Second Safer Skies Forum Report

March 29 - 30, 2022

Table of Contents

• 1. General Overview
  • 1.1 Safer Skies Forum
  • 1.2 Organizers
  • 1.3 Format
  • 1.4 Speakers, moderators, and panellists
  • 1.5 Participants
• 2. Summary of content
  • 2.1 Session 1: Opening Ceremonies
  • 2.2 Session 2: Current Threats and Information Sharing and Introduction of Fictional Scenario
  • 2.3 Session 3: Assessing Conflict Zone Risks
  • 2.4 Session 4: Identifying and Implementing Risk Mitigation to Address Threat
  • 2.5 Session 5: Fictional Scenario Wrap-up – Discussion
  • 2.6 Session 6: Closing Session
• 3. Conclusion
  • 3.1 Next Steps
• 4. Appendices

Welcome Message

The aviation industry plays a key role in connecting people and places across the planet. However, the vital services it provides are not immune to the safety and security risks posed by armed conflict, as tragically demonstrated by the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) and Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 (PS752). These tragedies clearly demonstrate the continued need for international cooperation and standardization in how the civil aviation community addresses the risks we all face from conflict zones.

In response to the downing of PS752, Canada established the Safer Skies Initiative. The main objective of the Initiative is to improve the safety of air travel worldwide by addressing gaps in the way the civil aviation sector deals with conflict zones. Building on the important work accomplished by the Netherlands and the International Civil Aviation Organization post MH17, the Safer Skies Initiative aims to enable States to take immediate action to reduce risk, while also promoting improvements to the global aviation system.

The Safer Skies Forum is a place for members of the aviation community to collaborate and share on a variety of topics, best practices and strategies to mitigate conflict zone risk. It brings States, international organizations and industry partners together with a common goal: to establish a common set of principles and practices to better protect passengers from the risk of flying in or near conflict zones.

Transport Canada (TC) and the Safer Skies Consultative Committee thank you for attending the virtual Forum from your offices and homes around the world. Without your support and commitment, the Safer Skies Initiative would not be possible. We also take this opportunity to invite States and organizations to endorse the Safer Skies Statement, which is available on TC’s website.

1. General Overview

1.1 Safer Skies Forum

The Safer Skies Forum is the only global event exclusively dedicated to improving the processes required to manage the shared risks conflict zones pose to global civil aviation operations.

The second Forum brought together States, organizations, and the global civil aviation industry to share expertise on conflict zone risk and engage in discussions focused on the threat environment, lessons learned, and best practices with respect to risk mitigation strategies. The Forum also addressed the way forward for advancing the Safer Skies Initiative and affirmed the international civil aviation community’s commitment to work together to mitigate conflict zone airspace risk.

1.2 Organizers

The Forum was co-hosted by the Government of Canada and the Safer Skies Consultative Committee (SSCC). Transport Canada (TC) would like to express its appreciation to its international partners in the SSCC whose leadership and guidance were integral to the development and delivery of this event.

Canada and the SSCC would also like to thank the many countries and industry stakeholders who agreed to lend their time and expertise as speakers, moderators, and/or panellists.

1.3 Format

The second Forum was a virtual event hosted on March 29 and 30, 2022, via the Engagez online platform. The event was divided into six sessions ranging from 60 to 120 minutes in length, held at various times during the day to ensure maximum global representation. The virtual platform allowed Forum participants to connect with one another in the Social Lounge section and to interact during and after the presentations. Within the Resources section, participants were given access to the documents presented throughout the Forum. For those who could not attend the Forum, or for participants who wanted to watch the presentations and discussions again, all six sessions were available under the ‘’on-demand Sessions’’ section of the platform, until the end of June 2022.

Canada’s Minister of Transport, the Honourable Omar Alghabra, delivered the Forum’s opening remarks, followed by other notable key speakers. Each subsequent session was guided by a moderator and featured expert panellists who spoke about specific topics. The sessions culminated in a question-and-answer period addressing questions that were prepared in advance by the moderator as well as live questions via the chat function posed by Forum participants.

Finally, a fictional conflict scenario was introduced at the beginning of the event and integrated into the content of each session. This provided an opportunity for participants to reference a plausible conflict while discussing best practices in information-sharing, risk assessment approaches and risk mitigation.

The second Safer Skies Forum Agenda and list of speakers is available in Appendix 1.

1.4 Speakers, moderators, and panellists

Day one of the Forum welcomed a group of distinguished keynote speakers, which included the President of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Secretary of Transportation from the United States Department of Transportation, the Secretary of State for Transport of the United Kingdom, the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management from the Netherlands, the Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to Canada, the President of the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations' (IFALPA), and the Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada. Speaker biographies are available in Appendix 2.

1.5 Participants

The second-annual Forum brought together more than 366 experts, from 55+ countries including states that are currently experiencing conflict within or near their borders. Participants registered from all parts of the globe including for example, Cameroon, Canada, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Republic of Korea, South Korea, Ukraine, United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.), among many others. Attendees represented the breadth and range of experiences and expertise across the global civil aviation community.

2. Summary of content

2.1 Session 1: Opening Ceremonies

The Honourable Omar Alghabra, Canada’s Minister of Transport, delivered the opening remarks welcoming participants to the Second Safer Skies Forum. Following Minister Alghabra’s address, several distinguished guests delivered noteworthy remarks highlighting what has been accomplished thus far while emphasizing the critical reasons why a Forum of this nature continues to be required.

In their words

Governments and airlines have key roles to play in helping to ensure that the risks conflict zones pose to civil aviation do not lead to future loss of life of aircraft passengers and crew.

The U.S. strongly supports the Safer Skies Initiative. To protect our citizens, we must work together.

The work of the Safer Skies has never been more crucial. So, let’s strengthen our global coalition against those who threaten our aircraft, reaffirm the values we share to protect the lives of innocent passengers and crews, and pledge to work together more closely than ever before to keep commercial aviation safe.

No matter which airline they choose, where they board their flight, or what their destination may be, all passengers must be assured that their flight path is a safe one. We owe this to all our citizens, all around the world.

It is essential to improve international efforts to safeguard civilian flight operations and to prevent tragedies in air operations.

In the ideal world it shouldn’t be necessary to have these kinds of conferences, but recent times... have shown us that this is more important than ever.

The Safer Skies Initiative, its platforms and forums contribute valuable content to achieve the declared goals, which is safety of air travel worldwide.

2.2 Session 2: Current Threats and Information Sharing and Introduction of Fictional Scenario

The second session focused on the current threat picture and included a discussion concerning the opportunities and challenges faced by states and industry when collecting and sharing information. This included information-sharing between states and industry, and amongst industry itself.

The second part of the session was dedicated to introducing a fictional conflict scenario to serve as a learning tool for participants, as well as for illustrative purposes when discussing various approaches to conducting risk assessments, determining the level of risk, and identifying risk mitigations. Questions from participants were addressed at the end of the session.

Summary of Presentations and Discussion

Current Threats

Expert panellists from the U.S. and Switzerland, along with Osprey Flight Solutions and Dragonfly -industry vendors that provide aviation risk assessments and information- provided an overview of the current threats posed by conflict zones. The U.S. highlighted current geographical areas of concern, including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Russia, Ukraine, and Yemen. They characterized associated non-state actors operating in these regions as militant groups (e.g., Tigray Defense Forces, Houthis etc.), extremist/terrorist groups (e.g., Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Al Qaeda and Lebanese Hezbollah), or drug trafficking organizations, and explained that non-state actors can be motivated by several factors including overthrowing the government, taking control of a particular region and/or instilling terror. These groups become a threat when they take action to achieve their goals, which can result in direct, indirect or accidental threats. For example, during the 2020 conflict in Libya, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) were misidentified by their own operators and accidently shot down, contributing to the heightened threat environment.

The session panellists conveyed that in addition to the primary threat, it is also vital to monitor the potential for spillover. To illustrate, in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, panellists spoke about how European states are closely monitoring the risk of the war rapidly expanding to other European countries. In another example from the war, panellists discussed several recent cases of unidentified UAS entering European airspace, one of which crossed several borders before running out of fuel and crashing. Weapon systems that are not contained by national borders have the potential to trigger escalation, thus posing risk, even when the incursion is unintentional. Incursions can force the re-routing of flights and cause a ‘bottle neck’ between flight routes, which is a spillover safety and security issue. Panellists also noted that while mitigating one risk, another can be created if there is a lack of awareness and communication between relevant parties.

The panel asserted that a key element to effectively mitigating global conflict zone risk is to identify and monitor where civil flight operations and threat intersect. For example, in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, air carriers overfly the region daily. This needs to be actively managed so that risk assessment determinations can be continually updated.

Panellists stressed that a key component in identifying threat is determining capability. Threat actors have access to a variety of weapons and have varying capabilities to employ these weapons. Expert panellists categorized the types of attacks as follows:

• Kinetic Attacks:
  • Ground based/low altitude weapons: small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-tank guided missiles, artillery, rockets, mortars, UAS
  • Anti-aircraft systems: MANPADS, surface-to-air missile

• Harassing Techniques:
  • Global Positioning System/electromagnetic interference
  • Lasing^{Footnote 1}

• Cyber Attacks:
  • Cyber-attacks degrading and/or disrupting aviation-related networks; primarily ransomware.

Trends in capability have been observed regarding aviation safety and security. This includes evident growth in state and non-state actors’ access to more advanced weapons, an increase in UAS procurement, technological development and use, as well as an increase in access to advanced rocket and missile systems by state sponsored groups. In addition, adversaries seek to learn and improve their performance, which can heighten the risk to civil aviation. These trends demonstrate the continued growth of future threats to civil aviation, which can intentionally or unintentionally expose aircraft/passengers to conflict zone risk.

Information-sharing

Panel experts agreed that there has been a significant improvement in civil aviation information sharing program/platforms amongst international partners; however, challenges remain. Advancing information- sharing practices requires an effective communication framework and sufficient resources to implement the necessary updates. To be successful, collaboration and active participation by airlines, states and international associations is necessary.

Panellists identified two opportunities for future work:

1. Industry crossover: historically, there has been a reluctance from air carriers to share information with other carriers due to proprietary concerns. These tensions are decreasing and there is now room to develop ‘crossover’ work within industry and the security sector. For carriers, strengthening this network could safeguard their own company, as well as others.
2. Government relationship building: governments continue to rely on personality-based information sharing mechanisms through the building of relationships and a network of trust that allows for information exchange on a one-on-one basis. However, there is room to look beyond personal contacts and formalize agency-to-agency processes so that information can be shared holistically; this only works if collaborators are receptive to the information.

It was noted that when sharing information, as a community, we should think about the conflict zone situation in question more broadly, not solely in terms of direct threats to civil aviation. The community needs to consider the situational environment around escalation, and then share the information widely.

In terms of frequency, it was recognized that there is a need to determine how much and how often information should be shared to avoid information overload, which can make information gathering difficult.

Introduction of the Fictional Threat Scenario

The second part of this session was dedicated to the introduction of the fictional conflict scenario. A comprehensive ‘beginning to end’ narrative was provided, outlining the scenario in four distinct phases:

1. Pre-conflict – Baselines and Triggers
2. Initial Conflict – Assessing Conflict Zone Risks
3. Conflict Intensifies – Risk Mitigations
4. Situation Stabilizes – Return to Regular Airspace

Although the scenario was fictional, the details were closely aligned with how a real-life conflict zone could develop. The full scenario is available in Appendix 3.

2.3 Session 3: Assessing Conflict Zone Risks

The objective of this session was to identify, highlight and discuss a variety of risk assessment models successfully used within different operational contexts. Panellists from Jordan, New Zealand and Lufthansa Airlines discussed their experiences with various risk assessment methodologies and participated in a fulsome discussion about the challenges, successes and application of each concept.

Summary of Discussion

Assessing Conflict Zone Risk

Discussions underlined the importance of a standardized approach to risk assessment that is designed to maintain open lines of communication between states and industry at all stages of the process. Consistent with discussions that took place during Session Two, panellists highlighted the need to better communicate information in a timely manner (i.e., prioritizing networking and ensuring that information reaches the right people). They also noted that the efficacy of the risk assessment could be optimized if partnerships between states and industry were formalized and based on collaborative information/data collection and assessment.

While State representatives agreed that it is imperative to collaborate when creating mitigation measures for escalating conflicts, they noted that the approach to collaboration varies. Some states’ expectation is for air carriers to provide their assessments as a baseline, with the government making the final decision, if needed. Other states actively support more of a relationship building approach, working directly with the air carriers and permitting specific industry officials to hold national security clearance to allow for more frank and open discussions.

From the air carrier perspective, the importance of establishing and using clear and consistent language when generating and conveying airspace notifications was emphasized. It was noted that pilots should be part of the security team when it comes to conducting risk assessments and should be educated and aware of current issues. The panellist stated that by virtue of their lawful responsibilities, pilots should have the ultimate say on what to do when a risk is identified during a flight. In closing, it was noted that assessments should not be made in isolation, and that generic reactive flight prohibitions should be avoided.

Fictional Scenario

In discussing risk assessments in the context of the fictional scenario, it was pointed out that due to the historic conflict over the border region an airline would likely have a long-standing, no fly zone over the contested area. Notwithstanding that possibility, at this stage an operator would begin by asking, ‘how does this affect us? ‘Do we operate flights in that region’? If the volatile states in question are destinations served by the air carrier, some states would enact a ‘whole-of-government’ approach and include input from departments of foreign affairs regarding engagement between states. It was agreed that information guiding the assessment should be processed through both intelligence and military experts to better understand the intent of those on the ground in the conflict, and their capabilities. Considering the scope of the conflict in its entirety, states may begin to develop an evacuation plan for citizens.

While state and industry perspectives may differ in some respects, it was agreed that risk is a part of aviation and it is up to industry and government to determine acceptable levels of risk, including when it should be accepted, avoided or mitigated.

2.4 Session 4: Identifying and Implementing Risk Mitigation to Address Threat

The focus of Session Four was how states and industry can identify and implement risk mitigations. Panellists from Kenya, Morocco and the United Kingdom (U.K.) presented an overview of how each of their respective states identify risk and the various mitigations available to them when addressing threat.

Summary of Presentations

Due to its important role in the risk mitigation process, information-sharing was referenced by each of the panellists. All three states demonstrated a continued commitment to improving information-sharing with industry, air carriers and service providers. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) was mentioned as a key partner in gaining access to critical data that supports decision making. For example, a technical committee established between Kenya and IATA has enabled the state to have access to valuable information that extends beyond the Eastern African region.

Risk Mitigation

Clearly understanding what you are trying to accomplish in applying risk mitigations is a good first step. Panellists agreed that even though safety and security risk assessments are different in nature, they should be considered concurrently, and free of political considerations. Operational information should also be considered essential to build a full ‘picture’ of the situation before any decision is made.

When determining which mitigation measure(s) should be taken, consequences must be weighed, as often effective mitigation measures can cause indirect ‘spillover’ issues. For example:

• Re-routing flights or restricting airspace results in additional traffic in other air corridors; safety implications must then be assessed.
• Requiring an aircraft to operate at a higher altitude over a conflict zone results in increased fuel consumption affecting the weight of the aircraft and added cost to the airline.

Legislative frameworks and regulating airspace are one potential approach in the risk mitigation decision making processes. When it is deemed necessary in the public interest, some States have the legal authority to restrict operations in a specific airspace, either temporarily or permanently.

For example, in Kenya, risk assessments are conducted by both the state and the national air operator, and while the sate provides advice on potential risks (severity assessment), it is the national operator who ultimately makes decisions for the safe conduct of their operations. Prohibiting flights is considered a last resort.

In general, striking a balance between safety, security, and the impacts of restricting aviation operations is challenging. Panellists emphasized that in addition to legislative authorities (e.g., to issue NOTAMs), what is equally important is the wider set of collaborative tools, including following ICAO annexes and guidance and maintaining robust lines of communication between government and all stakeholders.

When asked if the aviation community is agile enough to respond to threats, panellists agreed that there is always room for improvement, but that due diligence should not be sacrificed for expediency. Timing depends on many things including affected airspace, weaponry, diplomatic relations, and trade implications, to name a few. If an assessment results in a significant effect on any one of these factors, it could take longer to make and subsequently execute a decision. To counterbalance speed with the numerous factors in play, states require resources and both national and international cooperation.

Reflections on Industry Engagement

Coordination is key to engaging with industry. An integrated information management system is needed for governments and industry so that joint data can be assessed, verified, and disseminated to stakeholders in a timely manner. The U.K. has recently formalized a process for rapid information engagement with government, intelligence partners and industry stakeholders. This is a mechanism that government or industry stakeholders can use at any time to share information.

Morocco is currently part of EUROCONTROL’s Air Traffic Management (ATM) Security Coordination Group and is working to establish its own group of security and safety aviation partners within Morocco to share information on conflict zones. Currently Moroccan airlines conduct their own risk assessments; however, the Moroccan state is looking to bring together the efforts from the international community (e.g., EUROCONTROL, IATA, ICAO), with the best practices from the airlines within this unique group.

In discussing best practices for the identification and implementation of mitigation measures, panellists emphasized that coordinated efforts are essential at the national and international level. The way in which stakeholders collaborate is most effective when the processes are formalized. Avoiding the status quo and continuing to be innovative can be achieved by continuously updating procedures and refining processes.

2.5 Session 5: Fictional Scenario Wrap-up – Discussion

Session Five was an opportunity for the moderator and expert panellists from France, IATA, Jordan, Kenya, the Republic of Korea and the U.S. to summarize the results of the discussions surrounding the fictional scenario.

Pre-Conflict

Panellists agreed that the fictional scenario used throughout the Forum was plausible. Many real-life conflicts can initially appear peaceful on the surface. As such, it is important to have an awareness of the pre-conflict or baseline conditions to accurately assess changes. An effective way to monitor risk is to focus on increasing rhetoric from both parties; paying close attention to regional media is one effective way to understand the local situation.

Initial Conflict – Assessing the Conflict Zone

In the fictional scenario, the conflict was initiated with cross-border clashes. When conducting a risk assessment in the initial stage of conflict, it is critical to be aware of the potential triggers that can contribute to the outbreak of violence or further escalate tensions. For example, a subtle change in military posture can signal the need for heightened monitoring and the potential need to plan for alternative routings.

Several other elements were noted as key considerations for the assessment:

• Assess capabilities: understanding the military capabilities of each country. Military and civil aviation collaboration is needed to best understand weaponry and combat strategy.
• Conduct a broad assessment of whole region: are specific areas safer than others?
• Identify threats at various altitudes and refine knowledge of specific routes that are safe.
• Concentrate on the overfly zones and consider high seas as areas that might not have satellite coverage.
• Compare data and observations between states.
• Repatriation flights also require special consideration.

Recognizing that information-sharing is an ICAO Annex 17 obligation, the panel discussed best practices used by their respective organizations in sharing information. It was agreed that relevant and timely information is critical for both open-source and protected information. Open-source data should be validated and shared through formalized channels between government and industry so that carriers may make decisions quickly. However, since the sheer volume of open-source information can be overwhelming, data is best shared when tailored to the audience. Large carriers can handle a substantial volume of information whereas small-scale carriers may better manage critical and verified information.

Panellists noted that maintaining the integrity of a state’s confidentiality laws while sharing relevant classified information with stakeholders is a prevalent concern without a clear-cut, one size fits all solution. However, if classified information cannot be shared, states can, at minimum, communicate that their actions are based on substantiated intelligence.

Conflict Intensifies

States and air carriers have their own risk assessment capabilities, the results of which will often differ. Panellists were asked to comment on whether the state or air carriers’ assessment should take precedence when parties come to different conclusions. One perspective was that the government’s results should be given precedence as airlines tend to be driven by economic considerations. Conversely, it was suggested that the carrier’s findings should be given precedence when it comes to purely safety assessments within conflict zones since that is their domain, and that government assessments should be given precedent for general security-related threats. Panellists recommended that rather than being reactive to changes in the situation, the precautionary principle^{Footnote 2} should be applied each time.

Situation Stabilizes

Panellists identified indicators that pointed to the situation stabilizing:

• States have exhausted their capability and will to continue fighting. The international community-imposed sanctions preventing further large-scale aggression. External material supports were depleted and there was a lack of public support for the current conflict.
• The local population pressured their leadership to agree to a ceasefire.
• Cross-border activity ceased but tensions remain elevated. While there is an absence of heavy weapons fire, local commanders remained in place and a defensive footing is established. There remains a show of force and heightened vigilance; there is potential for localized skirmishes, but actions and responses were small scale in nature.
• Conditions have begun to stabilize to enable decisions to restore civil operations in areas of the conflict-associated restricted airspace. There is an outright return to bases by military and/or local leaders and government officials are establishing contact directly, or through supporting states.

Despite stabilization, expert panellists recommended that states continue to monitor the situation for a period of time in case of ceasefire violations. One way to be assured that states experiencing conflict are trustworthy with their peace rhetoric is to monitor their land activity to determine if their physical stance matches their verbal assertions. A gradual process of lifting risk mitigations was preferred by the expert panellists rather than easing all restrictions at once. Of note, scaling back a NOTAM/AIC is equally important as the initial implementation and the repetition of a full-scale risk assessment is required prior to any NOTAM revision.

Attendees were encouraged to take the scenario back to colleagues and conduct their own assessment. Questions that could be posed include: (1) Do we have the right procedures and communications processes in place; (2) What is our inventory of mitigation measures? The documents produced by the SSCC can be used to support this process.

2.6 Session 6: Closing Session

The closing session, moderated by Mr. Kevin Brosseau, Assistant Deputy Minister at Transport Canada, highlighted opportunities for action by the international civil aviation community identified throughout the Forum. It brought together representatives from the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), Expert Group on Risk Information Overflying Conflict Zones (EGRICZ), IATA and the SSCC.

The Secretary General of ICAO, H.E. Juan Carlos Salazar opened the session and provided remarks that highlighted the Safer Skies Forum and noting that it will be imperative for the international community to maintain the momentum that has been created. As demonstrated in the current context of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, there have been significant improvements in the development and efficacy of conflict zone risk management. However, as H.E. Salazar pointed out, risk comes in many forms with most conflicts being unpredictable and hard to manage. For this reason, ICAO’s Air Navigation Commission recently authorized the establishment of a new integrated Risk Management Study Group. This body of experts will review related risk management methodologies from the perspective of each of ICAO’s strategic objectives. The goal is to determine the feasibility of a unified framework that can be adapted and applied at both state and service provider levels.

Following H.E. Salazar’s remarks, Mr. Brosseau asked the panel what their respective organization’s plans were to address and enhance responses to conflict zones airspace risk management in the next year, and in the longer term.

ECAC – as a coordinator and ‘think-tank’ for its member states, ECAC is committed to initiatives that innovate and improve information sharing methods to help members to be ready for the ‘next unexpected situation’. Future work will focus on identifying remaining gaps and how to address them. There is space for a range of approaches, and ECAC will continue to work with industry, states and commercial organizations to support open-source information sharing.

EGRICZ – the priority will be on strengthening existing global conflict zone guidance documents. EGRICZ would like to see ICAO Doc 10084 strengthened through the inclusion of several best practices it has developed over the past few years.

IATA – getting information in the right hands at the right time is fundamental. IATA’s focus for the next year will be to continue taking advice from regulators and airlines and leveraging their digital platform to address information requirements.

SSCC – tackling the challenges associated with information sharing is of the utmost importance. The SSCC is identifying and evaluating international initiatives for rapid information-sharing pertaining to overflight threats and vulnerabilities in international civilian operations. Additionally, the SSCC will look to enhance its leadership within the global civil aviation community by establishing a formal State to State mentorship framework that will ensure conflict zone risk mitigation capacity is develop around the world.

3. Conclusion

3.1 Next Steps

The Second Safer Skies Forum, organized in part by the SSCC, presented an excellent opportunity for global civil aviation authorities, industry, and conflict zone risk mitigation subject-matter experts to come together to share their knowledge. In discussing the way forward, panellists were united in the understanding that due to the nature of conflict zone risk management, a deliverable is never truly ‘complete’; the work is continually evolving.

Collectively, it was conveyed that next steps will focus on more tangible elements e.g., what does information-sharing mean? How do we measure it? In advancing this approach it was indicated that it will be important to obtain advice from regulators and air operators and leveraging a digital platform using public information as a baseline.

Panellists agreed that the importance of wide representation, including a diversity of perspectives, is an essential component of achieving Safer Skies. Safer Skies has engaged with a significant number of states; however, as we move forward it is important to ensure the remaining gaps are filled. Conflict zone risk does not ‘set apart’ nationality of the overflying aircraft, therefore, best practices need to be disseminated as broadly as possible beyond SSCC member countries. This can be accomplished by making use of ICAO assemblies; it was also suggested that NATO be included in this work through a collaboration with ICAO and to incorporate unconventional actors into discussions (such as military representatives) acknowledging, that this could be sensitive in practice.

The third-annual Safer Skies Forum will be held in-person if it is safe to do so. A live-stream option will also be available enabling those who cannot travel to fully participate. The Netherlands, in collaboration with Canada, will host the third iteration of the event in 2023.

4. Appendices

4.1 The Safer Skies Forum Agenda

4.2 The Safer Skies Forum Biographies

4.3 Conflict Scenario Package

4.4 Safer Skies Consultative Committee Documents

4.1 The Safer Skies Forum Agenda

• Tuesday, March 29th, 2022

  Session one - Opening Ceremonies

  11:00 Z - 12:30 Z

  Speakers:

  Honourable Omar Alghabra – Minister of Transport of Canada

  H.E. Salvatore Sciacchitano – President of the Council, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

  Secretary Pete Buttigieg, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation

  Rt. Hon. Grant Shapps, Secretary of State for Transport of the United Kingdom

  Honourable Mark Harbers, Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management, Netherlands

  H.E Jorge Londoño de la Cuesta, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to Canada, Colombia

  Captain Jack Netskar, President, International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA)

  Special Guest: Andrii Bukvych, Chargé d’Affaires of the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada

  Master of Ceremonies: Kevin Brosseau, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada

  Session two - Information Sharing

  13:00 Z - 14:45 Z Current Threats and Information Sharing

  This session will provide participants with an update of the current threat picture, as well as a discussion of the opportunities and challenges faced by states and industry in collecting and sharing information, including intelligence. This includes information sharing between states and industry, and amongst industry. Further questions to be addressed include: What kind of framework is needed to support information sharing? And how do we ensure that enough resources are available to efficiently implement information sharing practices?

  Moderator: John A. Anderson, Manager of the Threat and Analysis Division, Office of National Security Programs and Incident Response, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), USA & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Expert Panel:

  Matthew Borie, Chief Intelligence Officer, Osprey Flight Solutions

  Carole Geissman, Legal and International Affairs at Federal Office of Civil Aviation, Switzerland

  Joel Gulhane, Senior Associate, Dragonfly

  Christy Hickey, Senior Analyst, Threat Analysis Division, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or,

  William Muldoon, Senior Analyst, Threat Analysis Division, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), USA & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  15:00 Z - 16:00 Z Introduction to Fictional Scenario

  A fictional scenario will be introduced to participants. The panel of experts will discuss best practices in terms of obtaining information (intelligence and open source) and sharing information between states, and states to industry. A Question & Answer session will follow.

  Presenter: Arnaud Borde, Head of Risk Analysis Unit for Civil Aviation, Directorate General for Civil Aviation, France & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Session three - Risk Assessment

  17:00 Z - 19:00 Z Assessing Conflict Risk Zones

  Panellists will highlight and discuss different risk assessment models successfully used in different contexts (e.g., smaller versus larger states, passenger carriers versus cargo carriers). This session will allow for robust discussion with participants to clarify concepts and application.

  Leveraging the fictional scenario, the panel will highlight how to conduct the risk assessment, and what the determination of risk would be. A Question & Answer session to follow.

  Moderator: Nicholas Robinson, Director General, Civil Aviation, Transport Canada

  Expert Panel:

  Abdulla A. Al-Nsour, Director of AVSEC & Facilitation, Aviation Security & Facilitation Directorate, Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission

  Mike Hill, Deputy Chief Executive Aviation Security and Infrastructure for the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Katharina Hemming, Aviation Security Risk Manager, Lufthansa Airlines

• Wednesday, March 30th, 2022

  Session four - Risk Mitigations

  11:00 Z - 12:30 Z Identifying and Implementing Risk Mitigations to Address Threats

  This session will present the results of the fictional scenario up to that point and introduce the notion of risk mitigation.

  Panellists will highlight best practices and present various approaches, which will then be applied to the fictional scenario. A Question & Answer session will follow.

  Moderator: Sarah Nacey, Deputy Director, Aviation Security Strategy & Policy, Department for Transport, United Kingdom

  Expert Panel:

  Richard Cave, Head of Global Risk & Response, Aviation Security, Strategy & Policy (ASSP), Department for Transport, United Kingdom & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Michael Aomo, Chief Safety Management System (SMS) Coordinator, Kenya Civil Aviation Authority & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Safae Raddaf, Head of Security and Facilitation, Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Morocco & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Session five - Fictional Scenario Wrap-up

  13:30 Z - 15:30 Z Discussion

  The Moderator and panellists will summarize the results of the fictional scenario, from information sharing to risk assessment and mitigations.

  The session will include a longer Question & Answer portion to provide participants with the opportunity to discuss the full breadth of the scenario and engage with the panellists on specific questions.

  Moderator: John Velho, Co-Chair, Safer Skies Consultative Committee (SSCC) and, Director, Passenger Protect Program and Targeting Operations, Transport Canada

  Panellists:

  Michael Aomo, Chief Safety Management System (SMS) Coordinator, Kenya Civil Aviation Authority & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Arnaud Borde, Head of Risk Analysis Unit for Civil Aviation, Directorate General for Civil Aviation, France & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Kyutae Kim, Assistant Director, Air Traffic Division, Office of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Republic of Korea

  William Muldoon, Senior Analyst, Threat Analysis Division, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), USA & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

  Matthew Vaughan, Director, Aviation Security & Cyber for International Air Transport Association (IATA)

  Session six - Forum Wrap-up and Way Ahead

  16:00 Z - 17:30 Z Closing Session

  In the closing session, speakers will identify the next steps for the Safer Skies Initiative as well as opportunities for action discussed throughout the Forum.

  Moderator: Kevin Brosseau, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada

  Keynote speaker: H.E. Juan Carlos Salazar, Secretary General, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

  Panellists:

  Kas Beumkes, Chair, Expert Group on Risk Information Overflying Conflict Zones (EGRICZ)

  Katie Buckley, Safer Skies Consultative Committee (SSCC)

  Mark Rodmell, Deputy Executive Secretary of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

  Matthew Vaughan, Director, Aviation Security & Cyber for International Air Transport Association (IATA)

  Closing remarks: Kevin Brosseau and video by the Association of Families of Flight PS752

4.2 The Safer Skies Forum Biographies

Key note speakers

Honourable Omar Alghabra - Minister of Transport of Canada

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H.E. Salvatore Sciacchitano – President of the International Civil Aviation Organization Council (ICAO)

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Secretary Pete Buttigieg, Secretary of Transportation, Department of Transportation, United States

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Rt. Hon. Grant Shapps, Secretary of State for Transport of the United Kingdom

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Honourable Mark Harbers, Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management

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His Excellency Jorge Londoño de la Cuesta, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia to Canada

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Captain Jack Netskar, President, International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations (IFALPA)

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Andrii Bukvych, Charge d’Affaires of the Embassy of Ukraine in Canada

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Kevin Brosseau, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada, Canada

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Presenters, panelists and moderators

John A. Anderson - Manager of the Threat and Analysis Division, National Security Programs and Incident Response, Federal Aviation Administration, United States of America

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Matthew Borie - Chief Intelligence Officer, Osprey Flight Solutions

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Carole Geissman, Legal and International Affairs at Federal Office of Civil Aviation, Switzerland

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Joel Gulhane, Senior associate and leads, Aviation security coverage, Dragonfly Intelligence

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Christy Hickey – Senior Analyst, Threat Analysis Division, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

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Arnaud Borde - Head of risk analysis unit, French Civil Aviation Authority (DGAC)

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Nicholas Robinson, Director General, Civil Aviation, Transport Canada

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Abdulla A. Al-Nsour, Director of AVSEC & Facilitation, Aviation Security & Facilitation Directorate, Jordan Civil Aviation Regulatory Commission (JCARC)

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Mike Hill, Deputy Chief Executive Aviation Security and Infrastructure for the Civil Aviation Authority, New Zealand

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Katharina Hemming, Senior Manager Aviation Security Risk Management, Deutsche Lufthansa AG

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Sarah Nacey, Deputy Director, Aviation Security, Department for Transport, United Kingdom & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

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Richard Cave, Head of Global Risk & Response, Aviation Security, Department for Transport, United Kingdom & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

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Michael Aomo, Chief Safety Management System (SMS) Coordinator, Kenya Civil Aviation Authority & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

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Safae Raddaf, Head of Security and Facilitation, Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Morocco & Member of the Safer Skies Consultative Committee

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John Velho - Director, Passenger Protect Program & Targeting Operations, Safety & Security, Transport Canada, Canada

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His Excellency Juan Carlos Salazar, Secretary General of ICAO, Colombia

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Kas Beumkes - Ministry of Water Management and Infrastructure, Netherlands

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Katie Buckley, Conflict Zone Information Office, Transport Canada

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Mark Rodmell, Deputy Executive Secretary of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC)

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Matthew Vaughan - Director, Aviation Security & Cyber for International Air Transport Association (IATA)

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4.3 Conflict Scenario Package

Narrative and Maps

Map Legend - Text version

	Country Name
	Flight Information Region (FIR)
	Reporting Point
	Capital City
	Airway Route and Identifier
	Moria - contested border region
	Air activity marker(s)
	Military activity markers: air defence & battles/attacks

	River/water feature
	International Border
	12NM Boundary
	Military units (silver and blue)
	Air defence assets (i.e. sams)
	Movement indicator (silver and blue)
	Military aircraft indicator
	Movement boundary, line of advance, limit of advance

 

Conflict Scenario Narrative - Overview

Situation (SLIDE #1): The region of Bluver is host to the nation-states of the Kingdom of Blue and the Republic of Silver. Each nation is a mid-developed country with coastal boundaries and a shared land border defined by the Wet River. The relationship between the countries could be best categorized as one of long-standing peace, although at times it has been an uneasy peace as there is a contested region regarding land ownership of mineral fields that span the shared border (Moria). This dispute has had periods of limited violence and armed conflict in the past and remains a source of contention between the nations.

Airspace: Both nations have a robust airspace structure with FIR zones that include both overland and oceanic airspace. There are multiple jet airways that overfly each country, including the contested border region, and connect their FIRs to Shire Oceanic FIR. Key reporting points and airway routings have been indicated on the adjoining map. Of note, airways J595, 435, 500, 400, 510, 991, and 429 span both Topaz and Diamond FIRs.

Armed Forces: Both nations represent middle-powers in the region and have roughly similar numbers of available military forces. While the Kingdom of Blue enjoys a superior air force (in terms of equipment and capability), the Republic of Silver have an edge in long range artillery systems (including ballistic missiles) as well as integration of Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). The Kingdom of Blue has not heavily invested in naval forces and is limited to coastal patrol and rescue vessels while the Republic of Silver has a standing naval force, limited in numbers, however they do possess ships of the line with short to medium range surface-to-air missile capability.

Kingdom of Blue	Republic of Silver
Capital: Topaz City Leader: King Arthur	Capital: Diamond City Leader: President Harrison
Military: army of approx. 110,000 soldiers	Military: army of approx. 125,000 soldiers
10 long range artillery systems Limited stocks of ballistic missiles	30 long range artillery systems Multiple variants of ballistic missiles
3 anti-aircraft systems (200 NM, up to FL500) 5 anti-aircraft systems (100 NM, up to FL250) 20 anti-aircraft systems (20 NM, up to FL080) Limited number of MANPADS	1 anti-aircraft systems (200 NM, up to FL500) 3 anti-aircraft systems (100 NM, up to FL250) 20 anti-aircraft systems (20 NM, up to FL080) MANPADS in use (5 NM, up to FL050)
50 modern jet fighters with air-to-air and air-to-surface capability	20 old-generation jet fighters, primarily air-to-air capability
Coastal patrol and rescue vessels	Small navy with SAM capability

Session 2: Presentation of the Fictional Conflict Scenario (Intro and Pre-Conflict Stage)

• Narrative as above (as background piece for introduction of the scenario) - SLIDE #1

Pre-Conflict Stage

Situation Update (SLIDE #2):

Political parties from both the Kingdom of Blue and Republic of Silver have once again resumed their long-standing arguments over the contested Moria region. Citing historical fact and fiction, these parties have turned to public opinion and emotion for support via various media outlets. Both parties have declared a need for action to immediately resolve this situation, and ‘’all options must to be considered, once and for all’’. While governing parties from both nations have sought to limit rhetoric, it is apparent that economic conditions along with external influence are supportive of each nation claiming ownership over the contested region.

In recent days we have seen increased pressure on the King and President to issue ultimatum to each other. Amidst this increasing diplomatic tension, both militaries appear to be mobilizing their land forces, and military air activity around both capitals is increasing.

Session 3: Assessing Conflict Zone Risks (Initial Conflict)

Situation Update (SLIDE #3):

Diplomatic tensions continue to rise as political and public support for armed action increases in both nations. To placate political opposition at home, governing parties are formally mobilizing elements of their forces. Moving from their home garrisons around the capital cities, military units from the Kingdom of Blue and Republic of Silver are deploying to their respective forward operating bases (FOBs) on the edges of the contested region.

The Kingdom of Blue has deployed forces at the international boundary and Wet River in the northern area of the contested region. Military air traffic has increased, and combat air patrols have taken station approximately half-way between Topaz City and the contested region. The Republic of Silver has deployed forces at the international boundary and Wet River in the southern area of the contested region. These vanguard forces are equipped with limited MANPADS and dedicated air defence assets remain at their home garrisons within the Diamond City area.

Concurrently, small-unit skirmishes by both forces have occurred in the area of the Wet River and the international boundary within the contested region as both forces begin to determine best approaches and lanes of movement for their respective main elements. These actions have included rapid small-scale border incursions.

Session 4: Risk Mitigations (Conflict Intensifies)

Situation Update:

SLIDE #4: Over the past week, diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and Republic have deteriorated with both countries recalling their staff and bracing for conflict. Internationally, each nation has relations with key foreign sponsors who have offered assistance in war material and expertise.

Both nations have engaged in long range artillery attacks at the Wet River and their respective inward regions. Kingdom of Blue air forces have been brought up to full readiness, while the Republic of Silver has deployed air defence assets beyond the capital city towards the contested region.

SLIDE #5: Two days ago, at 0000 Zulu, military forces of the Republic of Silver carried out successful river-crossing operations at multiple points along the Wet River in the contested region. These forces simultaneously struck north and west pushing past military elements of the Kingdom of Blue that were preparing for their own eastward thrust into Silver. There has been an increase in missile activity by both countries as Kingdom of Blue forces used their limited stores to strike deep into Silver territory. Republic of Silver has used significant numbers of ballistic missiles to target airfields and military transit corridors between Topaz City and the contested region.

Recent reporting has confirmed that both nations have begun to receive materials to replenish expended supplies. This includes surface to surface missile capability that the Kingdom of Blue has used to successfully target Silver naval assets southeast of the Brandy reporting point along the coastline. Increased surface to air missile activity by Republic of Silver forces has blunted Blue air force successes and has resulted in a de-facto air defence corridor along portions of J400 (east of Brandy) and J500.

Session 5: Fictional Scenario Wrap Up (Situation Stabilizes)

Situation Update:

The past week of operations have seen considerable shifts in the fortunes of war for both militaries.

SLIDE #6: Silver forces were able to surge inland past the contested region into the Kingdom of Blue with considerable speed. The success of the Kingdom of Blue ballistic missile strikes kept Silver air defence assets east of the Wet River and allowed Blue air forces to greatly assist the army in blunting the land advance by Silver. The initial gains made by Silver forces were effectively blunted and halted by the Blue military greatly assisted by foreign sponsor war materials.

SLIDE #7: Seizing this momentum, Blue forces were able to reclaim a considerable amount of lost territory while their attempts to cross the Wet River and strike inwards were equally stalled in large part due to the use of foreign sponsor materials by Silver forces.

SLIDE #8: Sustained military operations has significantly exhausted the combat power and capability of the military forces amid calls for ceasefire negotiations from the general populace of both nations. While combat air patrols by both air forces are in place between their nation’s capitals and the contested region, military forces are either returning to home garrisons or establishing defensive postures along the Moria contested region (effectively a return to pre-conflict boundaries).

Tensions in the contested region continue to be elevated, the loss of proud aerial and naval symbols has helped to lessen the pre-war rhetoric of the populace and political parties.

4.4 Safer Skies Consultative Committee Documents

Baseline Information Sharing - The Safer Skies Initiative identified the need for improving information sharing across the broader aviation sector as a top priority. The paper aims to establish a methodology for members to share baseline threat information affecting civil aviation operations in and near conflict zones. The methodology is intended to support threat awareness and risk assessments to inform determinations by air carriers and States on mitigation measures to safeguard civil operations prior to and during a crisis. To read the SSCC Information Paper Baseline Information Sharing in Respect to Conflict Zones please email the Safer Skies Secretariat at saferskies@iata.org.

Criteria for Airspace Closure – This paper provides principles for States, Air Operators and the State of Registry/State of the Operator (SoR/SoO) as guidance when making decisions related to airspace closure. To read the SSCC Information Paper Guiding Principles Related to Airspace Closures email the Safer Skies Secretariat at saferskies@iata.org.

Mitigation Strategy Inventory – This paper establishes an inventory of existing conflict zone management mitigations strategies, for both States in conflict and States not in conflict. To read the SSCC Information Paper on Mitigation Strategy Inventory email the Safer Skies Secretariat at saferskies@iata.org.

Rapid Information-sharing – This paper identifies and evaluates current international communication forums for rapid information-sharing pertaining to overflight threats and vulnerabilities in international civilian operations. It is intended to identify and establish a “secondary” method for States and/or Airport Operators to rapidly share emerging conflict zone threat related NOTAM/AIC information. The paper proposes to leverage the capabilities of the existing IATA non-commercial platform, known as the IATA Tactical Operations Portal (ITOP). To read the SSCC Information Paper on Rapid Information Sharing email the Safer Skies Secretariat at saferskies@iata.org