TRAN Committee Q&A: Government of Canada’s Response to the Downing of PS752
Q1: Why does Canada consider Iran’s final accident report to be incomplete?
Iran’s final report raises more questions than it answers. It provides information on what happened, i.e., the aircraft was downed by a missile, but does not sufficiently explain why it happened. The report concludes that PS752 was mistakenly shot down because an air-defence unit mistook the Boeing 737 as a threat. This misidentification reportedly occurred because of a misalignment of the missile launcher radar.. These claims are made without providing sufficient supporting evidence.
In addition to failing to provide sufficient evidence, the report also excluded from its scope any examination of the military decision-making process that led to the shootdown, stating that this line of inquiry fell outside the scope of the investigation. The Government of Canada strongly disagrees with this assessment. While failing to provide information pertaining to senior military and civilian decision-making, the report nevertheless asserts that it did not contribute to the shoot-down of PS752, and places the blame squarely on an individual missile operator who did not receive permission to shoot from senior officers, as he should have.
Due to these shortcomings, the Government of Canada does not believe that the report, and its resulting safety recommendations, will reduce the risks to civil aviation operations within Iran’s airspace. Furthermore, it is impossible for other states to learn lessons from this downing and implement similar safety actions within their own military to ensure this type of tragedy does not happen again, a key element of ICAO accident investigation reports. event.
Q2: Why was Iran allowed to investigate itself?
ICAO’s international accident investigation regime is laid out in Article 26 of the Chicago Convention, and further articulated in ICAO Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation. As per Article 26, in the event of an accident to an aircraft of a contracting State occurring in the territory of another contracting State, the State in which the accident occurs (known as the State of Occurrence) will investigate the circumstances of the accident. This investigation is to be undertaken in accordance with procedures recommended by ICAO Annex 13, so far as its laws permit.
While this system works well under most circumstances, it works far less well in situations where the State of Occurrence has admittedly or purportedly participated in the downing of a civilian aircraft. In these situations, conflict of interest concerns can arise that call into question the integrity and comprehensiveness of the resulting safety investigation.
While states may choose to delegate investigative responsibilities under these scenarios (e.g., Ukraine delegated investigative authorities to the Netherlands following the 2014 downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17), the State of Occurrence is under no obligation to do so. Although Annex 13 contains provisions to safeguard the impartiality of investigations, and other provisions that could temper conflict of interest concerns, gaps remain, and nothing in Annex 13 would impinge on the State of Occurrence’s right to lead the investigation if it so chooses.
The risk that a State would exploit the gaps in the existing accident investigation system was laid bare by Iran’s flawed investigation and report into the downing of flight PS752. The result was a problematic accident Investigation, and a report that did not address key questions raised by Canada and other parties to the investigation.
Iran’s Annex 13 failures included:
- Failure to protect evidence;
- Failure to maintain safe custody of the aircraft and its content;
- Inadequate protection of the site from unauthorized persons, as well as moving evidence;
- Cleaning up the site too hurriedly;
- Failure to arrange the readout of the flight recorders “without delay”; and,
- Not identifying all causes and/or contributing factors, both immediate and systemic.
Unsatisfied with the status quo, and in an effort to address gaps in the international system exposed by Iran, Transport Canada and its federal partners engaged in a thorough assessment of options to address conflict of interest concerns associated with the existing aircraft accident investigation regime.
Following the assessment, Canada is of the belief that an amendment to Annex 13 to introduce certain procedures to address conflict of interest concerns related to safety investigations conducted under these circumstances can improve the resulting investigation and its associated recommendations, and increase confidence in this process. This would lead to better quality and uptake of investigations and their recommendations, which would in turn improve accident prevention - the fundamental objective of Annex 13.
The push to reform Annex 13 is a key element of Canada’s greater PS752 Strategy at ICAO, and engagement with international partners has already begun and is expected to increase as the year progresses.
Q3: Why was Canada not more vocal in pressuring Iran to do better with its Accident Investigation?
On January 8, 2020, only hours after the downing, the Prime Minister issued a statement calling for a thorough investigation into the crash of PS752. On January 9, 2020, the Prime Minister publically announced that Canada had intelligence indicating that PS752 was shot down by an Iranian surface-to-air missile, and once again pressed Iran to conduct a thorough and credible investigation to determine the causes of the crash.
Canada’s Transportation Safety Board participated in the investigation, to the greatest extent Iran would allow, including participating in the readout of flight recorders, which was granted following strong pressure from Canada.
Canada repeatedly called on Iran to fulfill its investigatory responsibilities as articulated under Annex 13. This included bi-lateral calls, Ministerial letters and interventions at ICAO calling on Iran to arrange for the readout of flight recorders “without delay.” Canada also used every opportunity to intervene at ICAO to remind Iran of its responsibilities under Annex 13.
Canada’s Prime Minister, as well as Minister Garneau and Minister Alghabra consistently raised concerns about the investigation, especially about Iran’s failure to secure the crash site, preserve evidence, and arrange the timely readout of the flight recorders both at ICAO and directly with Iranian officials.
Canada also conducted its own examination of the downing and of Iran’s investigation, through the Special Advisor Ralph Goodale’s PS752 report, which was released on December 14, 2020.
Moreover, Canada created the Forensic and Examination and Assessment Team, which examined both open source and classified information related to the downing and will soon release its own technical report.
Finally, in anticipation of a final report that did not provide the answers sought by Canada, Transport Canada and its federal partners worked to develop a coordinated response strategy, which Canada will roll out over the coming months at ICAO and elsewhere.
Q4: What has Canada done to address the risks to civil aviation operations over or near conflict zones?
People travelling from one part of the world to another should have confidence that they will not be exposed to safety and security risks that conflicts pose to civilian flight operations.
Since Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 was shot down near Tehran, Iran, on January 8, 2020, Canada and its international partners have been working – both domestically and internationally – to improve the safety and security of air travel worldwide by addressing gaps in the way the civil aviation sector deals with conflict zones.
Domestically, Transport Canada has established a Canadian Conflict Zone Information Office (CZIO), which monitors and assesses conflict zone situations that could pose a risk to Canadian civil aviation operations. When it is perceived or assessed that a State responsible for managing its airspace is not properly mitigating existing risks to commercial aviation, Transport Canada can quickly issue an airspace notification for a risk area, either informative, advisory or prohibitive in nature. These notifications apply to Canadian Air Operators and Owners of Aircraft Registered in Canada. Since air operators are responsible for conducting their own risk assessments and making their own operational decisions, including flight planning and routing decisions, the content of the notification is intended to inform their operational decision-making. On January 10, 2020, Canada issued a notification advising Canadian air operators not to enter Iranian airspace – the notification remains in place. Canada monitors the situation in Iran regularly and all relevant updates are shared with Canadian air operators to ensure that they take those risks into consideration when planning their flight routes.
Internationally, through the Safer Skies Initiative, – a global initiative conceived and spear-headed by Canada – Canada is working with experts from different countries, international organizations, the civil aviation industry, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to set the stage and enhance the level of safety and security for commercial airlines travelling in higher risk areas and to prevent future tragedies.
Every State has sovereignty over its airspace. However, under international standards, a State also has a responsibility to manage risks to commercial carriers flying in its airspace. The Safer Skies Initiative offers countries the opportunity to work together to share information, advice, warnings and best practices to properly recognize conflict zones and better manage risks to civil aviation. The initiative aims to develop better risk assessments, effective safeguards, and clear accountability for operators and authorities who manage airspace. A unified approach from a coalition of like-minded countries would facilitate the restriction of domestic carriers from flying over or near a conflict zone. In support of this initiative, in December 2020, Transport Canada hosted the inaugural International Safer Skies Forum to promote and share best practices on airspace management near or over conflict zones. The event was attended by 87 states.
Q5: What steps is Canada taking to improve the way investigations into the downing of aircraft are managed in the future?
Canada has conducted a thorough assessment of options to address conflict of interest concerns that arise when a State admits involvement or there is credible evidence to suggest its involvement in the downing of an aircraft. This assessment included a consideration of options involving amendments to the Chicago Convention and/or ICAO Annex 13.
Canada believes that an amendment to Annex 13 to introduce certain procedures to address conflict of interest concerns related to safety investigations conducted under these circumstances can improve, and improve confidence in, the resulting investigation and its associated recommendations. This will lead to better quality and uptake of investigations and their recommendations, which will in turn improve accident prevention, the fundamental objective of Annex 13.
Canada is in the process of rolling out a coordinated, whole-of-government strategy to realize a variety of PS752-related objectives on the world stage, including reforms to Annex 13. [ATIP redacted]
Q6. Does the downing of Flight 752 constitute a violation of the human rights of those onboard the plane?
For GAC to answer