Rail notices - filter

Condition or Hazard observed:

• The inadequate sightlines for the current road and rail speed due to the angle of the intersection of the road and rail at this crossing could be expected to lead to a collision where a vehicle driver, passenger or railway employee is seriously injured or killed or cause damage to property or the environment;

• The horizontal alignment poses a risk to safe passage of vehicles that have a restricted view (e.g gravel trucks, tractor trailers, pickup trucks, cube vans or vehicles used for transporting farming goods and supplies). All of these types of vehicles have one thing in common: they restrict the driver to viewing an approaching train out the passenger front window only. The signs installed on Fansher road to prohibit heavy trucks and farm machinery exempt some vehicles that could have a restricted view as mentioned above; and

• On November 16, 2015, a fatality occurred at Mile 41.31(Euphemia Line) which had a similar level of safety as Mile 39.19 (Fansher Road). A lack of immediate action could result in a similar crossing incident which could reasonably be expected to lead to a person being injured or made ill or could cause damage to property or the environment.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Not allow railway equipment or movements to occupy the crossing at mile 39.19, Windsor Subdivision (Fansher Road, Dawn-Euphemia, ON) unless:

• The train speed is limited to 10MPH until the crossing is fully occupied

OR, if operationally more feasible at current track speeds;

• The crossing is manually protected by a flag person

Condition or Hazard observed:

Obstacles placed on the individual's property restrict the movement of vehicles, including trucks and emergency vehicles. This means that vehicles on the property could block the grade crossing and might not be able to clear the grade crossing when a train is approaching. This could cause an accident in which a person could be injured or killed and constitutes an immediate threat to safe railway operations.

Order to an individual

The person shall ensure that no obstacle placed on the property restricts the movement of vehicles in such way that a vehicle blocks the grade crossing or is unable to clear the grade crossing when a train is approaching.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The fact that equipment may still be left on track HT4T in Hochelaga Yard in proximity of residences, with the cause of the derailment of October 29, 2015 still to be determined, and the need for remedial measures still to be examined, could lead to another similar derailment, which could lead to a person being injured or damage being caused to the environment or to property.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

• CPR shall not leave equipment on track HT4T in CPR Hochelaga Yard until an update of the risk assessment that was previously done on April 30th, 2015, is conducted to mitigate any potential risk on the Outremont Spur, Mile 49.1 of the Adirondack Subdivision.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The location of the Grade Crossing is an area where there is a high density of pedestrian traffic due to the presence of an arena, restaurants, bars and hotels. The high density of pedestrian traffic at that location results in an increased risk of pedestrians going through the Grade Crossing, despite deployed, and of pedestrians running in front of a train while trains are approaching or crawling under railway equipment blocking the Grade Crossing. As this Grade Crossing is located on a double track main line, the risk associated with pedestrians going through the Grade Crossing, despite deployed, is increased as pedestrians could be unaware of potential railway equipment approaching on the second track.

The current operating practice at this Grade Crossing, while changing crews, results in the Grade Crossing being blocked or in the warning system device being activated on a prolonged basis. The train stopping on and past the crossing island circuit contributes to hazards or conditions described above.

Order to Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and the City of Kamloops:

• CPR must ensure that no Eastbound railway equipment stop on or past the Grade Crossing (3rd Avenue – CPR Mile 0.10) if such stoppage would result in the Grade Crossing being occupied, except for an emergency.
• CPR must ensure that crew changes will be at 2nd Avenue – CPR Mile 0.21 Thompson Subdivision. This location must be marked to prevent the railway crossing from being continuously activated.
• CPR must ensure that no Eastbound railway equipment is operated after stopping at Mile 0.21, until there is a DTMF crossing gate activation for 2nd Avenue and until the crew has waited for 20 seconds after the crossing gates are parallel to the ground for at least 5 seconds.
• CPR and the City of Kamloops must ensure that at least two flag persons (each) with stop signs, will be posted on each side of the track of the Grade Crossing at 3rd Avenue each time the crossing warning devices are activated for through trains.
• CPR and the City of Kamloops must ensure that the flag persons will prevent any pedestrian from walking through the Grade Crossing while crossing warning devices are activated.
• For greater clarity, this Order applies to any railway operator on the CP Thompson Subdivision.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Controlled locations with dual control switch point derails in service while the integrity of routes is compromised poses an imminent risk of derailment.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

• CPR shall instruct all movements approaching dual control switch point derails at Wentworth and Ballantyne, to be prepared to stop, until the crew visually confirms that the route is correctly lined.
• CPR shall not permit the practice of allowing cars to roll under their own momentum (commonly referred to as kicking cars) at St-Luc yard unless dual control switch point derails (when applicable) on the affected tracks are visually confirmed to be lined for the derailing route.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Track conditions including fouled ballast (mud) in combination with significant track profile and gauge deviations exist on a bridge approach at mile 31.8 Mountain subdivision which have not been remediated by CP. Failure to initiate remedial actions for non-compliant track conditions could result in a derailment in which a person could be injured or made to be ill or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Not operate train, transfer or engine movements on the Mountain subdivision unless under the following terms and conditions:

• Movements must not exceed 10 MPH at mile 31.8 Mountain subdivision.

Condition or Hazard observed:

CN is not including deadhead and/or transit time to and from the rest facility at the away from home terminal which is causing cumulative fatigue in operating crews due to increased time on-duty and reduced rest availability. As a result, operating crews have exceeded and are at risk of exceeding their maximum continuous time on-duty. As well, requiring crews to use this transit time towards resetting their clock under the Work/Rest Rules for Rail Operating Employees creates incorrect calculation for mandatory time off-duty (MTOD) reset times and reduces rest availability. These conditions are creating excessive fatigue to accumulate in operating crews, reducing necessary alertness while in care and control of trains.

Order Canadian National Railway:

• CN shall include all deadheading and transit time to and from the rest facility at the away-from-home terminal into operating crews' on-duty time.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The use of point protection zones at CP Rail Coquitlam yard places railway operations, employees, and the public in unnecessary danger due to the configuration of the point protection zones and accessibility to the main track. As well, a lack of clear instructions addressing multiple operating crews and protection of engineering employees, while performing track maintenance, contributes to the risks associated with these operations.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

• CPR shall not use Point Protection Zones within the Port Coquitlam yard until or unless this inspector is satisfied with the operating instructions pertaining to Point Protection Zones.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Undue delays in flag placement (fixed signals) are attributed to incremental changes being made in existing and unflagged slow order limits and/or with minor speed restriction adjustments, circumventing flag placement requirements through over-reliance upon Rule 43, para 3, and Rule 44(g) Exceeding the limits of a temporary slow order has the serious potential to cause track damage, derailment of a train, injury or death.

Small changes coinciding with Rule 43 issuances, and small changes to say it is a new Rule 43—and the 24 hours is restarted for flag placement purposes—is contrary to the intent of Canadian Rail Operating Rules Rule 43 and 44(g); the activity of changing small parameters of a Rule 43, and calling it a new Rule 43 is unacceptable and has caused, and may cause, an immediate threat.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

[Order is restricted to the CPR for the Province of British Columbia]

• When issuing Rule 43 (temporary slow orders) CPR shall ensure that: any new Rule 43, as per rule 44(g) placing fixed signal flags within 24 hours for (temporary slow orders); and, where the limits or the speeds are changed, or any other parameter for an existing Rule 43 are changed, the placing of the fixed signal flags from the time starting for the original Rule 43 will be required to be deployed reflecting the new limits, such that within 24 hours of any Rule 43, fixed signal flags will be deployed to show the correct limits. regardless of any changes to that Rule 43; and
• Shall consolidate any existing or future initially unflagged Rule 43 slow orders that are applicable within one mile or less of another Rule 43 (temporary slow order) and
• Shall give absolute priority to issuing main track occupancy to employees for the purpose of enabling placement of fixed signal flags upon issuance of any Rule 43 (temporary slow order) to comply with this Order, ensuring the 24 hour timeline of this Order is not violated. and
• Shall ensure that bulletins reflective of this Order are posted in all places where employees whose duties are affected can see them.

Condition or Hazard observed:

In the last three (3) months, TC, pursuant to s31 of the Railway Safety Act, has taken two (2) regulatory actions against CP to address the management of defective tie conditions on the CP Belleville and CP Winchester Subdivisions. Despite these other regulatory actions, for similar concerns related to the management of defective tie conditions, CP did not identify and apply remedial action for unsafe tie condition on the Cartier Subdivision.

CP has identified the Cartier Subdivision as a key route. The failure by CP to identify and apply remedial actions for unsafe tie conditions and the operation of the Cartier Subdivision at an operational speed higher than Class 3 track in circumstances where portions of the Cartier Subdivision do not meet the standard for Class 4 track results in unsafe railway operations.

Order Canadian Pacific (CP) Railway:

1. CP shall not operate trains at a speed greater than the maximum allowable operating speed for Class 3 track between mile 108 and mile 83.6 on the Cartier Subdivision until such time as CP provides satisfactory evidence that the track can be safely operated at an operational speed higher than Class 3 track and this item of this Order is rescinded; and
2. Within 15 days from this Order, CP shall develop and provide TC with an action plan addressing the safety conditions related to the management of defective ties on the entire Cartier Subdivision and, within 30 days of this Order, implement and put in place all measure(s) provided for in the action plan developed.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The failure by Essex Terminal Railway (ETR) (ETR) to identify and apply remedial actions for unsafe crossing conditions may result in unsafe railway operations. Operating over unsafe railway crossings could cause a crossing collision, which could lead to a person being injured or damage could be caused to the environment or to property.

Order Essex Terminal Railway (ETR):

• ETR shall provide to Transport Canada, within 15 days of this Order, an action plan addressing the safety conditions at all its public railway grade crossings and that all measures provided for in the action plan be implemented at all of ETR's public railway grade crossings within 30 days from receipt of this Order.

Condition or Hazard observed:

A large number of intruders cross the track, through the 12 holes in the fencing in the Souligny area of the Longue-Pointe Spur, and they could be injured or killed by a train.

Order Canadian National Railway:

• CN shall reintroduce the use of whistles, as stipulated in Rule 14 (L) of the Canadian Rail Operating Rules at the following six grade crossings in the Rue Souligny area of the Longue Pointe Spur:
  • Avenue Georges V (4.98)
  • Avenue Hector (5.08)
  • Boulevard Pierre Bernard (5.58)
  • Rue Des Ormeaux (5.78)
  • Avenue Lebrun (5.94)
  • Rue Honoré Beaugrand (6.39)

Condition or Hazard observed:

In light of the operations carried out, the large number of people who use this bike path and their behaviour around trains stopped on this grade crossing, an immediate threat to safety exists.

Order Canadian National Railway:

• CN shall, at the grade crossing at mile 0.29 of track CL 77 at the Limoilou Yard, prohibit any movement that stops on the grade crossing from starting up again unless the grade crossing is protected on both sides by employees to ensure that the public is protected. These employees must be able to communicate with the train team to prevent the train from moving in case of intrusion.

CN filed for review at the Transportation Appeal Tribunal of Canada on June 18, 2015

TATC hearing held March 23, 2016

TATC rendered its decision on July 12, 2016 and referred the matter to the Minister.

The Minister confirmed the Order on November 3, 2017. The Order remains in effect until CN has provided measures to remove the immediate threat.

Condition or Hazard observed:

When CP Rail closed down its classification yard at St-Luc yard, it moved most of its switching operations southward to what are commonly known as the "Diamond" and "Departure yard" areas.

Switching at the classification yard was protected by derails, which would prevent uncontrolled movement's from occurring. However, when switching operations were moved to the south end of the yard, no derails were installed to protect against uncontrolled movements that could not only foul the main line, but collide with oncoming trains.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Shall cease, the practice of releasing cars on their own momentum a St-Luc Yard where as a result an uncontrolled movement of railway equipment risks occupying the main track, unless such locations are protected by a secondary physical defense.

Condition or Hazard observed:

KFIR employees are failing to properly secure equipment left unattended. Numerous switches and derails are being left unsecured without an adequate locking device. In addition, derails in place intended to protect KFIR track from uncontrolled movement of equipment may not be adequate.

Order to Kettle Falls International Railway:

Shall not operate train, transfer or engine movements on the San Poil or Kettle Falls subdivisions in Canada unless under the following terms and conditions:

• On or before November 5, 2014, KFIR provide TC's Pacific Region office copies of the railway's Operating Instructions issued to employees regarding the Emergency Directive on Securement of Railway Equipment issued October 29, 2014.
• From the date this Notice & Order is received, a KFIR company officer conduct a personal contact job briefing with all operating employees prior to their next tour of duty in Canada. Such briefing must include a review of Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) Rule 112 Leaving Equipment Unattended and the Emergency Directive on Securement of Railway Equipment issued October 29, 2014. Records of such briefings must be provided to TC's Pacific Region office at intervals not exceeding 14 days.
• KFIR company officers perform proficiency testing of operating employees in Canada to include proper securement of railway equipment. Records of all proficiency tests must be provided to a TC Railway Safety Inspector upon request.
• Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR provide refresher training in all CROR Rules applicable to KFIR's Canadian operations to all operating employees required to work in Canada. Records of such training including employee name and date of training must be provided to TC's Pacific Region office on or before February 15, 2015.
• Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR conducts a comprehensive assessment of all existing derails on KFIR and customer tracks in Canada. Such assessment must at minimum, assess the type, installation and maintenance of the derail to ensure they are adequate to prevent uncontrolled movement of equipment. Additionally, as part of this assessment, KFlR evaluate the potential need for the installation of additional derails on KFIR tracks to protect against uncontrolled movement of equipment. This assessment must be reviewed by a Professional Engineer and a report of the findings, including remedial actions taken or planned to address any deficiencies provided to TC's Pacific Region office on or before December 15, 2014.
• Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR hold customer orientation sessions with all KFIR customer facility operators in Canada to provide information on safe work practices and procedures related to railway operations and equipment including securement of railway equipment. Records of these sessions must be provided to Transport Canada on or before December 15, 2014.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Substandard crosstie conditions exist with no effective support ties within the prescribed distance from a joint at numerous locations.

Order to Canadian National Railway:

Shall not use the line of track between mile 40.8 and mile 44.6 of the Sorel Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• All train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side. Without crossing warning systems and 1.8 meter barrier protection and pedestrian crossings that are flat; these conditions could reasonably be expected to develop into a situation in which a person could be injured or made to be ill or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

Order to Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

• The BNSF mount their standard Whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

• Between the hours of 0600 and 2000, all movements will sound a repetitive succession of short engine whistles (rule 14(f)) between MP 121.0 and MP 123.0 regardless of whether or not there are people or animals on or near the track. Rule 14(l) does not apply on public crossings at grade between MP 121.0 and MP 123.0 between the hours of 0600 and 2000.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection /fencing and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side.

Order to Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

• The BNSF mount their standard Whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

• Any train movement will issue repetitive succession of short horn blasts CROR (14f) regardless of persons or animals on the track.

AND

• Audible train horns will be presented by all train movements [including all other track users in either direction] from 07:00 to 22:00 hours every day of the year.

AND

• Where this Order conflicts with an existing time table or special instructions or GBO's or TBGO respecting train horns, at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 on this Subdivision, this Order will take precedence.

AND

• Normal BNSF whistling protocol as per their current timetable and bulletins remains in effect outside the hours (0700 -2200) of this Order.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Poor crossing sightlines are preventing road users to safely proceed through crossing without in curing the risk of being struck by approaching trains.

Order to Canadian National Railway :

• not allow any train traffic to use the crossings at mile 53.37 of the Drummondville subdivision and at mile 28.19 and 37.19 of the Kingston subdivision unless the train speed is limited to 10MPH.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The fact that equipment are left unattended on the CMQR territory, without being properly secured could lead or be a contributing factor into an event where equipment could roll uncontrolled and possibly:

• Collide with passenger trains
• Collide with freight trains handling or not dangerous goods
• Collide with vehicles carrying or not dangerous goods at a private or publiccrossing at grade
• Hit pedestrians at a private or public crossing at grade
• Cause injury to employees or the public and / or damage to the environment or property.

Order to Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada inc.:

• Allow CMQR employees to leave unattended equipment in sidings or main tracks on CMQR property without having been properly secured. This information mustbe confirmed to the Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) from the location of theequipment. This information must include the date, the time, the number of handbrakes applied, their location, the result of the hand brake efficiency test and thename of the employee.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Numerous locations over the line of track between mile 62.0 and mile 125.5 Sherbrooke Subdivision where the standard of maintenance poses a threat to safe railway operations due to track conditions that are not in compliance to the Track Safety Rules, such as:

• insufficient crossties to meet the minimum requirements for a 39 foot rail segment and insufficient ties under rail joints,
• insufficient number of track bolts,
• insufficient number of tie plates for the class of track,
• insufficient longitudinal restraint of the track resulting m significant rail movement,
• rail worn beyond limits,
• defective rails that have been detected by the rail flaw detector are still in track without appropriate remedial action,
• severely battered joints and rails with crushed heads remain in track without protection and with no plan to be changed out,
• insufficient ballast at many locations (no shoulders, empty cribs, low joints),
• deviations in track geometry.

Order to Central Maine and Québec Railway Canada Inc.:

Not use the tracks or allow the use of the tracks between mile 62 and mile 125.5 Sherbrooke Subdivision unless the speed of all trains is restricted to a maximum of ten (10) miles per hour between mile 62.0 and mile 125.5 of the Sherbrooke Subdivision, including the Cautionary Limits at Sherbrooke.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Several of the timber curbs, several timber posts, and some timber horizontal handrails are severely rotted, affecting the integrity of the guardrail to withstand lateral impact forces and thereby its ability to keep both pedestrians and vehicles safe from falling onto the track below.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc. (hereinafter CMQR) and Municipality of Eastman shall not allow any vehicular traffic to access the Chemin d'Orford-sur-le-Lac overhead bridge located in the Municipality of Eastman and crossing the CMQR Sherbrooke Subdivision at Mile 94.5 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• Maintain the stop signs on both approaches of the bridge until such time as the guardrails on the bridge itself have been repaired and that repairs have been approved by the appropriate road authority, and
• That all roadway signage associated with this structure be approved by the appropriate road authority.

The following conditions were observed during the course of our inspection of the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

• Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
• Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
• Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects in joints with extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc (CMQR), shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between Lennoxville (M. 65.5) and Brookport (M.125.6) otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. That the following curves encompassing mile posts 65.95, 66.05, 68.32, 75.73, 77.86, 86.16, 88.65, 88.93, 89.95, 91.58, 93.0, 93.4, 95.05, 96.4, 97.4, 98.49, 99.22, 100.92, 102.27, 102.52, 103.61, 103.97, and 113.4 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as they are replaced. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first of each month.
2. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as the excessively worn rails referred to in item 1 above are replaced.
3. That train speeds are reduced to 10 mph at locations of visually observed rail defects at mile 93.48, 100.27, 102.58 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 100.92 (gauge side lip cracking out), or that CMQR comply with the conditions outlined in item 1 at these locations: or the rails at these locations are replaced.
4. RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 1 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
5. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of the inspection on October l0th 2013 and supplemented with RFD testing completed between October 17th and 23rd 2013 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

• Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
• Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previou-sly noted in defect report 248-T.
• Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
• Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
• Rail worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
• Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects within rail joints having extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can be reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc (CMQR), shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between mileages 1.0 and 66.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
2. That the first 2 trains (1 engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track, after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions. Further to this condition, CMQR is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
3. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in defect report 264-T and previously submitted defect report 248-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
4. That the curves encompassing mile posts 10.49, 19.05, 22.17, 22.38, 22.83, 27.58, 34.60 and 35.35 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
5. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 4 above are replaced.
6. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 4 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
7. That visually observed rail defects referred to in report 264-T at mile 56.14 (2 defects) and mile 59.55 (2 defects) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
8. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and its rules and regulations be complied with.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of the inspection of the Stanbridge Subdivision:

• Verified locations, as indicated on Track Inspection Report 246-T, where cross level and surface conditions, in excess of 7 inches in combination with numerous defective or non-existent track ties, allow track to move excessively under load.
• Cross level of 6 1/8 inches on tangent track combined with clusters of 9 and 12 consecutive defective ties within a 30 foot proximity of a propane storage facility at mile 11.44 in the town of Bedford.
• Vegetation and other existent conditions in the ballast section that interfere with the track inspector's ability to adequately perform track inspection duties.
• There is a threat that these observed conditions on the Stanbridge Subdivision, which may have contributed to recent derailments on this line, can reasonably be expected to cause additional derailments.

Central Maine and Quebec Railway Canada Inc. shall not operate any train or engine on the Stanbridge Subdivision between mileages 0.0 and 12.4 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. No train shall be operated on that portion ofthe Stanbridge Subdivision until such time as CMQR ensures that a professional Engineer, qualified in the Track Safety Rules personally inspects the Stanbridge Subdivision and reports to this office:
   • a) That the inspection has been completed;
   • b) The directions under which the train can be safely operated.
2. All rail movements subsequent to item #1 will be in accordance with the directions provided in the report referred to in item #1.
3. Within 14 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, CMQR will ensure that the professional Engineer who has inspected the track provides Transport Canada with a report that lists all conditions observed that could compromise safe railway operations and the remedial action taken to appropriately address each of those conditions.
4. Within 30 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, CMQR will provide Transport Canada with CMQR's action plan to correct the supervision and support of track maintenance activities, in accordance with sound engineering principals, to ensure safe railway operations.