Attention:
All canadian private, commercial air operators utilizing Global Position System (GPS) / Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) navigation services
| File Classification No.: | Z 5000-35 |
|---|---|
| RDIMS No.: | 20604733 |
| Document No.: | CASA 2024-10 |
| Issue No.: | 01 |
| Effective Date: | 2024-10-10 |
Purpose:
The purpose of this notice is to provide guidance to civil air operators with regards to GPS/GNSS interference as it relates to instances of jamming and spoofing.
Background:
Over the past year, airspace users and operators have reported an increase in GPS/GNSS interference, primarily around conflict regions. These disruptions have taken the form of both jamming, where radio frequency interference is used to intentionally prevent air navigation systems from receiving data; and spoofing, which simulates a GPS signal to provide the aircraft affected with incorrect positioning, navigation and timing data.
While there are no dedicated flight crew alerts for interference, GPS/GNSS disruptions can be identified through a variety of impacts to on board systems, including:
- Loss of GPS/GNSS navigation service;
- Significant changes in GPS/GNSS position;
- False warnings from the flight management system (FMS) or data which conflicts with GNSS;
- False displays on inertial reference systems (IRS) which utilize GPS data;
- False alerts from the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS);
- False or changing time on aircraft clocks.
Experiencing these disruptions during flight may result in aircraft straying from its flight path. Near conflict regions, this may lead to an aircraft entering unapproved and high-risk airspace.
Recommended action
Aircraft operators should be aware of conflict regions where GPS/GNSS interference has been commonly reported, including (but not limited to): the Black Sea area; the Baltic Sea area; the eastern Mediterranean area; and the Middle East. If flying in these regions, operators should plan fuel contingencies and navigate at a heightened awareness, utilizing conventional Navigational Aids (NAVAIDs) where necessary. Operators should ensure that conventional arrival and approach procedures are included in the flight plan and that they are prepared to use such an arrival procedure in the absence of GNSS support.
Operators should remain aware of relevant Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and crew alerts to flight plans in areas of concern. Aircraft or equipment manufacturers should be contacted by operators for additional guidance on how to identify and respond to instances of GPS/GNSS interference with their products.
Upon experiencing GPS/GNSS interference, operators should report the event to the Air Traffic Service (ATS) as soon as possible.
Transport Canada continues to collaborate with the international civil aviation community to assess cybersecurity risks and their impacts on aviation safety.
Contact office:
For more information concerning this issue, contact the Civil Aviation Communications Centre: https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation/civil-aviation-contacts-offices/civil-aviation-communications-centre-contact-form.
Original signed by
Approved by Félix Meunier,
Director General,
Civil Aviation
Reported Incidents of GPS/GNSS Interference
(PDF, 225 KB)
The Transport Canada Civil Aviation Safety Alert (CASA) is used to convey important safety information and contains recommended action items. The CASA strives to assist the aviation industry's efforts to provide a service with the highest possible degree of safety. The information contained herein is often critical and must be conveyed to the appropriate office in a timely manner. The CASA may be changed or amended should new information become available.