detailed in section A3.3 above.

The TASE for Runaway Stabilizer (OE report Section 9.2.2.5) applies to all series of the B-737. This TASE flight training must be accomplished in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS that has proper control forces and travel system operation as stated in Section A3.3 above. The Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches must also be functional for this Runaway Stabilizer training. Any FFS malfunction that prevents the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches from functioning as designed is prohibited for training for all series of B-737.

The FFS ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway (a.k.a. the Dual Wire short malfunction) is the FFS malfunction permitted for B-737 MAX and B-737 NG Runaway Stabilizer training. Other B-737 FFSs, must have Runaway Stabilizer malfunctions qualified to meet the preceding requirements. For the B-737NG, Boeing has issued a Simulator Data Bulletin (SDB-737-008) in order to provide the same runaway stabilizer condition for 737NG simulators.

Pilots, other than those flying the B-737 MAX, must complete this training no later than January 1, 2024.

Guidance for Runaway Stabilizer flight training and manual trim technique is provided in separate subsections below.

A3.5.2 Flight Training guidance – Runaway Stabilizer

Guidance

Scenario purpose:

The purpose of Runaway Stabilizer training is to train the crew to recognize and mitigate this malfunction using the Runaway Stabilizer NNC (to maintain control of the aircraft and establish manual trim controls.)

Note:

The B-737-100/-200 series do not have a Speed Trim System (STS).

Scenario guidance:

The Runaway Stabilizer malfunction training is conducted with the crew following Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring roles in completing the Runaway Stabilizer NNC. Each pilot must complete this training as PF and PM.

Note:

The Runaway Stabilizer NNC is an unannunciated NNC. Pilots must be trained to recognize stabilizer trim movement in a manner not appropriate for flight conditions.

Ground and Flight training should ensure that pilots are familiar with normal stabilizer trim movement and when stabilizer trim movement should (and should not) be anticipated. An example of inappropriate stabilizer movement could be a continuous uncommanded stabilizer movement without airspeed, altitude or configuration changes, or Speed Trim System (STS) commanded stabilizer movement within 5 seconds of a Main Electric Stabilizer trim input.

Runaway Stabilizer flight training is provided using the ATA 27 Dual Wire Short malfunction to trigger the Runaway Stabilizer condition.

In the B-737 MAX Full Flight Simulator (FFS), the runaway stabilizer indications associated with the Dual Wire short malfunction, will be the autopilot (A/P) disengagement (if engaged) with the corresponding A/P disengage tone and by the illumination of multiple annunciator lights (A/P Disengage (flashes), Master Caution and Speed Trim Fail). The Stab Out of Trim light illuminates on landing when below 30 knots ground speed.

The B737NG FFS exhibits similar flight deck effects with the exception of the Stab Out of Trim light. On the B-737NG, the Speed Trim Fail, FLT CONT system annunciator and Master Caution lights can illuminate if there is a STS trim command in the direction opposite of the runaway. The PF should experience increasing control column forces if attempting to maintain a desired flight path, and should check for uncommanded movement of the stabilizer trim wheel.

Caution:

It is important in training to emphasize that pilots should always be vigilant for stabilizer trim movement that occurs in a manner not appropriate for flight conditions. This is to avoid “pre-programming” pilots to conclude they have a runaway stabilizer, if the A/P disengages or Master Caution light illuminates for other reasons.

With the Dual Wire Short malfunction (in a suitably qualified flight simulator), Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches will stop and reverse uncommanded stabilizer trim movement until released. If stabilizer movement is allowed to continue, control column cutout switches will activate to prevent further uncommanded stabilizer trim movement, but will not reverse it. The uncommanded stabilizer trim movement will resume with release of the control column.

Each pilot should be given “hands-on” experience on how the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches stop and reverse a runaway stabilizer (while the switches are held), and how the control column cutout will momentarily stop runaway stabilizer movement.

While accomplishing the Runaway Stabilizer NNC memory items, The PF should not hesitate to use the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches, to reduce control column forces. The PF should strive to minimize aircraft airspeed deviations from the airspeed at which the runaway stabilizer occurred, to avoid having large residual stabilizer manual trim forces after activating the Stab Trim cutout switches.

With a thorough understanding of the functions of the Main Electric Stabilizer trim and Control Column cutout switches functions, pilots should gain sufficient confidence in these control functions that they don’t need to rush to select the Stab Trim cutout switches to the Cutout position, especially before they remove excessive out of trim control column forces.

FFS malfunctions - Runaway Stabilizer Flight Training

As discussed in Section A3.3, TCCA has established the ATA 27 malfunction “Stabilizer Runaway” (a.k.a. the Dual Wire Short) as appropriate for Runaway Stabilizer training. TCCA has prohibited the use of the malfunction for training Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (a.k.a. the Electric Trim Switch malfunction.)

The Dual Wire short malfunction was established as being the appropriate malfunction for training, after an aircraft certification review of potential malfunctions that could result in a Runaway Stabilizer condition. This malfunction permits full function of all stabilizer controls required in the NNC, and is suitable for any training events of stabilizer movement not appropriate for the flight conditions, per the Runaway Stabilizer NNC Condition Statement. Pilots, other than those flying the B-737 MAX, must complete this training no later than January 1, 2024.

The Electric Trim Switch malfunction is a “legacy” B-737 Runaway Stabilizer malfunction that simulates a short circuit of one of the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches. An aircraft certification review established this malfunction was of an extremely low probability of occurring on the B-737 fleet. This malfunction does not permit the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches to reverse runaway stabilizer trim inputs. This legacy malfunction has led to inappropriate pilot responses, to hastily activate the Stab Trim cutout switches during Runaway Stabilizer training, and experience higher than desired manual trim forces as a result.

TCCA has therefore prohibited Runaway Stabilizer training using the “legacy” Electric Trim Switch malfunction for all series of B-737 because of its extremely low probability of this malfunction and the concern that it could result in a negative transfer of training.

Runaway Stabilizer NNC Memory Items

Note:

Refer to sub-section A2.2.1 for detailed guidance on the Runaway Stabilizer NNC and associated memory items (7 steps).

Steps 1 to 3 of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC memory items require the PF to take manual control of the aircraft by Holding the Control Column firmly and disengaging the Autopilot and Autothrottle (if engaged).

Step 4 requires the use of control column and thrust levers to control airplane pitch attitude and airspeed. The flight crew should also remain aware of thrust lever position for situational awareness of the aircraft state. The PF should continue to strive to minimize aircraft airspeed deviations from the airspeed at which the runaway stabilizer occurred, to minimize control column forces. The PF should not hesitate to use the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches, to reduce control column forces, while accomplishing this step.

Step 5 provides guidance to reduce control column forces through Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches as a key step prior to activating the Stab Trim cutout switches in Step 7. The PF should strive to remove control column forces as much as possible prior to activating the Stab Trim cutout switches. Failure to do so, may result in excessive manual trim forces.

Note:

The failure by the PF to reduce control column forces sufficiently through the Main Electric Stabilizer Trim switches may result in the PF needing to apply control column displacement sufficient to activate the Control Column switches. The PF should not assume that a runaway stabilizer condition has been stopped. (The runaway stabilizer movement will resume if the control column is released.)

Step 6 requires the crew to determine if the runaway stops after the autopilot disengages. This step is required to ensure that the autopilot is not the source of the Runaway Stabilizer.

Step 7 directs the flight crew to select both Stab Trim cutout switches to Cutout after the runaway stabilizer condition is verified and all preceding memory items have been completed correctly. This step is also required to permit the manual trimming of the Stabilizer (Step 8).

The last element of Step 7 to grasp and hold the Stabilizer trim wheel applies to a stabilizer brake failure in earlier series of the B-737, for which this NNC applies.

By actioning the Runaway Stabilizer NNC, the completion of the memory items will be assured. The crew may then complete the Speed Trim Fail NNC, since the Speed Trim Fail light will have illuminated during this malfunction. (The STS (Speed Trim and MCAS functions) will be inoperative with the Stab Trim cutout switches in Cutout position.)

Note:

Crews should not action the Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC in response to a Runaway Stabilizer. This NNC is actioned through a loss of electric trim through the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches, or as directed by the Stab Out Of Trim NNC, which is not the case here. Actioning the Stabilizer Trim Inoperative NNC will also result in the requirement to plan for a flaps 15 landing.

Training applicability and FFS

Training for Runaway Stabilizer and manual stabilizer trim applies to all B-737s. B-737 MAX pilots may take this training in a suitably qualified B-737NG Level C or D FFS. The B-737NG Level C or D FFS must meet the qualification requirements stated in Section A3.3 above, with the appropriate binary simulation load, and evaluation of the stabilizer trim system for proper control forces and travel system operation.

TCCA requires the use of the ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway (Dual Wire Short Malfunction) for this scenario. TCCA does not permit use of the ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (Electric Trim Switch Malfunction) for the reasons stated above.

As explained earlier, there are differences in the cockpit indications of this malfunction between the B-737 MAX and B-737NG. The Speed Trim Fail light may or may not illuminate on the B-737NG FFS during the Runaway Stabilizer Malfunction.

The Stab Out of Trim light illumination logic is different between the B-737 MAX and B-737NG. This light will only illuminate on the B-737 MAX on landing when below 30 knots ground speed. The Stab Out of Trim light may illuminate on the B-737NG if the failure is initiated with the autopilot engaged.

Similar to B-737 MAX Runaway Stabilizer training, for B-737s (other than B-737 MAX), each pilot should be given “hands-on” experience on the Main Electric Stabilizer trim switches and the control column cutout switch functions.

Recurrent Training

Flight training for Runaway Stabilizer and manual stabilizer trim operation must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training. Recurrent training should include all of the elements of the special training described above.

Recurrent training may include variations on the flight conditions for the Runaway Stabilizer as described in the following Recommendations.

Recommendations

The Runaway Stabilizer malfunction should be inserted both in the flaps up and flaps extended configurations to show pilots the different stabilizer trim rates as a function of flap configurations. The malfunctions should also be inserted at both the high and low speed ranges of the aircraft, for pilots to maintain aircraft control at these speed ranges (e.g. nose-down runaway stabilizer at high speed (near VMO/MMO), and nose-up runaway stabilizer with flaps extended at appropriate minimum flap manoeuvering speed.) Training may also be conducted during accelerated flight, such as a nose-down Runaway Stabilizer during acceleration from 250 KTS, in a climb above 10,000 feet.

A3.5.3 OE Report requirements – Manual Stabilizer Trim requirements

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

2.3 Use of manual stabilizer trim during approach, go-around and level off accomplished by each pilot acting as PF.

2.3.1 Use of manual stabilizer trim as described in subparagraph 9.2.2.4.

2.3.2 This training can be completed in a B-737 MAX or B-737NG FFS.

(OE Report - Main Body)

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during flight training:

9.2.2.4 Stabilizer trim

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

9.2.2.4.1 Training must emphasize the following during manual and electric trim operations:

a) Manufacturer recommended procedures for the proper use of main electric stabilizer trim during normal and non normal conditions, and manual stabilizer trim during non-normal conditions;
b) The different manual trim techniques recommended by the manufacturer;
c) The effects of airspeed and aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer and the resulting trim forces in both the nose-up and nose-down directions during operations at low and high airspeeds and/or mach number; and
d) Use of manual stabilizer trim during approach, go-around, and level off.

9.2.2.4.2 This item must be included in initial or transition training and must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training.

Guidance

Section 2. Flight Training of Appendix 7 of the TCCA OE Report for the B-737 explained the Manual Stabilizer Trim requirements training for the B-737 MAX pilots. This training must be completed by pilots before they may be authorized to fly the B-737 MAX. The training event must be accomplished by each pilot acting as PF and only in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX or B-737NG Level C or D FFS.

The manufacturer’s recommended procedures referred to in the OE report, refer to the Boeing Company ground and flight training outlined in Appendix 7 of the OE report.

Sub-section 9.2.2 of the main body of the OE report provides the TASE requirements for this training. This flight training applies to all B-737s. This TASE flight training may be accomplished in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS that meets the same requirements with regard to proper control forces and travel system operation as stated in Section A3.3 above

Pilots other than those flying the B-737 MAX, must complete this training in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS no later than January 1, 2024.

A3.5.4 Flight Training guidance - Manual Stabilizer Trim requirements

Guidance

Scenario purpose:

The purpose of this scenario is as follows:

Demonstration of various manual trimming techniques
Manually flown descent, approach, go-around and level-off using manual stabilizer trim

Scenario guidance:

Training on manual trimming techniques immediately follows the Runaway Stabilizer training for each pilot. This training includes manual trimming techniques from various stabilizer out of trim conditions and includes, single and two pilot efforts to manually trim the aircraft. The training also includes manual demonstrations of trimming at both high and low airspeeds, to demonstrate the effects of airspeed on aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer and the associated force required to move the stabilizer trim wheel.

Training should also demonstrate that the initial manual trimming forces (break-out forces) to start movement of the manual trim wheel may be significantly higher compared to the subsequent sustained manual trimming forces required. The training should also provide an opportunity for pilots to experience how the manual trim forces change as the aircraft approaches a trimmed condition.

The Runaway Stabilizer training should emphasize that using the Main Electric Trim Switches to minimize Control Column forces prior to activating the Stab Trim cutout switches, should minimize the resulting force required to move the stabilizer trim wheel.

Increased manual trim forces can result because of increased aerodynamic loads associated with high airspeeds, or pulling or pushing on the control column. A two pilot effort may be used to correct an out of trim condition. In extreme cases it may be necessary to relieve the aerodynamic loads to allow manual trimming. Aerodynamic loads can be relieved by reducing airspeed.

If manual stabilizer trim is needed, it is important to emphasize that the Stab Trim cutout switches should be placed in the Cutout position prior to extending the stabilizer trim wheel handles. Personal injury can occur if the stabilizer trim wheel moves due to electric trim inputs while the stabilizer trim wheel handles are extended.

The emphasis during the subsequent descent, approach and go-around using manual trim should focus on the need to anticipate trim changes for airspeed and configuration changes. This is particularly important during the go-around and subsequent level off maneuver, where large changes in thrust may result in large control column forces. Pilots should avoid a tendency to over-trim and should carefully monitor pitch attitude until the aircraft is fully trimmed and stabilized.

A3.6 Flight Training – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation

Figure 19: Boeing Flight Training profile – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor

A3.6.1 OE Report requirements – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

2.4 A Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation demonstration accomplished by either pilot acting as PF.

2.4.1 Condition must terminate in a landing in order to demonstrate the updated Stab Out of Trim light functionality.

Guidance

This Cross-FCC Monitor activation training must be completed by pilots before they may be authorized to fly the B-737 MAX. The training function must be accomplished by either pilot acting as PF and only in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS.

While the FCC Trim Monitor activation demonstration is accomplished in flight, this training scenario must end in a full-stop landing to demonstrate the updated Stab Out of Trim light functionality.

A3.6.2 Flight Training guidance – Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation

Guidance

Scenario purpose:

The purpose of this scenario is to demonstrate the Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activation in response to a Runaway Stabilizer originating from the FCC and the illumination of the Stab Out of Trim light on landing.

Scenario guidance:

This malfunction scenario is a demonstration of the Cross-FCC trim monitor detecting and stopping an erroneous stabilizer trim command. The stabilizer runaway will be stopped 1.3 seconds after activation of the malfunction.

If the Cross-FCC Trim Monitor activates in either the operational or the standby FCC channel, the FCC sends a signal to the other FCC to inhibit its stabilizer trim commands, this includes autopilot, Control Wheel Steering (CWS), and Speed Trim System (STS) commands.

If the A/P (CMD A or B) or CWS (CWS A or B) was engaged to the affected FCC channel (A or B), it will automatically disengage and cause the associated aural and visual alerts. The Speed Trim Fail light can illuminate automatically, during Master Caution recall, or not at all. The STS will no longer be available with the illumination of the Speed Trim Fail light.

For Fail Operational aerolanes, the No Autoland status is annunciated.

The Stab Out of Trim light will illuminate after landing when groundspeed is less than 30 knots. Crews should be vigilant and alert for the illumination of the Stab Out of Trim light after landing because it may be easily missed during this high workload phase of flight.

The flight crew should take to the appropriate action in response to the Stab Out of Trim light illumination on the ground. The crew should report the illumination of this light for appropriate maintenance action. The crew may action the Stab Out of Trim NNC, if in accordance with their Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Any subsequent flight should not be attempted, until the malfunction is rectified.

FFS Runaway Stabilizer malfunction applicable to Cross-FCC Trim Monitor

The ATA 22 malfunction, titled FCC Stabilizer Runaway is used to activate this scenario.

Training applicability and FFS

This training scenario specifically applies to the B-737 MAX and must be conducted in a B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS meeting the simulator qualification requirements stated in Section A3.3 (above).

Recurrent Training

Training of this scenario is not required for recurrent flight training. Flight crews should be reminded on actions to take in response to the illumination of the Stab Out of Trim light during recurrent ground or flight training.

A3.7 Flight Training – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions

Figure 20: Boeing Flight Training profile – High AOA malfunction

A3.7.1 OE Report requirements – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions

(OE Report - Appendix 7)

2. Flight Training

2.5 Erroneous high AOA during takeoff that leads to an unreliable airspeed condition accomplished by either pilot acting as PF.

2.5.1 Demonstrates flight deck effects (i.e. aural, visual and tactile) associated with the failure.
2.5.2 The discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in accordance with Airspeed Unreliable NNC.
2.5.3 Fault occurring during the takeoff procedure.
2.5.4 Must include a go-around or missed approach flown with erroneous high AOA condition.
- 2.5.4.1 Special emphasis placed on FD behavior biasing out of view upon selecting Takeoff/Go-around (TO/GA).

(OE Report - Main Body)

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during flight training:

9.2.2.7 Unreliable airspeed

This training applies to pilots flying the B-737NG, B-737 MAX, or conducting B-737NG/B-737 MAX Mixed Fleet Flying (MFF).

Training must include the discretionary deactivation of nuisance stick shaker in accordance with Airspeed Unreliable NNC.

Recurrent training may be accomplished in either a B-737NG or B-737 MAX FFS.

(OE Report - Main Body)

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

Pilots must receive special emphasis on the following areas during flight training:

9.2.2.6 Multiple Flight Deck Alerts During Non-Normal Conditions

Applicable to all series of the B-737:

Recognition and interpretation of the non-normal condition.
Prioritization of the required pilot actions

Guidance

This Airspeed Unreliable and Multiple Flight Deck Alert during Non-normal conditions training must be completed by pilots before they may be authorized to fly the B-737 MAX. The training function must be accomplished by the pilots as a crew and only in a suitably qualified B-737 MAX FFS.

Pilots flying only the B-737NG must complete this training in a suitably qualified B-737NG FFS no later than January 1, 2024.

This training scenario comprises unreliable airspeed training during take-off caused by a single erroneously high AOA sensor. The erroneously high AOA causes numerous flight deck effects including a continuous nuisance stick shaker. The B-737 MAX and B-737NG Airspeed Unreliable NNC has provisions for the deactivation of the nuisance stick shaker. This training scenario also requires a descent, approach and go-around after completion of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC. The purpose of the Go-around training is to demonstrate the Flight Director (FD) biasing out of view, and the means to re-establish vertical FD guidance.

The Training for multiple flight deck alerts during non-normal conditions applies to pilots flying all B-737s. Operators must develop suitable training scenarios where a single malfunction results in multiple flight deck alerts that require timely pilot action. This training must be accomplished in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS, no later than January 1, 2024.

Note:

The Airspeed Unreliable training, meets the criteria of the training requirement for multiple flight deck alerts during non-normal conditions for the B-737 MAX and B-737NG.

Recurrent Training

Pilots of the B-737 MAX and B-737NG must accomplish Airspeed Unreliable training due to an erroneously high AOA on take-off at least once every 36 months during recurrent training.

Either pilot may serve as PF during this training. Recurrent training may be accomplished in either a B-737NG or B-737 MAX FFS that meets the qualification requirements of the OE report.

In addition to the preceding requirements, operators should include airspeed unreliable training due to other sources of unreliable airspeed, such as pitot and or static port blockages, or other air data system failures.

Note:

Airspeed unreliable training due to other sources of unreliable airspeed is an additional requirement to Airspeed Unreliable training due to an erroneously high AOA on take-off. This training may be incorporated into other recurrent training events.

Pilots of all B-737s must accomplish training of multiple flight deck alerts during non-normal conditions at least once every 36 months during recurrent training. Pilots of the B-737 MAX and B-737 NG who accomplish the Airspeed Unreliable training due to an erroneously high AOA on take-off during recurrent training are considered to have met this training requirement.

A3.7.2 Flight Training guidance – Unreliable Airspeed and Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions

Guidance

Scenario purpose:

The purpose of this scenario is:

The recognition of an unreliable airspeed condition due to erroneous high Angle of Attack (AOA) malfunction and successfully complete the Airspeed Unreliable memory items and NNC;
Demonstration of FD behaviour during a Go-around/Missed Approach;
Training of Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions.

Scenario guidance:

This scenario is triggered by an erroneously high AOA vane on take-off, which will result in multiple cockpit indications, including the activation of an intermittent or continuous stick shaker.

Flight crews will be expected to discern whether they have actual or nuisance stall warning indications based upon the cockpit indications they observe. Flight crews will need to take appropriate stall recovery actions if valid stall warning indications are observed (e.g. both stall shakers are active, airframe buffeting etc.)

When the indications of unreliable airspeed are identified and verified, the crew will be expected to action the Airspeed Unreliable memory items and complete the Airspeed Unreliable NNC. The continuous stick shaker may be a significant distraction and may make communication difficult. The Pilot In Command (PIC) is encouraged to declare an emergency at the appropriate time to gain priority and minimize further distractions.

The NNC will have to be carefully and methodical read despite the possible distraction from the stick shaker. It will be acceptable to verbally abbreviate some of the NNC text provided the abbreviation is clear and accurate.

It will be possible to engage the autopilot in Step 14 of the NNC.

Note:

The autopilot however will disengage after five minutes of continuous stick shaker and will no longer be available for the remainder of the flight. This autopilot behaviour is identified in the Note in Step 14. The crew should plan to continue the remainder of the flight without autopilot.

The flight crew may need to remain in a sustained climb until the NNC is completed, and an appropriate altitude clearance should be obtained from ATC. In this specific scenario (of a high AOA malfunction), the flight crew should not change the aircraft thrust, pitch attitude and flap configuration, until a reliable airspeed indication can be determined and the Flight Director is available and selected ON.

Steps 20 to 23 (at the end) of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC provide for the flight crew to deactivate the nuisance stick shaker at the PIC’s discretion. The stick shaker Circuit Breakers (CBs) will have collars to aid in their correct identification. The crew should carefully identify and verify the correct CB before pulling, especially with the ambient noise and distraction caused by the continuous stick shaker. In addition to removal of the distraction of the stick shaker, the control column forces associated with the EFS will be removed and a reliable stall warning for the opposite side stick shaker will be made available.

Completion of Airspeed Unreliable NNC

The disabling of the nuisance stick shaker will provide for significantly less distraction and a quieter environment to assess the situation and plan contingencies, such as whether to return to land, or proceed to an alternate or destination.

The additional information section of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC should be carefully reviewed to ascertain the status of the aircraft. NNCs for IAS Disagree, ALT Disagree and AOA Disagree alerts will likely direct the crew back to the Unreliable Airspeed NNC, that should be reviewed for any specific actions.

It is advisable to review Deferred Items well before descent for planning. The N₁ value and Pitch Attitude for Go-around should be computed in advance. FD behaviour (biasing out of view when TO/GA is pushed during go-around or missed approach) should be anticipated.

All operational requirements, remaining aircraft capabilities, weather conditions and fuel requirements should be considered. The flight crew should carefully assess the FMC fuel predictions in light of potential erroneous air data inputs to the Flight Management System (FMS).

Training applicability and FFS

Initial training of this scenario applies to pilots flying the B-737 MAX. Either pilot may serve as pilot flying (PF) for this training scenario. Initial training must be conducted in a B-737 MAX Level C or D FFS meeting the simulator qualification requirements stated in Section A3.3 above. For all other B-737 this training must be accomplished in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS, no later than January 1, 2024.

Recurrent Training

This scenario must be accomplished at least once every 36 months during recurrent training. Either pilot may serve as pilot flying (PF) for this training task. For all series of B-737 this recurrent training must be accomplished in a suitably qualified B-737 FFS.

Other AOA malfunctions should be considered for recurrent training such as erroneously high or low AOA during take-off, level flight or descent. Pitot and/or static blockages should also be trained on a recurrent basis.

Multiple Flight Deck Alerts during Non-Normal Conditions

The erroneously high AOA in this scenario is an example of a single malfunction resulting in multiple flight deck alerts that will require timely flight crew actions. The flight crew will be required to recognize and interpret the non-normal conditions and prioritize required flight crew actions under demanding conditions. The onset of a stick shaker activation during take-off may be startling.

Although this scenario should be trained in real time, it is recommended that during training, the flight crew be discouraged from rushing through the NNC, and take all the time necessary to consider options after the NNC is completed. This type of training may be amenable to Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) scenarios, considering the numerous associated operational considerations.

Annex B – Flight Training requirements matrix

Training Event	Reference	Applicability	Initial Training	Recurrent Training	Comments/ Recommended Training
Stall Identification and MCAS Activation	A3.3 Flight Training – Recovery from Full Stall OE Report Appendix 7 section 2.1	B737 MAX	Prior to Flying B-737 MAX	Not Required - Recommended	Must be accomplished by each pilot as PF. There are no recurrent training requirements for this training. TCCA recommends that all B-737 MAX operators incorporate this training into their recurrent training profiles no later than 36 months after initial training.
Stall Identification and Speed Trim Function Demonstration	A3.3 Flight Training – Recovery from Full Stall	B-737 MAX	Not Required – Recommended	Not Required - Recommended	Recommended training in addition to MCAS demonstration (B-737 MAX). (Recommend an additional demonstration of the Speed Trim function in a full stall.) There are no recurrent training requirements for this training. TCCA recommends that all B-737 MAX operators incorporate this training into their recurrent training profiles no later than 36 months after initial training. Should be accomplished by each pilot as PF.
Full Stall Training	A3.3 Flight Training – Recovery from Full Stall	B-737 MAX	Prerequisite training to conducting Stall Identification and MCAS and Speed Trim Function Activation Training	Not Required - Recommended	Prerequisite training for stall entry and recovery at angles of attack beyond Stick Shaker. Must be accomplished by each pilot as PF. There are no recurrent training requirements for this training. TCCA recommends that all B-737 MAX operators incorporate this training into their recurrent training profiles no later than 36 months after initial training.
STS Demonstration during climb	A3.3 Flight Training – Recovery from Full Stall	B-737 MAX	Not Required – Recommended	Not Required - Recommended	Recommend training to be conducted in climb prior to conducting Stall Identification and MCAS and Speed Trim Function Activation training. Should be accomplished by each pilot as PF.
Runaway Stabilizer	A3.4 Flight Training – Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim operations during and approach and go-around OE Report Section 9.2.2.5 and Appendix 7 section 2.2	All B-737	Prior to Flying B-737 MAX Required for all other B-737 no later than Jan 1, 2024	Required	FFS must be suitably qualified. Must use only FFS malfunction ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway (Dual Wire Short Malfunction) for this training. Training using FFS malfunction ATA 27 Stabilizer Runaway – Trim Switch (Electric Trim Switch Malfunction) prohibited. Must be accomplished by each pilot as PF. Recurrent Training required no later than 36 months after initial training.
Manual Trim Requirements	A3.4 Flight Training –Runaway Stabilizer NNC and manual stabilizer trim operations during and approach and go-around OE Report Section 9.2.2.4 and Appendix 7 section 2.3	All B-737	Prior to Flying B-737 MAX Required for all other B-737 no later than Jan 1, 2024	Required	FFS must be suitably qualified. Must be accomplished by each pilot as PF. Recurrent Training required no later than 36 months after initial training.
Cross-FCC Trim Monitor Activation	A3.5 Flight Training – Cross FCC Trim Monitor Activation OE Report Appendix 7 section 2.4	B737 MAX	Prior to Flying B-737 MAX	Not required	This training applicable to B-737 MAX only. FSS malfunction ATA 22 FCC Stabilizer Runaway. Either pilot may serve as PF during this training.
Unreliable Airspeed – Erroneously High AOA on Take-off	A3.6 Flight Training – Unreliable Airspeed OE Report Section 9.2.2.7 and Appendix 7 section 2.5	B737 MAX B-737NG	Prior to Flying B-737 MAX Required for B-737 NG no later than Jan 1, 2024	Required	FFS must be suitably qualified. Either pilot may serve as PF during this training. Recurrent Training required no later than 36 months after initial training. In addition to Erroneously High AOA on Take-off, recurrent training must include other malfunctions that result in an unreliable airspeed condition.
Multiple Flight Deck Alerts During Non-Normal Conditions	A3.6 Flight Training – Unreliable Airspeed OE Report Section 9.2.2.6	All B-737	Prior to Flying B-737 MAX Required for all other B-737 no later than Jan 1, 2024	Required	Erroneously High AOA on Take-off on B-737 MAX and B-737NG meets the criteria of Multiple Flight Deck Alerts During Non-Normal Conditions. Suitable failure cases for this training requirement must be established for B-737 Classic and B-737. Recurrent Training required no later than 36 months after initial training.

Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) Operational Evaluation Report - The Boeing Company, Boeing 737 (PDF, 2.6 MB)

Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) Operational Evaluation Report

The Boeing Company Boeing 737

Management Co-ordination Sheet

Office of Primary Interest (OPI):

Table of contents

1. Record of revisions

2. Introduction

2.1 General

2.2 Regulatory Requirements / Language

3. Highlights of change

4. General

4.1 Scope of Report

4.2 Guidance Material

4.3 OE Report Effectiveness

4.4 Application of OE Report

4.5 Alternate Means of Compliance

4.6 AQP/OEB Report relationship

4.7 Boeing 737 MAX Initial Type Training, STAR and PEC course evaluations

4.8 Differences between Boeing 737 MAX and Boeing 737NG

4.9 Differences between B-737-8 and B-737-9

4.10 Boeing 737-800 Boeing Converted Freighter (BCF)

4.11 Rockwell Collins right seat Head Up Display (HUD) installation

4.12 Boeing 737-8 Boeing Business Jet (BBJ) MAX 8

4.13 Revised Flight Control Computer (FCC) software evaluation

4.14 Joint Operational Evaluation Board (JOEB) Evaluation of Boeing 737 MAX design changes

4.15 Boeing 737-8200

4.16 Appendix 8 - Purpose

5. Acronyms

6. Definitions

7. Pilot type rating

8. Related aircraft

8.1 Related Aircraft on same TCDS

8.2 Related Aircraft on different TCDS

9. Pilot training

9.1 Previous experience

9.2 Training Areas of Special Emphasis (TASE)

Pilots must receive special emphasis training in the following areas:

9.2.1 TASE - Ground Training

9.2.2 TASE - Flight Training

9.2.3 Tail strike avoidance

9.2.4 Two position Tail skid

9.2.5 Landing de-rotation

9.3 Specific flight characteristics

9.4 Seat dependent tasks

9.5 Training requirements not applicable to the B-737 series

9.5.1 Tuck and Mach buffet training

9.5.2 Fuel Jettisoning

9.6 Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD)

9.7 Training equipment

9.8 Differences Training between Related Aircraft

9.8.1 B-737NG to B-737 MAX Ground Training

9.8.2 B-737NG to B-737 MAX Flight Training

9.8.3 B-737CL (EFIS/Non-EFIS) aircraft to/from B-737NG (PFD/ND) aircraft differences

9.8.4 Blended, Split-scimitar and the MAX Advanced Technology winglet

9.8.5 Roll Command Alerting System (RCAS)

9.8.6 Runway Situational Awareness Tools (RSAT) system

9.8.7 Rockwell Collins Head-Up Guidance System (HGS) HGS-4000 and HGS-6000

9.8.8 Integrated Standby Flying Display (ISFD)

9.8.9 Display Installation

9.8.10 FMS for B-737-200 series

9.8.11 Future Air Navigation System (FANS)

9.8.12 Alternate Navigation System (ANS)

9.8.13 FMS

9.9 B-737 MAX special training for flight crews

9.10 Landing from a No flap or Non standard flap approach

10. Pilot checking

10.1

10.2 Specific flight characteristics

10.3 Seat dependent tasks

10.4 Other checking items

10.4.1 Precision approach using HUD and EFVS.

10.4.2 HUD vs. FD and Raw Data

10.5 FSTD

10.6 Equipment

10.7 Differences Checking between Related Aircraft

10.7.1 Alternating PPC for B73A, B73B and B73C

10.7.2 FMS demonstration of competency/checks

11. Pilot currency

11.1 Differences Currency between Related Aircraft

12. Operational suitability

The Boeing Company
Boeing 737

Appendix 5 – Annex 1
HGS 4000 EFVS qualification program – Not for landing credit