A07C0151 - Regulation of Passenger-Carrying Balloons - Balloon Emergency Fuel Shut-Off
Hard Landing – Fuel Leak and Fire
Sundance Balloons International
FireFly 12B (Hot Air Balloon) C-FNVM
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 15 nm NE
11 August 2007
Link to TSB Rec Report A08-01-02 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/fiches-facts/A07C0151/recs_a0801_cannon.asp )
Link to TSB final report A07C0151 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2007/a07c0151/a07c0151.asp )
Synopsis
The Sundance Balloons International FireFly 12B hot air balloon (registration C-FNVM, serial number F12B-004) was attempting to land in a field adjacent to Birds Hill Provincial Park near the northern outskirts of Winnipeg, Manitoba. The balloon was operated by Sundance Balloons International under a Special Flight Operations Certificate issued by Transport Canada. One pilot and 11 passengers were on board, all in the balloon’s basket. The flight was a local sightseeing flight originating in the southeast of Winnipeg and terminating in the northeast of Winnipeg.
The flight had been extended beyond Winnipeg as the pilot searched for a suitable landing area in strong winds. The balloon touched down and skipped several times. The basket was dragged on its side for about 700 feet and tipped over far enough for the burners to strike the ground as the balloon came to a stop. A propane fuel leak occurred and an intense uncontrolled fire ensued as the passengers were beginning to exit from under the partially-inverted basket. All occupants escaped; however, the pilot and two passengers suffered serious injuries in the intense fire. Four other passengers suffered minor injuries, some with burns. Two of the propane tanks and a fire extinguisher canister exploded, and the basket of the balloon was destroyed by fire. The accident occurred at about 0908 central daylight time.
Recommendations
Transportation Safety Board of Canada Recommendation A08-01
“The Department of Transport ensure that passenger-carrying commercial balloon operations provide a level of safety equivalent to that established for other aircraft of equal passenger carrying capacity."
Transport Canada Response to Recommendation A08-01
Transport Canada is conducting a risk assessment of commercial passenger-carrying balloon operations. This study will also address the special flight operations certificate process and commercial passenger-carrying balloon operation oversight. Once the review is complete, should regulatory changes be required, Notice of Proposed Amendments will be developed and submitted to the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council for consultation.
Transportation Safety Board of Canada Recommendation A08-02
“The Department of Transport ensure that balloons carrying fare-paying passengers have an emergency fuel shut-off."
Transport Canada Response to Recommendation A08-02
Transport Canada will conduct a risk assessment of the issues raised by this recommendation. This study will also determine whether regulatory or non-regulatory solutions would be appropriate to address these issues. Once the review is complete, should regulatory changes be required, Notice of Proposed Amendments will be developed and submitted to the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council for consultation.
A06O0206 - Airspace Vertical Structure surrounding Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport (LBPIA)
Mid-Air Collision
Between Cessna 172P C-GFGD
and Cessna 182T C-GCHN
Caledon, Ontario, 1 nm W
04 August 2006
Link to TSB final report A06O0206 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2006/a06o0206/a06o0206.asp)
Summary
On 04 August 2006, two light aeroplanes collided in mid-air approximately 1 nm west of the town of Caledon, Ontario. Both aeroplanes were operating in accordance with visual flight rules in Class E airspace. The collision involved a Cessna 172P aeroplane (serial number 17275680, registration C-GFGD) operated by the Brampton Flying Club and being flown by an instructor and student, and a Cessna 182T aeroplane (serial number 18281612, registration C-GCHN) being flown by its owner. C-GFGD was southeastbound in a gradual descent, wings level. C-GCHN was northbound in straight and level flight. The angle between the tracks of the two aeroplanes was approximately 120°.
During the collision, the right wing was torn from C-GCHN and the aeroplane became uncontrollable. C-GFGD sustained damage to the nose and cockpit areas. Both aeroplanes crashed in close proximity to the point of collision. The three occupants of the aeroplanes received fatal injuries and both aeroplanes were destroyed. There was a small post-impact fire as a result of debris from one aeroplane severing an electrical power line. There was no fire in the main wreckage of either aeroplane. The accident took place at 1234 eastern daylight time at 43°51'29.6" N, 080°1'12.8" W.
Recommendations
Transportation Safety Board of Canada Recommendation A08-03
“The Department of Transport, in coordination with NAV CANADA, take steps to substantially reduce the risk collision between visual flight rules aircraft operating in Class E airspace surrounding the Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport."
Transport Canada Response to Recommendation A08-03
The Department had requested NAV CANADA to review the architecture of the airspace underlying the Terminal Control Area surrounding Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport. As part of a more extensive airspace review of the Windsor, Toronto, Montreal corridor, the air navigation service provider has submitted a proposal in the form of an aeronautical study that addresses the very issues identified in the Board's Aviation Investigation Report A06O206. This submission, while far more ranging than the airspace issues addressed in the recommendation, is presently under review by Transport Canada. However, the proposed changes to the airspace surrounding LBPIA have been accepted.
More specifically, the Class C airspace exclusion surrounding the Brampton airport will be expanded to more than double its present area while the floor of this airspace will be raised to commence above 2,500 above sea level (ASL) between the 12 and 15 nautical mile arcs centered on LBPIA. In addition, segregated and unidirectional visual flight rules routes to and from the Brampton airport, based on prominent geographical and planimetric features, will be published. In respect of Class E airspace surrounding and underlying the Toronto terminal area serving other general airports and access to commonly used flight training areas, common frequency areas and segregated routes will be established.
Due to the extent of the changes to be implemented, implementation of the airspace structure and operational procedures are planned to take effect on March 12, 2009 to coincide with regular publication dates. In the intervening period an awareness and education program for the general and recreational aviation community will continue to be enhanced.
Should you require further information, please contact Aviation Safety Analysis at asi-rsa@tc.gc.ca