Executive Summary
The purpose of this document is to assist Transport Canada in articulating its vision for the implementation of Enhanced Train Control (ETC) technologies on Canada's rail network.
The primary objective of ETC systems, in the Canadian context, is to eliminate, or significantly reduce the probability of, catastrophic train-to-train collisions, train overspeed derailments, and train derailments through misaligned track switches, all as a result of inadvertent rule violations by train crews i.e., as a result of “human error”. Additional safety and/or operational benefits may also be possible, depending on the specific technical solution implemented.
Canada's national rail network is the third largest in the world with a total track length in excess of 40,000 km. The rail network primarily transports freight. CN and CP are the two major transcontinental freight railway operators; both are privately owned, and both have rail links that extend into the USA. Nationwide passenger services in Canada are provided by VIA Rail, a crown corporation. Inter-city travel in the Quebec City-Windsor corridor represents 96% of all VIA Rail passenger trips. Metrolinx, an agency of the Ontario Government, also provides a commuter rail passenger service in the Toronto area.
The current method of controlling train movements on Canada's rail network is primarily “rule-based”, governed by the Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR), with train movements managed and supervised by Rail Traffic Controllers. Low density corridors follow Occupancy Control System (OCS) rules with verbal clearances and other instructions issued to train crews, and with train crews responsible for complying with these instructions. Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) is utilized on higher density corridors with trackside signals indicating speed limits and clearance limits, and with train crews again responsible for observing and correctly responding to these wayside signals. There are no train-borne systems for overspeed protection, or to enforce restrictive signal aspects. Reliance is placed solely on train crews.
Unintended rule violations have therefore occurred as a result of loss of situational awareness. Following a rear-end collision of two CP trains in 1998, for example, the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) recommended: “The Department of Transport and the railway industry implement additional backup safety defenses to help ensure that signal indications are consistently recognized and followed”. Following a main track overspeed derailment of a VIA train in 2012 that killed three members of the operating crew and injured 45 passengers, the TSB recommended: “The Department of Transport require major Canadian passenger and freight railways implement physical fail-safe train controls, beginning with Canada's high-speed rail corridors”.
Canada's rail network is an “open” network. Given that all railway companies are required to follow the CROR, compatible trains owned and operated by any of the railway companies are able to operate safely, reliably and efficiently not only on rail corridors they own and maintain, but also on corridors owned and maintained by any of the other railway companies. For example, 98% of the track over which VIA passenger trains operate is owned by other railway companies, and freight and passenger trains operate over track owned by Metrolinx in the Toronto area.
Supporting this “interoperability” requirement is a critical factor in developing and deploying Canada's ETC solution in that it drives the requirement for functional standards for any train-borne, central or wayside ETC equipment, and protocol standards for the ETC data communications network.
In Europe, the “European Train Control System (ETCS)”, has been developed and deployed since 1990 as a standardized system to achieve interoperability on cross-border corridors, and to support international rail transport within Europe. This standardized system is replacing country-specific automatic train protection systems.
In the USA, “Positive Train Control (PTC)” has been developed and deployed since 2008. Three different PTC solutions have been implemented which had to be designed to be interoperable with each other.
These interoperable train control solutions in Europe and the USA are complex and expensive, and significant effort was required to develop interoperability standards, specifications and designs (10+ years). Developing an interoperable train control solution for Canada will be equally challenging, as there is no simple “off-the-shelf” solution.
In 2016, a study by Canada's Advisory Council on Railway Safety therefore recommended that a targeted, risk-based, corridor-specific implementation of train control technologies would be the best option for Canada. To date, this recommendation has been the “working assumption” for implementing ETC in Canada. A corridor-specific implementation offers the potential for a more cost-effective approach in that the investments in safety improvements on a given corridor can be tailored to the actual safety risk on that corridor. The higher the risk level on a given corridor, the higher the likely complexity and cost of the train control technical solution on that corridor.
Four (4) different “levels” of ETC functionality were proposed by the Canadian Rail Research Laboratory (CaRRL) of the University of Alberta, with Level 1 and Level 2 being Driver Advisory Systems and Level 3 and Level 4 being true “train control” solutions providing Automatic Train Protection functionality.
The simpler Level 1 or Level 2 Driver Advisory Systems would provide a variety of information and alerts to train crews to enhance their situational awareness. Train crews would still be responsible for rules compliance, however, and as such these systems may reduce, but would not eliminate, the probability of human error. Historically, such systems have not been regarded as “train control” solutions and have only been used for non-safety related functions such as energy use optimization or to support improved compliance with the operating timetable.
The more complex (and more expensive) Level 3 or Level 4 Automatic Train Protection systems would also provide information and alerts to the train crew, but in addition would provide automatic (“fail-safe”) enforcement, by applying the train brakes, if a potential hazard were to exist. Such systems are specifically designed to prevent over-speed derailments, prevent train collisions as a result of STOP signal violations, and prevent train derailments as a result of operation over mis-aligned track switches.
ETC Levels 1, 2 and 3 are “overlay” solutions in that they require that existing methods of train control, such as CTC and Occupancy Control Systems, be retained to generate movement authorities, clearances and restrictions. As such, any operational limitations within the existing methods of control, and/or any state-of-good-repair issues with existing signaling and train control equipment, would remain and would not be addressed by the ETC solution.
ETC Level 4 would be a “stand-alone” solution capable of not only eliminating the consequences of train crew error, but also of replacing equipment and functions currently being performed by existing methods of control. This could potential offer other operational business case benefits to the railway companies, in addition to safety benefits, but would be more complex (and costly) to implement.
With a corridor-specific, risk-based approach, the risk assessments must be completed up-front in order to establish the ETC-preventable safety risks on each corridor, the appropriate ETC technology solution on each corridor to mitigate these safety risks, and the priorities (corridor ranking) for implementing the selected technology solutions. The risk assessments should consider both the likelihood of preventable derailments and collisions on each corridor, as well as the potential consequences of such occurrences, with consideration of factors such as the corridor characteristics, current method of control, and the current and anticipated future train movements on the corridor.
This report identifies two possible ETC Implementation Scenarios that could result from the corridor-specific risk assessments.
The first scenario assumes that the corridor-specific risk assessments conclude there is no urgency to implement an Automatic Train Protection system (ETC Level 3 or 4) on any corridors in Canada's rail network. As such, the implementation approach would be to focus first on implementing an “ETC standard” Driver Advisory System (ETC Level 1 or 2) to improve train crew situational awareness, if it can be demonstrated that such systems will indeed reduce the probability of train crew human errors. Then, as a subsequent step, as may be required at some point in the future, upgrade or replace the back-office, wayside and locomotive equipment on the higher risk corridors to support an “ETC standard” Automatic Train Protection solution.
The second scenario assumes that the corridor-specific risk assessments conclude there is a need to implement an Automatic Train Protection system (ETC Level 3 or 4) on certain high-risk corridors in Canada's rail network. As such, the implementation approach would be to focus first on implementing an “ETC standard” Automatic Train Protection solution on these high-risk corridors (that would likely already be equipped with CTC) and would likely include the high speed, mixed-traffic corridors, such as the Quebec City/Windsor corridor, and other corridors in areas of high population density supporting the transportation of hazardous materials. Then, as a subsequent step, implement a Driver Advisory System solution, as appropriate, on the remaining corridors.
Once the implementation approach and priorities have been established, a detailed implementation plan and schedule for specifying, designing, procuring and installing the corridor-specific back-office equipment, and any corridor-specific wayside equipment, could then be developed by the respective host railways. If a specific corridor is to be equipped to support an Automatic Train Protection System solution, the host railway would also need to establish if the Automatic Train Protection system is to be installed as an overlay (ETC Level 3) or as a new method of control (ETC Level 4).
An implementation plan and schedule would also be required for equipping the locomotive fleets of the freight and passenger railways operating on Canada's rail network. This implementation plan would also be driven by the implementation priorities adopted for equipping the various corridors i.e., either equip all locomotives with a Driver Advisory System solution first, and then, at a later date upgrade or replace the ETC equipment on certain locomotives with an Automatic Train Protection solution, or first equip all locomotives that could operate on high-risk corridors with Automatic Train Protection equipment.
Regardless of the specific implementation strategy adopted, it is clear that at any point of time during the multi-year implementation of ETC, some locomotives (and some corridors) may be equipped with Automatic Train Protection equipment, some locomotives (and some corridors) may be equipped with Driver Advisory System equipment, and some locomotives (and some corridors) may not be equipped with any ETC solution. The level of actual ETC safety protection on a given corridor is therefore not only dependent on the ETC equipment installed on the corridor, but also on the ETC equipment installed on the locomotives operating on that corridor.
The corridor-specific approach (which implies different ETC levels on different corridors/locomotives) is however fundamentally in conflict with the interoperability requirement (which implies a standardized solution on all corridors and trains). Addressing this fundamental conflict is the primary challenge in developing a detailed “road map” to implement ETC on Canada's rail network.
For example, if an Automatic Train Protection solution were required on a given high-risk corridor, should all locomotives (passenger and freight) operating on Canada's rail network be required to be equipped with Automatic Train Protection equipment, or only those locomotives that regularly operate on that high-risk corridor? In the latter case, should other locomotives be prevented from operating on that corridor, or allowed to operate on that corridor with a reduced level of safety protection?
To support all levels of ETC functionality across ETC-equipped corridors in the Canada rail network will require secure and reliable data communications between railway back-office equipment (and where applicable, corridor-specific wayside equipment) and all ETC-equipped trains operating on the various corridors. The more complex the ETC solution, the more complex the data communication system requirements.
To deliver the corridor-specific equipment, locomotive-specific equipment, and data communication network equipment will also require the development of the relevant technical specifications, standards and technical solutions. Standards development will be complicated by potentially different, corridor-specific, technology solutions.
The deployment of ETC systems across Canada's rail network will clearly be a highly complex logistical undertaking requiring many activities to be coordinated and integrated and involving numerous stakeholders over many years. As such, other factors that will require consideration by the relevant stakeholders in developing an ETC Implementation Road Map will include: the overall management/governance/organizational structure; cost-sharing, specifically on mixed-traffic corridors; the level of involvement of the supply industry; procurement/contracting strategies; program/project management approach; systems integration management approach; safety certification approach; updates to the Canadian Rail Operating Rules; and maintenance of ETC specifications/standards; etc.
In summary, the ETC Implementation Road Map will be driven by Interoperability Considerations and by the Implementation Priorities, which in turn will be driven by Transport Canada's Vision for ETC in Canada. Clarifying this Vision is therefore a critical first step, so that all the implications of the Vision can be fully evaluated.
Learn More: To obtain a copy of the report, please contact the Rail Safety Directorate at RailSafety@tc.gc.ca