Notices and Orders

Condition or Hazard observed:

Failing to identify and remediate unsafe track conditions and ensure that track is safe for all movements at the authorized speed could result in a derailment situation where a person could be injured, or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

CP was ordered to: under the responsibility of a professional engineer overseeing the line of track between Field and Revelstoke, BC, for the entire Mountain Subdivision:                                        

1. Inspect and assess the track structure including rails, ties, ballast and fastening systems as well as turnouts on all main tracks by conducting, but not limited to, visual inspections and using track testing technology.

2. Review and assess any findings of inspections conducted by certified Track Inspectors and inspection data from any track testing technology inspections used to inspect the track structure outlined in item 1.

3. Assess the management oversight, quality and adequacy of track inspections and maintenance activities being conducted, including factoring in the available track time allocated to conduct those activities.

4. Provide a preliminary report, by March 3, 2023, that includes inspection and assessment findings from the activities listed under items 1, 2 and 3, as well as short term actions taken or planned to be taken in addressing any deficiencies identified.

5. Provide a final report, on or before May 31, 2023, to allow for a detailed evaluation of the track structure when it is clear of snow, that includes at a minimum, a summary of the activities listed under items 1, 2, and 3, and all actions taken or planned to ensure the line of track remains safe for movements at the authorized speed.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Due to insufficient vehicular storage space and a narrow road approach, larger vehicles stopped at the crossing are at risk of being struck by railway equipment or by oncoming road traffic.

CP was ordered to:

Provide a stop and proceed on the crossing at Mile 95.92 of the CP Cascade Subdivision until such time that there is no longer evidence of vehicles queuing over the crossing.

Condition or Hazard observed:

• CP operations, specific to Extended Service Run (ESR), are creating conditions which are causing fatigue to accumulate in operating crews, thereby reducing their alertness, while in care and control of trains. The operational conditions contributing to this are:
  • Not including transit time, to and from the away-from-home rest facility, and the away-from-home terminal as time on duty;
  • Not allowing crews to book rest at the away-from-home terminal after being cancelled for duty;

Not listing ESR trains on the train lineup for a sufficient amount of time. This does not allow crew members sufficient planning time for a sleep cycle prior to being on duty.

The Canadian Pacific Railway was ordered to:

At home, and away-from-home terminal of Kamloops, Roberts Bank, and Port Coquitlam (Greater Vancouver Area Terminals inclusive):

• Shall include all transit time to and from the rest facility at the away-from-home terminal as operating crews on-duty time;
• Shall allow ESR crews the ability to book up to eight hours undisturbed rest when cancelled;
• Shall have all ESR trains posted on the ESR specific train lineup or a general lineup if utilized, for a minimum of eight hours prior to call time, and up to a maximum call time of twelve hours.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The location of the Grade Crossing is an area where there is a high density of pedestrian traffic due to the presence of an arena, restaurants, bars and hotels. The high density of pedestrian traffic at that location results in an increased risk of pedestrians going through the Grade Crossing, despite deployed, and of pedestrians running in front of a train while trains are approaching or crawling under railway equipment blocking the Grade Crossing. As this Grade Crossing is located on a double track main line, the risk associated with pedestrians going through the Grade Crossing, despite deployed, is increased as pedestrians could be unaware of potential railway equipment approaching on the second track.

The current operating practice at this Grade Crossing, while changing crews, results in the Grade Crossing being blocked or in the warning system device being activated on a prolonged basis. The train stopping on and past the crossing island circuit contributes to hazards or conditions described above.

Order to Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) and the City of Kamloops:

• CPR must ensure that no Eastbound railway equipment stop on or past the Grade Crossing (3rd Avenue – CPR Mile 0.10) if such stoppage would result in the Grade Crossing being occupied, except for an emergency.
• CPR must ensure that crew changes will be at 2nd Avenue – CPR Mile 0.21 Thompson Subdivision. This location must be marked to prevent the railway crossing from being continuously activated.
• CPR must ensure that no Eastbound railway equipment is operated after stopping at Mile 0.21, until there is a DTMF crossing gate activation for 2nd Avenue and until the crew has waited for 20 seconds after the crossing gates are parallel to the ground for at least 5 seconds.
• CPR and the City of Kamloops must ensure that at least two flag persons (each) with stop signs, will be posted on each side of the track of the Grade Crossing at 3rd Avenue each time the crossing warning devices are activated for through trains.
• CPR and the City of Kamloops must ensure that the flag persons will prevent any pedestrian from walking through the Grade Crossing while crossing warning devices are activated.
• For greater clarity, this Order applies to any railway operator on the CP Thompson Subdivision.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Track conditions including fouled ballast (mud) in combination with significant track profile and gauge deviations exist on a bridge approach at mile 31.8 Mountain subdivision which have not been remediated by CP. Failure to initiate remedial actions for non-compliant track conditions could result in a derailment in which a person could be injured or made to be ill or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

Order that Canadian Pacific Railway Company:

Not operate train, transfer or engine movements on the Mountain subdivision unless under the following terms and conditions:

• Movements must not exceed 10 MPH at mile 31.8 Mountain subdivision.

Condition or Hazard observed:

CN is not including deadhead and/or transit time to and from the rest facility at the away from home terminal which is causing cumulative fatigue in operating crews due to increased time on-duty and reduced rest availability. As a result, operating crews have exceeded and are at risk of exceeding their maximum continuous time on-duty. As well, requiring crews to use this transit time towards resetting their clock under the Work/Rest Rules for Rail Operating Employees creates incorrect calculation for mandatory time off-duty (MTOD) reset times and reduces rest availability. These conditions are creating excessive fatigue to accumulate in operating crews, reducing necessary alertness while in care and control of trains.

Order Canadian National Railway:

• CN shall include all deadheading and transit time to and from the rest facility at the away-from-home terminal into operating crews' on-duty time.

Condition or Hazard observed:

The use of point protection zones at CP Rail Coquitlam yard places railway operations, employees, and the public in unnecessary danger due to the configuration of the point protection zones and accessibility to the main track. As well, a lack of clear instructions addressing multiple operating crews and protection of engineering employees, while performing track maintenance, contributes to the risks associated with these operations.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

• CPR shall not use Point Protection Zones within the Port Coquitlam yard until or unless this inspector is satisfied with the operating instructions pertaining to Point Protection Zones.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Undue delays in flag placement (fixed signals) are attributed to incremental changes being made in existing and unflagged slow order limits and/or with minor speed restriction adjustments, circumventing flag placement requirements through over-reliance upon Rule 43, para 3, and Rule 44(g) Exceeding the limits of a temporary slow order has the serious potential to cause track damage, derailment of a train, injury or death.

Small changes coinciding with Rule 43 issuances, and small changes to say it is a new Rule 43—and the 24 hours is restarted for flag placement purposes—is contrary to the intent of Canadian Rail Operating Rules Rule 43 and 44(g); the activity of changing small parameters of a Rule 43, and calling it a new Rule 43 is unacceptable and has caused, and may cause, an immediate threat.

Order Canadian Pacific Railway:

[Order is restricted to the CPR for the Province of British Columbia]

• When issuing Rule 43 (temporary slow orders) CPR shall ensure that: any new Rule 43, as per rule 44(g) placing fixed signal flags within 24 hours for (temporary slow orders); and, where the limits or the speeds are changed, or any other parameter for an existing Rule 43 are changed, the placing of the fixed signal flags from the time starting for the original Rule 43 will be required to be deployed reflecting the new limits, such that within 24 hours of any Rule 43, fixed signal flags will be deployed to show the correct limits. regardless of any changes to that Rule 43; and
• Shall consolidate any existing or future initially unflagged Rule 43 slow orders that are applicable within one mile or less of another Rule 43 (temporary slow order) and
• Shall give absolute priority to issuing main track occupancy to employees for the purpose of enabling placement of fixed signal flags upon issuance of any Rule 43 (temporary slow order) to comply with this Order, ensuring the 24 hour timeline of this Order is not violated. and
• Shall ensure that bulletins reflective of this Order are posted in all places where employees whose duties are affected can see them.

Condition or Hazard observed:

KFIR employees are failing to properly secure equipment left unattended. Numerous switches and derails are being left unsecured without an adequate locking device. In addition, derails in place intended to protect KFIR track from uncontrolled movement of equipment may not be adequate.

Order to Kettle Falls International Railway:

Shall not operate train, transfer or engine movements on the San Poil or Kettle Falls subdivisions in Canada unless under the following terms and conditions:

• On or before November 5, 2014, KFIR provide TC's Pacific Region office copies of the railway's Operating Instructions issued to employees regarding the Emergency Directive on Securement of Railway Equipment issued October 29, 2014.
• From the date this Notice & Order is received, a KFIR company officer conduct a personal contact job briefing with all operating employees prior to their next tour of duty in Canada. Such briefing must include a review of Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) Rule 112 Leaving Equipment Unattended and the Emergency Directive on Securement of Railway Equipment issued October 29, 2014. Records of such briefings must be provided to TC's Pacific Region office at intervals not exceeding 14 days.
• KFIR company officers perform proficiency testing of operating employees in Canada to include proper securement of railway equipment. Records of all proficiency tests must be provided to a TC Railway Safety Inspector upon request.
• Within ninety (90) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR provide refresher training in all CROR Rules applicable to KFIR's Canadian operations to all operating employees required to work in Canada. Records of such training including employee name and date of training must be provided to TC's Pacific Region office on or before February 15, 2015.
• Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR conducts a comprehensive assessment of all existing derails on KFIR and customer tracks in Canada. Such assessment must at minimum, assess the type, installation and maintenance of the derail to ensure they are adequate to prevent uncontrolled movement of equipment. Additionally, as part of this assessment, KFlR evaluate the potential need for the installation of additional derails on KFIR tracks to protect against uncontrolled movement of equipment. This assessment must be reviewed by a Professional Engineer and a report of the findings, including remedial actions taken or planned to address any deficiencies provided to TC's Pacific Region office on or before December 15, 2014.
• Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Notice & Order, KFIR hold customer orientation sessions with all KFIR customer facility operators in Canada to provide information on safe work practices and procedures related to railway operations and equipment including securement of railway equipment. Records of these sessions must be provided to Transport Canada on or before December 15, 2014.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side. Without crossing warning systems and 1.8 meter barrier protection and pedestrian crossings that are flat; these conditions could reasonably be expected to develop into a situation in which a person could be injured or made to be ill or damage could be caused to the environment or property.

Order to Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

• The BNSF mount their standard Whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

• Between the hours of 0600 and 2000, all movements will sound a repetitive succession of short engine whistles (rule 14(f)) between MP 121.0 and MP 123.0 regardless of whether or not there are people or animals on or near the track. Rule 14(l) does not apply on public crossings at grade between MP 121.0 and MP 123.0 between the hours of 0600 and 2000.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection /fencing and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side.

Order to Burlington Northern and Santé Fe Railway (BNSF)

• The BNSF mount their standard Whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

• Any train movement will issue repetitive succession of short horn blasts CROR (14f) regardless of persons or animals on the track.

AND

• Audible train horns will be presented by all train movements [including all other track users in either direction] from 07:00 to 22:00 hours every day of the year.

AND

• Where this Order conflicts with an existing time table or special instructions or GBO's or TBGO respecting train horns, at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 on this Subdivision, this Order will take precedence.

AND

• Normal BNSF whistling protocol as per their current timetable and bulletins remains in effect outside the hours (0700 -2200) of this Order.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people wanting to get to the beach or back from the beach; insufficient barrier protection and no crossing warning systems, presents an immediate threat to rail safety at these railway crossings and along the White Rock promenade and before and after the White Rock Promenade. Also the existing pedestrian crossings [except for the pier] have about a 15% walking grade to the top of the railway tracks and down the other side.

Order to BNSF:

• The BNSF shall mount their standard whistling signage at the BNSF Mile post 121.00 and Mile 123.00 such that train whistling will occur in both directions at and between both mile posts. And those whistling posts will be visited by track forces at least once per week to ensure placement.

AND

• Any train movement within these mileposts will issue repetitive succession of short horn blasts at and between the mile posts 121.00 to mile post 123.00. Where a locomotive only has "automatic horn sequencing" the train horn will be depressed immediately after each sequence and repetitively at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions.

AND

• Where a locomotive has only "automatic horn sequencing" the train horn will be depressed immediately after each sequence, repetatively between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions. Audible train horns cited above will be presented by all train movements [including all other track users in either direction] from dawn until dusk 365 days of the year, between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 in both directions.

AND

• Where this Order conflicts with an existing time table or special instructions or GBO's or TBGO respecting train horns, at and between Mile 121.00 and Mile 123.00 on this Subdivision, this Order takes precedence. Normal whistling protocol as per the current timetable and bulletins remains in effect outside the hours (Dawn to Dusk) of this Order.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Given the existing number of trains, numerous promenade users, huge numbers of people travelling to and from the beach, and a lack of a crossing warning system the public is at risk of being struck by a train.

Order to the City of White Rock :

• The City shall close this public crossing on the city side (north of the track). This will be done at a location of 13 feet from the first rail (northern rail). The barrier presented will be one that is 6 feet (1.8 meters) in height; not allow the ability to crawl through, and adjoin existent fencing. It must be removable in whole or in part to facilitate access for safety and emergency services at any time.

OR

• Install a swing gate or similar mechanism that can be opened at the discretion of the City. However, the opening will only occur as long as it is required to move a vehicle over and clear of the Railway and shall not be parked any closer than 13 feet from the closest rail. The gate may not swing open in whole or in part to obstruct the railway track. Safety and emergency services must be able to access this location at any time.

OR

• The City of White Rock will post a flag person from dawn until dusk 365 days of the year to ensure vehicles, motorcycles and pedestrians are not stopping or parking within 13 feet of any rail.

Condition or Hazard observed:

Due to a change in CP Rail's operation at North Bend, pedestrians have been observed climbing through the trains while they are stopped performing crew changes.

Canadian Pacific Railway Must Not;

• Perform crew changes while the train is occupying the Chaumox Road Crossing at mile 0.40 Cascade sub.

Condition or Hazard observed:

A condition exists on Frank Street in the City of Terrace, BC where vehicles up to 25 meters in length (including vehicles carrying dangerous goods) are authorized by the City to operate over the railway crossing with only 12 meters of safe storage capacity between the CN live rail and the traveled portion of provincial Highway 16.

CN restrict access to the crossing surface by any appropriate significant physical protective means, such that the crossing surface shall not be accessed by road vehicles from Frank Street or Highway 16.

• CN will review the integrity of any physical protection on a weekly basis and communicate any tampering, compromise, or removal of the protection to 604-666-9922 and to the CN Police and the Terrace, BC R.C.M. Police.

Condition or hazard observed:

CPR Operating Bulletin CPSB015-13 contains an instruction that permits operation of trains on the mountain subdivision eastward without operative dynamic brake. The requirement of dynamic brake was the result of a number of employee fatalities and a number of minor to severe injuries in British Columbia resulting from uncontrolled movements.

Canadian Pacific Railway Must Not:

• Permit the operation of trains on the Mountain Subdivision with a Dynamic Brake factor of 'nil' or any similar designation and must ensure that all trains are equipped with operative dynamic brake.

Condition or hazard observed:

A newly added 3-way stop is causing traffic queuing over the railway crossing significantly increasing rail safety concerns. There are no sight lines for traffic approaching this railway crossing travelling in a North Westerly direction. Opportunities for train / vehicle impact are now significant at this location. There is no pedestrian or cyclist provisions at either side of this railway crossing, on the roadway.

The Resort Municipality of Whistler, BC shall stop using the road crossing and shall not allow any road vehicles, pedestrians or cyclists to use the railway crossing, seven (7) days a week from 7:00 am until 6:30 pm except under the following conditions:

• Provide a qualified flag person at the South vehicle stop bar at the railway crossing, the flagging person to be facing in a southerly direction.
• Flagging in effect from 7:00 am until 6:30 PM seven(7) days per week (except for statutory holidays).
• Provide instruction to the flagging person; such that upon the sound of the railway warning bell and flashing lights, the flagging person shall restrict vehicle traffic, cyclists and pedestrians from advancing from the South over the stop bar at the railway crossing and will do so until the railway operation has cleared the railway crossing.

Condition or hazard observed:

• Track structure defects and combinations of defects including wide gauge, defective ties, defective rails, cracked and broken joint bars and track geometry conditions non-compliant to Class 1 requirements
• Failure of Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) track inspectors to properly identify, evaluate and initiate appropriate remedial action for Track Safety Rule deviations
• Failure of Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) to train, qualify and certify Track Supervisors and Track Inspectors as required by the Track Safety Rules

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line segments of track between mile 14.4 and mile 22, between mile 25 and mile 30.1, between mile 49 and mile 53.4, and between mile 62.0 and mile 71.0 on the Armstrong Subdivision, and the line segment of track between mile 87.6 and mile 116.0 on the Kelowna subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• A Professional Engineer licensed in British Columbia and familiar with Railway operations and the requirements of the Track Safety Rules conducts a track inspection of the above noted track segments by such a method as to ensure the track is compliant with the Track Safety Rules no later than November 16, 2012.
• A detailed report of the findings of that inspection, including remedial actions taken to correct defects and written confirmation that the track is compliant to the Track Safety Rules and safe for movements at the authorized speed, be provided to Transport Canada on or before November 30, 2012.
• Subsequent inspections by a Professional Engineer, including detailed reports provided to Transport Canada, be conducted at a frequency not exceeding 30 days from the date of the last inspection until such time as Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) has qualified and certified Track Supervisors and Track Inspectors as per the requirements of the Track Safety Rules and provided those qualification records to Transport Canada.

Condition or hazard observed:

• Substandard crosstie conditions that do not effectively maintain gauge
• Clusters of weak and defective crossties carrying through rail joints

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

• Use the line of track between mile 70.5 and mile 71.0 Armstrong Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

Condition or hazard observed:

1. CP south bound consist headed by engine 3009 had a near miss (2 meters) with an east bound light/grey/brown pick up truck at 11:44 on Tuesday, April 03, 2012. Due to actions of the road vehicle.
2. Nearly all road vehicles ignore both the west and east facing stop signs mounted with the railway "crossbucks" on either side of the railway crossings.
3. Driver frustration during railway switching times and through trains is very apparent and has escalated safety concerns to an immediate threat level at this location; unsafe vehicle actions requires positive traffic control. Drivers are parking on one railway track when the other switches. Road Traffic stopped at the provincial railway crossing east bound backs up over the CPR crossing such that the road traffic is unaware or unconcerned about CPR train traffic.
4. West bound road traffic on Vye Road (from south bound traffic on Highway 11) backs up from the CPR crossing and the provincially regulated railway crossing all the way to Highway 11, there are no storage occupancy lanes on the provincial Hwy 11.
5. Note 25 meter (82 feet) B trains are operating on Vye Road on a regular basis (many carrying dangerous goods) these barely fit between the two (2) railway crossings, past the stop signs, often stopped in the danger zone of a live rail.
6. There are no stop lines or stop lines that are so faded as not to delineate a stop location for the travelling road public at these railway crossings.
7. The CPR usually operates through trains twice a day, weekdays and on a switching day may be 6 times more a day for a total of 8 crossings, on a switching day. The most current [AADT] Averaged Annual Daily Traffic count on Vye road provided by the Road Authority (City of Abbotsford) is 8500 vehicles.
8. On non switching days the CPR has a cross product of 17,000, for days that include switching rail cars at this location the cross product is 68,000. Cross product is a factor using number of train crossings at a given location multiplied by the amount of road vehicle crossings per day. Transport Canada – Surface considers a cross product of 1200 as a threshold for the consideration of Flashing Lights, Bells and Gates. Railway activated crossing gates provide positive road traffic control.
9. The second rail crossing offers additional risk factors (second train scenario for road vehicles) due to its close proximity of rail crossings. The potential for a catastrophic accident is high. ICBC traffic accident data and a CPR train vehicle accident (2009) shows collateral damage occurring at this location. During inclement weather and nightfall these concerns are further exacerbated.

City of Abbotsford shall not:

• allow any road vehicle traffic of any kind, including pedestrians, cyclists and persons using handicapped devices to cross onto railway right-of-way, past the posted road stop signs at the railway crossing on Vye Road, Abbottsford BC; during Monday through Friday ( except statutory holidays) from 08:00 to 1600 hours daily; or

City of Abbotsford shall:

1. provide road qualified flagging persons to locate at either stop sign east facing and west facing on Vye Road at the railway crossing concerned. This deployment shall occur Monday through Friday, every week between 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours inclusive, excluding statutory holidays; and
2. flagging persons will stop the road traffic at the location identified with a handheld stop sign and remain stopping traffic when any rail equipment including trains, or switched cars are either occupying and or approaching the railway crossing. Approaching is defined as any rail equipment within 500 meters, if observed coming towards the railway crossing. Flagging persons will stop any road traffic crossing past the posted stop signs until the rail crossing is clear of any rail equipment and or any approaching rail equipment. When the above conditions of both (a) and (b) have been met and there are no trains or equipment; traffic flagging personnel may release the vehicle traffic flow.

Condition or hazard observed:

1. CP south bound consist headed by engine 3009 had a near miss (2 meters) with an east bound light/grey/brown pick up truck at 11:44 on Tuesday, April 03, 2012. Due to actions of the road vehicle.
2. Nearly all road vehicles ignore both the west and east facing stop signs mounted with the railway "crossbucks" on either side of the railway crossings.
3. Driver frustration during railway switching times and through trains is very apparent and has escalated safety concerns to an immediate threat level at this location; unsafe vehicle actions requires positive traffic control. Drivers are parking on one railway track when the other switches. Road Traffic stopped at the provincial railway crossing east bound backs up over the CPR crossing such that the road traffic is unaware or unconcerned about CPR train traffic.
4. West bound road traffic on Vye Road (from south bound traffic on Highway 11) backs up from the CPR crossing and the provincially regulated railway crossing all the way to Highway 11, there are no storage occupancy lanes on the provincial Hwy 11.
5. Note 25 meter (82 feet) B trains are operating on Vye Road on a regular basis (many carrying dangerous goods) these barely fit between the two (2) railway crossings, past the stop signs, often stopped in the danger zone of a live rail.
6. There are no stop lines or stop lines that are so faded as not to delineate a stop location for the travelling road public at these railway crossings.
7. The CPR usually operates through trains twice a day, weekdays and on a switching day may be 6 times more a day for a total of 8 crossings, on a switching day. With the most current [AADT] Averaged Annual Daily Traffic count on Vye road provided by the Road Authority (City of Abbotsford) is 8500 vehicles.
8. On non switching days the CPR has a cross product of 17,000, for days that include switching rail cars at this location the cross product is 68,000. Cross product is a factor using number of train crossings at a given location multiplied by the amount of road vehicle crossings per day. Transport Canada – Surface considers a cross product of 1200 as a threshold for the consideration of Flashing Lights, Bells and Gates. Railway activated crossing gates provide positive road traffic control.
9. The second rail crossing offers additional risk factors (second train scenario for road vehicles) due to its close proximity of rail crossings. The potential for a catastrophic accident is high. ICBC traffic accident data and a CPR train vehicle accident (2009) shows collateral damage occurring at this location. During inclement weather and nightfall these concerns are further exacerbated.

City of Abbotsford shall not:

• allow any road vehicle traffic of any kind, including pedestrians, cyclists and persons using handicapped devices to cross onto railway right-of-way, past the posted road stop signs at the railway crossing on Vye Road, Abbottsford BC; during Monday through Friday ( except statutory holidays) from 08:00 to 1600 hours daily; or

City of Abbotsford shall:

1. provide road qualified flagging persons to locate at either stop sign east facing and west facing on Vye Road at the railway crossing concerned. This deployment shall occur Monday through Friday, every week between 08:00 hours to 16:00 hours inclusive, excluding statutory holidays; and
2. flagging persons will stop the road traffic at the location identified with a handheld stop sign and remain stopping traffic when any rail equipment including trains, or switched cars are either occupying and or approaching the railway crossing. Approaching is defined as any rail equipment within 500 meters, if observed coming towards the railway crossing. Flagging persons will stop any road traffic crossing past the posted stop signs until the rail crossing is clear of any rail equipment and or any approaching rail equipment. When the above conditions of both (a) and (b) have been met and there are no trains or equipment; traffic flagging personnel may release the vehicle traffic flow.

Condition or hazard observed:

1. The pre-emption to the traffic lights at Production Way and Fraser Hwy is not connected, a CN through train east bound @ 1344 hours passed over the crossing without the benefit of any pre-emption cycle, the traffic lights were cycling normally, causing confusion to the motorists. Two (2) vehicles had to jam on the brakes and two (2) vehicles barely made it through without getting hit with the railway crossing arm. The intersection was blocked with vehicles that were not cleared out and there was imminent danger to a senior person at the pedestrian crosswalk closest to the railway crossing.
2. Gate drop delay at this railway crossing is only 8 seconds, this is inappropriate for road vehicles that are 25 meters in length (many truck and trailer units at this location.) There has been significant gate strikes at this location. The current design vehicle needs to be identified by the Road Authority and gate delay time submitted to the rail authority.
3. ICBC Data identifies a large number of vehicle on vehicle accidents at or near this railway crossing location. History shows in the past a high CPR trouble ticket count. Complaints from trucking companies (hitting gates and getting traffic tickets) caused an inordinate inspection at this location. The TSB data base shows a number of train vehicle accidents at this location in the past 10 years although no fatalities.
4. Advanced pre-emption should always use a timer to delay crossing activation [weekly checks] to ensure a constant pre-emption time to mirror a train called pre-emption; this minimizes danger to the road public.
5. Pre-emption should always be activated by the test switch or other means (DTMF) and crossing activation delayed as per the pre-emption timing sequence.
6. Pre-emption should be deactivated when the test switch is raised (to pick up gates) to allow traffic to move normally when the Railway crossing is in trouble (providing proper protection).
7. Pre-emption checks are required on an annual basis by the road authority and the rail authority jointly; this ensures that nothing has changed on this critical interface that provides optimum safety for both the railway and the road public at traffic pre-empted railway crossings locations.

Canadian Pacific Railway shall not:

• allow any train movement from either direction at this railway crossing to exceed the maximum speed of 10 M.P.H. until the railway crossing is fully occupied at which time normal track speed may be resumed; and

Canadian Pacific Railway shall:

1. ensure that weekly crossing checks are done only after ascertaining there are no pedestrians in possible danger attempting to use a pedestrian crosswalk and traffic signal system that is not synchronized with the traffic lights at the Fraser Highway and Production Way; and
2. ensure that a crossing check under the current configuration is only commenced when there are no immediate 25 meter vehicles approaching the railway crossing that may be impacted by only an 8 second gate drop delay; and
3. only commence a railway crossing check when the RED traffic light ball first illuminates to stop road traffic on the Fraser Hwy, at the intersection of Fraser Hwy and Production way.

Condition or hazard observed:

Unidentified defective plug doors are not being reported to the CN Mechanical Department therefore they are not being repaired prior to returning them in service

CN must ensure that the customer reports all defective plug doors that require wedges, are open, are unsecured or inoperable.

CN Transportation personnel must identify and report any defective plug doors and not remove those cars from the customer site.

CN Transportation personnel must identify and report any defective plug doors and not move those cars from Squamish yard.

Condition or hazard observed:

Substandard track conditions on the Kelowna subdivision between mile 87.6 and mile 95.9

• Pockets of defective track ties carrying through rail joints
• Failure to initiate appropriate corrective actions for defects identified on inspection reports

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line of track between mile 87.6 and mile 95.9 Kelowna Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.

Condition or hazard observed:

Substandard track conditions on the Lumby subdivision between mile 2.0 and mile 13.4

• Pockets of defective track ties carrying through rail joints
• Excessive vegetation fouling track structure obstructing visual inspections
• Failure to initiate appropriate corrective actions for defects identified on inspection reports

Kelowna Pacific Railway (KPR) shall not:

Use the line of track between mile 2.0 and mile 5.0 and the line of track between mile 11.0 and mile 13.4 Lumby Subdivision for any train operations otherwise than under the following terms and conditions:

• Train or engine movements are made at a speed not exceeding 10 miles per hour.