13. Canada's Maritime Security Strategic Framework 2020

Executive Summary

Canada is a maritime nation with an extensive coastline and a complex maritime transportation system.  This complex and extensive system is vital to a country that relies heavily on international maritime commerce.

Domestic and international maritime threats have the potential to impact Canada’s maritime transportation system, our national security and more broadly, our sovereignty and economic interests. 

While significant investments have been made to strengthen maritime security, gaps remain. These include gaps in maritime domain awareness, waterside security at ports, enforcement capacity, and limited legal authority to routinely share maritime security-related information. 

In addition to the evolving threat environment and persistent gaps, the developing Canada-U.S. partnership on security and economic cooperation (Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness) necessitates an updated strategic and collaborative approach to maritime security

Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework presents strategic guidance to achieving comprehensive maritime security to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests. Further, it underscores the need for greater collaboration/partnerships between all levels of government nationally and internationally as well as with the private sector and other non-governmental organizations.  The Framework highlights five security activities (Maritime Domain Awareness; Safeguarding; Responsiveness; Resilience, Collaboration) through which current and future maritime security efforts will be focused. 

As no one government department or agency can achieve maritime security alone, the Framework emphasizes collaborative solutions by leveraging existing capabilities and  highlights that not only current, but on-going and future efforts build on individual departments/agencies’ strengths and expertise to ensure efficient and effective use of available resources. 

Table of Contents

Executive Summary. i

Introduction. 1

Linkages to other strategies/initiatives 2

Canada’s Maritime Domain. 3

Threats to Canada’s Maritime Security. 4

Gaps and Mitigations 6

Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework. 7

Scope. 7

Security Activities 7

Maritime Domain Awareness 9

Safeguarding. 10

Responsiveness 11

Resilience. 12

Collaboration. 13

Implementation. 14

Conclusion. 14

Introduction

The world has seen a marked rise in maritime security threats in recent years as part of a broader global trend in crime and terrorism.  Migrant smuggling, sea-borne terrorist attacks, as well as maritime based transnational crime and espionage continue to be threats to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.  At the same time, with increased traffic in the Arctic threats are emerging in Canada’s increasingly accessible North.

While the Government has, over the last decade, invested significant resources to strengthen maritime security, current and emerging threats as well as documented security gaps in the maritime domain persist.  These include gaps in maritime domain awareness, waterside security at ports, enforcement capacity, and limited legal authority to routinely share maritime security-related information. 

In addition to the evolving threat environment and persistent gaps, the developing Canada-U.S. partnership on security and economic cooperation (Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness) necessitates an updated strategic and collaborative approach to maritime security.  Canada’s proposed maritime security strategic framework is premised on an integrated whole-of-government approach that would align with the perimeter vision and with other Canadian government policies.

Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework (the “Framework”), sets out an interdepartmental approach to achieve comprehensive security in our maritime domain.  The Framework provides direction and guidance for interdepartmental coordination, planning, and programming in pursuit of the achievement of comprehensive security in Canada’s maritime domain.  As the maritime security component to a whole-of-Government approach to national security, the Framework facilitates future direction of Canada’s maritime security to 2020.

The Framework highlights five security activities (Maritime Domain Awareness; Safeguarding; Responsiveness; Resilience, Collaboration) through which current and future maritime security efforts will be focused.  Of the five security activities, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Collaboration are the key binding elements of maritime security in Canada.  MDA is at the core of Canada’s layered maritime security approach that seeks to collect, fuse, analyze and disseminate actionable information to decision makers.  Collaboration, on the other hand, includes efforts in support of the other security activities to ensure that Canada’s maritime security objectives are achieved through the cooperative efforts of national, provincial, municipal, non-government and private sector partners, as well as with international partners.

Canada’s maritime domain is vast, complex and multijurisdictional and as such requires collaborative efforts to maintain its safety and security.  No one government department or agency of the Government of Canada can achieve these objectives alone.  Collaboration and/or partnerships at the interdepartmental and international level must be pursued.  Canadians must be assured that maritime security continues to work as a collaborative enterprise in the national interest and in a manner that addresses current and emerging threats.

Linkages to other strategies/initiatives

Canada is influenced directly or indirectly by the security postures of its partners and by decisions and guidance from international organizations.  In particular, Canada is influenced by our relationship with the United States.  The Government has renewed a commitment to strengthen the Canada-U.S. partnership in the areas of security and economic prosperity.  By adopting Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, the Government established a long-term partnership to accelerate the legitimate flows of people and goods between countries while strengthening security and economic prosperity.  The joint Canada-U.S. Declaration focuses on four areas of co-operation: addressing threats early; trade facilitation, economic growth and jobs; integrated cross-border law enforcement; and critical infrastructure and cyber-security.  The Framework also speaks to these goals.

The Framework, like the Declaration, focuses on addressing threats before they reach Canada’s shores.  The Framework urges federal partners to pursue a perimeter approach to security, working together at and away from the border to enhance security and prosperity.  At the same time, the Framework encourages the development of a common understanding of the threat environment through improved intelligence and information sharing as well as joint Canada-U.S. threat assessments to support informed risk management decisions.

In addition, the Framework recognizes the importance of identifying opportunities to integrate efforts and where practicable to work together.  It identifies initiatives where maritime security stakeholders in both countries can build on existing bilateral law enforcement programs to develop the next generation of integrated cross-border law enforcement operations that leverage cross-designated officers and resources to jointly identify, assess and interdict persons and organization involved in transnational crime.  The Framework also highlights the same key issues that permeate the Declaration – sharing information to strengthen security.  In addition to alignment with the Beyond the Border Initiative, the Framework incorporates the Government’s proven integrated approach to national security issues across government.  It features similar principles (Cooperation and Partnership, Resiliency, and Risk Management) to the approach taken in Building Resilience Against Terrorism; Canada’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy.  The Framework also complements Canada’s Northern Strategy and supports the first priority – Exercising our Arctic Sovereignty.  Similar to the Northern Strategy, the Framework identifies current efforts and mitigation efforts to address gaps in the North.

Finally, the Framework aligns with Treasury Board Secretariat’s Whole-of-government Framework, designed to map the financial and non-financial contributions of departments and agencies to a set of 16 high-level Government outcome areas.  Two outcome areas are particularly relevant: “A safe and secure Canada”, and “A strong and mutually beneficial North American Partnership,” which together highlight the importance of the effective and efficient use of resources to secure the maritime domain without restricting the flow of legitimate trade.

Canada’s Maritime Domain

With three oceans and the longest coastline in the world, Canada is a maritime nation with a vast maritime domain.  Our ocean estate alone covers a surface area of approximately 7.1 million square kilometers, much of which is remote in a fragile and unforgiving environment.  In addition, Canada shares the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway, the world’s longest deep-draft inland waterway covering more than 3,700 kilometers and more than 50 ports.  Canada’s maritime domain also includes extensive coastlines and a complex maritime system that includes vessels, ports, harbours, and other maritime facilities.  This complex and extensive system is vital to a country that relies heavily on international maritime commerce.

There are more than 300 commercial ports and harbours in Canada, with the ports of Vancouver, Montreal and Halifax as key intermodal hubs in the global maritime system.  Seventeen major ports are designated as Canada Port Authorities under Canada’s National Marine Policy.  Every year these ports, collectively, handle approximately $140 billion worth of goods.  In addition, this vital sector supports over 250,000 direct and indirect jobs and generates over $20 billion in economic activity.  Moreover, the continued flow of legitimate goods and people across the oceans and waterways is at the heart of globalization that sustains economic security and prosperity.  Canada is a beneficiary of this trend as its trading relationships continue to diversify and grow.  Maritime security must be a priority for Canada’s trade to grow and for Canada to continue to prosper.  Simultaneously, vulnerabilities must be minimized from current and emerging multi-faceted threats in the maritime domain.

From a maritime security standpoint, the maritime environment can be conceived in terms of three geographical regions – areas defined using internationally accepted terms from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[1].  Canada's rights within each of these zones will differ.[2] 

• Waters under Canadian jurisdiction: Maritime areas which include Canada’s internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

• High Seas                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Maritime areas outside of the control of sovereign states; (i.e. waters not included in the EEZ, territorial sea or internal waters of a State).

• Waters under foreign jurisdiction:  Maritime areas which include the internal waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and EEZ of foreign states.

Threats to Canada’s Maritime Security

Domestic and international maritime threats have the potential to impact Canada’s maritime transportation system, our national security and more broadly, our sovereignty and economic interests. 

The arrival of two migrant vessels – the Ocean Lady in October 2009, carrying 76 Tamil asylum seekers and the Sun Sea in August 2010, carrying 492 Tamil asylum seekers – exemplifies that Canada is vulnerable to threats brought to our shores by human smuggling involving transnational organized criminal networks and, in some cases, terrorist organizations. 

Other threats of an organized crime nature including the smuggling of illicit drugs, weapons and other contraband remain.  In addition, traditional concerns relating to Canadian sovereignty and legal claims continue and are important elements in Canada’s security priorities.  As the Arctic becomes more accessible because of the warming climate, there is the potential for threats to emerge.  Of particular concern are identified gaps in MDA.

Internationally, piracy and armed robbery at sea, off the coast of Somalia and in the world’s oceans at large, as well as sea-borne terrorist attacks similar to the Mumbai, India attack, are other examples of threats with direct and indirect implications for Canada.  The International Maritime Bureau estimates that piracy costs the global economy between $7 and $12 billion a year.  The losses are the result of theft, extortion (ransom payments), shipping delays, warship contributions and ever-increasing insurance rates.  Canada has also endured costs related to piracy and armed robbery at sea through direct contributions to international counter piracy efforts.  Three Canadian warships (HMCS Ville de Québec, HMCS Winnipeg and HMCS Fredericton) have been deployed in recent years in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa to support NATO’s contribution to combating piracy, and to escort ships contracted by the World Food Programme.  Beyond these direct costs, are indirect ones associated with broader implications.  For example, an attack on a port or shipping channel could result in a significant slow-down of international shipping with attendant consequences on other sectors of the economy such as manufacturing and transportation.

Further details about on-going threats and gaps in the North, and as a result of organized crime and terrorism are highlighted below.  The changing and evolving nature of the threat environment facing Canada at home and abroad necessitates the need for an updated strategic framework. 

Organized Crime.  Transnational criminal organizations, operating without respect for borders, increasingly engage in waterside and port criminality.  Their illicit activities include but are not limited to the smuggling of humans, drugs, currency, firearms, and other contraband goods.  A number of these organizations operate at or through marine ports, while others are involved with marine smuggling of people or goods through maritime borders and coasts, including the Canada-United States maritime border.

Terrorism.  Foreign-based terrorist organizations, with linkages to Canada, possess maritime capabilities and the potential to mount maritime-based operations.  These groups, some with ties to homegrown extremists, use Canada for financing, recruitment, procurement and operational planning purposes.  The nature and risk of terrorism-related threats in the maritime environment continues to evolve.  It includes, but is not limited to, ideologically motivated acts of serious violence, the passage of terrorism-affiliated individuals into Canada, or criminal ventures such as human smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking and kidnapping for purposes of funding future terrorist activities.  Similarly, issue-based domestic extremist groups in Canada have the potential to engage in such activities within the maritime environment that extend beyond lawful protest.     

Threats in the Arctic Region.   A strong Canadian presence in areas under Canadian jurisdiction in the Arctic is integral to the Government of Canada’s objective of exercising our sovereignty.  Current threats to Canadian integrity in the Arctic include socioeconomic, environmental, criminal, and national security threats related to terrorism, espionage or foreign interference.  The international competition for resources has also driven hostile intelligence services from foreign states to collect intelligence on Canada’s Arctic.  Increased marine-related economic activity in the Arctic region provides increased incentive for organized criminal networks to expand their scope of illicit activities to the Northern Territories.

Migrant vessels.  Human smuggling and irregular mass maritime-based migration continue to pose potential national security and terrorism-related threats to Canada.  Conflicts in failed and unstable countries often result in the steady flow of asylum seekers from war-torn regions to safe states, such as Canada.  The desperation of asylum seekers and refugees could be taken advantage of by organized criminal human smuggling groups, terrorist recruiters and radicalizers. 

Espionage.  As a leader in many maritime economic and scientific fields, Canada is an attractive target for espionage.  Hostile foreign state and/or foreign intelligence services are increasingly motivated to engage in the unlawful acquisition of Canada’s military, political, economic and scientific information or assets relating to the maritime environment.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery mechanisms.  Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical threats.  This continues to pose a risk to Canadian interests.  Certain states with WMD ambitions have exploited the maritime domain for procurement of WMD materials.

Piracy and armed robbery at sea.  The 21^st Century has seen a resurgence of piracy, a form of maritime criminality that had largely been suppressed.  Piracy has reappeared in the Straits of Malacca, off Nigeria and certain parts of South America, as well as off the Horn of Africa, for a variety of reasons.  Piracy can pose a threat to vital international shipping lanes.  Piracy also threatens the ability of authorities to control the movement of people and goods, as well as access points to failed, failing or hostile states. 

Gaps and Mitigations

Canada’s approach to strengthening maritime security has been to analyze security gaps and develop appropriate measures for addressing those gaps most in need of mitigation.  Gaps analysis is a comprehensive interdepartmental process undertaken through the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG) designed to pin point vulnerabilities.  It is based on a systematic analysis conducted to assess potential threats and identify areas where vulnerabilities exist.  Prioritization is shaped by considerations such as the impact on public confidence, economic factors, international relations, level of government control and collateral benefits.

Key Multi-Agency Achievements Implementation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT) Establishment of Marine Security Operation Centres on the coasts and Great Lakes Integrated cross-border maritime law enforcement operations (Shiprider) Small Vessel and Facility Security Strategy Maritime Commerce Resumption Strategy Advance Commercial Information Program and Radiation Detection initiative Joint Canada-U.S. Vessel Inspection Program Creation of National Port Enforcement Teams at key ports Marine Event Response Protocol (MERP) Marine Security Enforcement Teams CF involvement in offshore deployments (e.g. Joint Inter-agency Task Force-South)

The Government of Canada has worked diligently to mitigate gaps and address maritime security threats to Canada.  IMSWG partners working collaboratively through a whole-of-government approach have addressed a number of gaps.  However, gaps continue to exist.  Recently conducted gaps analyses highlight vulnerabilities that if left unaddressed could potentially lead to incidents that could have devastating impact on the economy, trade relationships, the environment and the nation as a whole.  For example, while the implementation of the Automatic Identification System and the Long Range Tracking and Identification System significantly improve domain awareness, there remains a lack of persistent wide-area surveillance of Canada’s EEZ and approaches, particularly in the North.  At the same time, while AIS and LRIT provide details on the position of vessels, small vessels, which are not required to have either system, and non-compliant or clandestine vessels remain a challenge.

At the same time, other challenges remain despite interdepartmental efforts to mitigate them.  The creation of National Port Enforcement Teams and Marine Security Enforcement Teams have mitigated gaps in waterside security and have addressed enforcement capacity issues.  However, additional mitigation efforts are required to address remaining gaps in this area including providing clarity in roles and responsibilities and better coordination of existing on-water assets and resources.  Another key challenge is limited extra-territorial jurisdiction for law enforcement options authorized under current Canadian law.

Finally, the establishment of Marine Security Operations Centres on both coasts and along the Great Lakes – to collect, retain and analyze data to assist in the detection and assessment of maritime security threats, and where necessary support a coordinated response – is a key achievement.  However, there continues to be legislative “barriers” to routine information sharing between MSOC partners as originally envisaged.  Legislative changes will be required to ensure MSOCs achieve their full potential.

While significant gains have been made, much remains to be done as the threat environment continues to evolve and gaps remain. 

Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework

Scope

Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework will provide direction for interdepartmental coordination, planning, and programming in pursuit of the achievement of comprehensive security in Canada’s maritime domain in order to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests and to address threats and gaps and support overall government national security objectives.

Security Activities

More than 10 years ago, the Government of Canada through the IMSWG established four security activities to guide the government’s maritime security efforts.  These activities include: Maritime Domain Awareness; Safeguarding; Responsiveness; and Collaboration.  Recently, Resilience was added as a fifth activity. 

These security activities are undertaken using existing resource to address priorities arising from the threat environment and to meet Canada’s national security objectives.  Of the five security activities, Maritime Domain Awareness[3] is the foundation of all maritime security activities.  It is at the core of a layered maritime security approach that seeks to improve Canada’s ability to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate actionable information to decision-makers so they can identify and manage threats and take a coordinated approach to address current and emerging threats, either overseas or as they approach Canada.  Moreover, the shared nature of maritime security responsibilities demands that this information be shared to enable those responsible to effectively and efficiently secure Canada’s marine domain. 

The need to act together and recognition that not one department alone can address maritime threats speaks to the importance of a whole-of-government approach and the need for collaboration.  Collaboration permeates all maritime security activities and helps to ensure that those responsible for maritime security can share appropriate information and ensures collective, coordinated approach at all levels (national, provincial, international etc.) to address Canada’s maritime security.

While MDA and Collaboration are the two fundamental areas, all current and future maritime security efforts must be directed through all five security activities including Safeguarding, Responsiveness and Resilience. 

Safeguarding includes efforts to enhance the physical security of marine infrastructure or other critical infrastructure in or around maritime areas.  It also includes efforts to enhance personnel screening to prevent potential terrorists or terrorist devices from gaining entry into Canada or accessing our marine transportation system.  Key objectives are ensuring the integrity of critical physical and technological infrastructures and preventing infiltration of high-risk people and objects into the marine system. 

Responsiveness, on the other hand, is guided by the principle that action must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and preferably at a distance from Canada and Canadians.  Key objectives include the ability to interdict, apprehend and contain high-risk people, containers, goods and vessels at the earliest opportunity and respond to incidents in a timely manner. 

Finally, in the area of Resilience (which covers resilience as well as continuity, resumption, and recovery activities), Canada recognized the importance of ensuring its maritime transportation system is prepared for, and can recover in a timely manner from, major supply chain disruptions.  Reducing vulnerabilities and facilitating recovery are integral to the maritime security continuum.  Moreover, a resilient transportation system is both a less attractive potential target to  terrorists and a more robust and marketable one in general.  Key objectives include working with all of Canada’s supply chain stakeholders to ensure they are as resilient as possible and developing pre-need relationships, plans and protocols between all levels of government, industry and with international partners to ensure a unity of effort throughout the response stage and into the recovery stage of an emergency.

What follows is a concise abstract of key activities currently underway plus additional mitigation efforts that can be undertaken within existing resources and reference levels.

Maritime Domain Awareness

Within this activity area, security efforts are guided by the principle that the greater the vulnerability the more detailed the Government of Canada’s information requirements.

Includes surveillance, understanding, awareness as well as liaison and coordination efforts within the geographic zones in cooperation with domestic and foreign intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies.

Strategic Priority  Achieve the effective understanding and awareness of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety and prosperity of Canada. Identified/Existing Gaps Lack of persistent wide area surveillance of Canada’s EEZ, approaches, and in the Arctic Comprehensive Canada-U.S. bi-national MDA picture Inadequate awareness of small vessels in waters under Canada’s jurisdiction and approaches as well as lack of real time access to small vessel and pleasure craft registry Information sharing challenges as a result of legal, policy and cultural differences Availability and leveraging of specific technology and support Current Activities Track, monitor and identify vessels through the use of various sensors and systems such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification Tracking (LRIT), radar, aerial surveillance, and RADARSAT Access and maintain data by collecting, screening and assessing information on vessels, cargo, infrastructure and persons through various regulatory reporting regimes to identify threats at the earliest opportunity, as well as the development of a bi-yearly Marine Security Threat and Risk Assessment Collect, analyze, disseminate and share information as appropriate through the three existing MSOCs Facilitate awareness of MDA activities through engagement efforts with stakeholders, partners and allies and programs such as Coastal Watch. Monitor and review MDA performance through corporate reports and performance reporting regimes Additional Mitigation Efforts Achieve full operational capability for MSOCs and establish mechanisms to permit routine information sharing domestically Improve national maritime picture Improve joint Canada-U.S. threat and risk assessments Develop various mechanisms to reduce legal, policy and cultural barriers to information sharing domestically, bi-laterally with the United States and international partners Further integrate and synchronize monitoring efforts with our domestic and international partners and stakeholders Exploit and assess the feasibility of current and potential technologies to conduct persistent surveillance in Canada’s EEZ and approaches, including in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway, and the Arctic Enhance awareness of small vessels in waters under Canadian jurisdiction and improve timeliness of access to small vessel and pleasure craft registry

Safeguarding

The key principle guiding safeguarding activities is that the maritime system is only as strong as its weakest link.  Safeguarding includes efforts to enhance the security of maritime infrastructure or other critical infrastructure in or around maritime areas.

Strategic Priority Through maritime domain awareness and collaboration, protect maritime-related assets, activities, infrastructure and population centres in Canada Identified/Existing Gaps Waterside security including clarified roles/responsibilities, authorities and instruments Enhance coordination[4] of existing patrols in waters under Canadian jurisdiction Awareness of ‘norms’ – normal activities and conditions in our maritime domain to easily identify abnormalities that may highlight a developing situation Current Activities Marine Security Clearance Program Joint Canada-U.S. vessel inspection program Creation of restricted land side areas Review of waterside security roles and responsibilities Advance Commercial Information Program Radiation Detection Instrumentation Network (RADNET) operational at Canadian marine ports to provide radiation measurements with 24/7 alert capability Canada-U.S. Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (Shiprider) Sovereignty Patrols - ships and aircraft Fisheries Patrols Monitoring of vessel traffic through Canadian Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Centres Marine Security Enforcement Teams Cooperation of international partners to identify threats as early as possible International maritime security capacity building Additional Mitigation Efforts Address Waterside Security Report recommendations taking into account lessons learned from the Vancouver Olympic Games and the G8/G20 summit Explore options to address organized crime and criminality at ports Outreach initiatives in maritime communities Enhance the Canada-U.S. joint vessel inspection program (i.e.JVIT) Mutual vessel certification recognition in the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence Seaway Regulatory harmonization with the U.S. Consider initiatives for enhanced Arctic security (e.g. reporting for small vessels and transiting vessels) Security requirements and regulations for offshore installations Implement legislation to ratify Shiprider Agreement and deploy short duration contingency operations to address specified threats, as resources allow Explore expansion of Advance Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record Program to cruise ships

Responsiveness

Responsiveness activities are guided by the principle that action must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and preferably at a distance from Canada and Canadians.  It includes enforcement efforts conducted in cooperation with appropriate foreign and domestic law enforcement and security agencies having jurisdiction to respond to a maritime event.
 

Strategic Priority Interdict, apprehend and contain high-risk people, containers, goods and vessels at the earliest opportunity and strengthen the ability to respond to maritime threats in a timely manner. Identified/Existing Gaps Limited Arctic maritime security contingency plans and limited ability to respond quickly in the North Lack of integration between Canada and U.S. marine event response plans Lack of persistent enforcement at ports and waters under Canadian jurisdiction Limited on water and in-port federal law enforcement capacity and coordination Limited routine on-water coastal patrol capacity to identify and respond to potential security and law enforcement threats Current Activities National Port Enforcement Teams at key ports (Halifax, Hamilton, Montreal and Vancouver) Marine Security Enforcement Teams Marine Security Emergency Response Teams Integrated Border Enforcement Teams Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (Shiprider) Fully developed and validated Marine Event Response Plan (MERP) Various contingency plans in place to respond to maritime incidents, including in the North Additional Mitigation Efforts Implement legislation to ratify Shiprider Agreement and deploy short duration contingency operations to address specified threats, as resources allow Develop contingency plans for security events in the Arctic in support of Canada’s Northern Strategy Enhance coordination to address waterside security and law enforcement threats Coordinate operational planning (e.g. Canada’s MERP with the U.S. Maritime Operational Threat Response Protocol (MOTR)

Resilience

The marine transportation system is key to Canada’s continued economic prosperity.  It is vital that Canada’s maritime transportation system prepares for and can recover in a timely manner from major disruptions due to a significant supply chain disruption.  Reducing vulnerabilities and facilitating recovery are integral parts of the marine security continuum.  Resilience includes the steady and expedient recovery from the effects of threats to maritime activities.

Strategic Priority Minimize damage and accelerate recovery in the maritime domain, its infrastructure and transportation system after a supply chain disruption Identified/Existing Gaps Consistent lexicon regarding resilience/resumption/recovery More integration of regional resilience/resumption/recovery planning. (i.e. the need for more communication/coordination across key ports and other maritime stakeholders, including industry, suppliers and service providers) Critical infrastructure of regional and national significance implicated in the maritime supply chain need to be better identified and accounted for in regional and national planning activities Need for a National Maritime Recovery Plan, including a communications protocol, to help coordinate federal resumption/resiliency/recovery initiatives and integrate them with provincial and regional efforts A need to determine a framework for the prioritization of goods and people through the marine transportation system following a supply chain disruption Mainstreaming resiliency/resumption/recovery into business practices, and conversely, incorporating operational concerns into security and emergency management practices Harmonizing resilience/resumption/recovery activities internationally Given the interconnectedness of our national and international supply chain, the need to expand resilience/resumption/recovery efforts into other modes (air, rail, road) Current Activities Continued assistance in the development/refinement of regional Maritime Commerce Resumption Plans (Halifax, Hamilton, Montreal, and Vancouver) Refinement of  National Maritime Commerce Resumption Strategy Information and best practice sharing with domestic and international partners National roll-out of National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure Canada-United States Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure Additional Mitigation Efforts Develop guidance and standards for reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening resiliency and redundancy Integration of resiliency/resumption/recovery planning into Gateway and Corridor initiatives Development of lessons learned and best practices documents After-event coordinated evaluation mechanisms Enhance current operational plans regarding Migrant Vessels

Collaboration

Collaboration includes efforts in support of other security activities to ensure that Canada’s maritime security objectives are achieved through the cooperative efforts of national, provincial, municipal, non-government and private sector partners, as well as with international maritime security partners.

Strategic Priority Enhance cooperation in ensuring timely, coordinated and proportionate actions against maritime threats in Canada or abroad. Identified/Existing Gaps Barriers to routine information-sharing in MSOCs Limited awareness and coordination of science, technology and analysis in support of maritime security Current Activities Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group Interdepartmental cooperation and information-sharing through MSOCs Integrated maritime Command Control and Communications Marine Security Coordination Fund National Waterside Coordination Team Canada-U.S. participation in Integrated Border Enforcement Teams Canada-U.S. participation in Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (Shiprider) Canada-U.S. contributions to the 2010 Joint Border Threat and Risk Assessment Bi-National Marine Security Compliance and Enforcement Working Group (CEWG) International maritime security capacity building efforts Coast Guard Fora (North Atlantic, North Pacific, Canada-U.S.) Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Crime Forum Liaison officers abroad Participation at the International Maritime Organization CCG/RCMP Marine Security Enforcement Teams Additional Mitigation Efforts Develop legislative framework to support guidance / policy to facilitate information-sharing Enhancement of the intelligence network Enhance the coordination and integration of science, technology and analysis in support of marine security by the creation of an interdepartmental technology working group Enhanced strategic coordination and policy development with U.S. partners Implement Small Vessel and Facility Security Strategy

Implementation

Implementation of the Framework requires an integrated collaborative approach across the Government of Canada.  Delivery of programs under the security activities rests with individual departments and agencies according to their respective mandates.  Implementation will also rely on partnerships, including those between all levels of government as well as the private sector, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.  Accordingly, activities and responsibilities proposed under the Framework will be shared where appropriate between those partners.   

Governance and Review

Governance mechanisms are designed to achieve effective cross-government cooperation on marine security initiatives and the elements of this Framework.  Overall, coordination and administration rests with the IMSWG and its attendant committees.  Established in October 2001, the IMSWG is supported by its Policy and Operations Committees and is guided by an Assistant Deputy Minister Marine Security Committee.  Periodic review, including the production of a bi-annual progress report to ensure continued relevance of the Framework elements to the challenges of today and the future, coordination and its further development are also the responsibility of the IMSWG and its committees. 

Communication of the Framework

The Framework is designed for officials within the Government of Canada.  It is to be shared and understood within IMSWG member organizations responsible for implementation.  It may be shared, on a confidential basis, with other stakeholders, including foreign partners, as descriptive of Canada’s approach to maritime security.  Officials are encouraged to use the basic architecture of the Framework to explain Canada’s approach to securing its maritime domain.

Conclusion

Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework presents strategic guidance to achieving comprehensive maritime security to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests while respecting Canada’s international obligations and laws including the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  Further, it underscores the need for greater collaboration/partnerships between all levels of government nationally and internationally as well as with the private sector and other non-governmental organizations.   No one government department or agency of the Government of Canada can achieve the strategic priorities alone. 

Achieving comprehensive maritime security is challenging, not least because of the vastness of Canada’s maritime domain.  In addition, threats emanating from increased sophistication of criminal organizations, human smuggling networks, piracy and armed robbery at sea have direct and indirect impacts on Canada’s economic and national security interests.  Therefore, the Government has developed a strategic framework that will guide a coordinated and collaborative effort to gain knowledge of the maritime domain, to protect people, infrastructure, respond to maritime events and quickly resume maritime-borne activities.

The Framework is aligned with national strategies and policies including Canada’s Northern Strategy, Counter-Terrorism Strategy as well as the recently announced Canada-U.S. Border Initiative and builds on existing maritime security programs and initiatives. 

The effective implementation of Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework assumes/requires increased collaboration between our domestic and international partners.  Such an approach would result in increased awareness of activities of our maritime domain leading to the development of appropriate safeguarding, response and recovery activities.  Based on this integrated and collaborative approach to security, the Government of Canada would be well prepared to adapt to the ever changing threat environment.

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