Notices and Orders

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people travelling to and from the beach, and a lack of a crossing warning system the public is at risk of being struck by a train.

Order to the City of White Rock :

• The City shall close this public crossing on the city side (north of the track). This will be done at a location of 13 feet from the first rail (northern rail). The barrier presented will be one that is 6 feet (1.8 meters) in height; not allow the ability to crawl through, and adjoin existent fencing. It must be removable in whole or in part to facilitate access for safety and emergency services at any time.

OR

• Install a swing gate or similar mechanism that can be opened at the discretion of the City. However, the opening will only occur as long as it is required to move a vehicle over and clear of the Railway and shall not be parked any closer than 13 feet from the closest rail. The gate may not swing open in whole or in part to obstruct the railway track. Safety and emergency services must be able to access this location at any time.

OR

• The City of White Rock will post a flag person from dawn until dusk 365 days of the year to ensure vehicles, motorcycles and pedestrians are not stopping or parking within 13 feet of any rail.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side.

Order to BNSF:

• The BNSF shall mount their standard whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

• Any train movement within these mileposts will issue repetitive succession of short horn blasts at and between the mile posts 121.00 to mile post 123.00. Where a locomotive only has "automatic horn sequencing" the train horn will be depressed immediately after each sequence and repetitively at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions.

AND

• Where a locomotive has only "automatic horn sequencing" the train horn will be depressed immediately after each sequence, repetatively between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions. Audible train horns cited above will be presented by all train movements [including all other track users in either direction] from dawn until dusk 365 days of the year, between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions.

AND

• Where this Order conflicts with an existing time table or special instructions or GBO's or TBGO respecting train horns, at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 on this Subdivision, this Order takes precedence. Normal whistling protocol as per the current timetable and bulletins remains in effect outside the hours (Dawn to Dusk) of this Order.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Numerous locations where trains are exceeding the maximum allowable speed limits in areas where there are fewer than the minimum allowable number of non-defective cross-ties per 39 feet.

Order to CN:

• Canadian National Railway shall ensure that the Fort Frances Subdivision between mile 90.1 and mile 142.8 not be used unless:
  1. Trains are operated at a speed not greater than the maximum allowable operating speed for Class 2 track
  2. The track is inspected within 15 calendar days, and subsequently with no more than 30 calendar days between inspections, by a Professional Engineer taking responsibility in accordance with Section 11 of the RSA.
  3. Transport Canada is provided with copies of these track inspection reports, including all mitigating actions taken, resulting from these inspections within 14 calendar days from completion of each inspection.

Condition or Hazard observed:

A combination of numerous public complaints and verified crossing malfunctions has led to the questioning of the reliability of the crossing warning systems and to a loss of road user confidence. The reliability of the crossing warning systems has not demonstrated to operate in a consistently safe manner.

VIA Rail shall not:

Allow any passenger or freight trains to operate over the following grade crossings on the Smiths Falls Subdivision:

• Woodroffe Road and Mile 3.28;
• OC Transpo Transit Way and Mile 3.30;

Unless the following conditions are met:

• A flag person must be at each crossing location prior to a train's arrival.
• A train must not occupy the crossing until 2 flag persons, one on each side of the train, are in place to manually protect it from vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
• The flag persons must remain in place until the train has completely cleared the crossing.

Condition or Hazard observed:

A combination of numerous public complaints and verified crossing malfunctions has led to the questioning of the reliability of the crossing warning systems and to a loss of road user confidence. The reliability of the crossing warning systems has not demonstrated to operate in a consistently safe manner.

VIA Rail shall not:

Allow any passenger or freight trains to operate over the following grade crossings on the Smiths Falls Subdivision:

• Woodroffe Road and Mile 3.28;
• OC Transpo Transit Way and Mile 3.30;
• Fallowfield Road and Mile 3.88;
• Greenbank Road and Mile 5.10;
• Jockville Road and Mile 5.73; and
• Strandherd Drive and Mile 6.81.

Unless the following conditions are met:

• A flag person must be at each crossing location prior to a train's arrival.
• A train must not occupy the crossing until 2 flag persons, one on each side of the train, are in place to manually protect it from vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
• The flag persons must remain in place until the train has completely cleared the crossing.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Several of the timber curbs, several timber posts, and some timber horizontal handrails are severely rotted, affecting the integrity of the guardrail to withstand lateral impact forces and thereby its ability to keep both pedestrians and vehicles safe from falling onto the track below. This poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.

MMAC and Municipality of Eastman shall not allow any vehicular traffic to access the Chemin d'Orford-sur-le-Lac overhead bridge located in the Municipality of Eastman and crossing the MMAC Sherbrooke Subdivision at Mile 94.5 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• Maintain the stop signs on both approaches of the bridge until such time as the guardrails on the bridge itself have been repaired and that repairs have been approved by the appropriate road authority. and
• That all roadway signage associated with this structure be approved by the appropriate road authority.

Condition or Hazard observed:

• Several of the timber curbs, several timber posts, and some timber horizontal handrails are severely rotted, affecting the integrity of the guardrail to withstand lateral impact forces and thereby its ability to keep both pedestrians and vehicles safe from falling onto the track below. This poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.
• The timber guardrails on the bridge approaches on the south side (me Principale end) have been damaged and appear to be substandard, thereby putting in question their ability to function as intended should there be an impact from a vehicle. This poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.
• Winter conditions increase the risk of vehicular impact to the timber guard rail and this poses a threat to the safety and well being of the public and to safe railway operations.

MMAC and Municipality of Eastman shall not allow any vehicular traffic to access the Chemin d'Orford-sur-le-Lac overhead bridge located in the Municipality of Eastman and crossing the MMAC Sherbrooke Subdivision at Mile 95.4 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• Until such time as the guardrails on the approaches to the bridge and on the bridge itself have been repaired and that repairs hare been approved by the appropriate road authority and
• That all roadway signage associated with this structure have been approved by the appropriate road authority.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of our inspection of the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

• Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
• Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
• Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects in joints with extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between Lennoxville (M. 65.5) and Brookport (M.125.6) otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. That the following curves encompassing mile posts 65.95, 66.05, 68.32, 75.73, 77.86, 86.16, 88.65, 88.93, 89.95, 91.58, 93.0, 93.4, 95.05, 96.4, 97.4, 98.49, 99.22, 100.92, 102.27, 102.52, 103.61, 103.97, and 113.4 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as they are replaced. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first of each month.
2. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as the excessively worn rails referred to in item 1 above are replaced.
3. That train speeds are reduced to 10 mph at locations of visually observed rail defects at mile 93.48, 100.27, 102.58 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 100.92 (gauge side lip cracking out), or that MM&A comply with the conditions outlined in item 1 at these locations: or the rails at these locations are replaced.
4. RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 1 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
5. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of the inspection on October 10th 2013 and supplemented with RFD testing completed between October 17th and 23rd 2013 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

• Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
• Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 248-T.
• Rust on rail surfaces that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
• Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
• Rail worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.
• Numerous Rail Flaw Detected (RFD) rail defects which, if not replaced, will require visual or ultrasonic re-inspection after 30 days from initial detection. With 94% of those rail defects within rail joints having extensive rail end batter, marginal track tie and surface support combined with additional thermal stresses exerted with the colder temperatures, it can be reasonably be expected that the progression of these defects will continue to the point of failure if not adequately protected and monitored.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between mileages 1.0 and 66.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
2. That the first 2 trains (1 engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track, after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions. Further to this condition, MM&A is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
3. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in defect report 264-T and previously submitted defect report 248-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
4. That the curves encompassing mile posts 10.49, 19.05, 22.17, 22.38, 22.83, 27 .58, 34.60 and 35.35 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
5. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 4 above are replaced.
6. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 4 above are replaced. In addition, that all current RFD detected rail joint defects be removed and that the speed of all trains not exceed 10 mph until these defects are removed or re-inspected as per the Track Safety Rules (within 30 days of each inspection).
7. That visually observed rail defects referred to in report 264-T at mile 56.14 (2 defects) and mile 59.55 (2 defects) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
8. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and its rules and regulations be complied with.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of Transport Canada's inspection of the Moosehead Subdivision;

• Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
• Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 245-T.
• Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
• Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
• Rails worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Moosehead Subdivision between mileages 101.8 and 117.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interferewith the safe passage of trains.
2. That the first 2 trains (engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions.
3. After item 2 has been satisfied, MM&A is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
4. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in previously submitted defect report 245-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
5. That the curves encompassing mile posts 104.14, 106.11, 107.44, 110.27, 116.12 and 116.97 on the Moosehead Subdivision having rails that are excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected 3 times per week in addition to a walking inspection twice monthly. The results of these inspections are to be forwarded to Transport Canada on the first day of each month.
6. That the speed of all trains be reduced to 10 mph until such time as excessively worn rails referred to in item 5 above are replaced.
7. That RFD testing be increased to twice annually until such time as rails exceeding or approaching wear limits identified in item 5 above have been replaced.
8. That visually observed rail defects at mile 106.5 (field side VSH I shear break) and mile 110.6 (broken base I field weld on tie plate) have the speed reduced to 10 mph for all trains until such time as they are replaced.
9. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were observed during the course of Transport Canada's inspection of the Sherbrooke Subdivision;

• Public and private crossings with flangeways obstructed with mud and gravel.
• Sightlines of several private and farm crossings obstructed as previously noted in defect report 248-T.
• Rust on rail surface that may compromise the integrity of the circuits of grade crossing warning systems.
• Visually observed rail defects, field side VSH's (vertical split head) on heavily corrugated rail surfaces.
• Rail worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company (MM&A) shall not operate or allow any train or engine on the Sherbrooke Subdivision between mileages 1.0 and 66.0 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

1. That all flangeways of public and private crossings be inspected and cleared of any obstructions that may interfere with the safe passage of trains.
2. That the first 2 trains (1 engine with a minimum of 3 cars) to travel over the above noted track, after the issuance of this order, operate under the restriction of a "stop and protect" order at all crossings protected with grade crossing warning systems due to "rusty rail" conditions. Further to this condition, MM&A is to ensure that each crossing warning system is operating as intended.
3. That sightlines be cleared at private and farm crossings obstructed by vegetation as noted in defect report 264-T and previously submitted defect report 248-T or protected with a "stop and protect" order.
4. That rail flaw (RFD) testing for internal rail defects be carried out prior to any train operating, including ultrasonic hand testing of locations that are not detectable by RFD testing equipment due to rail surface conditions such as corrugation, shelling, etc.
5. That the following curves with rails excessively worn beyond acceptable rail wear limits be visually inspected after the passage of each train: curves encompassing mile posts 10.49, 19.05, 22.17, 22.38, 22.83, 27.58, 34.60 and 35.35 on the Sherbrooke Subdivision.
6. That visually observed rail defects referred to in report 264-T at mile 56.14 (2 defects) and mile 59.55 (2 defects) be replaced.
7. That all applicable requirements under the Railway Safety Act, and it's rules and regulations be complied with.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The following conditions were detected during an inspection on the Stanbridge Subdivision:

• Verified locations, as indicated on Track Inspection Report 246-T, where cross level and surface conditions, in excess of 7 inches in combination with numerous defective or non-existent track ties, allow track to move excessively under load.
• Cross level of 6 1/8 inches on tangent track combined with clusters of 9 and 12 consecutive defective ties within a 30 foot proximity of a propane storage facility at mile 11.44 in the town of Bedford.
• Vegetation and other existent conditions in the ballast section that interfere with the track inspector's ability to adequately perform track inspection duties.
• There is a threat that these observed conditions on the Stanbridge Subdivision, which may have contributed to recent derailments on this line, can reasonably be expected to cause additional derailments.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway Company shall not operate any train or engine on the Stanbridge Subdivision between mileages 0.0 and 12.4 otherwise than under the following terms and conditons:

1. No train shall be operated on that portion of the Stanbridge Subdivision until such time as MM&A ensures that a professional Engineer, qualified in the Track Safety Rules personally inspects the Stanbridge Subdivision and reports to this office:
   1. That the inspection has been completed;
   2. The directions under which the train can be safely operated.
2. All rail movements subsequent to item #1 will be in accordance with the directions provided in the report referred to in item #1.
3. Within 14 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, MM&A will ensure that the professional Engineer who has inspected the track provides Transport Canada with a report that lists all conditions observed that could compromise safe railway operations and the remedial action taken to appropriately address each of those conditions.
4. Within 30 days of the inspection referred to in item #1, MM&A will provide Transport Canada with MM&A's action plan to correct the supervision and support of track maintenance activities, in accordance with sound engineering principals, to ensure safe railway operations.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The equipment left unattended on the MMA territory, without being properly secured could lead or be a contributing factor into an event where equipment could roll uncontrolled and possibly:

• Collide with passenger trains
• Collide with freight trains handling or not dangerous goods
• Collide with vehicles carrying or not dangerous goods at a private or public crossing at grade
• Hit pedestrians at a private or public crossing at grade
• Cause injury to employees or the public and / or damage to the environment or property.

Montreal, Maine & Atlantic Railway shall not:

• Allow MMA employees to leave unattended equipment in sidings or main tracks on MMA property without having been properly secured. This information must be confirmed to the Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) from the location of the equipment. This information must include the date, the time, the number of hand brakes applied, their location, the result of the hand brake efficiency test and the name of the employee. MMA shall maintain a record of this information. This record shall be made available to a Railway Safety Inspector upon request.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Due to a change in CP Rail's operation at North Bend, pedestrians have been observed climbing through the trains while they are stopped performing crew changes.

Canadian Pacific Railway Must Not;

• Perform crew changes while the train is occupying the Chaumox Road Crossing at mile 0.40 Cascade sub.

Condition or Hazard observed:

A condition exists on Frank Street in the City of Terrace, BC where vehicles up to 25 meters in length (including vehicles carrying dangerous goods) are authorized by the City to operate over the railway crossing with only 12 meters of safe storage capacity between the CN live rail and the traveled portion of provincial Highway 16.

CN restrict access to the crossing surface by any appropriate significant physical protective means, such that the crossing surface shall not be accessed by road vehicles from Frank Street or Highway 16.

• CN will review the integrity of any physical protection on a weekly basis and communicate any tampering, compromise, or removal of the protection to 604-666-9922 and to the CN Police and the Terrace, BC R.C.M. Police.

Condition or hazard observed:

CPR Operating Bulletin CPSB015-13 contains an instruction that permits operation of trains on the mountain subdivision eastward without operative dynamic brake. The requirement of dynamic brake was the result of a number of employee fatalities and a number of minor to severe injuries in British Columbia resulting from uncontrolled movements.

Canadian Pacific Railway Must Not:

• Permit the operation of trains on the Mountain Subdivision with a Dynamic Brake factor of 'nil' or any similar designation and must ensure that all trains are equipped with operative dynamic brake.

Condition or hazard observed:

A newly added 3-way stop is causing traffic queuing over the railway crossing significantly increasing rail safety concerns. There are no sight lines for traffic approaching this railway crossing travelling in a North Westerly direction. Opportunities for train / vehicle impact are now significant at this location. There is no pedestrian or cyclist provisions at either side of this railway crossing, on the roadway.

The Resort Municipality of Whistler, BC shall stop using the road crossing and shall not allow any road vehicles, pedestrians or cyclists to use the railway crossing, seven (7) days a week from 7:00 am until 6:30 pm except under the following conditions:

• Provide a qualified flag person at the South vehicle stop bar at the railway crossing, the flagging person to be facing in a southerly direction.
• Flagging in effect from 7:00 am until 6:30 PM seven(7) days per week (except for statutory holidays).
• Provide instruction to the flagging person; such that upon the sound of the railway warning bell and flashing lights, the flagging person shall restrict vehicle traffic, cyclists and pedestrians from advancing from the South over the stop bar at the railway crossing and will do so until the railway operation has cleared the railway crossing.

Condition or hazard observed:

• Track structure defects and combinations of defects including wide gauge, defective ties, defective rails, cracked and broken joint bars and track geometry conditions non-compliant to Class 1 requirements
• Failure of Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) track inspectors to properly identify, evaluate and initiate appropriate remedial action for Track Safety Rule deviations
• Failure of Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) to train, qualify and certify Track Supervisors and Track Inspectors as required by the Track Safety Rules

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line segments of track between mile 14.4 and mile 22, between mile 25 and mile 30.1, between mile 49 and mile 53.4, and between mile 62.0 and mile 71.0 on the Armstrong Subdivision, and the line segment of track between mile 87.6 and mile 116.0 on the Kelowna subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• A Professional Engineer licensed in British Columbia and familiar with Railway operations and the requirements of the Track Safety Rules conducts a track inspection of the above noted track segments by such a method as to ensure the track is compliant with the Track Safety Rules no later than November 16, 2012.
• A detailed report of the findings of that inspection, including remedial actions taken to correct defects and written confirmation that the track is compliant to the Track Safety Rules and safe for movements at the authorized speed, be provided to Transport Canada on or before November 30, 2012.
• Subsequent inspections by a Professional Engineer, including detailed reports provided to Transport Canada, be conducted at a frequency not exceeding 30 days from the date of the last inspection until such time as Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) has qualified and certified Track Supervisors and Track Inspectors as per the requirements of the Track Safety Rules and provided those qualification records to Transport Canada.

Condition or hazard observed:

• Substandard crosstie conditions that do not effectively maintain gauge
• Clusters of weak and defective crossties carrying through rail joints

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

• Use the line of track between mile 70.5 and mile 71.0 Armstrong Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

Condition or hazard observed:

1. CP south bound consist headed by engine 3009 had a near miss (2 meters) with an east bound light/grey/brown pick up truck at 11:44 on Tuesday, April 03, 2012. Due to actions of the road vehicle.
2. Nearly all road vehicles ignore both the west and east facing stop signs mounted with the railway "crossbucks" on either side of the railway crossings.
3. Driver frustration during railway switching times and through trains is very apparent and has escalated safety concerns to an immediate threat level at this location; unsafe vehicle actions requires positive traffic control. Drivers are parking on one railway track when the other switches. Road Traffic stopped at the provincial railway crossing east bound backs up over the CPR crossing such that the road traffic is unaware or unconcerned about CPR train traffic.
4. West bound road traffic on Vye Road (from south bound traffic on Highway 11) backs up from the CPR crossing and the provincially regulated railway crossing all the way to Highway 11, there are no storage occupancy lanes on the provincial Hwy 11.
5. Note 25 meter (82 feet) B trains are operating on Vye Road on a regular basis (many carrying dangerous goods) these barely fit between the two (2) railway crossings, past the stop signs, often stopped in the danger zone of a live rail.
6. There are no stop lines or stop lines that are so faded as not to delineate a stop location for the travelling road public at these railway crossings.
7. The CPR usually operates through trains twice a day, weekdays and on a switching day may be 6 times more a day for a total of 8 crossings, on a switching day. The most current [AADT] Averaged Annual Daily Traffic count on Vye road provided by the Road Authority (City of Abbotsford) is 8500 vehicles.
8. On non switching days the CPR has a cross product of 17,000, for days that include switching rail cars at this location the cross product is 68,000. Cross product is a factor using number of train crossings at a given location multiplied by the amount of road vehicle crossings per day. Transport Canada – Surface considers a cross product of 1200 as a threshold for the consideration of Flashing Lights, Bells and Gates. Railway activated crossing gates provide positive road traffic control.
9. The second rail crossing offers additional risk factors (second train scenario for road vehicles) due to its close proximity of rail crossings. The potential for a catastrophic accident is high. ICBC traffic accident data and a CPR train vehicle accident (2009) shows collateral damage occurring at this location. During inclement weather and nightfall these concerns are further exacerbated.

City of Abbotsford shall not:

• allow any road vehicle traffic of any kind, including pedestrians, cyclists and persons using handicapped devices to cross onto railway right-of-way, past the posted road stop signs at the railway crossing on Vye Road, Abbottsford BC; during Monday through Friday ( except statutory holidays) from 08:00 to 1600 hours daily; or

City of Abbotsford shall:

1. provide road qualified flagging persons to locate at either stop sign east facing and west facing on Vye Road at the railway crossing concerned. This deployment shall occur Monday through Friday, every week between 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours inclusive, excluding statutory holidays; and
2. flagging persons will stop the road traffic at the location identified with a handheld stop sign and remain stopping traffic when any rail equipment including trains, or switched cars are either occupying and or approaching the railway crossing. Approaching is defined as any rail equipment within 500 meters, if observed coming towards the railway crossing. Flagging persons will stop any road traffic crossing past the posted stop signs until the rail crossing is clear of any rail equipment and or any approaching rail equipment. When the above conditions of both (a) and (b) have been met and there are no trains or equipment; traffic flagging personnel may release the vehicle traffic flow.

Condition or hazard observed:

1. CP south bound consist headed by engine 3009 had a near miss (2 meters) with an east bound light/grey/brown pick up truck at 11:44 on Tuesday, April 03, 2012. Due to actions of the road vehicle.
2. Nearly all road vehicles ignore both the west and east facing stop signs mounted with the railway "crossbucks" on either side of the railway crossings.
3. Driver frustration during railway switching times and through trains is very apparent and has escalated safety concerns to an immediate threat level at this location; unsafe vehicle actions requires positive traffic control. Drivers are parking on one railway track when the other switches. Road Traffic stopped at the provincial railway crossing east bound backs up over the CPR crossing such that the road traffic is unaware or unconcerned about CPR train traffic.
4. West bound road traffic on Vye Road (from south bound traffic on Highway 11) backs up from the CPR crossing and the provincially regulated railway crossing all the way to Highway 11, there are no storage occupancy lanes on the provincial Hwy 11.
5. Note 25 meter (82 feet) B trains are operating on Vye Road on a regular basis (many carrying dangerous goods) these barely fit between the two (2) railway crossings, past the stop signs, often stopped in the danger zone of a live rail.
6. There are no stop lines or stop lines that are so faded as not to delineate a stop location for the travelling road public at these railway crossings.
7. The CPR usually operates through trains twice a day, weekdays and on a switching day may be 6 times more a day for a total of 8 crossings, on a switching day. With the most current [AADT] Averaged Annual Daily Traffic count on Vye road provided by the Road Authority (City of Abbotsford) is 8500 vehicles.
8. On non switching days the CPR has a cross product of 17,000, for days that include switching rail cars at this location the cross product is 68,000. Cross product is a factor using number of train crossings at a given location multiplied by the amount of road vehicle crossings per day. Transport Canada – Surface considers a cross product of 1200 as a threshold for the consideration of Flashing Lights, Bells and Gates. Railway activated crossing gates provide positive road traffic control.
9. The second rail crossing offers additional risk factors (second train scenario for road vehicles) due to its close proximity of rail crossings. The potential for a catastrophic accident is high. ICBC traffic accident data and a CPR train vehicle accident (2009) shows collateral damage occurring at this location. During inclement weather and nightfall these concerns are further exacerbated.

City of Abbotsford shall not:

• allow any road vehicle traffic of any kind, including pedestrians, cyclists and persons using handicapped devices to cross onto railway right-of-way, past the posted road stop signs at the railway crossing on Vye Road, Abbottsford BC; during Monday through Friday ( except statutory holidays) from 08:00 to 1600 hours daily; or

City of Abbotsford shall:

1. provide road qualified flagging persons to locate at either stop sign east facing and west facing on Vye Road at the railway crossing concerned. This deployment shall occur Monday through Friday, every week between 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours inclusive, excluding statutory holidays; and
2. flagging persons will stop the road traffic at the location identified with a handheld stop sign and remain stopping traffic when any rail equipment including trains, or switched cars are either occupying and or approaching the railway crossing. Approaching is defined as any rail equipment within 500 meters, if observed coming towards the railway crossing. Flagging persons will stop any road traffic crossing past the posted stop signs until the rail crossing is clear of any rail equipment and or any approaching rail equipment. When the above conditions of both (a) and (b) have been met and there are no trains or equipment; traffic flagging personnel may release the vehicle traffic flow.

Condition or hazard observed:

1. The pre-emption to the traffic lights at Production Way and Fraser Hwy is not connected, a CN through train east bound @ 1344 hours passed over the crossing without the benefit of any pre-emption cycle, the traffic lights were cycling normally, causing confusion to the motorists. Two (2) vehicles had to jam on the brakes and two (2) vehicles barely made it through without getting hit with the railway crossing arm. The intersection was blocked with vehicles that were not cleared out and there was imminent danger to a senior person at the pedestrian crosswalk closest to the railway crossing.
2. Gate drop delay at this railway crossing is only 8 seconds, this is inappropriate for road vehicles that are 25 meters in length (many truck and trailer units at this location.) There has been significant gate strikes at this location. The current design vehicle needs to be identified by the Road Authority and gate delay time submitted to the rail authority.
3. ICBC Data identifies a large number of vehicle on vehicle accidents at or near this railway crossing location. History shows in the past a high CPR trouble ticket count. Complaints from trucking companies (hitting gates and getting traffic tickets) caused an inordinate inspection at this location. The TSB data base shows a number of train vehicle accidents at this location in the past 10 years although no fatalities.
4. Advanced pre-emption should always use a timer to delay crossing activation [weekly checks] to ensure a constant pre-emption time to mirror a train called pre-emption; this minimizes danger to the road public.
5. Pre-emption should always be activated by the test switch or other means (DTMF) and crossing activation delayed as per the pre-emption timing sequence.
6. Pre-emption should be deactivated when the test switch is raised (to pick up gates) to allow traffic to move normally when the Railway crossing is in trouble (providing proper protection).
7. Pre-emption checks are required on an annual basis by the road authority and the rail authority jointly; this ensures that nothing has changed on this critical interface that provides optimum safety for both the railway and the road public at traffic pre-empted railway crossings locations.

Canadian Pacific Railway shall not:

• allow any train movement from either direction at this railway crossing to exceed the maximum speed of 10 M.P.H. until the railway crossing is fully occupied at which time normal track speed may be resumed; and

Canadian Pacific Railway shall:

1. ensure that weekly crossing checks are done only after ascertaining there are no pedestrians in possible danger attempting to use a pedestrian crosswalk and traffic signal system that is not synchronized with the traffic lights at the Fraser Highway and Production Way; and
2. ensure that a crossing check under the current configuration is only commenced when there are no immediate 25 meter vehicles approaching the railway crossing that may be impacted by only an 8 second gate drop delay; and
3. only commence a railway crossing check when the RED traffic light ball first illuminates to stop road traffic on the Fraser Hwy, at the intersection of Fraser Hwy and Production way.

Condition or hazard observed:

The continued failure to adequately control movements within Symington yard has resulted in an unacceptable rate of collisions over the past year.

CN shall not operate any yard movement within Symington yard unless such movements are operated under the following conditions:

• Restricted to a maximum speed of 10 mph;
• Operate at a speed that will allow stopping within one-third the range of vision of equipment.

Condition or hazard observed:

The stopping or queuing of vehicles on the Michell Road crossing in the City of Belleville, Ontario, at mile 216.24 Kingston Subdivision CN Rail.

City of Belleville shall:

• Ensure that the Mitchell Road crossing not be used until such time as mitigating measures are put in place to curtail the stopping or queuing of vehicles on the crossing.

Condition or hazard observed:

28 cracked or broken 85 lb. splice bars were observed in 2.25 miles of walking inspections of random portions of the Carberry Subdivision between the miles of 13.0 and 39.7.

Trains are operating on these portions of the Carberry Subdivision in excess of the allowable speed limits for the conditions of the track.

Canadian National Railway Company not operate any train or engine on the Carberry Subdivision between mileages 13.0 and 39.70 otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• Designate the identified segments of track as "Excepted Track", or
• Trains and engines shall not operate at speeds greater than 10 miles per hour on areas of track with less than 100 lb rail between the mileages stated until an inspection of all joint bars has been performed and defects repaired, and
• Prior to removing the 10 mile per hour speed restriction, CNR shall provide a report of any condition not meeting the TSR found during the above inspections and provide a plan which indicates car loading limits, maximum train speeds and the inspection regime which will be implemented to ensure continuing compliance.