Minister Marc Garneau appearance at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Aircraft Certification on March 12, 2020

From: Transport Canada

Briefing materials prepared for the Honourable Marc Garneau, Minister of Transport, for his appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Aircraft Certification on March 12, 2020.

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Notes for an address by the Honourable Marc Garneau, Minister of Transport to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities Regarding Aircraft Certification

Ottawa, Ontario

March 12, 2020

10 minutes

Check against delivery

Thank you, Mr. Chair, Vice-Chairs and Committee Members, for the invitation to contribute to the Committee's study of aircraft certification.

Transport Canada appreciates the Committee's work on all issues related to the safety of the travelling public and is pleased to help in any way it can.

Aircraft certification is essential to the safety and security of our transportation system and is part of Transport Canada's mandate.

March 10th marked the one-year anniversary of the tragic Ethiopian Airlines accident. And it's been nearly 18 months since the tragic Lion Air accident. Our thoughts continue to be with the victims, along with their family members and friends.

As Committee members know, the model of plane involved in both accidents was the Boeing 737 MAX 8. On March 13, 2019, days after the Ethiopian Airlines accident, Transport Canada received and analyzed new satellite data that informed its decision to swiftly close Canadian airspace to the aircraft.

These restrictions will remain in place until Transport Canada is fully satisfied that all safety concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the FAA, and adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place.

Civil Aviation relies on the global collaboration of manufacturers, operators and regulators. All stakeholders, including governments, work together to minimize the risk of aviation accidents. The International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, facilitates this collaboration.

Under the ICAO convention, the country that manufactures an aircraft – known as the "state of design" – is responsible for certifying its airworthiness and safe operation. The state of design must conduct the testing needed to certify the aircraft, and then share this information widely.

Under Annex 8 of the ICAO convention, countries can either accept the state-of-design certification or use the results of the original performance tests to validate the certification.

Boeing manufactures the MAX 8 in the United States and the Federal Aviation Administration – the FAA – is responsible for its certification.

The FAA is also responsible for certifying Boeing's approach to fixing the problems identified in the wake of the MAX 8 accidents.

In addition, it must ensure the effectiveness of any recommended changes to the aircraft's design and operation, as well as to crew procedures and training.

Transport Canada continues to work closely with the FAA on its review of the MAX 8. We also continue to work closely with civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil in hopes that this model of aircraft can return to service, and transport travellers safely to destinations around the world.

Transport Canada has been, since the accidents, conducting an independent review of the design changes proposed for the MAX 8 that the FAA are working to certify. This review will include test flights of the aircraft to validate the proposed changes.

Any changes in an aircraft's design or operations can also impact crew procedures and training. A Joint Operational Evaluation Board, comprising international civil aviation authorities, including Transport Canada, is analyzing the proposed changes to the MAX 8 and will identify any potential impacts on crew procedures and training.

The Board's analysis might, for instance, identify new training requirements, such as additional simulator training, before the MAX 8 can return to service. Transport Canada may also require additional training for crews that operate the MAX 8 in Canada.

A key contributor to the Lion Air accident – and a suspected contributor to the Ethiopian Air accident – is the automatic activation of a system known as MCAS: Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System following a failure of an Angle of Attack Indicator, which measures the aircraft's angle relative to the oncoming air. MCAS is part of the larger system that also controls speed stability of the aircraft.

Under specific flight conditions, MCAS automatically moves the aircraft's horizontal stabilizer – the device that adjusts the nose of the plane so that it points up or down.

In the wake of the Lion Air accident, the FAA – the state of design responsible for the MAX 8 – issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive related to the MCAS. The Directive amended procedures, by drawing the crew's attention to the existing Runaway Stabilizer Procedure that would allow crews to effectively counteract the unwanted activation of the MCAS system.

Three Canadian operators fly the Max 8: Air Canada, Sunwing and WestJet. Transport Canada immediately shared the FAA's Airworthiness Directive with these airlines, and then took an additional step to further improve safety. In collaboration with the three airlines, Transport Canada developed and implemented enhanced training requirements for pilots.

The requirements exceeded the standards implemented by the FAA's Airworthiness Directive and were specifically designed to reduce the time delay to the crew's use of the runaway trim-stabilizer procedure required to counteract the effects of the unwanted MCAS activation.

The additional step of new training demonstrates Canada's commitment to the highest possible safety standards.

To complete the training, aircrews had to memorize the five steps required to exercise the runaway trim-stabilizer procedure. Previously, aircrews had to memorize only two of the five steps and then, if needed, consult the cockpit handbook for the other steps.

I am confident that the measures implemented by the FAA Airworthiness Directive, subsequently adopted and enhanced by Transport Canada in collaboration with Canadian MAX 8 operators, significantly reduced the risks involved in situations like the one that led to the Lion Air crash.

It is impossible to determine whether the combination of these measures would have prevented a similar crash in Canada. What is certain, however, is that the combination of mitigation strategies better prepared Canadian pilots to manage the failure conditions that were evident in the MAX 8 accidents.

Commercial aviation operates in a highly complex, continuously evolving environment. I encourage Committee members to recognize that Canada maintains one of the safest civil aviation systems in the world. Our safety record results from the hard work, dedication, experience and technical expertise of the men and women directly involved in the system.

On behalf of the public, Transport Canada remains absolutely committed to safety and bases all of its safety-related decisions on accurate, current and relevant evidence.

Thank you. I'll do my best now to answer the questions of Committee members.

Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities (TRAN)

Date: Thursday, March 12, 2020

Time: 3:30-4:30PM

Location: Room 225-A, West Block (televised meeting)

Subject: Aircraft Certification Process

Witnesses:

Transport Canada (Based on Mains 2019-2020 appearance)

  • Hon. Marc Garneau, P.C., M.P., Minister of Transport
  • Aaron McCrorie, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety & Security
  • David Turnbull, Director, National Aircraft Certification

Opening Remarks: Minister to deliver remarks (10 mins)

Question of witnesses:

For the first round of questioning, six (6) minutes (for both question and answer) to a representative of each party in the following order (24 mins):

  1. Conservative Party
  2. Liberal Party
  3. Bloc Québecois
  4. New Democratic Party

For the second and subsequent rounds, time allocation is as follows (25 mins):

  • Conservative (5 mins);
  • Liberal (5 mins);
  • Conservative (5 mins);
  • Liberal (5 mins);
  • Bloc Québecois (2.5 mins);
  • New Democratic Party (2.5 mins);

About TRAN

The Committee reconvened on February 18, 2020 following the opening of the 43rd Parliament. Committee membership is aligned with the distribution of seats in the House of Commons (6 Liberals, 4 Conservatives, 1 Bloc, 1 NDP). MP Vance Badawey (Liberal) is the Chair and MP Todd Doherty (Conservative) is the Vice-Chair.

The Committee can study any aspect of the management and operations of Transport Canada and Infrastructure Canada, as well as any legislation, programs or policy areas administered by the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Infrastructure.

TC-related motions before the Committee during the 43rd Parliament include:

  1. That, the Committee undertake a study of four meetings in regard to Transport Canada's aircraft certification process, including, but not limited to, the nature of Transport Canada's relationship to the Federal Aviation Administration and other certifying bodies, as well as the role of airplane manufacturers in the certification process.
  2. That the Committee undertake a study of two (2) meetings on the risks of centralizing rail traffic control in Canada and the consequences of relocating CN rail traffic controllers in Montreal to Edmonton.
  3. That the Committee commit to undertake a study focusing on current and anticipated labour shortages in the Canadian transportation sector, for example truck drivers, mariners, maintenance staff, trainers/instructors and various types of engineers and technicians in the aviation sector. The study would identify the implications of such shortages and look at possible solutions to alleviate problems stemming from them; and that, in consultation with the Committee Members, the Chair be empowered to coordinate the resources and scheduling necessary to execute these studies in six (6) meetings or fewer.
  4. That the Committee commit to undertake a review and provide recommendations on how the Government of Canada can electrify public transportation across the country. Review other international jurisdictions, municipalities, provinces and provide best practices. And that, in consultation with the Committee Members, the Chair be empowered to coordinate the resources and scheduling necessary to execute these studies in six (6) meetings or fewer.

TRAN during the 43rd Parliament

The Committee has undertaken two studies since the beginning of the 43rd Parliament:

Study: The Mandate Letters of the Ministers of Transport and the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities

  • Sponsor: MP Luc Berthold (CPC, Quebec)
  • Length of study: February 27, 2020 (One meeting)

Study: Aircraft Certification Process

  • Sponsor: MP Todd Doherty (CPC, British Columbia)
  • Length of study: Ongoing (one of four meetings have occurred)

Active studies at dissolution

From September 2018 to June 2019, the Committee held several meetings in order to analyse the Estimates of Transport Canada and Infrastructure Canada. Furthermore, TRAN held several short briefings on a variety of subjects, such as:

  • National Trade Corridors Fund
  • The delivery of infrastructure to Indigenous communities
  • The temporary use in Canada, by Canadians, of American-plated vehicles
  • The mandate of the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities

Prior to the summer 2019 adjournment, however, the Committee initiated one study relevant to Transport Canada's portfolio:

  • Study: Canada's Requirements for Passenger Rail Service
  • Sponsor(s): MP Robert Aubin (NDP, Québec)
  • Span of the study: N/A. Study commencement interrupted by dissolution.

Committee activity within the last year

In addition to briefings and referrals from the House of Commons, TRAN completed six studies from September 2018 to June 2019. These studies touched on matters such as departmental expenditures, surface transportation, public transit and the aviation sector. As a result of the studies, the Committee received three Government Responses.

Study: Canadian Transportation Logistics Strategy

Study: Bus Passenger Safety

  • Sponsor(s): MP Robert Aubin (NDP, Québec)
  • Span of the study: April 2, 2019 to May 28, 2019 (Five meetings)
  • Report: Report 31 - Bus Passenger Safety (PDF, 2.8 MB)

Study: Main Estimates, 2019-2020

Study: Private Members' Motion M-177, Challenges Facing Flight Schools in Canada

Study: Assessing the Impact of Aircraft Noise in the Vicinity of Major Canadian Airports

Study: Supplementary Estimates (A), 2018-2019

Biographies

Vance Badawey (Niagara Centre, Ontario)
Chair of the Committee

Vance Badawey

Vance Badawey was first elected as Member of Parliament on October 19, 2015 for the riding of Niagara Centre. Mr. Badawey began his career in public service as a City Councillor for the City of Port Colborne in 1994. He thereafter was elected as Mayor of Port Colborne in 1997. In 2006 he was re-elected to the office of Mayor in Port Colborne and Regional Councillor for the Regional Municipality of Niagara.

As the Member of Parliament for Niagara Centre, MP Badawey has collaborated with several parliamentary caucuses, including the Indigenous, Horseshoe, Rural and Steel caucuses.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Climate change
  • Investments in public transit
  • Voiced support for the ECCC Great Lakes Protection Initiative

Issues of interest:

  • Rail Safety
  • Transportation infrastructure investments
  • Level crossing
  • Oversight mechanisms
  • Maintenance, repair and replacement of VIA Rail's fleet
  • CTA Review – Long-term agenda for the future of transportation in Canada
  • National strategy on transportation and logistics (intermodal connections)

Churence Rogers (Bonavista – Burin – Trinity, Newfoundland and Labrador)

Churence Rogers

Mr. Rogers is the Liberal Member of Parliament for the riding of Bonavista – Burin – Trinity. He was first elected in a by-election that was held on December 11, 2017. Mr. Rogers was elected with 69.2% of the vote.

Before entering federal politics, Mr. Churence Rogers served as the Mayor of Centreville-Wareham-Trinity and as president of the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Municipalities.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Transportation logistics in eastern Canada
  • Seat belt regulations
  • Ferry rates by Marine Atlantic Inc.

Helena Jaczek (Markham – Stouffville, Ontario)

Helena Jaczek

Helena Jaczek studied at the University of Toronto and obtained a medical degree and Masters of Health Science from the institution. Thereafter, she obtained a Masters of Business Administration from York University.

In her professional career, Ms. Jaczek occupied a variety of positions in the healthcare sector, such as general practice at the Women's College Hospital and as Chief Medical Officer of health in York Region.

In 2007, Ms. Jaczek was elected in Ontario's provincial legislature, where she would go on to serve in several capacities. These included positions such as Committee membership, as a Parliamentary Assistant to Ministers and, later, as Minister. In 2019, she was elected to the House of Commons as the Member of Parliament for the riding of Markham – Stouffville.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Expressed support for continued federal infrastructure investments

Maninder Sidhu (Brampton East, Ontario)

Maninder Sidhu

Mr. Sidhu was first elected to parliament in the riding of Brampton East in 2019 and defeated the independent MP Raj Gewel.

Prior to his entry in politics, Mr. Sidhu graduated from the University of Waterloo and started a customs brokerage business and possesses experience in international trade consultation. He is also the founder of The Kindness Movement Charity, which assists underprivileged school children in Canada and India.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

Fayçal El-Khoury (Laval – Les Îles, Quebec)

Fayçal El-Khoury

Mr. Fayçal El-Khoury obtained a degree in civil engineering from Concordia University. Thereafter, Mr. El-Khoury established a construction company in Laval.

From 2005 to 2015 Mr. El-Khoury worked as a consultant specializing in business relations with the Middle East.

Faycal El-Khoury is a Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party. He was first elected in the 2015 federal election, with 47.7% of the vote. Mr. El-Khoury holds a diploma in Engineering from the Concordia University.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Investments in public transit
  • Support for Transport Canada's ZEV program

Chris Bittle (St. Catharines, Ontario)
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport

Chris Bittle

MP Bittle was born in Niagara Falls in 1979. After the conclusion of high school, Mr. Bittle attended Queen's University where he graduated with an Honours Bachelor of Arts. He thereafter attended the University of Windsor, where he obtained a Bachelor of Laws.

After completing his studies, Mr. Bittle began a career as a lawyer with the firm Lancaster, Brooks and Welch LLP. The focus of his work concerned commercial disputes, real estate litigation defamation and landlord-tenant issues.

Mr. Bittle was first elected to the House of Commons in the 2015 Canadian general election. During the 42nd Parliament, Mr. Bittle served from 2017 to 2019 as Deputy Leader of the Government in the House of Commons.

Mr. Bittle is married and has a son, named Ethan.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Supports increased investments in public transit

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Support for enhanced climate action

Andy Fillmore (Halifax, Nova Scotia)
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities

Andy Fillmore

Mr. Fillmore began his studies at Acadia University and thereafter transferred to the Technical University of Nova Scotia, now known as Dalhousie University. At the Technical University, Mr. Fillmore obtained an undergraduate degree in architecture and a graduated degree in urban and rural planning. He was also awarded a graduate degree in Design Studies from the Harvard Graduate School of Design.

In his professional career, MP Fillmore has served in a variety of positions related to urban designing and planning. During his career, the MP worked in both the private and public sector. Most recently prior to his election, Mr. Fillmore was Vice President of Planning and Development at the Waterfront Development Corporation, where he focused on economic opportunity, tourism and the creation of new public spaces in Halifax.

Mr. Fillmore was initially elected during the 2015 general election was the Member of Parliament for Halifax. During the 42nd Parliament, MP Fillmore served in various roles, including as the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs. Thereafter, the MP served as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Democratic Institutions. At the beginning of the 43rd Parliament, Mr. Fillmore was appointed as Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Introduced a motion to ensure a GHG emissions impact study would be conducted for infrastructure projects with federal funding of over $500,000 (M-45)

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • State of the breakwater at Herring Cove (Meeting organized by the Atlantic Pilotage Authority)
  • Supported the purchase of accessible buses for Halifax

Todd Doherty (Cariboo – Prince George, British Columbia)
Conservative critic for Transport

Todd Doherty

MP Todd Doherty was first elected in the 2015 federal election. Prior to his election, MP Doherty worked as an aviation executive, where he promoted regional, provincial and national passenger, cargo and tourism opportunities on the world stage. During his time in the private sector, Mr. Doherty also authored and co-authored industry papers on regulatory challenges affecting air service development and other aviation-related issues.

Since becoming a Member of Parliament, MP Doherty has focused on the creation of a national framework on post-traumatic stress disorder. He has also been vocal about the ongoing softwood lumber trade dispute between Canada and the United States. During the 42nd Parliament, Mr. Doherty served as the Conservative critic for Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Vice-Chair, Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Voiced support of M-177 (Study of the pilot shortage issue in Canada)
  • Criticized Transport Canada's fishing vessel length requirements
  • Raised concerns about delegated legislation in Bill C-49
  • Criticized the fee structures for airlines and air passengers

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Criticized the Government's handling of the Canadian National strike

Luc Berthold (Mégantic – L'Érable, Québec)
Conservative critic for Infrastructure and Communities

Luc Berthold

Mr. Berthold was first elected to the House of Commons on October 19, 2015.

Prior to his political career, Mr. Berthold was a journalist and radio host for CKLD radio. In 1996, he became the Chief Editor of the "Courrier Frontenac".

In 1999, Mr. Berthold began his political career as a Political Assistant for Ms. Nathalie Normandeau. He would go on to serve in several political positions within the Québec Liberal Party. In 2006, Luc Berthold was elected as Mayor of Thetford Mines, a position in which he served until 2013.

As a Member of Parliament, MP Berthold has served as the deputy critic for Infrastructure and Communities, the deputy critic for Transport and as Agriculture critic.

Mr. Berthold has three children.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Lac-Mégantic Rail Bypass
  • Grain transportation
  • Concerns regarding the transportation of oil by rail
  • Opposed the privatization of Canadian airports
  • Earmarking the Air Traveler Security Charge to CATSA

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • End the transportation of dangerous goods in Lac-Mégantic until security is "100% secure"
  • Criticized the Government's handling of the Canadian National strike

Scot Davidson (York – Simcoe, Ontario)

Scot Davidson

Mr. Davidson was first elected in a by-election in February 2019 for the riding of York – Simcoe.

MP Davidson holds a degree in Economics from York University. Prior to his political career, he owned and operated several businesses in York-Simcoe.

MP Davidson has professed a commitment to small business issues and the health of Lake Simcoe. As a private citizen, Mr. Davidson has served on the Georgina Medical Health Board, the Georgina Waterways Advisory Committee, the Lake Simcoe Fisheries Stakeholder Committee and the Jackson's Point BIA.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Lake Simcoe clean-up fund

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Lake Simcoe clean-up fund

Tony Baldinelli (Niagara Falls, Ontario)
Conservative Deputy Critic for Transport

Tony Baldinelli

Mr. Baldinelli was first elected to the House of Commons in the 2019 federal election. Prior to his election, he served as the head of communications for the Niagara Parks Commission.

MP Baldinelli has also worked as a Legislative Assistant to Niagara Falls' former Member of Parliament, Rob Nicholson. He has also served in this capacity in the Ontario Legislature under Marilyn Mushinski, Ontario's Minister of Citizenship, Culture and Reaction at the time.

Mr. Baldinelli has a degree in Political Science from McMaster University and a Public Relations Certificate from Humber College.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • n/a

Xavier Barsalou Duval (Pierre-Boucher – Les Patriotes – Verchères, Québec)
Bloc Critic for Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

Xavier Barsalou Duval

Mr. Barsalou Duval was first elected on October 19, 2015. He has a Master's in Business Administration (MBA) and a Bachelor's Degree in accounting. Prior to his political career, he taught accounting at the college level and working several years in Cabinet as the accounting auditor. Mr. Barsalou Duval has been highly implicated in his local Bloc Québecois and Parti Québecois riding associations since he was eighteen years old. He thereafter became President of the Forum Jeunesse of the Bloc Québecois, a position he held from 2012 to 2015. In his career, he has also been very active in the Mouvement Montréal français and in the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de Montréal.

During the 42nd Parliament, MP Barsalou Duval was the critic for the Economic Development, Government Operations, National Revenue and Public Accounts. In the aftermath of the 43rd Canadian federal election, MP Barsalou Duval was appointed as parliamentary critic for the transport, infrastructure and communities portfolio.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Rail disaster at Lac-Mégantic in 2013;
  • Safety Management System regulations;
  • Amendments to the List of Prohibited Items on aircrafts; and
  • Shoreline Protection Program

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Opposition to the idea of an "energy corridor" and the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion
  • Electrification of the transportation sector
  • Opposition to Air Canada's proposal to acquire Air Transat

Taylor Bachrach (Skeena – Bulkley Valley, British Columbia)
NDP Critic for Infrastructure and Communities

Taylor Bachrach

 In 2008, Mr. Bachrach was elected to the Telkwa Town Council. After moving to Smithers in 2011, he was elected mayor and thereafter won re-election twice.

Mr. Bachrach was first elected to the House of Commons in the 43rd Canadian general election.

Outside of his political life, Mr. Bachrach is the owner of Bachrach Communications, a media consultancy firm in Smithers. Since 2018, he has also served as the President of the Go By Bike BC organization, a cycling advocacy group.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Environmental policy;
  • Importance of rivers in the northwest (Statement on World Rivers Day)
  • Enshrining UNDRIP into federal law
  • Supportive of EV fast charging infrastructure

TC-related topics raised during his career:

  • Modernization of the Smithers Airport Terminal;
  • Bus service connecting communities along the Highway of Tears;

Niki Ashton (Churchill – Keewatinook Aski, Manitoba)
NDP Critic for Public Ownership and Transport

Niki Ashton

Note: While Ms. Ashton is the NDP critic for Public Ownership and Transport, she is not a member of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.

Prior to her entry in politics in 2005, Ms. Ashton worked as a coordinator and promoter of volunteering at the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens.

With regards to her education, Ms. Ashton obtained her Bachelor's degree in Global Political Economy from the University of Manitoba. She thereafter obtained her M.A in International Affairs from Carleton University. She is currently working to obtain a PhD in peace and conflict studies from the University of Manitoba.

Ms. Ashton has also presented her candidacy to the leadership of the New Democratic Party of Canada on two occasions, in 2012 and 2017.

Member of the following Committee(s):

  • None

TC-related topics raised during the 42nd Parliament:

  • Reparation of the Churchill rail line
  • Environmental policies of the Liberal government
  • Greyhound's elimination of western bus routes

TC-related topics raised since the 43rd Canadian general election:

  • Crown-Indigenous relations
  • Environmental policies of the Liberal government
  • Opposition to the Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion Project

Media lines

Main key messages

  • Transport Canada is committed to keeping Canadians, the travelling public, and the transportation system safe and secure.
  • The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), as the state of design, is responsible for certifying Boeing's approach to fixing the identified issues and the resulting changes to the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft.
  • Transport Canada is reviewing the Boeing 737 MAX 8 changes while working extensively with the state of design, the U.S. FAA, and civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil towards the goal of a global return to service for the aircraft.
  • Once the fix has been certified by the U.S. FAA, Transport Canada will determine, through its own independent review, whether to validate the proposed changes. Transport Canada will conduct its own test flights of the aircraft as part of its validation of the proposed changes.
  • As part of this review, Transport Canada will evaluate the impact on training requirements through its participation in a Joint Operational Evaluation Board which is made up of global certification authorities.
  • The results of the Board will be used to establish the minimum training requirements, including the possibility of simulator training, for the return to service of the 737 MAX 8 aircraft. We will not speculate on the specific training that will be required until this work is completed.
  • If deemed necessary, Transport Canada will require supplementary training in Canada, beyond training determined by the Board.
  • Transport Canada will not lift the flight restrictions on the Boeing 737 MAX 8 until the department is fully satisfied that all safety concerns have been addressed by the manufacturer and the FAA and that enhanced flight crew procedures and training are in place.

Simulator training

  • Transport Canada is encouraged to see that Boeing is signaling the importance of simulator training as part of the return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft.
  • Canada continues to independently review and validate the Boeing 737 MAX 8 changes, while working extensively with the state of design, the United States, as well as other civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil.
  • As part of this review and validation work, in April 2019, Transport Canada Civil Aviation Officials established criteria, and clearly outlined the scope and concerns that we expect to be addressed by Boeing and the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) before the aircraft can return to service in Canada. Until these criteria are met, Transport Canada will not lift the airspace restriction on this aircraft.
  • As part of the validation process, Transport Canada is participating in the upcoming Joint Operations Evaluation Board (JOEB), a key component of the ongoing certification work that includes participants from Canada, the United States, as well as other civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil.  
  • Transport Canada will consider Boeing's recommendation for flight crew simulator training as part of a suite of changes that could be implemented.

Ferry flights

  • Transport Canada has been working with affected Canadian air operators to resolve any operational impacts as a result of the grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 by Transport Canada on March 13, 2019.    
  • Under the safety notice, the only way air operators can fly the Boeing 737 MAX 8 and 737 MAX 9 aircraft out of their current locations is under ferry flight provisions. Ferry flights are conducted to move aircraft to various locations for purposes such as maintenance and storage or to allow pilots in command to maintain training currency.
  • No passengers were on board these ferry flights.
  • Prior to the approval of these flights, Transport Canada put in place strict safety conditions to maintain safety:
    • Operations are restricted and limited to certain weather conditions;
    • Only advanced pilot evaluators are permitted to conduct the flights;
    • Pilots are required to receive specialized briefings and training, and be specifically trained on a 737 MAX simulator; and
    • Additional crew is onboard all flights, as well as a mandatory third pilot.
  • Canada continues to independently review and validate the Boeing 737 MAX 8 changes, while working extensively with the state of design, the United States, as well as other civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil.
  • As part of this review and validation work, in April 2019, Transport Canada Civil Aviation Officials established criteria, and clearly outlined the scope and concerns that we expect to be addressed by Boeing and the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) before the aircraft can return to service in Canada.
  • Until these criteria are met, Transport Canada will not lift the airspace restriction on this aircraft.

Questions and answers

Q1. Could you explain the technical aspects of the MCAS?

A1. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is a flight control software written into the Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight control system.

The MCAS is a function that automatically moves the horizontal stabilizer under certain flight conditions. It resides in the computer system that hosts the autopilot and flight guidance systems, and only operates in manual flight with the autopilot off. 

The horizontal stabilizer affects the pitching axis of the airplane, and is normally used to trim the airplane for a range of weights and flight conditions.  

Q2. What does the MCAS do for a plane?

A2. By adjusting the horizontal stabilizer in a nose down sense, the MCAS increases the forces felt by the pilot on the control column during certain maneuvers.

These forces have requirements for how they change while flying high speed turns and low speed stalls. 

Q3. What conditions should activate the MCAS?

MCAS activates when the angle of attack sensors detect a high angle of attack in a manual flight with the autopilot off.

The amount of stabilizer nose down movement is a function of speed and angle of attack.

Q4. What goes into certifying a plane?

Aircraft certification is a process by which an aircraft manufacturer demonstrates to the airworthiness authority that the safety requirements have been met.

Through a bilateral agreement, Transport Canada works closely with the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to ensure that our certification expectations are met for any U.S. made aircraft and aviation products. 

As part of this process, Transport Canada conducts its own independent validation of U.S. FAA-certified aircraft and products destined to operate in Canada.

In this instance, Boeing is updating the software on the 737 MAX 8 to improve the MCAS function.

Transport Canada is continuing its independent review and validation of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 changes, while working extensively with the state of design, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and civil aviation authorities in Europe and Brazil towards the goal of a global return to service for the aircraft. To that end, Canada is taking a leadership role with international authorities to address all factors necessary to achieve a safe return to service.

Transport Canada will not lift the current flight restriction until it is fully satisfied that all concerns have been addressed by the Boeing 737 MAX 8 manufacturer and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place to ensure safety.

Q5. Will Transport Canada conduct its own test flights of the aircraft following the FAA's certification test flight?

Transport Canada will conduct its own test flights of the aircraft as part of its validation of the proposed changes.

Key issue: Canadian National (CN) Railway Transfer of Rail Traffic Controllers (RTC) from Montreal to Edmonton

Location: Edmonton, Alberta - Allanwater and Reddit subdivisions

Issue/source: Canadian National (CN) Railway will be transferring Rail Traffic Controllers (RTC) control from the Montreal Rail Traffic Control Centre (RTCC) to the Edmonton RTCC.

Date: March 3, 2020

Suggested responses

  • Rail safety is Transport Canada's top priority, and the Government of Canada is continuously looking for ways to make our railway system even safer for Canadians.
  • Transport Canada conducts inspections of railway operations including rail traffic control operations on a regular basis, to verify they are compliant with all regulatory requirements and operating safely.
  • When non-compliance or safety concerns are identified, the department does not hesitate to take appropriate enforcement action.
  • Transport Canada is aware of the current changes that are taking place at CN with regards to the centralization of RTC Operations. We are monitoring developments and we will conduct inspection activities as warranted.

Background information

Rail traffic control transfer

  • Under the Canadian Rail Operating Rules, a rail traffic controller (RTC) is defined as "an employee in charge of the supervision and direction of movements and for the provision of protection for track work and track units on a specified territory,,. In essence, and RTC supervises the movements of trains across the rail network.
  • Over the last few months, Transport Canada has been contacted by CN regarding its plan to centralized all RTC positions into a single location in Edmonton. As part of this change, it will relocate its rail traffic control operation in Montreal to Edmonton in phases in 2020. CN has filed the following notifications of change with Transport Canada under the Railway Safety Management System Regulations, 2015:
    • On December 16, 2019, CN filed notification regarding the transfer of RTC control of the Allanwater and Redditt Subdivisions (located in Ontario) from Montreal to Edmonton.
    • On February 12, 2020, CN filed notification regarding the transfer of RTC control of the York, Halton and Bala subdivisions (located in Ontario) from Toronto to Edmonton.
    • On February 27, 2020, CN filed notification regarding the transfer of RTC control of the Caramat subdivision (located in Ontario) from Montreal to Edmonton.
  • On November 27, 2019, wrote the Prime Minister regarding his concerns with the move of the RTC operations to Edmonton. is a rail traffic controller with CN. In response to concerns, CN provided the following information to Transport Canada.

Operational concerns

  • CN previously relocated its RTC from Toronto to Montreal and it has reviewed lessons learned from issues that arose in that relocation.
  • CN has a business resumption plan should this new consolidated RTC centre ever experience and interruption in operating due to an emergency situation.

Official language concerns

  • CN is aware of and intends to continue to comply with its obligations under the Official Languages Act.CN has committed to ensuring that service in French will be available to all its train crews and partners in francophone and bilingual regions at all times.
  • Oversight of the Official Languages Actwould be the responsibility of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages

Collective agreement concerns

  • The company is undertaking this consolidation in accordance with its collective agreements.
  • Barganing agents participated in the risk assessments conducted to support the change in operations.
  • On February 5, 2020, TC requested CN provide its risk assessment regarding the transfer of control of the Allanwater and Redditt Subdivisions from Montreal to Edmonton. The department received the risk assessment on February 19, 2020. TC has reviewed the risk assessment and had determined that the risk level is low. TC will continue to liaise with CN to ensure the transition is going according to plan as submitted under the SMS Regulations.
  • Following a notification of change, TC has the option to increase the frequency of inspections or inspection type and/or conduct targeted audits to monitor compliance and identify any possible safety concerns.
  • In the case of this CN RTC Centralization, it would be TC's intention to conduct specific inspections once the changes have been fully implemented. Should non-compliance or safety concerns be identified, the department will not hesitate to take appropriate enforcement action.
  • It should be noted that CN has already centralized successfully its RTC operations in the United States. Further, Canadian Pacific has had a centralized operation of its RTC in Calgary, Alberta, for several years.

Railway Safety Management System Regulations, 2015

  • The Railway Safety Management Regulations, 2015 (SMS Regulations) require railway companies to conduct a risk assessment when a proposed change in operations may affect the safety of the public or personnel or the protection of the property or environment.
  • Prior to making the change in operations, the railway company must notify the Minister of the change and must, at the request of the Minister, file the documentation relating to the associated risk assessment. The Regulations do not require the Minister to approve the change in operations or approve the risk assessment.
  • Transport Canada verifies railways are compliant with the SMS Regulations by auditing railways and by reviewing submitted risk assessments following notifications of change in operations.
  • Under the Railway Safety Act, risk Assessments submitted to Transport Canada in response to a request from the department under the Railway Safety Management System Regulations, 2015 are considered confidential and must not knowingly be disclosed or made available by any person without the authorization of the person who provided the information or documentation.

Key issue: Ukrainian Airlines Downing & Safer Skies Initiative

Location: Tehran, Iran

Issue/source: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-63-canadians-among-those-killed-after-ukrainian-airliner-crashes-in/

Date: February 25, 2020

Suggested responses

  • Our thoughts continue to go out to all affected by the tragic downing of a Ukrainian Airlines aircraft that occurred on January 8th in Iran.
  • The Department is committed to seeing that risks are properly mitigated when it comes to flight operations near conflict zones.
  • Our Safer Skies initiative reflects our strong and dynamic commitment in that regard.
  • As the downing occurred in Iran, the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority is the primary investigative body. Ukraine, France and the United States also have a role as Accredited Representatives.

If pressed

  • TC remains vigilant and is monitoring the potential for military action in the various regions of the World. The Department is in communication with its air operators and is keeping them informed of any evolving situation.
  • TC is developing a process to better inform its air operators regarding the risk of flight operations near or over conflict zones and the issuance of NOTAMs regarding foreign airspace.
  • The NOTAMs will remain in place until such time as the Government of Canada deems it appropriate to revoke them or modify them, based on evidence and risk analysis.

If pressed – ICAO Work and Information Sharing

  • TC has engaged with its international partners in order to better mitigate the risk associated with flights near or over conflict zones.
  • TC works very closely with Canadian air operators that fly abroad to ensure they are well informed and understand risks in foreign airspace.

Background information

  • On January 3rd, A320 Cham Wings aircraft arrived at Baghdad International Airport at 7:32PM EST from Damascus. General Qassim Soleimani of the Irani Quds Force and other pro-Iranian paramilitary figures entered two vehicles and departed towards downtown Baghdad. Around 8:00PM EST, an MQ-9 Reaper drone launched several missiles, striking the convoy on Baghdad Airport Road and killing 10 people, including the General.
  • TC advised Air Canada, the only Canadian airline operating in that area, of the escalating situation and continued close communication with the operator. On January 7, 2020 Air Canada adjusted their routes to avoid the area following the Iranian missile strikes in Iraq.
  • On January 7th at 08:52pm EST, the Federal Aviation Administration issued NOTAMs outlining flight restrictions that prohibit U.S. civil aviation operators from operating in the airspace over Iraq, Iran, and the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
  • On January 7th, between 08:45 and 9:15pm EST, 16 ballistic missiles were fired towards Ayn al-Asad and Erbil Base. Iran claims responsibility for the attack as retaliation for the January 3rd drone strike by the US military. All American and coalition military personnel, including Canadian military personnel, were unharmed in the attack.
  • Ukraine International Airlines flight PS752 to Kyiv (UIA flight 752) was downed less than four minutes after taking off from Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran on January 7th at 11:42PM EST by Iran's air defence.
  • Data on the flightradar24.com website shows the plane taking off as normal, and rising to an altitude of 7,925 feet before the aircraft suddenly stopped broadcasting its coordinates.
  • All 176 people aboard the flight are deceased, including 57 Canadians.

Transportation Safety Board (TSB) Perspective

  • The Canadian air accident investigation participation is through the independent Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB).
  • In accordance with Annex 13, the TSB is in direct communication with the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of the Islamic Republic of Iran and have inspected the accident site and the wreckage as an expert.
  • Two TSB air accident investigators formed part of the Canadian delegation in Iran following the downing.
  • The TSB is communicating and coordinating directly with participating accident investigation agencies from other countries as well as well.
  • 2 TSB investigators spent 6 days in Tehran, followed by 2 days in Kyiv as part of the investigation.

TC current state of action

  • As of January 8, 2020, 10:00am, TC has been fully engaged on this tragedy.
  • On January 8, 2020, at 11:30am, TC received Aireon data for the flight and immediately started analyzing the data.
  • A letter to the Director General of Civil Aviation's counterpart in Ukraine was sent on January 8, 2020, to offer technical assistance. A meeting occurred on January 11th between the DG of Civil Aviation and his counterpart in Ukraine to discuss next steps. The two authorities have continue to exchange information regularly.
  • TC has sent a technical aviation expert to Ukraine to work directly with Canadian and Ukraine officials.
  • We are also working with the International Civil Aviation Organization to arrange how the sharing of information will occur with Iranian authorities.
  • On February 14, 2020, at the Munich Security Conference, the Prime Minister has announced the Canada ‘Safer Skies' initiative, and committed to work with international partners, including key countries, airlines, and the International Civil Aviation Organization to improve safety and airspace management around conflict zones.
  • On January 10th, TC issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) advising against entering Iranian and Iraqi airspace. No Canadian operators fly directly to the affected area.
  • TC sent a Liaison Officer to Kyiv (Ukraine) from January 14 to 29 in order to support the Canadian Mission in Ukraine with their technical and aviation related questions.
  • On February 9th, TC issued a NOTAM regarding the Syrian airspace, and on February 16th, a NOTAM regarding the Libyan airspace.

ICAO Work and Information Sharing

  • Upon invitation from Iran, ICAO has nominated a team of advisors to assist the investigation of the downing of Flight PS752.
  • Following the investigation, ICAO has publicly committed to looking into its conflict zone guidance and compliance, using recommendations from the investigation and building on the work done by the ICAO Task Force on Risks to Civil Aviation arising from Conflict Zones, which was stood up following the downing of flight MH 17 in 2014.
  • Transport Canada will continue working with Canadian operators to augment the process to fully inform risk assessments with more robust information sharing processes.

Key issue: Crude Oil Derailment in Emo, Ontario

Location: Emo, Ontario (near Fort Frances and Highway 602, north of the US border)

Issue/source: On February 18, 2020, a Canadian National (CN) Rail train carrying various dangerous goods was involved in a derailment near Emo, ON.

Date: March 9, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The safety of Canadians is a top priority for me and the Government of Canada. The latest derailment involving dangerous goods in Emo, Ontario is concerning.
  • Transport Canada has put into place specific measures through a Ministerial Order to help prevent further derailments of trains carrying large quantities of dangerous goods.
  • Transport Canada will continue to review the accident and will take all necessary safety actions to protect public safety.

Background information (preliminary information)

  • At approximately 21:30 ET on February 18, 2020, a Canadian National (CN) Rail Key train carrying 132 loads of various goods, including dangerous goods, was involved in a derailment near Mile 108.2 on the Fort Frances Subdivision near Emo, Ontario and the Rainy River First Nation's Manitou Rapids Indian Reserve No. 11.
  • The derailment occurred near Highway 602, which is just north of the Canada-United States border and the cause of the derailment remains undetermined. As of March 9, 2020, the highway will be partially opened to the public from 07:00 to 09:00ET, as well as from 17:00 to 21:00. This traffic management plan is anticipated to be in place for up to 10 days.
  • Approximately 31 cars derailed, including 26 tank cars, with 5 cars leaking crude oil. The pooling of the crude oil is contained near the cars. The spill is not near the river or any other waterways. The amount of oil that has leaked has not been determined. The train was travelling at approximately 44 mph.
  • Transportation Safety Board and Transport Canada officials, as well as CN Railway, Ontario Provincial Police and local fire department attended the scene. Eight homes were evacuated but the evacuation was lifted as of the evening of February 19, 2020. No fire and no injuries have occurred.
  • On February 20, 2020, CN installed new track in the area of the incident and a total of 8 trains have passed through since 00:00 ET, February 21, 2020, operating at 10-15 mph. It is expected that CN will continue to operate trains at 25 mph at the site of the incident for the week of February 24, 2020.
  • Remediation efforts are still ongoing. The road crossing remains closed to the public until the railcars have left the site. It is unknown when the crossing will reopen to the public. There is a temporary crossing in place for local emergency services to use.
  • TC inspectors last inspected the track on August 28, 2019. A number of non-compliances were identified, but have since been remediated by CN. TC issued a notice acknowledging the immediate action taken by CN with respect to the identified non-compliances.
  • It should be noted that on May 4, 2019, another CN train derailment occurred near the location of the present accident, in which 6 cars containing Petroleum Crude Oil derailed. No injuries or leaks resulted from the derailment.

Speed restrictions

  • The Key Train and Key Route Rules, which came into effect in February 2016, impose speed restrictions on trains carrying dangerous goods.
  • This rule limits Key Trains to a maximum speed of 50 mph and further restrict Key Trains to a maximum speed of 40 MPH within the core and secondary core of Census Metropolitan Areas.
  • A Key Train has one or more loaded tank cars of dangerous goods that are toxic by inhalation or 20 or more loaded tank cars containing dangerous goods.
  • Measures for the immediate slowdown of key trains (carrying 20 or more cars containing dangerous goods; or a train carrying one or more cars of toxic inhalation gas) were introduced, via Ministerial Order, following the accident in Guernsey, Saskatchewan on February 6, 2020.
  • Since then, the Ministerial Order has been updated to provide a more targeted risk-based approach, and will remain in place until April 1, 2020.
  • The speed limit for key trains is now limited to 35 mph in metropolitan areas. Outside of metropolitan areas where there are no track signals, the speed is limited to 40 mph.
  • The speed limit for higher risk key trains is now limited to 25 mph where there are no track signals. For metropolitan areas, the speed limit is 30mph unless the metropolitan area is in a non-signal territory where the speed limit will be maintain at a maximum 25 mph.
  • Higher risk key trains are unit trains where tank cars are loaded with a single dangerous goods commodity moving to the same point of destination; or trains that include any combination of 80 or more tank cars containing dangerous goods.

Key issue: Non-main track train derailment in Cowansville (File closed)

Location: Eastern Townships, Québec

Issue/source: Summary of a derailment in Cowansville that occurred on a private trackage of a Central Maine Customer.

Source: Journal La Voie de L'Est

Date: March 9, 2020

Suggested responses

  • Transport Canada is aware of the derailment that occured in Cowansville today, and has followed up on the matter.
  • The derailment occurred on a private track, off of the Newport Subdivision near the intersections of des Industries Street and des Textiles Street. Private tracks are under the jurisdiction of the Ministère des Transports du Québec.
  • Early indication is that the derailment was due to an accumulation of ice and snow on the track of the private customer.
  • A set of wheels on one car derailed during the pushing operation. The car was carrying plastic pellets that are not dangerous goods.
  • The estimated time to put the car back on the rails is two (2) hours. The car was rerailed at 7:30 p.m.
  • Overall, Transport Canada continues to monitor CMQR operations, and will not hesitate to take measures to ensure rail safety.

Key issue: Canadian Pacific Railway Crude Oil Train Derailment

Location: Guernsey, Saskatchewan – (115 Kilometers Southeast of Saskatoon, Saskatchewan) CP Rail Mile 43.4 Sutherland Subdivision

Issue/source: Derailment of 31 cars with Petroleum Crude Oil Railcars – Guernsey, Saskatchewan - February 6, 2020, from the train that originated from Rosyth, Alberta (Near Hardisty, Alberta) and destined to Stroud, Oklahoma.

Date: March 09, 2020

Suggested responses

  • Rail safety is Transport Canada's top priority, and the Government of Canada is continuously looking for ways to make our railway system even safer for Canadians.
  • Transport Canada has put into place specific measures through a Ministerial Order to help prevent further derailments of trains carrying large quantities of dangerous goods.
  • Transport Canada continues to review the incident and will take additional enforcement action should any instances of non-compliance with the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act or Railway Safety Act be found.
  • I would note that the Transportation Safety Board is actively investigating this incident, as the lead federal organization for transportation accidents in Canada.
  • A Minister's observer was deployed to the site. Transport Canada will engage with the TSB as required and will conduct follow-up inspections.

Background information

Derailment

  • At approximately 07:15 ET, on February 6, 2020, a Canadian Pacific (CP) train carrying 104 loads of petroleum crude oil and two sand loads (Buffer cars), derailed on the main line, between mileage 43 and 44 of the Sutherland subdivision, in Guernsey, Saskatchewan.
  • Approximately 31 railcars derailed and 27 caught fire which resulted in the evacuation of the village of Guernsey.
  • On February 11, 2020, the fire was completely extinguished allowing the residents to return to their homes.
  • The track was reopened with speed limit restrictions, including the revised Ministerial Slow Order, being observed.
  • As of February 12, 2020 all lanes of Highway 16 are open with a speed restriction of 60 km/hr in place.
  • TC deployed a Remedial Measures Specialist, Rail and Transportation of Dangerous Good (TDG) Inspectors to the site.
  • TC inspectors last inspected the track January 29, 2020.
  • National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) representatives arrived on scene on February 9., 2020. Eight representatives from Transportation Safety Board (TSB), NTSB, and the railcar manufacturer worked with TC inspectors to evaluate and assess the railcars. The following unconfirmed numbers provide a rough estimate:
    • 2.86 million liters petroleum crude oil was being transported by the affected railcars.
    • 1.2 million liters of petroleum crude oil was lost.
    • Overall 23 railcars lost content to some degree.

Previous derailments

  • This is the second derailment of a train carrying crude oil in that area and the third in the past 12 months in Canada.
  • On December 9, 2019, a CP train derailed at mile 48.8 of the CP Sutherland subdivision near Guernsey, Saskatchewan. Thirty three tank cars derailed resulting in a fire.
  • On February 16, 2019, a CN train derailed 37 cars carrying petroleum crude oil in a rural area near St. Lazare, Manitoba. This derailment did not result in a fire.

Speed restrictions

  • The Key Train and Key Route Rules, which came into effect in February 2016, impose speed restrictions on trains carrying dangerous goods.
    • A Key Train has one or more loaded tank cars of dangerous goods that are toxic by inhalation or 20 or more loaded tank cars containing dangerous goods.
  • An updated Ministerial Order 20-03 was issued on February 16, 2020 and remains in effect until April 1, 2020 noting the following speed restrictions:
    • Not operate a Key Train at a speed that exceeds 40 mph in non-signaled territory;
    • Not operate a Key Train at a speed that exceeds 35 mph within Census Metropolitan Areas;
    • Not operate a Higher Risk Key Train at a speed that exceeds 25 mph in non-signaled territory;
    • Not operate a Higher Risk Key Train at a speed that exceeds 30 mph within Census Metropolitan Areas. For greater certainty, the operation of a Higher Risk Key Train within Census Metropolitan Areas that are in non-signaled territory remain subject to the limit of 25 mph.

Next steps

  • Rail Safety will continue to review the documentation and reports of the status of the infrastructure and equipment prior to the incident to verify compliance with the Railway Safety Act.
  • The TSB continues to investigate the track and tank cars.
  • The Remedial Measures Specialist will complete an incident report in March 2020.

Key issue: Rail blockades

Location: National

Issue/source: the Canadian Rail network has been impacted by unprecedented disruptions over the last month. Rail traffic on key railway lines in various locations across the country have been halted due to protests supporting the Wet'suwet'en nation, some of whose hereditary chiefs oppose a natural gas pipeline in British Columbia.

Date: March 9, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The Government of Canada is aware of the significant economic impacts of the blockades, and has been committed since the outset to finding a solution for the benefit of all Canadians.
  • Last weekend, a proposed agreement on land and title rights was reached with representatives of Wet'suwet'en hereditary chiefs and senior federal and B.C. cabinet ministers. Details of the proposed deal are not being released until it is endorsed by members of the Wet'suwet'en nation.
  • Over the past month, there have been over 60 blockades across the country. At the height of the blockades, CN was forced to shut down its eastern network.
  • We recognize the significant impact of the blockades on the economy and the transportation system, which have been felt across a range of sectors of the Canadian economy, and we appreciate the patience that Canadians have shown.
  • We are pleased that the last of the blockades have been removed, and our focus now turns to the recovery of the rail network.
  • While we know the recovery of the rail network will take time, CN and CP continue to make every effort to return to normal operations and address the backlog, while ensuring essential goods are moving to the communities that need them. We would like to acknowledge their hard work and cooperation during this difficult time.
  • As Minister of Transport, I have a duty to ensure that our rail system and its infrastructure are as safe as possible. I want to remind Canadians that rail lines and rail yards are dangerous places for people without the proper training. Large moving trains confronted with unexpected obstacles on a rail line cannot stop instantly and this presents an extreme hazard to the life of those inside the train and those in front of a moving train.       
  • The Government of Canada is committed to working on these matters in a manner consistent with its broader commitments to reconciliation. All parties must engage in open and respectful dialogue to ensure this situation is resolved quickly and peacefully.

Background information

  • The Canadian rail network has been impacted by unprecedented disruptions over the last month. Rail traffic on key railway lines in various locations across the country have been halted due to protests supporting the Wet'suwet'en Nation, some of whose hereditary chiefs oppose a natural gas pipeline in British Columbia.
  • Industries that are dependent on rail transportation have been the most impacted including the mining, grain, automotive, chemical and energy sectors. Many production facilities rely on rail for inputs as well as to sell final products. Often, facilities run just-in-time inventory and do not have sufficient on-site storage to maintain normal operations without rail service for more than a week. As such, the rail blockades have resulted in scaling back of operations, and the planned shutdown of some facilities, which has resulted in temporary layoffs.
  • Since February 2, 2020, over 60 events impacting transportation have been registered in different regions of the country. The last two blockades were lifted on March 5.
  • Railways are now shifting to recovery mode, regaining fluidity in Western and Eastern Canada. Significant progress have also been reported at main Canadian ports in terms of reducing on-dock inventories. This recovery has been facilitated by softer economic conditions, partly attributed to the coronavirus epidemic.
  • It is expected to take weeks before the transportation system fully recovers and all the backlogs are addressed.

Key issue: Canadian Cruise Ship Season and COVID-19

Location: National

Date: March 9, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The safety and security of the travelling public and the transportation system are Transport Canada's top priorities.
  • Cruise ships represent a very high-risk medium for viral transmission of COVID-19. In responding to the outbreak of the virus, the Government of Canada is prioritizing the health and safety of Canadians.
  • In order to best preserve the integrity of the Canadian health care system and protect the health care of Canadians, the Government of Canada is looking at all available options for the upcoming cruise ship season.
  • While cruise ship season is still over a month away, we are working with key partners to fully prepare for a cruise ship in Canadian waters with passengers or crew diagnosed with COVID-19.

Background information

Marine

  • Cruise ships represent a very high-risk medium for viral transmission to Canada and Canadians. These ships are basically floating cities and even without COVID-19, the rapid spread of infections and viruses and the close proximity between passengers makes quarantines onboard vessels virtually impossible. As can be seen with the recent quarantine of the Diamond Princess in Japan and the Grand Princess in the United States, it is extremely challenging to prevent and contain an outbreak of COVID-19 on a large cruise ship, despite the best efforts of leading cruise ship operators.
  • Transport Canada is leading efforts to look at options to respond to and/or prevent the risk of a vessel with passengers or crew being diagnosed with COVID-19.
  • Cruise Ship season is from April to October in Canada.
  • Preliminary 2019 data shows that:
    • 146 cruise ships entered Canadian waters of which approximately 70% (101) had operated in the United States before entering Canadian waters.
    • On the west coast, of the 88 cruise ships which entered Canadian waters, last ports of call were United States (82), Mexico (2), Japan (2), Panama (1), and the Russian Federation (1).
    • On the east coast 58 cruise ships entered Canadian waters with last ports of call in: United States (19), Greenland (18), Iceland (7), United Kingdom (6), Ireland (4), Bahamas (1), France (1), Norway (1), and Portugal (1).
  • Cruise Line International Association (CLIA) and its member lines (including those that operated in Canada in 2019) have implemented enhanced screening measures:
    • Deny boarding to all persons who have traveled from, visited or transited via airports in China, including Hong Kong and Macau, within 14 days before embarkation;
    • Deny boarding to all persons who, within 14 days before embarkation, have had close contact with, or helped care for, anyone suspected or diagnosed as having Coronavirus, or who is currently subject to health monitoring for possible exposure to Novel Coronavirus; and,
    • Conduct preboarding screening necessary to effectuate these prevention measures. Enhanced screening and initial medical support are to be provided, as needed, to any persons exhibiting symptoms of suspected Novel.
  • CLIA has indicated to federal officials that they will be presenting additional measures the week of March 8, 2020.

Key issue: Canadian Response to the Outbreak of COVID-19

Location: National

Date: March 9, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The safety and security of the travelling public and the transportation system are Transport Canada's top priorities.
  • As a supporting department, Transport Canada is working closely with the Public Health Agency of Canada, Health Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency and others to coordinate efforts to mitigate the risks associated with COVID-19.
  • TC, together with partners at PHAC and other organizations, has developed a domestic and international cruise strategy that identifies an array of options to address the public health risk.
  • TC is conducting outreach activities with transportation sector representatives to share information, identify potential impacts and discuss risk mitigation measures.

Background information

Health situation

  • As of March 9, 2020, there were over 109,000 confirmed cases and 3,800 deaths globally, with approximately 77 percent of cases occurring in China. Cases of the virus have now been confirmed in over 100 countries. Large clusters of cases have been appearing in South Korea (7,382), Italy (7,375) and Iran (6,566).
  • There have been 67 cases in Canada These numbers do not include the 48 Canadians who were on board the Diamond Princess cruise ship in Yokohama, Japan and tested positive. 
  • Global Affairs Canada has issued the following Government of Canada Travel Advisories in relation to COVID-19:
    • Avoid all travel to Hubei Province, China
    • Avoid non-essential travel to mainland China, Iran and Northern Italy
    • Practice special precautions in Japan and South Korea
  • In light of the increased spread of the illness, the Public Health Agency of Canada has also issued travel health notices for Hong Kong and Singapore. At this time, the Government of Canada is not recommending cancelling or postponing travel to these regions, but does recommend precautions against respiratory illness.
  • Canada's Chief Public Health Officer has advised Canadians to reconsider traveling on a cruise ship during the COVID-19 epidemic.

Civil Aviation

  • Enhanced screening measures have been put in place at international Canadian airports. These measures include additional health screening questions, messaging on arrivals screens, and the presence of screening officers to help assess the requirement for assessment of travelers by a Quarantine Officer.
  • Transport Canada collaborated with PHAC to provide domestic and international air carriers with flights from China with an in-flight message to be delivered to passengers when landing in Canada. The message advises that travelers must provide information about their travel history and their current health status. In addition, enhanced guidance on cleaning aircraft for infectious diseases was shared with air carriers.
  • There are no direct flights from Iran or Singapore to Canada. Nonetheless, in 2019, there were respectively about 130,000 and 65,000 passengers from Iran and Singapore which travelled to Canada connecting through other countries.
  • In the first week of March (Mar 3-9) Canada expected around 2,000 passengers from Italy (1 flight per day).
  • Transport Canada officials have established regular group calls with the air transport sector on public health measures, and are now expanding this to bilateral calls with Canadian carriers on economic and financial impacts.

Marine

  • TC, together with partners at PHAC and other organizations, has developed a domestic and international cruise strategy that identifies an array of options to address the public health risk.
  • Cruise Ship season is from April to October in Canada
  • Preliminary 2019 data shows that:
    • 146 cruise ships entered Canadian waters of which approximately 70% (101) had operated in the United States before entering Canadian waters.
    • On the west coast, of the 88 cruise ships which entered Canadian waters, last ports of call were United States (82), Mexico (2), Japan (2), Panama (1), and the Russian Federation (1).
    • On the east coast 58 cruise ships entered Canadian waters with last ports of call in: United States (19), Greenland (18), Iceland (7), United Kingdom (6), Ireland (4), Bahamas (1), France (1), Norway (1), and Portugal (1).
  • Transit times from China to BC range from 14 – 30 days. In 2019 of 542 cargo vessels, 21% of vessels made the transit in less than 15 days and 79% of vessels made the transit in more than 15 days.

Assisted returns

  • The Government of Canada has organized 3 assisted departures from areas affected by the outbreak. The Canadians evacuated from Wuhan, China have been released from quarantine, after two weeks in isolation in CFB Trenton. In addition, 129 PAX from the Diamond Princess Cruise ship have been evacuated. They were released from quarantine on March 6. Others who travelled on the Diamond Princess but declined the offer of repatriation are also subject to mandatory 14-day quarantine upon arrival in Canada.
  • A fourth assisted departure flight is scheduled to evacuate Canadians on March 10th from the Grand Princess Cruise ship in San Francisco. Evacuees will undergo a 14-day quarantine at CFB Trenton upon arrival.

Key issue: Current Rail Safety Oversight in the Lac-Mégantic Area

Location: Eastern Townships, Quebec

Issue/source: a summary of current rail safety oversight in the Lac-Mégantic area

Date: March 9, 2020

Suggested responses

  • In May 2019, Transport Canada (TC) ordered Central Maine and Quebec Railway (CMQ) to repair all irregularities identified following an inspection, implement safety measures, and increase monitoring efforts. CMQ took immediate action to address the non-compliances found.
  • On September 6, 2019, the Minister of Transport ordered CMQ to proceed with all necessary repairs identified in the spring 2019 inspection and implement new safety measures no later than October 15, 2019. These measures were carried out as required.
  • TC is aware of Canadian Pacific's acquisition of Central Maine and Quebec Railway. We will continue to monitor any developments regarding this sale.
  • TC continues to monitor the rail network, and will not hesitate to take measures as necessary to ensure rail safety.

Background information

  • On July 6, 2013, a Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway train carrying crude oil derailed causing 47 fatalities in downtown Lac-Mégantic (Québec). The population remains deeply concerned about rail safety.
  • In 2014, Central Maine and Quebec Railway (CMQ) purchased the assets of the bankrupt Montreal Maine & Atlantic Railway, and began its rail operations after making significant investments to improve the rail infrastructure.
  • CMQ does not currently transport crude oil, and made a commitment that they would not resume transportation of crude oil without first informing the affected communities.
  • Since the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, numerous measures have been taken by Transport Canada (TC) to further improve rail safety, and the transportation of dangerous goods by rail, through regulatory and legislative reform. For instance, implementation of enhanced securement requirements of unattended locomotives, equipment and trains; enhanced tank car standards; and application of speed restrictions for trains carrying dangerous goods through Census Metropolitan Areas.
  • In May 2019, during a rail safety inspection on CMQ's Sherbrooke Subdivision (Farnham to Lac-Mégantic), TC noted that the number of defective rails found in ultrasonic testing had increased compared to the previous year. A Notice and Order was issued requiring the company to increase the number of ultrasonic rail inspections.
  • CMQ took immediate action to address the non-compliances found including applying speed restrictions where appropriate.
  • On August 15, 2019, the "Coalition des citoyens et organismes engagés pour la sécurité ferroviaire de Lac-Mégantic" (the coalition)sent a highly publicized letter to Transport Canada expressing concerns about the increase in track defects on the CMQ line in the Lac-Mégantic area.
  • On September 5, 2019, the coalition sent a formal letter "mise en demeure" to TC asking the Minister to block the transportation of dangerous goods in the region until defective rails identified in the recent TC report are repaired.
  • On September 6, 2019, a Ministerial Order was issued under section 32.01 of the Railway Safety Act, ordering the company to take actions to improve the safety of its rail operations on the Sherbrooke Subdivision. These actions included conducting an internal review of their certification and training program of track supervisors and repairing the defects at the locations identified in the order, no later than October 15, 2019. The company was also ordered to increase the frequency of Ultrasonic Rail Inspections.
  • Since September 9, 2019, TC inspectors conducted follow-up inspections on the entirety of the Sherbrooke Subdivision to ensure that the repairs done by CMQ are in compliance with the Railway Safety Act and the Ministerial Order.
  • On November 6, 2019, CMQ submitted to Transport Canada the results of their Fall 2019 ultrasonic inspection, as per the Ministerial Order. The results have been analyzed by the department, and a field inspection was conducted on November 18th and 19th.
  • During the week of February 3, 2020, CMQ began their next ultrasonic testing as per the Ministerial Order. On March 2, 2020 the test results were forwarded to TC by the CMQR. Our inspectors are currently analyzing the results and will follow up in the coming weeks. The next ultrasonic test, has been scheduled by CMQR for June 2020. The Department will continue to follow up to ensure that any deficiencies identified are corrected in accordance with regulatory requirements.
  • During the week of February 18, 2020, Transport Canada conducted an audit of CMQR's Safety Management System with a focus on track management. The results are being analysed and the report is in the drafting stages.

Key issue: CN Train Derailment in Kingston, Ontario

Location: Kingston, Ontario

Issue/source: On 4 March 2020, a Canadian National (CN) Rail train was involved in a derailment in Kingston, ON.

Date: March 5, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The safety of Canadians is a top priority for me and the Government of Canada. The latest derailment involving dangerous goods in Kingston, Ontario is concerning.
  • Transport Canada will continue to review the accident and will take all necessary safety actions to protect public safety.

Background information

  • At approximately 11:45 ET on March 4, 2020, there was a derailment involving six (6) Canadian National (CN) Railway cars in Kingston, Ontario. The railcars contained dangerous goods (adipic acid in powder form – an environmentally hazardous substance), which do not pose a risk to human life/health, but can be toxic to aquatic life. The railcars derailed on their side and one of them has spilled about the quantity of one drum of solid product. The cause of the derailment has not yet been determined.
  • There are no injuries. Despite local news reports to the contrary, the Police have indicated that there were no evacuations, but that some businesses closed for the day due to the derailment. The derailment is blocking Bath Road, between Queen Mary Road and Armstrong Road.
  • This train was not travelling on main track. The maximum speed on this track is 10 mph. According to the train crew, the train was travelling at 9 mph.
  • CN and local fire department are on site; however, no injuries have been reported. The incident site is located near the Invista plant, which is serviced by CN. A representative from the company is on site to assist the fire department.
  • Transport Canada Rail Safety Inspector and Remedial Measures Specialist attended the scene on March 4, 2020 and left the site later that day.
  • The road crossing is currently closed to the public and there is currently no estimated time for when the road will be cleared. Bus routes are being detoured due to the road closure.
  • As of March 5, 2020, the leaking railcar has been patched and rerailed. One remaining railcar needs to be rerailed as it remains on its side. Engineering services are on scene to repair the rail and crossing. The crossing sustained damage and will need to be rebuilt.

Key issue: Train derailment near Prince George, BC

Location: Giscome, British Columbia – (Mile 123 of Fraser Subdivision) CN main line

Issue/source: Train derailment near Prince George triggers school evacuation

Date: March 6, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The safety of Canadians is a top priority for me and the Government of Canada. Today's derailment involving dangerous goods in Giscome, British-Columba is concerning.
  • Transport Canada will continue to review the accident and will take all necessary safety actions to protect public safety.

Background information

  • At approximately 12:30 PT, on March 5, 2020, a train carrying a mixed load of products and dangerous goods derailed approximately 23 miles east of Prince George, BC (Fraser Subdivision, at Mile 123) on CN's main line. The location is called Giscome, BC.
  • The derailment occurred in signaled territory. The cause is yet to be determined. However, CN has ruled out any possible tampering.
  • According to preliminary information, the train was proceeding westward at 40 mph when they incurred an undesired emergency brake application. The maximum track speed at that location is 45 mph.
  • In total, 28 cars have derailed, including 7 cars loaded with Liquefied Petroleum Gases (UN1075 / 2.1) and 1 car loaded with Methanol (UN1230 / 3(6.1)). Twenty railcars are hauling non-dangerous goods (petroleum coke). The train has 153 loads and 22 empties.
  • Six railcars are on their side impacting Hay Creek. The total non-dangerous goods spill was half of one railcar into the creek. An environmental response contractor will launch a boat and set a boom on the creek.
  • There is no fire or injuries. CN hazmat has detected a very small leak from one of the propane cars, there are no readings outside of the hatch. Environmental monitoring will be set up by tomorrow.
  • The Giscome Elementary School local school has been evacuated as a precaution.
  • The Upper Fraser road is closed, there is a significant detour thru Bowron Forest Service road.
  • A CN team, the Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Transportation Safety Board (TSB) are on site. A Transport Canada remedial measures specialist (RMS) and inspector are also on site.
  • The plan is to continue moving the railcars in preparation for future transfers, which are expected to begin today (March 6, 2020).

Key issue: VIA Rail Derailment in Missanabie, Ontario

Location: Missanabie, Ontario (White River subdivision)

Issue/source: On March 4, 2020, a VIA Rail passenger train derailed near Missanabie, Ontario.

Date: March 5, 2020

Suggested responses  

  • The safety of Canadians is a top priority for me and the Government of Canada.
  • We are aware of the derailment of a VIA train near Missanabie, Ontario. Transport Canada will continue to review the accident and will take all necessary safety actions to protect public safety.

Background information

  • At approximately 10:07 ET on March 4, 2020, a VIA Rail train 186 derailment occurred at a crossing at Mile 57.85 on the White River subdivision near Missanabie, Ontario.
  • It was reported that two locomotives derailed and the cause of the derailment was due to ice accumulation. The train was travelling eastbound between White River and Sudbury at under 10 miles per hour at the time of derailment.
  • There were 3 employees and no passengers on board, and there were no injuries.
  • The train consisted of two self-propelled passenger equipment. The lead wheels on the lead locomotive derailed on a siding.
  • While the main track is not blocked, VIA trains 186 and 185 were cancelled March 4, 2020. Regular service is expected to resume on Saturday, March 7, 2020.
  • At 15:00 ET, March 4, 2020, during the righting of the train, the locomotive's diesel tank was punctured, causing a spill. The Transportation Safety Board is aware of the spill.

Key issue: Aircraft Certification 2

Location: National         

Issue/source: Minister Scrum

Date: April 1st, 2019

Suggested responses

  • Aligned with other leading aviation authorities such as EASA and the FAA, Transport Canada uses a delegate system to assist in the type certification of new aircraft designs or new aircraft systems.
  • To ensure the safe and effective administration of the delegate system, Transport Canada conducts significant oversight of its delegates and performs its own thorough examination of any new aircraft design or system.
  • This oversight and review has not dimished as a result of the use of delegates. In fact over time, we are doing more, not less. For example, Transport Canada recently spent over 160,000 person hours reviewing and approving the Bombardier C-Series aircraft design.
  • This is in comparison with an earlier Transport Canada review of the Bombardier CRJ in 1999 where officials spent a total of 18,439 hours reviewing and certifying the design.
  • I understand there are a number of different reviews underway to examine the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX. Canada has agreed to participate and contribute its own expertise in some of these reviews.
  • I look forward to assessing the outcomes of these reviews with my officials and determining where their findings may be able to further strengthen Canada's existing certification system.

Background information

  • While there are differences in the legal and administrative structures, most aviation authorities use a range of delegations to ensure aviation safety to achieve efficiency.
  • Both the United States and Canada delegate appropriately qualified industry personnel the authority to review, analyze and confirm compliance to the design standards required to be met to achieve their respective type certificates on new aircraft or new aircraft systems. The Type Certificate, however, is issued by the authority.
  • Through a bilateral agreement, Transport Canada works closely with the FAA to ensure that our certification expectations are met for any U.S.-made aircraft and aviation products. The same process is used by the FAA in its review of Canadian-made products.
  • For a significant post-certification design change, Transport Canada can elect to perform a technical evaluation, in concert with the FAA as the lead authority, prior to issuing our own approval.

Key issue: Boeing 737-8 max training requirements

Location: National

Issue/source: TC determination of training requirements

Date: April 18, 2019

Suggested responses

  • There are many factors to be considered before Transport Canada permits the return to service of Boeing 737-8 Max aircraft in Canadian airspace.
  • Transport Canada officials continue to seek information from the FAA and Boeing as the new software update and associated training and procedures are developed. At this point, it is not known when this software update will be available.
  • Transport Canada will not lift the flight restriction of the Boeing 737-8 MAX until it is fully satisfied that all concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the FAA, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place.
  • It is premature to conclude which updated training procedures will be required, however, these procedures will have to meet Transport Canada's stringent standards.
  • All pilots of the Boeing 737-8 MAX will have to meet the training standards that will be required to fly this aircraft. 

Background information

Following the Minister's comments regarding simulator training being a key for the 737-8 MAX, Canadian Operators and media have been seeking further information and clarification regarding TC's position on the training that will be required before the 737-8 MAX is returned to service.

Key issue: Air Canada flights during MAX grounding

Location: National         

Issue: https://globalnews.ca/news/5918545/boeing-737-max-8-air-canada-training/
Https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-canada-jet/lone-737-max-criss-crossed-canada-for-pilot-checks-during-grounding-iduskbn1w31bi

Date: September 19, 2019

Suggested responses

  • As part of our ongoing work to assist operators to address the impact of the Boeing 737 airspace restrictions, Air Canada requested that Transport Canada approve non-revenue flights between Montreal (YUL), Val d'Or (YVO) and North Bay (YYB) to maintain currency of their pilots, reposition the storage of the aircraft and better prepare Air Canada for safe resumption of operations, when or if, the aircraft return to service.
  • Prior to the approval of these limited set of flights a risk assessment was performed and strict safety conditions were put in place including:
    • The operation in only certain weather conditions;
    • Specialized briefings and pilot training prior to the flights; and,
    • The inclusion of additional flight crew on the flights.
  • These flights have been allowed so that a small core of senior pilots could remain current – safety is the main driver.
  • Air Canada has been approved for one (1) additional flight to support currency training prior to relocating their fleet for winter storage while the airspace restrictions continue.

If pressed

  • Air Canada is the only Canadian operator that does not fly a similar aircraft to maintain pilot currency.  Westjet and Sunwing both fly the 737 NG.
  • Transport Canada will continue to assess these requests as received.

Background information

  • Transport Canada authorized each flight to go from Montreal to North Bay, from North Bay to Val D'Or, and from Val D'Or back to North Bay. No "touch and goes" were carried out.
  • The flights were carried out to allow pilots in command (PIC) to maintain currency.
  • Transport Canada authorized these flights because the carrier does not operate the Boeing 737 NG aircraft, but the pilots still need to maintain currency.  As previously mentioned, no passengers were on board these ferry flights.
  • Pilots in an airline operation are required to do training and a pilot proficiency check every six months. They must also complete additional Line Checks or Line Indoctrination training, which is a check conducted over a typical route by an air operator (non-simulator training).
  • When a Pilot Proficiency Check, Line Check or Training has expired for more than 24 months, the pilot is required to successfully complete the air operator's initial training program and applicable proficiency checks before returning to service. 
  • A line check will be required for all pilots once the MAX aircraft is returned to commercial service.
  • Transport Canada has modified the Canadian Aviation Regulations to recognize the benefits of the latest simulator technology in training Canadian pilots. The change allows pilots to keep their licenses up to date by using a Transport Canada approved training program in a full-flight simulator as an alternative option  to acting as pilot-in-command or co-pilot of an aircraft within five years before a flight.
  • In addition to these full-flight simulators, pilots are also required to fly two actual sector flights in order to meet the requirements to fly commercial passenger flights.

Approved AC Flights

  • Flights requests were received throughout the period of August 26 to September 13. They were approved as the plans were solidified. To date, 23 AC flights have been authorized by TC, 6 in August and 17 in September, for operation during the ongoing Max grounding for currency training.
  • In addition, there is currenty one (1) flight planned for maintenance and recency on Friday September 20, with eleven (11) more upcoming movements planned for long-term storage (not for currency training), all of which have been authorized by TC.

Key issue: Boeing 737 MAX 8

Location: National

Issue/source:

Date: February 21, 2020

Suggested responses

  • Transport Canada (TC) is committed to keeping Canadians, the travelling public, and the transportation system safe and secure.
  • TC and other key international certifying authorities are working collaboratively towards the certification and validation of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 design changes.
  • As the grounding continues, TC is working with our impacted Canadian airline operators.
  • TC will not lift the current flight restriction until it is fully satisfied that all concerns have been addressed by the Boeing 737 MAX 8 manufacturer and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place to ensure safety.

Background information

  • The Boeing 737 MAX 8, a new aircraft, was involved in two serious fatal accidents resulting in the death of 346 passengers.
    • The first accident took place on October 29, 2018, where a Lion Air Flight took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, with 189 passengers on board, and crashed into the sea minutes after takeoff.
    • The second accident occurred on March 10, 2019, where an Ethiopian Air Flight took off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 157 passengers on board, crashing shortly after takeoff.
  • Following the Lion Air accident, Transport Canada (TC), in collaboration with the three Canada operators of the MAX 8 (Air Canada, WestJet and Sunwing), implemented additional mandatory training requirements for Canadian Boeing 737 MAX 8 pilots on a precautionary basis. These additional Canadian training requirements exceeded those of other countries.
  • Following the Ethiopian Airlines accident on March 10, 2019, TC officials took immediate action to gather evidence, assess the risks and need for action. They reached out to international partners, experts from industry and pilots who fly the aircraft and considered all available information as it became available in the days immediately following this accident. Many aviation regulators overseas grounded the plane March 12, 2019.
  • Early on March 13, 2019, TC experts received satellite data from Aireon, a global air traffic surveillance system company that provided indications the Ethiopian Airlines flight experienced significant flight control problems similar to the Lion Air flight. Based on this preliminary data, later the same morning, the Minister of Transport announced an immediate closure of Canadian airspace to the Boeing 737 MAX 8 on a precautionary basis. The U.S. followed Canada, grounding the Boeing 737 MAX 8 later that day.
  • The U.S. Federal Aviation Association (FAA), as the state of design, is responsible for certifying Boeing's approach to fixing the identified issues that contributed to the two accidents. Transport Canada will validate any FAA certification before the aircraft can resume flights in Canada.
  • As part of its validation work, in April 2019 TC identified to the FAA key areas of concerns that must be addressed before the aircraft can return to service in Canada:
    • Acceptable levels of pilot workload;
    • The architecture of the flight controls; and,
    • Minimum training required for crew members.
  • The concerns identified by TC are closely aligned with those of other aviation authorities including: the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
  • The four major certification authorities (i.e. ANAC, EASA, FAA, and TC) have been working collaboratively towards a coordinated certification and validation of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 design changes that would allow for a globally aligned return to service of the aircraft. This includes working to establish common training requirements.
  • The aim of these collaborative efforts is a global return to service. However, TC has been clear with authorities, operators and the public that, if necessary for safety reasons, Canada is prepared to impose additional requirements (i.e., more robust training or procedures) than other countries, as it did after the first Boeing 737 MAX 8 crash.
  • TC has been at the forefront of the international collaboration with aviation safety agencies to ensure that they are well aware of the certification and analysis work that is underway and Canada's position on this work. Many authorities have indicated that they will be reviewing TC's validation work to assist them in deciding whether to return the aircraft to service.
  • TC also participated in the Joint Operational Technical Review (JATR) with the FAA, the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) and other civil aviation authorities to conduct a comprehensive and independent technical review of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight control system. On October 11, 2019, the FAA published the results of the JATR review and recommendations.
  • The U.S National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also released its report on September 26, 2019, following its Boeing 737 MAX 8 investigation. The report included seven recommendations that are closely aligned with the issues TC outlined in its April 2019 letter to the FAA, and continues to have.
  • On October 25, 2019, the Indonesian authorities released a report on the 2018 Lion Air accident, which contains 26 recommendations, including 9 directed to the FAA. Some recommendations are similar in scope to those in the NTSB and JATR reports.
  • TC is carefully reviewing the recommendations from the JATR, NTSB and Indonesia's reports, which generally correspond to the issues TC identified in April 2019, as it continues its work towards the return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 in Canada.
  • TC also continues to work closely with the three affected Canadian air operators (Air Canada, WestJet, Sunwing) as it works through the evaluation process to consider authorizing the Boeing 737 Max 8 to fly again in Canadian airspace.
  • The Canadian validation will be based on the final package Boeing submits to the FAA and the FAA's own position on the submission, as the lead state of design. The FAA has indicated it has no timeline for this process.
  • The New York Times published an article on November 22nd on a working level exchange that was initiated by a TC official with certification experts on the possibility of removing the MCAS to address ongoing concerns.
  • The purpose of the exchange was to share ideas between highly trained aircraft certification experts who have been given wide latitude for assessing all issues and looking at all alternatives for the safe return to service of the aircraft. This exchange does not represent the official views of TC.
  • On January 8, 2020, Transport Canada's Director General of Civil Aviation met with family members of the Canadian victims of the March 2019 Ethiopian Airlines accident. This meeting allowed TC to hear concerns and questions from the families. The DG of Civil Aviation also outlined the actions taken to date, as well as the rigorous review of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 that is currently underway.
  • On February 12th, the Minister of Transport Canada met with the impacted families of the Ethiopian Airlines Crash in Toronto.
  • TC has made it clear that it will not lift the current flight restriction of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 until it is fully satisfied through its validation process that all concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the FAA, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training requirements are in place to ensure safety.

Key issue: December 28th Globe and Mail Article

Location: National

Issue/source: December 28th Globe and Mail Article entitled "Blind Spots" on the grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX.

Date: December 31, 2019

Suggested responses

  • Transport Canada (TC) is committed to keeping Canadians, the travelling public, and the transportation system safe and secure.
  • Following the Lion Air crash, Transport Canada received the same summary assessment and continuing Airworthiness Directive from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as other regulatory authorities around the world.
  • However, Transport Canada was the only regulatory authority in the world to implement additional measures above and beyond what was recommended by the FAA following the Lion Air crash.
  • Canadians can be assured that TC will not lift the current flight restriction until it is fully satisfied that all concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the FAA, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place to ensure safety.

If pressed

  • The FAA did not provide Canadian authorities all the information about the MCAS crash simulations and fatal crash projections until April 2019. While some preliminary information was provided to Transport Canada following the Lion Air accident, the full analysis and specifics of the Transport Aircraft Risk Assessment Methodology was not received until after the grounding.
  • Following the Lion Air accident, Transport Canada worked with Canadian operators to develop and implement enhanced training requirements for pilots that exceeded the standards implemented by other countries. This measure was put in place on November 8, 2018, shortly after the Lion Air accident, and remained in place until the grounding of the aircraft.
  • Very late on March 12, 2019, TC experts first obtained detailed satellite data from Aireon. Based on analysis of this new data, TC decided early on March 13, 2019 to ground the Boeing 737 Max 8.
  • Canada was the first civil aviation authority to cite evidence such as satellite data in grounding the Boeing 737 Max 8.
  • Transport Canada's review is ongoing, therefore it would be premature to discuss the return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft at this time.

Background information

  • An article that included factual inaccuracies was published by the Globe and Mail on Saturday, December 28th regarding the Boeing 737 Max 8 and its MCAS system.

Addressing inaccuracies in article

  • The article suggests that Canada was unique in having special access to additional information on the risks of MCAS from the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) immediately following the tragic Lion Air accident and that TC chose not to take action. However, TC did not receive the full report until April 2019, one month after the fleet was grounded.
  • It also suggests that Transport Canada followed the FAA's lead as one of several other authorities to put in place enhanced training requirements. However, Canada was unique in requiring additional training requirments fter the Lion Air accident.
  • The article asserts that following the Ethiopian Airlines accident, Transport Canada received satellite data from the FAA and chose to do nothing for several days between the second accident and the decision to ground on March 13, 2019. However, Transport Canada recived the data directly from Aireon late on March 12, and after a quick analysis recommended grounding the fleet on March 13.

Background on Boeing MAX 8 accidents

  • The Boeing 737 MAX 8 was involved in two serious fatal accidents resulting in the death of 346 passengers.
    • The first accident took place on October 29, 2018, where a Lion Air Flight took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, with 1898 passengers on board, and crashed into the sea minutes after takeoff.
    • The second accident occurred on March 10, 2019, where an Ethiopian Air Flight took off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 157 passengers on board, crashing shortly after takeoff. Amongst these passengers, there were 18 Canadians.
  • Following the Lion Air accident, Transport Canada (TC), in collaboration with the three Canada operators of the MAX 8 (Air Canada, WestJet and Sunwing), implemented additional mandatory training requirements for Canadian Boeing 737 MAX 8 pilots on a precautionary basis. These additional Canadian training requirements exceeded those of other countries.
  • Following the Ethiopian Airlines accident on March 10, 2019, TC officials took immediate action to gather evidence, assess the risks and need for action. They reached out to international partners, experts from industry and pilots who fly the aircraft and considered all available information as it became available in the days immediately following this accident. Many aviation regulators overseas grounded the plane March 12, 2019.
  • The U.S. Federal Aviation Association (FAA), as the state of design, is responsible for certifying Boeing's approach to fixing the identified issues that contributed to the two accidents. Transport Canada will validate any FAA certification before the aircraft can resume flights in Canada.
  • As part of its validation work, in April 2019, TC identified to the FAA key areas of concerns that must be addressed before the aircraft can return to service in Canada:
    • Acceptable levels of pilot workload;
    • The architecture of the flight controls; and,
    • Minimum training required for crew members.
  • The concerns identified by TC are closely aligned with those of other aviation authorities including: the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
  • The four major certification authorities (i.e. ANAC, EASA, FAA, and TC) have been working collaboratively towards a coordinated certification and validation of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 design changes that would allow for a globally aligned return to service of the aircraft. This includes working to establish common training requirements.
  • TC continues to work closely with the three affected Canadian air operators: Air Canada, WestJet and Sunwing.
  • TC participated in the Joint Operational Technical Review (JATR) with the FAA, the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) and other civil aviation authorities to conduct a comprehensive and independent technical review of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight control system. On October 11, 2019, the FAA published the results of the JATR review and recommendations.
  • The U.S National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also released its report on September 26, 2019, following its Boeing 737 MAX 8 investigation. The report included seven recommendations that are closely aligned with the issues TC outlined in its April 2019 letter to the FAA, and continues to have.
  • On October 25, 2019, the Indonesian authorities released a report on the 2018 Lion Air accident, which contains 26 recommendations, including 9 directed to the FAA. Some recommendations are similar in scope to those in the NTSB and JATR reports.
  • TC is carefully reviewing the recommendations from the JATR, NTSB and Indonesia's reports, which generally correspond to the issues TC identified in April 2019, as it continues its work towards the return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 in Canada.
  • TC's validation of the changes to the aircraft will be based on the final package Boeing submits to the FAA and the FAA's own position on the submission, as the lead state of design. The FAA has indicated it has no timeline for this process.

Key issue: Meeting with families of victims from the Ethiopian airlines crash

Location: Joseph Shepard Building - 4900 Young Street, North York, Ontario at the Canadian Boardroom on the 4th floor.

Issue/source: Meeting with the families of Canadians who lost their lives in the Ethiopian Airlines crash that occurred on March 10, 2019.

Date: Wednesday January 8, 2020

Suggested responses

  • The safety and security of Canadians and of the transportation system are Transport Canada's (TC) top priority.
  • TC welcomes an open discussion with impacted families of the Ethiopian Airlines crash.
  • This meeting will allow TC to hear concerns and questions from the families.
  • TC also hopes to outline the actions taken to date, as well as the rigorous review of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 that is currently underway.
  • TC is pleased to hear that more than half of the impacted families will be attending this meeting.
  • TC will not lift the current flight restriction until it is fully satisfied that all concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

If pressed

  • If necessary, Canada is prepared to impose additional requirements prior to the return to service of Canadian-registered Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft to ensure the safety of all Canadians, and the travelling public.

Background information

  • A meeting between the Director General of Civil Aviation and the impacted families of the Ethiopian Airlines crash has been scheduled for Wednesday, January 8 in North York, due to the proximity of many of the families.
  • TC has received confirmation that about ten out of the eighteen families will be attending the meeting on January 8, with most of them joining in-person, while others attending via teleconference.
  • During this meeting, TC will be listening to the families' thoughts and concerns about the aircraft. TC will also explain the details of the certification process and TC's role in validating the aircraft. Additionally, TC will confirm our approach for the return of service of the aircraft.
  • TC had previously met with two of the impacted families.
  • The Boeing 737 MAX 8 was involved in two serious fatal accidents resulting in the death of 346 passengers:
    • The first accident took place on October 29, 2018, where a Lion Air Flight took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, with 1898 passengers on board, and crashed into the sea minutes after takeoff.
    • The second accident occurred on March 10, 2019, where an Ethiopian Air Flight took off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 157 passengers on board, crashing shortly after takeoff. Amongst these passengers, there were 18 Canadians.
  • Chris Moore who lost his daughter Danielle Moore, Roland Rehhorn who lost his daughter Angela Rehhorn, and Paul Njoroge who lost his wife Carolyne, his mother-in-law Anne and his children Rubi, Kelli and Ryan in the Ethiopian Airlines plane crash have reached out to Transport Canada with a number of questions and concerns regarding the Boeing 737 Max 8.
  • Through direction from the Minister following a Minister briefing after the writ period, an email was sent on December 5, 2019 to these three families to offer an in-person meeting with the DG of Civil Aviation. This offer was extended to the other 15 impacted Canadian families.
  • Mr. Moore, Mr. Rehhorn and Mr. Njoroge all responded positively to the invitation and have facilitated connection with the other Canadian families.

Key issue: Safety record stats

  • In 2018, there were a total of 151 aviation accidents, down from the 2017 total of 190, and a 29% decrease from the previous 10-year (2008-2017) average of 214.
  • There were 16 fatal accidents in 2018, down from 2017 (18) and from the previous 10-year average of 24
  • 2018: The fatal accidents accounted for 25 fatalities, also down from the 2017 total of 27 and 43% below the previous 10-year average of 44 fatalities.
  • The accident rate has continued a steady decline over the previous 10-years. The 2018 accident rate of 3.1 (accidents per 100,000 hours flown) was the lowest recorded over the previous 10-year period.
  • Airline operations (705) in Canada continue to be one of the safest in the world. In 2018, there were 3 accidents, none of which resulted in fatalities; on par with the previous 10-year average (3).

Annex A: Boeing 737 MAX-8 In-service

February 2019

North America (162)

  • Canada (41)
    • Air Canada (24)
    • WestJet (13)
    • Sunwing Airlines (4)
  • USA (115)
    • Air Lease Corporation (14)
    • American Airlines (24)
    • Aviation Capital Group (5)
    • BusinessJet / VIP Customer (2)
    • GECAS (25)
    • Southwest Airlines (USA) (31)
    • United Airlines (USA) (14)
  • Mexico – Aeromexico (6)

South America (15)

  • Aerolieas Argentina (2)
  • GOL Linhas Aereas  (Brazil) (6)
  • Copa Airlines (Panama) (6)
  • Comair Limited (South Africa) (1)

Europe (63)

  • Ireland (13)
    • AerCap (5)
    • Avolon (3)
    • CDB Financial Leasing (1)
    • SMBC Aviation Capital (Ireland) (2)
    • Timaero Ireland Limited (Ireland) (2)
  • Icelandair (Iceland) (3)
  • Norwegian Air Shuttle (Norway) (18)
  • Smartwings, a.s. (Czech Republic) (1)
  • TUI Travel PLC (United Kingdom) (14)
  • Turkish Airlines (Turkey) (12)
  • Enter Air Sp. z o.o. (Poland) (2)

Africa (7)

  • Ethiopian Airlines Group (Ethiopia) (5)
  • Mauritania Airlines (Mauritania) (1)
  • Royal Air Maroc (Morocco) (1)

Asia (133)

  • China (77)
    • 9 Air (1)
    • Air China (15)
    • China Development Bank Fin.  (Hong Kong) (1)
    • China Eastern Airlines (14)
    • China Southern Airline (16)
    • Hainan Airlines Holding (China) (7)
    • ICBC Leasing  (China) (5)
    • Shandong Airlines (China) (6)
    • Shenzhen Airlines (China) (5)
  • Singapore – BOC Aviation Limited (7)
  • Fiji Airways (Fiji) (2)
  • flydubai (United Arab Emirates) (14)
  • Garuda Indonesia (Indonesia) (1)
  • Lion Air (Indonesia) (14)
  • Qatar Airways (Qatar) (5)
  • SCAT Airlines (Kazakhstan) (1)
  • SilkAir (Singapore) (5)
  • SpiceJet (India) (7)

Annex B: TC and EASA review comparison

As standard practice in the certification and validation process, each CMT authority will make a determination and issue their validation of the FAA certification. However, EASA, ANAC and TC continue to closely align their areas of review in the Boeing 737-MAX validation process.

In reviewing the three (3) TC and five (5) EASA categories of review that were to the FAA there is clear alignment between them:

Infographic. See long description below.
 

TC 1 alignment with EASA 1, 3

  • Functional appropriateness is a broad term which will encompass some of the evaluations done under the Functional Hazard Assessment and Safety Analyses that is referred to by EASA.
  • This activity will also review the architecture of the aircraft systems involved which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, flight controls and autopilot that was highlighted by EASA

TC 2 alignment with EASA 1, 2, 3

  • TC's architectural robustness evaluation is a broad term which encompasses the domains of system safety which EASA deconstructed to Functional Hazards Assessment, Safety Analysis and Development Assurance.

TC 3 alignment with EASA 4, 5

  • Our appropriateness of human factors evaluation is a broad term which includes human factors as an engineering discipline, up to the definition of the crew training needs, which EASA have deconstructed into two bullets.

Letter to the FAA TCCA scope of involvement

April 16, 2019

Attention: Federal Aviation Administration

Subject: Boeing 737-8 MAX - TCCA scope of involvement for Validation of Design Change

References:

  • Transport Canada Aircraft Certification Engineering Debrief Note, Boeing 737-8 MAX, 8 April 2019
  • Transport Canada Aircraft Certification Flight Test Debrief Note, Boeing 737-8 MAX, 4 April 2019
  • Transport Canada Concern Paper C-FT-03 Ed 2, 22 November 2018, Interpretation of Stall Identification and Assessment of Related Failure Modes

Dear Mr

The purpose of this letter is to summarize the proposed scope of Transport Canada Civil Aviation

(TCCA) involvement in validating the B737-8 MAX type design changes that will be required prior to the aircraft type's return to service. As we have discussed, I look forward to working collaboratively with the FAA in order to find a mutually acceptable outcome that would safety return the MAX to service.

You will find attached the details of expectations and outstanding actions in the fonn of TCCA Debrief Notes produced by our Engineering and Flight Test teams following our visit in Seattle on the week of March 25 (References I and 2). Both of these documents also build on outstanding issues from TCCA Concern Paper C-FT-03, which was drafted at the time of the original validation of the MAX 8, and revised following the Lion Air accident.

The following provides a high level summary of TCCA's expectations and intended actions which will be required to validate design changes to the B737 MAX:

  • Compliance to the TCCA certification basis
    • Satisfactory closure of C-FT-03 and the Debrief Notes {References 1 thru 3)
    • Assess the appropriateness of the functionality of the MCAS and its supporting systems
      • Understanding of the reason for the system design, and its attributes
      • Natural (un-augmented) in-flight stall characteristics of the B737 MAX are to be fully characterized and understood
      • The Speed Trim System has been considered a Stall Identification System by both Boeing and the FM: Consideration of the failure of this system to be captured in a non-normal procedure and/or associated with a limitation
      • The relationship between the MCAS and the stall needs to be understood to assess it not being classified as a stall protection system
      • Assessment of the acceptability of disabling augmentation (STS, MCAS) as a response to sensor malfunctions being detected
    • Assess the architectural robustness
      • Assess the acceptability of reliance on low integrity systems
      • Understanding of the completeness and correctness of the safety assessment; the systematic process for capturing safety requirements, assumptions and Failure Hazard Assessment (FHA) needs to be understood and seen to meet the principles of ARP4754A for validation and verification
      • Alignment between the system integrity and its criticality
      • Assessment of the integrity of all inputs to the Enhanced Digital Flight Control System (EDFCS), including and not limited to the angle-of-attack (AOA)
      • Confirmatio n that no single failure would prevent continued safe flight and landing or significan tly reduce the capability of the airplane
      • Review of unintended effects testing and fault propagation in relation to the proposed MCAS design changes
    • Assess the appropriateness of human factors considerations
      • Workload is viewed by TCCA as being unacceptable for line crew of average piloting skills. Appropriate checklist procedures are required to improve the probability of a flight crew completing necessary procedures to lead to a safe landing with acceptable pilot workload
      • Assessment that no single failure would prevent continued safe flight and landing or significantly reduce the capability of the crew to cope with the resulting failure conditions
      • Assessment of the E-Cab data, including the simulator validation data to assess its fidelity
  • Assess whether any unsafe feature or characteristic makes the aircraft unsafe, per Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) 521.57(2)(b)
  • Assessment that the proposed design changes address what is currently known of the failure modes associated with the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents

I note that our expected validation effort remains within the scope of our existing Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement and its associated Implementation Procedures (IPA). TCCA's validation activities are anticipated to consist of involvement from flight test (test pilot, test engineer) and systems engineering (avionics, flight controls, aircraft integration and safety, electronic equipment and design assurance) disciplines, in the following potential activities:

Technical familiarization meetings

Flight simulator/engineering simulator sessions

Flight tests

Document and engineering report reviews

We appreciate in advance your support in assisting with the provision of all necessary information in order to facilitate an expeditious closure of this issue.

I would also like to take the opportunity to express that we are looking forward to collaborating with you as part of the Joint Authorities Technical Review.

Sincerely,

J. David Turnbull

Director, National Aircraft Certification Transport Canada
cc. Nicholas Robinson, Director General, Transport Canada Civil Aviation

Quick reference handbook

Emergency quick reference checklist

Cabin altitude warning/rapid depressurization

  1. Donoxygen masks and set regulators to 100%
  2. Establish Crew communications
  3. Pressurization mode selector: MAN
  4. Outflow valve switch: Hold in CLOSE until the outflow valve indication shows fully closed
  5. Choose one:

    • Cabin altitude is not controllable:

      Refer to Reference items QRH page 2.1

    • Cabin altitude is not controllable:

      • Passenger sign: ON

      • Pass oxygen switch: ON.

        Go to the Emergency Descent QRC.

Emergency descent

  1. Advise ATC and obtain the area altimeter setting.
  2. Passenger signs: On
  3. Without delay, descend to the lowest safe altitude or 10,000 feet, whichever is higher.
  4. ENGINE START switches: Cont
  5. Thrust levers (both): Reduce thrust to minimum or as needed for anti-ice
  6. Speed brakes: Flight detent
    • If structural integrity in doubt, limit speed as much as possible and avoid high maneuvering loads.
  7. Set target speed to MmoN mo.

Refer to reference items QRH page 0.1

Runaway stabilizer

  1. Control column: Hold firmly
  2. Auto-pilot (if engaged): Disengage
    • Do not re-engage the autopilot
    • Control airplaine pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as required
  3. If the runaway stops after the autopilot is disengaged
  4. If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged:
    • Stab Trim Cutout
    • Switches (both): Cutout
      • If the runaway continues:
        • Stabilizer trim wheel: Grasp and hold

Refer to reference items QRH page 9.1

Revision: 000-31 Aug 17
B737 MAX
Section EQRC, page 5

Emergency quick reference checklist

Cabin altitude warning/rapid depressurization

  1. Donoxygen masks and set regulators to 100%
  2. Establish crew communications
  3. Pressurization mode selector: Man
  4. Outflow valve switch:
    • Hold in close until the outflow valve indication shows fully closed
  5. Choose one:
    • Cabin altitude is controllable:
      • Refer to Reference Items QRH page 2.1
    • Cabin altitude is not controllable:
      • Passenger sign: On
      • Pass Oxygen switch: On
      • Go to the Emergency Descent QRC.

Emergency descent

  1. Advise ATC and obtain the area altimeter setting.
  2. Passenger signs: On
  3. Without delay, descend to the lowest safe altitude or 10,000 feet whichever is higher.
  4. Engine start switches: Cont
  5. Thrust levers (both): Flight detent
    • Reduce thrust to minimum or as needed for anti-ice
  6. Speed brakes: Flight detent
    • If structural integrity in doubt, limit speed as much as possible and avoid high maneuvering loads.
  7. LI Set target speed to MmoN mo.

Refer to Reference Items QRH page 0.1

Runaway stabilizer

  1. Control: Hold firmly
  2. Autopilot (if engaged: Disengage
    • Do not re-engage the autopilot.
  3. Autothrottle (if engaged).
    • Do not re-engage the autothrottle.
  4. Control airplaine pitch attitude manually with control column and main electric trim as needed.
  5. Stab Trim Cutout switches (both): Cutout
    • If the runaway continues:
      • Stabilizer trim wheel: Gra and hol

Refer to Reference Items QRH 9.1

Bulletin: 18-02 - 08NOV18
Section EQRC, Page 5

Summary of Concern Paper Raised during Initial Boeing 737-MAX 8 validation

What is a Concern Paper?

A Concern Paper is a tool that is used during the certification and validation process of an aircraft or aeronautical product. A Concern Paper is raised when Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), as the Validating Authority (VA), does not agree with or does not understand how compliance was determined by the Certifying Authority (CA) to a particular required design standard.

The paper provides a venue for a written exchange on the subject, with the goal of reaching a common agreement and way forward. In some cases, the CA will explain their rationale, possibly providing additional information which addresses the VA's concern – the paper is then closed with agreement. 

In other cases, the two parties may continue to disagree, indicating a different interpretation or approach being applied to the certification standard that is in question.  If this difference does not constitute a safety concern, the VA may close the paper with the documented disagreement, and will take the issue "off-line" (away from the open project) in order to harmonize on the interpretation for future projects.  This allows the validation process to continue.  The Concern Paper must have a closure statement that indicates whether or not the validated Type Certificate should be issued, and under what conditions, if any, must be adhered to.

In any case where there is a safety concern by the VA, additional measures may be imposed on the validated Type Certificate (e.g., through aircraft flight manual, or possibly imposed modifications) to address the VA's concerns. 

The Certification Management Team (CMT) which is made up of the FAA, EASA, ANAC and TCCA, continuously reviews and tries to harmonize items that have arisen in validation exercises that have proved to represent different viewpoints. These efforts help to ensure consistency across leading certification partners.

Concern Paper C-FT-03 Original Issue, 22 November, 2018

Specific to the Concern Paper raised, the intent was to inquire with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as to their interpretation of design standard 25.201 (stall identification). The purpose was to seek clarity on whether FAA and TCCA shared a common view as to how compliance should be demonstrated to this common requirement. 

The requirement involves a demonstration of a stall.  The aircraft is considered compliant if indications of a stall naturally occur, specifically (1) a natural nose down pitch occurs that cannot be readily arrested, or (1) in combination with either or both of (2) or (3): (2) buffeting that is a strong deterrent to further speed reduction, (3) pitch control at the aft stop with no further subsequent pitch up.

A TCCA flight test was conducted as part of the validation on November 9, 2016, and Boeing was notified of our inquiry at that time.  What was learned is that activation of an "Elevator Feel Shift (EFS)" system at the point of natural stall causes an increase in control column forces that a pilot would have to overcome if trying to attempt to continue the stall. 

TCCA considered this system as operating similarly to a stick pusher system, which would typically only be required if the aircraft did not have inherent stall recovery characteristics, such that "a natural nose pitch down occurs that cannot be readily arrested", per the requirement.  As such, TCCA did not understand how compliance was demonstrated, and further inquired about the design integrity of the EFS system if in fact it was being relied upon to establish compliance.

While TCCA was aware of the presence of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) prior to the Concern Paper, as TCCA collected more information on this subject, we learned that MCAS was added to an existing Speed Trim System (STS) specifically for the MAX series aircraft to address a different requirement related to stalls in high speed turns.  TCCA also learned that the MCAS system activated in normal low speed level stall situations. These discoveries led to the questions on compliance and were the subject of the Concern Paper. 

Boeing and FAA have been describing both EFS and MCAS as "enhancements" to the natural stall characteristics, whereas TCCA, from what was observed, felt they may be required for basic compliance, and as such would need to have the appropriate design assurance such that failures in these systems be appropriately mitigated.

The FAA provided an updated response to the concern paper in March of 2018 that was not acceptable to TCCA.  TCCA continued to work with Boeing and FAA during the early investigation of the MCAS flight control computer updates, to determine if the Speed Trim System, including MCAS, constituted a stall protection or a stall identification system. 

Throughout the examination and discussion with the CA, the issue was not considered a safety case that would necessitate holding up certification in Canada.  This is a risk based decision made each time a validated Type Certificate is issued with any outstanding inquiries still open. In this case there was a commitment from the FAA to continue dialogue on this issue, as the 737 MAX 9 validation remained to be validated, and it would continue on in that context. 

As information continued to be made available, officials gained an increasingly clearer picture of basic stall compliance and the contributions that other systems such as MCAS played in failure scenarios. 

Activities from March 2019 to Feb 2020

Based on TCCA's dissatisfaction with the FAA's response to the concern paper, and due to similar questioning by Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the FAA responded by creating means of compliance issue paper entitled "Stall Identification Systems on the 737 MAX". It was acknowledged by Boeing and FAA that the combination of speed trim (including MCAS) and EFS constituted a stall identification system.  

Over the summer and fall of 2019, Boeing and FAA completed back to back stalls and wind-up turns with the stall identification system fully operative (STS + EFS), partially inoperative (STS or EFS off), and totally inoperative (STS and EFS off).  The intent of this testing was to show the natural airplane characteristics with the system inoperative or degraded, and to demonstrate that the stall identification system was not protecting the airplane from unsafe characteristics. 

TCCA was satisfied with this response from the perspective of stall identification, the original subject of the concern paper.  As of February 2020, TCCA identified two areas of concern with the FAA's means of compliance issue paper, related to consideration of failure conditions.  The concern paper will remain open pending the resolution of these comments, but the original line of questioning on stall identification has been satisfactorily resolved.  

A planned TCCA Flight Test during the validation of the MAX changes will conduct a subset of these back-to-back maneuvers to have first-hand knowledge of the natural stall characteristics of the 737 MAX.

Key messages

A Concern Paper is a tool that is used during the certification and validation process of an aircraft or aeronautical product. It is a clear demonstration of how certifying and validating authorities collaborate to ensure clear understanding of the work completed by the certifying authority.

A Concern Paper is raised when Transport Canada, as the Validating Authority, does not agree with or does not understand how a certification decision was made by a Certifying Authority to a particular required design standard.

The process provides a documented venue for information exchange on the subject, with the goal of coming to a common agreement while also maintaining the ultimate independent decision making of the validating authority.

In some cases, the certifying authority explains their rationale which is accepted by the validating authority and the paper is closed.  In other cases, the two parties may continue to disagree, indicating a different interpretation or approach being applied.  

If this difference does not constitute a safety concern, the validating authority may close the paper with the documented disagreement. They will then agree to take it "off-line" to harmonize on the interpretation for future projects. 

However, if there is any element of a safety concern by Transport Canada, additional measures will be imposed on the Canadian Type Certificate. For example changes to the aircraft flight manual, or possibly imposed modifications to the product. 

Concern Paper C-FT-03 Original Issue, 22 November, 2018

Specific to the Concern Paper raised, the intent was to inquire with Federal Aviation Administration as to their interpretation of a stall identification standard for the Boeing MAX. The aircraft is considered compliant if indications of a stall naturally occur during specific scenarios.

During the initial validation of the MAX aircraft a Transport Canada flight test raised questions as to whether this requirement was met.

While TCCA was aware of the presence of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) prior to the Concern Paper, as Transport Canada collected more information on this subject, officials learned that MCAS was added to an existing system specifically for the MAX to address a different requirement related to stalls which led to the Concern Paper. 

In this case, Transport Canada's starting position was an observation, seeking input from the FAA as to how they determined stall compliance. The discussion on this issue had not revealed any safety case that would necessitate holding up certification in Canada. 

Over the summer and fall of 2019, Boeing and FAA completed flight testing for stalls. The intent of this testing was to show the natural airplane characteristics with the system inoperative or degraded, and to demonstrate that the stall identification system was not protecting the airplane from unsafe characteristics. 

TCCA was satisfied with this response from the perspective of stall identification, the original subject of the concern paper. 

TCCA plans to do addition flight tests during the validation of the MAX changes to provide additional first-hand knowledge of the natural stall characteristics of the 737 MAX.

Letter to the editor of Globe and Mail

February 21, 2020

David Walmsley

Editor in Chief

The Globe and Mail

Dear Mr. Walmsley,

I am writing in response to your February 17 article on the Boeing 737 Max 8. In the interest of transparency and maintaining public confidence in Transport Canada's actions and decisions concerning the grounding of the aircraft, I wish to correct some misleading statements in the article.

The article asserts that following the Ethiopian Airlines accident, Transport Canada delayed the decision to ground the aircraft because the department was waiting for input from the U.S. As we have re-iterated to you several times over the course of your reporting on this issue, this statement is absolutely false.

Following any aircraft accident, it is regular practice to seek information and input from a wide variety of sources including the state of design, other authorities including those involved in the accident investigation, the aircraft manufacturer, and most importantly, our own experts. In the case of the Ethiopian Airlines accident, we first obtained detailed satellite data from Aireon (an international consortium of air navigation service corridors that includes NAVCAN, the Canadian service provider) very early on the morning of March 13. After quickly analyzing this new data, we independently decided to ground the Boeing 737 Max 8 that same morning. Following our decision, the FAA grounded the aircraft shortly after.

Second, the article suggests that Canada may have been limited in its ability to independently review and validate aircraft. This assertion is simply not true. Canada's decisions to validate an aircraft that has been certified by any State of design have always remained independent. Further, as stated several times to you, Canada continues to independently review and validate the Boeing 737 MAX 8 changes. This has been Transport Canada's position since the grounding of the aircraft and our review and expectations continue to be clearly outlined to the State of design.  As part of this review, Transport Canada will conduct its own test flights of  the aircraft after the FAA completes its own. We will not lift the flight restrictions on the Boeing 737 MAX 8 until we are fully satisfied that all safety concerns have been addressed by the manufacturer and the FAA and that enhanced flight crew procedures and training are in place.

Finally, Transport Canada has welcomed its opportunity to participate in reviews of the certification process conducted by the U.S. and is also undertaking its own internal review of the certification and validation process. However, contrary to your article there have been no final decisions on what changes Transport Canada may implement internally or advocate globally. Canada is committed to working with all certification authorities including the FAA, EASA and ANAC in examining the recommendations stemming from these multiple reviews, including the Joint Authorities Technical Review and National Transportation Safety Board Review.

I trust that this clarification will ensure future reporting on this issue reflects the true nature of Transport Canada's actions during the days following the accident and our independent and evidence-based decision to ground the aircraft in Canada.

Regards,
Nicholas Robinson
Director General, Civil Aviation Transport Canada

Boeing 737-8 MAX Timeline – Transport Canada actions

  • October 29, 2018 – Lion Air flight JT 610 took off from Jakarta and crashed into the sea with 189 people on board. There were no survivors.
    • The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee indicated that the Boeing 737 MAX 8 experienced erroneous input from one of its Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors.
  • November 7, 2018 - the FAA issued an emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) to address the safety issue. TC and EASA also adopted the AD immediately after.
  • November 9, 2018 - TC finalized work with Air Canada, WestJet, and Sunwing, to develop and implement a change to the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) of the Boeing 737 MAX 8. All Canadian MAX pilots were trained through multimedia and required to commit a 5-step process to memory. The additional training responded to the preliminary analysis as to the cause of the crash and these Canadian requirements exceeded those of all other countries.

Sunday, March 10, 2019

  • On March 10, 2019, a Boeing 737 MAX 8, operated by Ethiopian Airlines, crashed shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, killing all 149 passengers and 8 crew on board.
    • As with all international commercial aircraft accidents, Transport Canada (TC) undertook an immediate review of the event to determine any Canadian connections (operator, aircraft certification, Canadian equipment, Canadians involved, similar aircraft operated in Canada)
    • Given that Canadians were fatally injured, TC contacted the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) to identify what involvement they may have
    • TC officials contacted all Canadian operators of the MAX to advise of the accident and that TC would be reviewing
  • Briefings were provided to TC Senior Executives on what we knew in advance of a Monday morning Minister/Deputy Minister meeting.
  • 22:30 – TC Civil Aviation began to assess whether or not the aircraft should be grounded

Monday, March 11, 2019

  • 7:30: TC Civil Aviation experts convened meetings prior to Ministerial briefing
  • 9:30: Ministerial briefing included brief on Ethiopian Airlines accident
  • Morning: TC National Aircraft Certification reached out to U.S. Federal Aviation Association (FAA) to discuss accident, collect information for continued airworthiness review (standard practice)
  • 14:00: An additional Minister's Office briefing was held to share information gathered since morning meeting
  • TC Civil Aviation held discussions throughout the day, internally and with FAA and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) – collecting information and determining what steps authorities were looking to take.
  • Throughout Monday, the decision was made not to take action until Transport Canada received additional information. The Minister participated in a media scrum to reassure Canadians that based on the data available, the aircraft was still deemed to be safe. He remarked that Canada had put additional training measures in place for the Canadian operators of the aircraft following 2018 Lion Air accident. These measures were beyond what all other countries' aviation authorities had implemented.
  • By end of day Monday, three national aviation authorities (Ethiopia, China and Indonesia) and five airlines (Gol Airlines, Jet Airways, Cayman Airways, Silk Air, and Aeromexico) had issued direction to ground the 737-8 MAX.

Tuesday, March 12, 2019

  • Early email briefs
  • 9:00 - A Minister's Office briefing was held
  • 9:30 - TC Civil Aviation meeting was held and which included a panel of experts convened to review current information and determine status and possible additional measures
    • National Aircraft Certification, Civil Aviation Standards: National Civil Aviation Operations: Legal Counsel; Director General's Office and Policy and Regulatory Services
  • Morning – Minister participated in another media scrum
  • Morning – TC officials discussed with EASA who identified that they will be moving ahead with issuing an Airworthiness Directive to ground the aircraft
  • 12:15 - A Briefing to the Deputy Minister was held
  • 13:00 - EASA issued AD grounding aircraft
  • 13:35 - A briefing to the Privy Council Office was provided
  • 14:30 - TC Civil Aviation meeting was held which included the reconvening of the morning's panel of experts. Three options were presented to address the issue (status quo; full closure of Canadian airspace to MAX aircraft; and closure of Canadian airspace to foreign MAX operators who did not have additional measures/training for pilots put in place as Canada had).
    • National Aircraft Certification, Civil Aviation Standards, National Civil Aviation Operations, Legal Counsel, Director General's Office and Policy and Regulatory Services
  • Officials' continued discussions throughout the day FAA as part of the continued air worthiness process to examine the aircraft.
  • 16:30 – Meeting to update the Associate DM
  • By end of evening, TC had prepared a mitigation strategy and planned for a Minister's briefing on morning of March 13.
  • By end of day March 12, 2019, 15 additional countries had imposed restrictions, including EASA, the UK, France, Ireland, Australia and Germany.

Wednesday, March 13, 2019

  • 06:00 - Transport Canada received new satellite data from Aireon. Data was shared with experts for analysis, and Deputy Minister and Minister were made aware of this new information.
  • 8:00 – A Deputy Minister briefing was held
  • 8:30 - Analysis of the new data suggested a possible similarity between the Ethiopian Airlines accident and the Lion Air accident. TC experts recommended grounding the aircraft.
  • 9:00-11:00
    • A Ministerial briefing was held, and outlined the determination ground the aircraft.
    • Departmental officials provided heads up to Canadian operators and FAA and EASA
  • 11:30 – Minister and TC officials participated in a news conference announcing the decision to ground the aircraft.
  • 13:00 – A TC Civil Aviation meeting was held to brief program and regional colleagues
  • 14:00 – A TC panel of experts convened for meeting to discuss next steps.
    • National Aircraft Certification, Civil Aviation Standards: National Civil Aviation Operations: Legal Counsel; Director General's Office and Policy and Regulatory Services; Aviation Operations (SitCen)
  • 14:30 - U.S. announced intention to ground, formal statement issued at 15:00
  • By end of day Wednesday, March 13, 2019, seven additional authorities had imposed restrictions, including the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong and Lebanon.

Resumption of Service of the Boeing Max 8: Issues Brief

Purpose

To provide information on the accidents and grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 (MAX 8); the early steps taken by Transport Canada (TC); the work underway towards a return to service (RTS) of the aircraft; and, anticipated next steps.

Background information: Accidents and early actions

  • Following the MAX 8 Lion Air accident on October 29, 2018, TC implemented mandatory training requirements on November 8 for Canadian MAX 8 pilots.
    • Requirements exceeded all countries and addressed initial accident findings
  • Following the Ethiopian Airlines accident on March 10, 2019, TC took immediate action gathering information from national and international experts, and assessing the risks and need additional action.
  • Many aviation authorities began to ground the aircraft following the second accident with Europe and many Pacific countries taking the decision on March 12.
  • On March 13, TC received data from Aireon, a global air traffic surveillance system company, that indicated similar problems between the two accidents.
  • Based on this information, at 11:30 a.m. the same morning, the Minister immediately close Canadian airspace to the MAX 8. The U.S. took a decision to ground the aircraft following the announcement.
  • Three Canadian air operators are impacted by the grounding: Air Canada, WestJet and Sunwing.

Background information: Roles and responsibilities

  • As the manufacturer, Boeing has been developing a modification package to address the safety risks identified by these accidents.
    • The changes include modifications to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) that has been identified as a primary contributing factor in the accidents and factors related to the cockpit workload for the pilots.
  • As the U.S. is the State of Design for Boeing products, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible to certify all changes to the MAX 8.
  • Through a bilaterial agreement, TC works with the FAA to validate any U.S.-made aircraft and aviation products, ensuring that our certification expectations are met.
    • The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Brazilian National Aviation Authority (ANAC), as the other two leading certification authorities, have similar arrangements to validate the FAA certification.
  • TC is conducting a risk-based, independent review and validation of the changes and may take any additional action deemed necessary to ensure aviation safety.
  • The accidents and subsequent grounding of the aircraft has brought greater scrutiny to the original certification and the current review underway.

Background information: Governance and reviews

Existing structures are in place to assist in the review of the current certification and validation activities:

  • Certification Management Team (CMT): The CMT group is made up of four civil aviation authorities: the FAA, EASA, ANAC (Brazil) and Transport Canada. The CMT collaboratively identifies and addresses certification issues.
  • Joint Operation Evaluation Board (JOEB): this group is also comprised of FAA, TC, EASA and ANAC; this group determines appropriate pilot training requirements for aircraft, once certified.

Additional processes have also been created to review the current and previous certification:

  • Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR): FAA, the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) and several civil aviation authorities including TC conducted a comprehensive technical review of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight control system between April and October 2019.
  • Technical Advisory Board (TAB): FAA, U.S. Air Force, NASA, and Volpe National Transportation Systems Center are conducting a multi-agency review of the proposed software update and system safety assessment. Members have not been involved in any aspect of the Boeing 737 MAX certification. The TAB will directly inform the FAA's decision to return the 737 MAX fleet to service.
  • Blue Ribbon Panel: initiated by U.S. Department of Transport (DOT) and co-chaired by Former Head of the U.S. Transportation Command and Former President of the Air Line Pilots Association, with technical experts from government, academia, and industry. The panel is reviewing FAA's procedures for certification of new aircraft, including the 737 MAX certification process from 2012 to 2017.

Key background information: Criteria for safe return

  • In April 2019, TC communicated to the FAA its primary concerns and expectations for the certification of the MAX 8 (see Annex A for details):
    • Compliance to TC's certification requirements:
      • Function of MCAS
      • Architecture of the aircraft; and,
      • Human factors consideration.
    • Assess whether any unsafe feature or characteristic makes the aircraft unsafe, per Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) 521.57(2)(b).
    • Assessment that the proposed design changes address what is currently known of both the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents.
  • TC's concerns were closely aligned with EASA and ANAC who provided similar notification of expectations (see Annex B for EASA comparison).

Subsequent Reports released by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the JATR and the Indonesian Lion Air Accident report have aligned with the areas TC identified earlier in the process

Key background information: Reviews and findings

  • On September 26, the NTSB released its MAX 8 investigation report that included seven FAA recommendations (see Annex C)
    • TC agrees with the recommendations and many are aligned with concerns that have been highlighted by TC and other authorities.
  • On October 11, the FAA released the JATR's independent review of the MAX 8 certification, that included twelve recommendations (see Annex D)
    • TC contributed to the development of the recommendations that align with the work underway as part of the validation process.
  • On October 25, Indonesian authorities released a report on the 2018 Lion Air accident. It included 26 recommendations; many similar in scope to those in the NTSB report.
  • TC has also initiated an internal review of its certification and validation program to identify any potential areas for improvement. Draft findings of the review are expected in Winter 2020.

Considerations: Certification

  • The aerospace industry continues to experience rapid growth and innovation. New and revised aeronautical products continue to be introduced that demand a continuously evolving certification capacity
  • While close alignment of certification standards between leading authorities has delivered a stronger certification system, fundamental questions have been raised as a result of the two MAX accidents. Specifically:
    • Scope of review for new variant aircraft of existing models (e.g., original Boeing 737 vs. 737 MAX)
    • Scope of human factors review for aircrew and interaction with automated aircraft systems
    • Oversight of certification tasks delegated to industry (i.e., delegation)
  • While TC has historically erred more conservatively in these three areas, the ongoing internal review of the certification and validation process will provide recommendations on areas of improvement.
    • A separate briefing on the scope of the review will be provided.
  • Following the accidents, work remains for authorities to publicly and amongst each other, demonstrate oversight and consistent application of this function.

Considerations: Canadian Operators

  • Canadian operators have been significantly impacted by the grounding; having the third largest global MAX 8 fleet at the time of grounding (41).
  • Two thirds of the Sunwing fleet for their Summer schedule were grounded 6 of 9.
  • Air Canada has exclusively trained over 425 pilots on the MAX 8. Once grounded, these pilots could not fly other aircraft so have been idle since.
    • As part of training requirements, pilots are required to do training and a pilot proficiency checks every six months. For this reason, TC has allowed non-revenue flights (e.g., no passengers or cargo) to be conducted, under strict requirements, to allow pilots to fly the MAX 8 and maintain their recency.
  • WestJet lost 13 aircraft from their fleet directly impacting planned expansion (particularly internationally) in 2019-2020.
  • Operators continue to seek support from TC to bring new or retired aircraft back into operation as they continue to face challenges due the grounding.
  • Public opinion research performed by operators has identified the regulator as being trusted to make a decision regarding RTS. As such, operators have been adamant in the strong TC participation in any RTS announcement.

Considerations: International Collaboration

  • The Canadian validation of the MAX 8 must be based on the final submission to the FAA, and on the FAA's position, as State of Design, on the package.
  • The FAA is aware of outstanding information and expectations that must be met before Canada can consider validating the MAX 8
  • The four major certification authorities (i.e. ANAC, EASA, FAA, and TC) have been working collaboratively towards a coordinated certification and validation of the MAX 8 that would:
    • allow for a globally aligned RTS of the aircraft;
    • establish common training requirements; and,
    • publically demonstrate global acceptance of proposed changes
  • Given the public uncertainty of aircraft's safety and the scrutiny of the global certification process, a global return to service is the goal to begin to address these concerns.

Considerations: International Collaboration

  • In addition to the work with its certification authority partners, TC has been at the forefront of the international collaboration with aviation safety agencies.
    • TC have provided updates to ensure authorities are aware of the analysis underway and Canada's validation positions.
    • Authorities have indicated that they will be reviewing TC's validation to assist them in deciding whether to return the aircraft to service
  • While the goal of these efforts is a coordinated global RTS, TC has been clear with authorities, operators and the public that, if necessary for safety reasons, Canada is prepared to impose additional requirements
    • Similar to the actions taken following the first Lion Air MAX 8 accident.

Considerations: Training

  • TC, FAA and EASA had established Computer Based Training (CBT) for the Boeing 737 MAX.
  • Following the Lion Air accident, TC authorized an enhanced Quick Reference Guide procedure to enable Canadian pilots to take appropriate actions if faced with the same situation. Canada's air operators revised their aircraft operating procedures to maximize the effectiveness of the crew's reaction to failure conditions.
  • We put measures in place to ensure pilots were trained and ready to respond to an MCAS failure, while Boeing worked to implement a long term solution. These additional Canadian training requirements exceeded those of other countries.
  • Once the final changes to the aircraft are certified by the FAA, TC will participate in a JOEB to assess training requirements with the U.S. FAA, EASA and ANAC.
  • The results of the JOEB will be used to establish the minimum training requirements, including the possibility of simulator training, for the return to service of the 737 MAX 8 aircraft. Until this work is completed, it would be premature to speculate on the specific training that will be required.   
  • If deemed necessary, TC can choose to require supplementary training in Canada, beyond training determined by the JOEB.

Current status

  • Since the grounding, FAA certification timelines have been publicly discussed with all estimations having been exceeded to date. At no time has Canada suggested a timeline; instead focusing on getting the data required to make an informed decision.
  • There are key steps and decisions that remain in working towards a Canadian RTS:
    • Boeing submission of final certification package for FAA review
    • FAA certification of design changes, in conjunction with partners (TC, EASA, ANAC)
    • Joint Operational Evaluation Board to determine pilot training requirements (FAA, TC, EASA and ANAC)
      • TC may determine its own additional pilot training requirements
    • FAA to issue an Airworthiness Directive (AD) outlining changes required prior to RTS
    • TC to review the FAA's certification package and FAA AD to validate
      • Either TC will accept FAA certification and AD; or,
      • TC will issue its own AD with additional requirements/conditions (e.g., training)
    • TC to validate operators' successful implementation of changes
    • TC to lift grounding (issue Notice to Airmen)

Next steps

  • TC will continue to work with the three main certification authorities to address outstanding issues and evaluate the work Boeing complete to address required modifications.
  • TC officials intend to meet with families of the victims of the Ethiopian Air flight in the near future.
  • Since the beginning of the grounding TC has kept Canadian stakeholders (e.g., operators, labour associations) current on the status of the validation activities underway; TC will continue to seek opportunities to brief these stakeholders.
  • TC is developing a proactive communication strategy for the eventual announcement of the outcome of validation activities and RTS conditions of the aircraft.
  • TC will continue to brief you on the progress of the validation review and related activities.

Annex A: TC expectations for FAA's certification

  • As communicated to the FAA in April 2019, the following provides a high level summary of TC's expectations and intended actions which will be required to validate design changes to the B737 MAX:
  • Compliance to the TCCA certification basis
    • Satisfactory closure of C-FT-03 and the Debrief Notes (References 1 thru 3)
    • Assess the appropriateness of the functionality of the MCAS and its supporting systems 
    • Assess the appropriateness of human factors considerations 
  • Assess whether any unsafe feature or characteristic makes the aircraft unsafe, per Canadian Aviation Regulations (CAR) 521.57(2)(b)
  • Assessment that the proposed design changes address what is currently known of the failure modes associated with the Lion Air and Ethiopian accidents
  • TC also noted the intended scope of its own validation of the aircraft:
    • involvement from flight test (test pilot, test engineer) and systems engineering (avionics, flight controls, aircraft integration and safety, electronic equipment and design assurance) disciplines, in the following potential activities:
      • Technical familiarization meetings
      • Flight simulator/engineering simulator sessions
      • Flight tests
      • Document and engineering report reviews

Annex B: TC alignment with EASA

As standard practice in the certification and validation process, each CMT authority will make a determination and issue their validation of the FAA certification. However, EASA, ANAC and TC continue to closely align their areas of review in the Boeing 737-MAX validation process.

In reviewing the three (3) TC and five (5) EASA categories of review that were to the FAA there is clear alignment between them:

Infographic. See long description below.
 

TC 1 alignment with EASA 1, 3

  • Functional appropriateness is a broad term which will encompass some of the evaluations done under the Functional Hazard Assessment and Safety Analyses that is referred to by EASA.
  • This activity will also review the architecture of the aircraft systems involved which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, flight controls and autopilot that was highlighted by EASA

TC 2 alignment with EASA 1, 2, 3

  • TC's architectural robustness evaluation is a broad term which encompasses the domains of system safety which EASA deconstructed to Functional Hazards Assessment, Safety Analysis and Development Assurance.

TC 3 alignment with EASA 4, 5

  • Our appropriateness of human factors evaluation is a broad term which includes human factors as an engineering discipline, up to the definition of the crew training needs, which EASA have deconstructed into two bullets.

Annex C: Recommendations (NTSB)

  • NTSB A-19-10 (1) FAA to require that Boeing ensure that system safety assessments for the 737 MAX in which it assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs, from systems such as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response
    • TC agrees with the intent. TC has outstanding Issue Papers which detail specific concerns related to this recommendation. TC is waiting for the FAA's response to these Issue Papers.
  • NTSB A-19-10 (2) FAA to require that Boeing incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer assumptions.
    • TC agrees with the intent. TC has communicated its position to the FAA, and awaits their position on which design enhancements will be expected of Boeing by the FAA.  TC notes that certain arguably practical enhancements will be hampered by their applicability to common aspects of the 737NG, which the FAA thus far considers out of scope for this activity.  The NTSB recommendation leaves considerable latitude to respond to this recommendation. TC has outstanding Issue Papers which detail specific concerns related to this recommendation. TC is waiting for the FAA's response to these Issue Papers.
  • NTSB A-19-11 Require that for all other US type-certificated transport-category airplanes, manufacturers (1) ensure that system safety assessments for which they assumed immediate and appropriate pilot corrective actions in response to uncommanded flight control inputs consider the effect of all possible flight deck alerts and indications on pilot recognition and response; and (2) incorporate design enhancements (including flight deck alerts and indications), pilot procedures, and/or training requirements, where needed, to minimize the potential for and safety impact of pilot actions that are inconsistent with manufacturer assumptions.
    • Noted by TC. Recommendation is not applicable to Canadian domestic products.
  • NTSB A-19-12 Notify other international regulators that certify transport-category airplane type designs (for example, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, Transport Canada, the National Civil Aviation Agency-Brazil, the Civil Aviation Administration of China, and the Russian Federal Air Transport Agency) of Recommendation A-19-11 and encourage them to evaluate its relevance to their processes and address any changes, if applicable.
    • TC agrees with the recommendation, but doesn't see a need for it to revisit assumptions in system safety analyses for in-service aircraft outside of the already existing Continuing Airworthiness (CAW) processes. This would require significant resources for potentially no gain, while negating TC oversight in other areas. Problems identified by the NTSB partially originate in inadequate application of Changed Product Rule. TC will assess any concerns identified with the use of Changed Product Rule process.
  • NTSB A-19-13 Develop robust tools and methods, with the input of industry and human factors experts, for use in validating assumptions about pilot recognition and response to safety-significant failure conditions as part of the design certification process.
  • NTSB A-19-14 Once the tools and methods have been developed as recommended in Recommendation A-19-13, revise existing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and guidance to incorporate their use and documentation as part of the design certification process, including re-examining the validity of pilot recognition and response assumptions permitted in existing FAA guidance.
  • NTSBN A-19-15 Develop design standards, with the input of industry and human factors experts, for aircraft system diagnostic tools that improve the prioritization and clarity of failure indications (direct and indirect) presented to pilots to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of their response.
  • NTSB A-19-16 Once the design standards have been developed as recommended in Recommendation A-19-15, require implementation of system diagnostic tools on transport-category aircraft to improve the timeliness and effectiveness of pilots' response when multiple flight deck alerts and indications are present.
    • TC believes recommendations A-19-13 through A-19-16 are all linked and TC strongly agrees with them. TC recognizes the need for harmonization among authorities and is looking forward to participating in future harmonization activities. The NTSB recommendations closely align with TC's use of a generic Cert Memo (CM) "Human error considerations of 25.1309" since 2010 which is based on a system safety assessment approach of evaluating the safety-significant failure conditions for potential flight crew (and maintenance personnel) errors during the design certification process. This CM has been used on the past two domestic certification programs and also on foreign validation programs. […]

Annex D: Recommendations (JATR)

  • R1 Changed Product Rules: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to the application of the Changed Product Rule (CPR) to the certification of the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA works with other civil aviation authorities to revise the harmonized approach to the certification of changed products. Changed Product Rules (e.g., 14 CFR §§ 21.19 & 21.101) and associated guidance (e.g., Advisory Circular 21.101-1B and FAA Orders 8110.4C and 8110.48A) should be revised to require a top-down approach whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system perspective. These revisions should include criteria for determining when core attributes of an existing transport category aircraft design make it incapable of supporting the safety advancements introduced by the latest regulations and should drive a design change or a need for a new type certificate. The aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all its subsystems, the flight crew, and the maintenance crew. These Changed Product Rule revisions should take into consideration the following key principles:
    • A comprehensive integrated system-level analysis recognizing that in this complex interactive system, every change could interact with other parts of the system.
    • The assessment of proposed design changes on existing systems at the aircraft level includes using development assurance principles, system safety principles, and validation & verification techniques. The level of assessment should be proportional to the impact of the change at the aircraft level.
    • The consideration of training and qualification of flight and maintenance personnel, as well as detailed explicit procedures for the safe operation of the aircraft.
      • TC adopted the CPR and its Advisory Circular. Authorities who have validated the 737 MAX agree with the analysis of the CPR and support the revision of the certification process of changed products to allow for a more harmonized approach. . Thereby, the concern expressed and the resulting recommendation is applicable to TC, and as such, is supported. TC experience with CPR has been generally less problematic, and Canadian applicants have more often opted to select newer standards rather than justify the use of older pre-existing standards which arguably is at the heart of the 737 MAX issue.
  • R2 Development and use of up-to-date requirements and practices: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to the regulations, policy, and compliance methods applied to the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA updates regulations and guidance that are out of date and update certification procedures to ensure that the applied requirements, issue papers, means of compliance, and policies fully address the safety issues related to state-of-the-art designs employed on new projects. JATR team members also recommend that the FAA reviews its processes to ensure that regulations and guidance materials are kept up to date.
    • The FAA has not kept up with a backlog of rulemaking activities. As a result, there has been a number of other means utilized by the FAA to apply these needed changes. As a result of the various methods to institute the changes, some regulations were not applied consistently to achieve the intended benefit. As TC has a policy to adopt FAA regulations, this recommendation directly effects TC and required TC to use similar alternate means to cater to this lack of rulemaking.
  • R3 Consistent interpretation and application of requirements: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to the certification of the B737 MAX flight control system and related interfaces, JATR team members recommend that the FAA reviews the B737 MAX compliance to 14 CFR §§ 25.1329 (Flight Guidance System), 25.1581 (Airplane Flight Manual – General), and 25.201 (Stall Demonstration) and ensure the consistent application and interpretation of regulatory guidance material for the system safety assessment, handling qualities rating method, and conformity requirements for engineering simulators and devices. Should there be a non-compliance, the root cause should be identified and measures implemented to prevent recurrence.
    • This concern is related to ensuring a consistent application of the requirements. TC needs to ensure we have common expectations with the FAA to ensure harmonized application of the regulations and guidance material. TC's investigations on the MAX thus far have been in part in alignment with this recommendation.
  • R4 Changes during the certification process: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to the FAA type certification process, JATR team members recommend that the FAA reviews and updates the regulatory guidance pertaining to the type certification process with particular emphasis on early FAA involvement to ensure the FAA is aware of all design assumptions, the aircraft design, and all changes to the design in cases where a changed product process is used. The FAA should consider adding feedback paths in the process to ensure that compliance, system safety, and flight deck/human factors aspects are considered for the aircraft design throughout its development and certification.
    • This recommendation is specific to how the FAA conducts their oversight. TC surveillance of Canadian Design Approval Organizations and its application of the certification process ensures similar concerns are not as relevant in the Canadian context. TC certification programs incorporate dedicated flight deck / human factors evaluations. Changes are evaluated holistically, and are not evaluated in isolation of the pre-existing cockpit environment
  • R5 Delegation of certification authority: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to FAA's oversight by the Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO), JATR team members recommend that the FAA conducts a workforce review of the BASOO engineer staffing level to ensure there is a sufficient number of experienced specialists to adequately perform certification and oversight duties, commensurate with the extent of work being performed by Boeing. The workforce levels should be such that decisions to retain responsibility for finding compliance are not constrained by a lack of experienced engineers. The FAA should review the Boeing Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) work environment and ODA manual to ensure the Boeing Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) engineering unit members (E-UMs) are working without any undue pressure when they are making decisions on behalf of the FAA. This review should include ensuring the E-UMs have open lines of communication to FAA certification engineers without fear of punitive action or process violation.
    • This recommendation is specific to how the FAA conducts their oversight. TC surveillance of Design Approval Organizations is more integrated with the company throughout the certification process and as such similar concerns are not as relevant in the C0anadian context

Report Recommendations (JATR)

  • R6 Holistic, integrated aircraft-level approach: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to the design process of the flight control system and the related system safety assessments for the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA promotes a safety culture that drives a primary focus on the creation of safe products, which in turn comply with certification requirements. Aircraft functions should be assessed, not in an incremental and fragmented manner, but holistically at the aircraft level. System function and performance, including the effects of failures, should be demonstrated and associated assumptions should be challenged to ensure robust designs are realized. The safety analysis process should be integrated with the aircraft development assurance process to ensure all safety requirements and associated assumptions are correct, complete, and verified. The FAA should encourage applicants to have a system safety function that is independent from the design organization, with the authority to impartially assess aircraft safety and influence the aircraft/system design details. Adoption of a safety management system is one way this can be achieved.
    • Changed Product Rule does not necessarily ensure a holistic, integrated aircraft-level approach is applied to significant modifications, as the interpretation and application of CPR can vary. As TC follows harmonized CPR policies, this recommendation is applicable. TC certification practices currently incorporate a more holistic approach to incremental design change, implying the effects on the entire aircraft are analyzed.
  • R7 Human factors: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to human factors-related issues in the certification process, JATR team members recommend that the FAA integrates and emphasizes on human factors and human system integration throughout its certification process. Human factors-relevant policies and guidance should be expanded and clarified, and compliance with such regulatory requirements as 14 CFR §§ 25.1302 (Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew), 25.1309 (Equipment, Systems, and Installations), and 25.1322 (Flightcrew Alerting) should be thoroughly verified and documented. To enable the thorough analysis and verification of compliance, the FAA should expand its aircraft certification resources in human factors and in human system integration.
    • Changed Product Rule may not ensure a holistic, integrated aircraft-level approach applied to human factors considerations; although, this is dependent on how the process is interpreted and applied. TC needs to ensure we have common expectations with the FAA to ensure harmonized application of the regulations and guidance material. As TC follows harmonized CPR policies, this recommendation is applicable. TC has relied on SME Pilots and Engineers to conduct human factors related activities with support of Applicant specialists. The decision as to whether or not to seek permanent Human Factors specialists is a recommendation that TC will have to consider moving forward – there have been no decisions made on this at this point.
  • R8 Development assurance: Based on the JATR team's observations and findings related to the development assurance process applied to the design of the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA ensures applicants apply industry best practice for development assurance, including requirements management, visibility of assumptions, process assurance activities, and configuration management. The FAA should ensure achievement of the close coupling that is required between the applicant safety analysis process and the development assurance process to classify failure conditions and derive the level of rigor of design development and verification. A current example of industry best practice is SAE International's Aerospace Recommended Practice 4754A (ARP4754A). The FAA should review and amend Advisory Circular 20-174 to clearly articulate the principles of ARP4754A, promoting industry best practice for development assurance of aircraft and aircraft systems to address applicants' design trend of increasing integration between aircraft functions and systems.
    • TC needs to ensure we have common expectations with the FAA to ensure harmonized application of the regulations and guidance material particularly for application to modified aircraft (possible amendment to AC 20-174). TC has incorporated many of these best practices already in its major certification programs within the last 10 years; most notably the use of ARP4754A.
  • R9 Impact of product design changes on operations: Based on the JATR team's findings and observations related to the operational design assumptions of crew response applied during the certification process for the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA requires the integration of certification and operational functions during the certification process. The FAA should be provided all system differences between related aircraft in order to adequately evaluate operational impact, systems integration, and human performance.
    • TC has recognized the close linkages and coordination with the operational evaluation function. Improvements in linkages and communications have been implemented in many recent certification activities. Further alignment and integration of the operational and certification sides of the house is an ongoing exercise.
  • R10 Impact of product design changes on flight crew training: Based on the JATR team's findings and observations related to flight crew training, JATR team members recommend that the FAA requires a documented process to determine what information will be included in the Airplane Flight Manual, the Flight Crew Operating Manual, and the Flight Crew Training Manual. The FAA should review training programs to ensure flight crews are competent in the handling of mis-trim events..
    • TC agrees with this recommendation; although, it is specific to the FAA. TC reviews flight manuals to ensure that the objective of this recommendation is met.
  • R11 Impact of product design changes on maintenance training: JATR team members recommend that the FAA conducts a study to determine the adequacy of policy, guidance, and assumptions related to maintenance and ground handling training requirements.
    • TC needs to ensure we have common expectations with the FAA to ensure harmonized application of the regulations and guidance material where intended.
  • R12 Post-certification corrective actions and data sharing: JATR team members recommend that the FAA reviews its policies for analyzing safety risk and implementing interim airworthiness directive action following a fatal transport aircraft accident. The FAA should ensure that it shares post-accident safety information with the international community to the maximum extent possible.
    • TC will be considering this recommendation for a similar review given the lessons learned from the FAA's response to the 737 MAX events as current practices may have room for incremental improvement. TC will determine whether any changes are warranted in our processes related to Airworthiness Directives.  It is likely that TC will learn more from this in consultation with the FAA.

Boeing 737 MAX-8

Location: National

Summary of issue/background

The concerns identified by TC are closely aligned with those of other aviation authorities including: the Brazilian Civil Aviation Authority (ANAC) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

  • The Boeing 737 MAX 8, a new aircraft, was involved in two serious fatal accidents resulting in the death of 346 passengers.
    • The first accident took place on October 29, 2018, where a Lion Air Flight took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, with 189 passengers on board, and crashed into the sea minutes after takeoff.
    • The second accident occurred on March 10, 2019, where an Ethiopian Air Flight took off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia with 157 passengers on board, crashing shortly after takeoff.
  • Following the Lion Air accident, Transport Canada (TC), in collaboration with the three Canada operators of the MAX 8 (Air Canada, WestJet and Sunwing), implemented additional mandatory training requirements for Canadian Boeing 737 MAX 8 pilots on a precautionary basis. These additional Canadian training requirements exceeded those of other countries.
  • Following the Ethiopian Airlines accident on March 10, 2019, TC officials took immediate action to gather evidence, assess the risks and need for action. They reached out to international partners, experts from industry and pilots who fly the aircraft and considered all available information as it became available in the days immediately following this accident. Many aviation regulators overseas grounded the plane March 12, 2019.
  • Early on March 13, 2019, TC experts received satellite data from Aireon, a global air traffic surveillance system company that provided indications the Ethiopian Airlines flight experienced significant flight control problems similar to the Lion Air flight. Based on this preliminary data, later the same morning, the Minister of Transport announced an immediate closure of Canadian airspace to the Boeing 737 MAX 8 on a precautionary basis. The U.S. followed Canada, grounding the Boeing 737 MAX 8 later that day.
  • The U.S. Federal Aviation Association (FAA), as the state of design, is responsible for certifying Boeing's approach to fixing the identified issues that contributed to the two accidents. Transport Canada will validate any FAA certification before the aircraft can resume flights in Canada.
  • As part of its validation work, in April 2019 TC identified to the FAA key areas of concerns that must be addressed before the aircraft can return to service in Canada:
    • Acceptable levels of pilot workload;
    • The architecture of the flight controls; and,
    • Minimum training required for crew members.
  • The four major certification authorities (i.e. ANAC, EASA, FAA, and TC) have been working collaboratively towards a coordinated certification and validation of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 design changes that would allow for a globally aligned return to service of the aircraft. This includes working to establish common training requirements.
  • The aim of these collaborative efforts is a global return to service. However, TC has been clear with authorities, operators and the public that, if necessary for safety reasons, Canada is prepared to impose additional requirements (i.e., more robust training or procedures) than other countries, as it did after the first Boeing 737 MAX 8 crash.
  • TC has been at the forefront of the international collaboration with aviation safety agencies to ensure that they are well aware of the certification and analysis work that is underway and Canada's position on this work. Many authorities have indicated that they will be reviewing TC's validation work to assist them in deciding whether to return the aircraft to service.
  • TC also participated in the Joint Operational Technical Review (JATR) with the FAA, the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) and other civil aviation authorities to conduct a comprehensive and independent technical review of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 flight control system. On October 11, 2019, the FAA published the results of the JATR review and recommendations.
  • The U.S National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) also released its report on September 26, 2019, following its Boeing 737 MAX 8 investigation. The report included seven recommendations that are closely aligned with the issues TC outlined in its April 2019 letter to the FAA, and continues to have.
  • On October 25, 2019, the Indonesian authorities released a report on the 2018 Lion Air accident, which contains 26 recommendations, including 9 directed to the FAA. Some recommendations are similar in scope to those in the NTSB and JATR reports.
  • TC is carefully reviewing the recommendations from the JATR, NTSB and Indonesia's reports, which generally correspond to the issues TC identified in April 2019, as it continues its work towards the return to service of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 in Canada.
  • TC also continues to work closely the three affected Canadian air operators (Air Canada, WestJet, Sunwing) as it works through the evaluation process to consider authorizing the Boeing 737 Max 8 to fly again in Canadian airspace.
  • The Canadian validation will be based on the final package Boeing submits to the FAA and the FAA's own position on the submission, as the lead state of design. The FAA has indicated it has no timeline for this process.
  • TC has made it clear that it will not lift the current flight restriction of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 until it is fully satisfied through its validation process that all concerns have been addressed by Boeing and the FAA, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training requirements are in place to ensure safety.

Messages

  • Transport Canada (TC) is committed to keeping Canadians, the travelling public, and the transportation system safe and secure.
  • TC and other key international certifying authorities are working collaboratively towards the certification and validation of the Boeing 737 MAX 8 design changes.
  • As the grounding continues, TC is working with our impacted Canadian airline operators.
  • TC will not lift the current flight restriction until it is fully satisfied that all concerns have been addressed by the Boeing 737 MAX 8 manufacturer and the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and that adequate flight crew procedures and training are in place to ensure safety.

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