Owners and operators of Airbus Canada BD-500-1A10 and -1A11 Aeroplanes
|File Classification No.:||Z 5000-35|
|Document No.:||CASA 2021-10|
The purpose of this Civil Aviation Safety Alert (CASA) is to raise awareness of occurrences of takeoff with incorrect throttle setting and the implications on spoiler deployment, and to provide information and recommendations to owners and operators of these aeroplanes.
On 15 July 2018, when initiating takeoff from Porto (LPPR), the pilot flying (PF) advanced the thrust levers (TLs) of an A220-300 to a thrust lever angle (TLA) of 20.6 degrees, which caused the autothrottle (AT) to remain armed without becoming engaged.
After exceeding a wheel speed of 60 knots (kt), the spoilers deployed. At an indicated airspeed of between 90 and 100 kt, the flight crew noticed that the thrust was set too low. After advancing the throttles, the spoilers retracted. The aircraft took off approximately 1000 metres before the end of the runway, at a distance which was 1.5 times the length of the takeoff distance calculated, continued to climb and landed in Geneva without any further incidents.
The Swiss Transportation Investigation Safety Board (STSB) investigated the incident, issuing Final Report No. 2355 and Safety Recommendation no. 552. This report indicated that there had been five takeoffs between 14 February 2018 and 30 July 2018 in which the engines’ takeoff thrust was not set correctly.
Airbus Canada issued All Operator Message (AOM) CS-AOM-00-00-0037 on 21 December 2018 to communicate the following key messages to all operators’ flight operations crews:
- Ensure AT engages when taking off with AT (AT engages at 23 degrees TLA, which approximately corresponds to 68% N1),
- Ensure proper takeoff thrust is set,
- Ensure thrust settings are checked at 80 kt in accordance with the Flight Crew Operational Manual (FCOM) Volume (Vol.) 2 page 03-02-27.
- If this procedure is not followed, once wheel speed is above 60 kt and TLA is less than 23 degrees or 68% N1, the following will occur:
- The ground lift dump (GLD) will fully activate,
- There is no engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) message to indicate the status of the GLD,
- AT will change to Hold mode.
Airbus Canada has also revised the FCOM Vol. 2 to Issue 016D, dated 20 April 2021, to emphasize the correct setting of the TLs during takeoff, including a new PF callout for correct engagement of the AT.
Airbus Canada will also issue revised training instructions to improve flight crew management of the AT and understanding of the GLD control logic during takeoff.
Transport Canada (TC) recommends the following for all BD-500-1A10 and -1A11 aeroplanes:
Flight crews should become familiar with the information contained in Airbus Canada AOM CS-AOM-00-00-0037.
Operators should incorporate the contents of Airbus Canada FCOM Vol. 2 Issue 016D into their procedures.
When the revised training becomes available, operators should adapt their training programs to incorporate the revised training instructions.
TC continues to evaluate this issue and might issue recommended or mandatory corrective action, as necessary.
For more information concerning this issue, contact a Transport Canada Centre; or contact Daniel Gosselin, Continuing Airworthiness in Ottawa, by telephone at 1-888-663-3639, facsimile at 613-996-9178 or by e-mail at TC.CAWWEBFEEDBACK-retroactionWebMDLN.TC@tc.gc.ca.
Original signed by
Chief, Continuing Airworthiness
National Aircraft Certification
The Transport Canada Civil Aviation Safety Alert (CASA) is used to convey important safety information and contains recommended action items. The CASA strives to assist the aviation industry's efforts to provide a service with the highest possible degree of safety. The information contained herein is often critical and must be conveyed to the appropriate office in a timely manner. The CASA may be changed or amended should new information become available.