Recommendation 1: National Defence, Transport Canada and Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard, working together, should take concrete actions to address the long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the following:

  • the inability to track vessels continuously and to identify non-emitting vessels
  • the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters.

KEY MESSAGES

We are committed to working with our partners to address long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the continuous tracking of vessels and identification of non-emitting vessels and to improving information sharing to ensure our Arctic waters are safe and secure.

Our partners

  • There are numerous government departments responsible for overseeing Canada’s Arctic waters. This includes Transport Canada, National Defence, Canadian Coast Guard, and Environment and Climate Change Canada, with support from Public Services and Procurement Canada.
  • These departments will work together to take concrete actions to address the report’s recommendations.
  • The Government of Canada also works hand in hand with Inuit and Indigenous communities, Arctic residents, and industry to ensure our Arctic waters are safe and secure.

Concrete actions / specific initiatives (being undertaken to address the recommendations found in the report)

  • The Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) lays out the objectives and activities that the Government of Canada will pursue through to 2030 as part of its commitment to a safe, secure, and well-defended Arctic and North. Strengthening Canada's domain awareness, surveillance, and control capabilities in the Arctic and the North is one of the objectives of the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. 
  • Transport Canada leads the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, which is currently updating Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework and reviewing its supporting strategies dealing with both maritime domain awareness and Arctic maritime security. The Framework is currently scheduled for approval at the next Assistant Deputy Minister Marine Security Committee on March 23rd, 2023.
  • Canada’s multi-agency Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs) are located on the east and west coasts and the Great Lakes. Through these centres, domestic partners exchange expertise and information on maritime security issues. A comprehensive assessment of the MSOCs is forthcoming, which will provide renewal recommendations. The review will be done through a third party and the report is expected in June 2023.
  • Transport Canada is reviewing legislation and regulations to address potential gaps and ensure that the marine transportation security framework continues to address modern threats and risks to the marine transportation system.
  • The Enhanced Maritime Situational Awareness system is an important initiative to increase the amount of accurate and detailed information on maritime activities. 

With sea ice receding and ship traffic increasing in the Artic, what is Transport Canada doing to address the increased risk of marine pollution?

  • Large vessels transiting through Arctic waters are subject to regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001, and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to report their position daily to the Marine Communications and Traffic Services center in Iqaluit. This way, Transport Canada remains aware of vessel positions and can ensure effective oversight of discharges into the marine environment.  
  1. How are vessels tracked?
  • Tracking entails the ability to determine the current and past locations of a vessel, categorize a vessel’s size and particulars, and where possible ascertain a vessel’s name and unique registration number.   
  • While there are limited capabilities available in Canada’s Arctic to track vessels, from a national perspective departments and agencies have several sources to track vessels approaching or entering our waters. 

If pressed

  • Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) provides vessel tracking data on vessels operating in or near waters under Canadian jurisdiction.  This includes Long Range Identification & Tracking (LRIT) and terrestrial Automatic Identification System (AIS).  
  • Canadian Space Agency (CSA) which manages the RADARSAT Constellation Mission and other space-based surveillance sources that have a range of payloads, such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR).  
  1. Why are all small vessels not tracked?
  • Tracking of small vessels is done in a manner that is consistent with international conventions. Where appropriate, shore-based radar stations could monitor and report vessel traffic in local areas. 

If pressed

  • The Marine Transportation Security Regulations are used to implement international conventions linked to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.  Reporting requirements that concern commercial vessels engaged on international voyages that are capture under these regulations.  
  • Under the Navigation Safety Regulations, the carriage and use of Automatic Information Systems is required by self-propelled vessels of 150 gross tonnage or more when carrying more than 12 passengers on an international voyage[1]. Ships that do not match the descriptions above – in particular, pleasure craft, fishing vessels, and warships – can be fitted with Class B AIS systems but are not mandated to do so.  
  • With some exceptions (for example fishing vessels), the Long Range Identification and Tracking Regulations apply to the following Canadian vessels engaged on international voyages:
    • all passenger vessels (more than 12 passengers) including high speed passenger craft, and cargo vessels, including high speed craft, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards.  
  1. Why cannot all information be shared?
  • Canada is bound by its domestic legislation - including the Criminal Code, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Access to Information Act, the Privacy Act, and other relevant departmental legislation - in terms of sharing, collecting and using personal, private information between its own government departments and agencies s well as with foreign states.   If pressed  
  • When a threat is identified or event occur, every effort is made to share appropriate information for decision making and activities to be coordinated.  
  • One example of collaboration is through the Maritime Event Response Protocol (MERP), which expands the direction as delineated in the Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP). The objective of the MERP is to provide specific strategic guidance for a whole-of-government response to any significant maritime event that transcends the mandate and/or potentially exceeds the capability of any given government organization.  
  1. What is the legal framework for the sharing of information between MSOC partners?
  • The May 2013 Memorandum of Understanding regarding Information Sharing in the Marine Security Operations Centres (and its annexes) sets out roles and responsibilities of the core participants regarding the contribution, sharing, and dissemination of information by the Core Participants. If pressed  
  • Notwithstanding this Memorandum of Understanding, there are legal constraints on the collection, storage, sharing and use of personal information and information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
  • As such, all personal data/information collected, stored, shared or used as part of Marine Security Operations Centres operations must be safeguarded and protected by the core participants in accordance with legal requirements, Treasury Board guidance, and departmental policies.
  • In view of the Office of the Auditor General report on the Arctic Waters Surveillance and the specific recommendation on information sharing, it is understood that the MSOC Governance will be examining the May 2013 Memorandum of Understanding.  
  1. What is Transport Canada – as Chair of the IMSWG – doing to address the reported lack of progress to close the identified gaps in Arctic waters surveillance?
  •  Transport Canada - working with key partners of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group – is re-invigorating the working group. 
    • The IMSWG governance includes 17 federal departments and agencies with appropriate responsibilities associated with marine security.
      • CBSA, CFIA, CSIS, Canadian Space Agency (CSA), Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), DFO – CCG and Conservation and Protection (C&P), DOJ, DND, ECCC, GAC, Government Operations Centre (GOC), PS, RCMP, TC, ex-officio members: Finance, PCO, TBS
  • The IMSWG has endorsed the updated Maritime Security Strategic Framework, which will be reviewed (being planned for April or May 2023) by the Assistant Deputy Minister – Marine Security Committee.  Transport Canada and key partners are also updating and creating supporting strategies.  Transport Canada has drafted an update to the Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy that is currently is an interdepartmental review process at the Director General-level.  The Canadian Coast Guard “holds the pen” and is working with partners in drafting the Arctic Maritime Security Strategy.
  • To support the IMSWG’s plan, the working group has re-orientated the supporting structure.  Gone is the consultative committee – replaced by a more active coordination committee.  This new committee has been reduced in size to only a few members at the Director-level.  Supporting the Committee’s work are several “task specific” groups.
  • The Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group last met on November 15th, 2022.  This meeting was focused on the updating of the Maritime Security Strategic Framework and its supporting strategies. The prior meeting occurred on July 19th, 2022. 
  1. What is TC’s plan to address the long-standing gaps in Arctic maritime domain awareness, particularly the inability to track vessels continuously and to identify non-emitting vessel; and the barriers that prevent efficiently sharing and integrating relevant information about vessel traffic in Arctic waters?
  • Transport Canada is reviewing legislation and regulations (i.e., the Marine Transportation Security Act and the Marine Transportation Security Regulations) and ensures that the marine transportation security framework continues to be appropriate to modern threats and risks to the marine transportation system.  
  • Collaboratively, Transport Canada, leading the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group, is updating Canada’s Maritime Security Strategic Framework and supporting strategies – including the Arctic Maritime Security Strategy and Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy.
  • In addition, the Ocean Protection Plan (OPP) includes initiatives which have direct and indirect impacts on Arctic maritime domain awareness including:
    • Enhanced Maritime Situational Awareness (EMSA), which provides near real-time vessel activity and other marine environmental information in local waters through a user-friendly web platform; and
    • Proactive Vessel Management (PVM), which includes the development of a safe shipping strategy. Tuktoyaktuk in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR) is a key community contributing to these developments.
  • Transport Canada has also introduced the Arctic Shipping Safety and Pollution Prevention Regulations to address the unique hazards faced by vessels in the Arctic; and,
  • Identified mitigation and management measures for vessel activity in Cambridge Bay in collaboration with our Inuit partners and by bringing together local knowledge and western science through the Cumulative Effects of Marine Shipping initiative (CEMS).

 If pressed:

  • Proposed enhancements to the Marine Transportation Security Act will:
    • expand existing regulatory authorities respecting information sharing with federal and provincial departments
    • amend the 96-hour Pre-Arrival Reporting form to include: more detailed crew information; and estimates of each stop in Canada
    • enable Transport Canada to enter into agreement with other organizations to oversee and enforce the Marine Transportation Security Act and its regulations
    • shift the focus of the act to being risk and threat based, thereby enabling the department to respond more effectively to situations of unacceptable security risk. 
  • The Marine Transportation Security Act Modernization is included as part of Bill C-33:  Strengthening the Port System and Railway Safety in Canada Act.  This was tabled in Parliament in November 2022, and is currently (as of January 17, 2023) at second reading in the House of Commons.  
  • We plan for Spring 2024 pre-publication of the Marine Transportation Security Regulations. 
  • The Maritime Security Strategic Framework:
    • Will enable a coordinated approach in addressing a range of maritime security challenges and interests. 
    • Aligns with and advances Government of Canada policies such as the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, Canada’s Defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged and Canada's Oceans Protection Plan.  
  • The Arctic Maritime Security Strategy will provide a unified, integrated approach to Arctic maritime security.

If pressed further:

  • The Maritime Security Strategic Framework recognizes the efforts and contributions of departments and agencies associated with the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group - including Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, National Defence and Transport Canada. The Strategy will be submitted for the approval of the Working Group by June 2023.  
  • The Maritime Domain Awareness Strategy will outline a process to organize and use current national capabilities to identify, assess, and address maritime domain awareness issues through the engagement of stakeholders both at home and abroad.  
  1.  How and when does Transport Canada – as part of the Marine Security Operations Centre initiative – propose to incorporate measures to identify gaps in monitoring, assessing, and reporting on maritime domain awareness and way forward on operational flexibility, options, and tools?
  • The Marine Security Operations Centre framework emphasizes collaborative solutions by leveraging existing and emerging capabilities, capacities and mandates among the core partners. This approach focuses not only on current but also future opportunities to enhance departments/agencies’ strengths and expertise to ensure efficient and effective use of available resources.
  • The Marine Security Operations Centre initiative recognizes the need for a comprehensive assessment of the interdepartmental program, to provide renewal recommendations. ‘Renewal’ refers to the overall desired outcome – for the future positioning of the program to ensure the MSOCs can accomplish their mission and continue to evolve with the ever-changing maritime safety and security landscape.  
  • I would refer the specific plans for the review of the Marine Security Operations Centre to the Canadian Coast Guard, which is the current Chair of the MSOC governance committees.
  1. What is the Enhanced Maritime Situational Awareness Initiative and how does it support Arctic Maritime Surveillance?
  • EMSA is an initiative that has been renewed under the Oceans Protection Plan,. Itis an OPP initiative that has been co-developed with indigenous partners, and is improving overall domain awareness for indigenous and coastal communities. It provides near real-time vessel traffic information and other marine environmental data to provide a comprehensive picture of the maritime environment
  • Arctic partners and participants are using EMSA to monitor vessel traffic, track ice breakers, record vessel and marine mammal observations during open water season, integrating hydrophone and drone data and monitoring fuel deliveries. In the Arctic, the system is currently being used in Tuktoyaktuk, Northwest Territories; Cambridge Bay, Nunavut; and Nain, Labrador.
  • The platform also supports community safety by integrating GPS devices into trip planning.
  1. Are there other ways in which Transport Canada is improving maritime surveillance capabilities in the Arctic?
  • Under the Oceans Protection Plan, Transport Canada is working with the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Space Agency to augment the Canadian Coast Guard’s terrestrial Automatic Identification System (AIS).
  • As part of this partnership, the Maritime Security Operations Centre in Halifax fuses the terrestrial and space-based AIS feeds into one dynamic, real-time feed for use by the Federal Government. This fused feed provides more robust coverage of vessel traffic in areas of high traffic areas and helps fill vessel information gaps in remote areas of Canada’s waterways in the Arctic.
  1. Are there examples of how Transport Canada is leveraging local knowledge to support maritime surveillance in the Arctic?
  • Under the renewed Oceans Protection Plan initiative, Proactive Vessel Management (PVM) is a partnership with two Arctic communities to address marine shipping concerns in their waterways. Transport Canada, and its partners in Inuvik, NT and Cambridge Bay, NU, are working together to develop voluntary management measures for marine vessel traffic.
  • Areas of interest include cruise ship management, community safety on the ice, ice breakers, vessel speed limits in, and mapping safe harbours and places of refuge. Under this initiative, TC is relying on the local knowledge brought forward by those that live, work and hunt in the region to inform the development of vessel management measures.
  • AS an example, Transport Canada’s partners in Cambridge Bay sighted the Kiwi Roa sailing the Northwest Passage, during the pandemic at a time when foreign pleasure craft were prohibited from entering those waters. Through the connections made under the PVM initiative that they informed Transport Canada and other authorities of the vessel aits location.

Recommendation 2: To address delays in the delivery of equipment to replace and improve the key federal capabilities used for maritime surveillance in the Canadian Arctic and the risk that several types of equipment may cease operating before being replaced, National Defence, Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Public Services and Procurement Canada should:

  • Identify options and take action to acquire equipment in a timely manner, and;
  • Develop and approve contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced.

KEY MESSAGES

  • We are working towards developing a long-term strategy for the NASP fleet to ensure continued surveillance of the Arctic, which includes ensuring our DASH 7 aircraft is used for its full lifecycle, using our other Dash 8 aircraft in the Arctic as required, and augmenting the NASP by introducing a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System into the fleet by 2025 as a proof of concept.
  • We have also taken other steps to ensure our presence in the Arctic over the long-term, with the construction of a new Hangar and an Accommodations unit in Iqaluit. Both facilities should be completed in 2024-25 and offers the possibility of extending surveillance operations into late Fall or winter.
  • Under the Oceans Protection Plan, the Government :
    • Funded the Government of Nunavut (GNU) to undertake a Community Needs Study – leading to the  acquisition of safety equipment for fuel resupply operations in Nunavut.
    • Funded  projects in Canada’s Arctic and North (Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Nunavik, and Nunatsiavut) through the Investments in Safety Equipment and Basic Marine Infrastructure in Northern Communities Initiative. As a result, 32 Indigenous communities now have access to safety equipment and/or basic marine infrastructure, such as sealift areas, safe freight storage, barge moorings and manifolds, barges to transport goods, and pipelines to transfer fuel from barge to communities.
  1. What options has TC developed and what actions have been taken to acquire equipment in a timely manner?

Dash 7 Parts / Serviceability

  • TC’s National Aerial Surveillance Program (NASP) uses the Dash 7 aircraft as the primary aircraft for Arctic surveillance. The Vancouver Dash 8 is also used on an as required basis.
  • TC has developed a strategy to acquire a substantial inventory of Dash 7 parts to increase aircraft serviceability. Due to the limited availability of parts, TC is procuring a large inventory of replacement parts to augment its existing stock.
  • This strategy will improve aircraft serviceability for another few years.

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS)

  • TC has also acquired a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which is scheduled for delivery in 2023.
  • The RPAS was acquired as a proof of concept to assist with the development of training and regulatory programs. The asset will be a very productive platform for the NASP and will augment the fixed wing surveillance capability.
  • The RPAS will be operational in 2025 following the training of personnel and the development of regulations and standards and increase in Satellite Communications.
  • RPAS budget = original project budget $39.5 M, budget for acquisition $36.1 M; no long-term operational funding secured

NASP Hangar

  • TC has identified the lack of infrastructure as an issue in the Arctic and has secured funding got the NASP Hangar  as part of the Oceans Protection Plan.
  • The new hangar will support the maintenance of aircraft operating in the region and allow for the possibility of extending surveillance operations into late fall or winter.
  • This hangar will put the Government of Canada in a very good position for the next 25-30 years.
  • The facility will also support the operations of the new remotely piloted aircraft system.
  • This infrastructure can also enhance the support provided to the Arctic operations of other government departments on an as required basis

The Request for Proposals for the hangar will be released in Q4 of fiscal year 22/23.  If economically feasible, the construction will start in fiscal year 2023/24 and be completed in 2024/25.  

  1. Has Transport Canada developed and approved contingency plans to address the risk of having reduced surveillance capabilities in the event that key satellites, ships, or aircraft cease to operate before they are replaced? Yes, the Department has already started to develop contingency plans and has taken action in order to be prepared for reduced surveillance capabilities.

Coverage for when the Dash 7 is unserviceable

  • TC’s National Aerial Surveillance Program uses the Dash 7 aircraft as the primary aircraft for Arctic surveillance.
  • While the Department works towards developing a long-term strategy for the NASP fleet replacement, this strategy will help in improving aircraft serviceability for another few years.
  • The Ottawa, Vancouver and Moncton based Dash 8 fleet can serve as a contingency to the Dash 7 on an as required basis.
  • TC has also acquired a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which is scheduled for delivery in 2023 and it will be operational by 2025.
  • The RPAS is expected to augment Transport Canada’s surveillance capacity in the Arctic. As it is a developmental capability, the concept of operations will evolve over the next few years.
  1. Will the RPAS replace the need for a Dash 7 in the Arctic?
  • No, there are no plans for the RPAS to replace our fixed wing assets, it will augment them.
  • Iqaluit is our gateway to the North and the Arctic landmass is a huge area which is challenging to cover with only one asset operating there during the shipping season.
  • The RPAS is very much a development program, and it will be Canada’s first medium altitude long endurance aircraft put into an operational environment.
  • The RPAS is a proof-of-concept project compared to established NASP program. The training programs, regulatory and standards development, and Satellite communications are all areas which need to mature prior to the RPAS being considered as a fully operational asset.
  • The RPAS will be equipped with similar remote sensing equipment as the present NASP fleet which will provide value to Canadians and the Government of Canada in the Arctic.
  • RPAS is equipped upgraded MX15 High-Definition Camera, marine surveillance radar and mapping camera (not presently installed on Dash 7/8)

If Pressed

  • There are many advantages and disadvantages to each system, and it is important for TC to maintain the proper mix of assets.
  • For example,
    • an advantage of the RPAS is that its maximum endurance is 24 hours whereas the Dash 7 endurance is 8 hours.
    • A disadvantage of the RPAS is that it is limited to the bandwidth of the communications satellites and can presently only operate below 72 degrees N latitude whereas the Dash 7 can cover the entire Arctic.
  • RPAS budget = original project budget $39.5 M, budget for acquisition $36.1 M; no long-term operational funding secured
  • NASP budget for the Arctic Operations - $4.87 M funded by Oceans Protection Plan

If Pressed about TC’s Previous Interest in acquiring Global Hawk (Eurohawk)

Global Hawk (Eurohawk)

  • In 2018, TC became aware of a surplus German Eurohawk RPAS (Global Hawk). The possible purchase and refit of this system to meet the Canadian requirements was considered.
  • However, after considerable research it was determined that the platform was not suited the Concept of Operations proposed by Canada for its RPAS project to support the National Aerial Surveillance Program in the Arctic.
  • In addition, the purchase and subsequent retrofit, operational and maintenance costs exceeded the Canada’s proposed budget and timeline.
  • As a result TC proceeded with a competitive RFP process which resulted in the December 2020 contract award to Elbit Systems Limited for the Hermes HFE900 Starliner.
  1.  What is Transport Canada’s long-term plan for the renewal of its assets used in the Arctic?
  • The Department is currently involved in a review of TC’s Aircraft Services Directorate which includes looking at the need for capitalization. The report is due in the Spring of 2023.
  • While the Department works towards developing a long-term strategy for the NASP fleet replacement, acquiring a substantial inventory of spares for the Dash 7 will help in improving aircraft serviceability for another few years.
  • Replacing the Dash 7 with a fourth Dash 8 is the logical option for the Department as there are many advantages to operating a common aircraft type.
  • The new hangar will support the maintenance of aircraft operating in the region and allow for the possibility of extending surveillance operations into late fall or winter.
  • This hangar will put the Government of Canada in a very good position for the next 25-30 years.   On the RPAS  
  • TC has acquired a Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which is scheduled for delivery in 2023 and will be operational in 2025.
  • The Medium Altitude Long Endurance RPAS has been acquired as a proof of concept to assist with the development of training and regulatory programs in Canada.
  • The RPAS is a proof-of-concept project compared to established NASP program. The training programs, regulatory and standards development, and Satellite communications are all areas which need to mature prior to the RPAS being considered as a fully operational asset.
  • The RPAS presently being acquired is very much a development program and it will be Canada’s first medium altitude long endurance aircraft put into an operational environment.
  • Once Satellite Communications have advanced and the Regulations and Standards for Beyond Visual Line of Sight RPAS operations have been developed, TC will explore what the proper mix of fixed wing and RPAS assets is for Arctic Operations.
  • The Department is also working on RPAS projects in other TC regions and the lessons learned from those operations will ease the transition to the Arctic, when time permits (Satellite Communications, Regulations, Standards and Training Programs).
  1. What will these assets achieve and what are the benefits for Canadians?

On the Dash 7 / Dash 8 Fleet

  • Dash 7 maximum endurance is 8 hours and up to 900 hours of surveillance per year. Up to 400 of the 900 hours is in the Arctic.
  • Dash 8 maximum endurance is 6.5 hours and up to 1200 hours of surveillance per year per aircraft. Of the 1200 hours for the Vancouver based Dash 8, up to 100 hours is in the Arctic.

On the RPAS

  • RPAS maximum endurance is 24 hours
  • RPAS to deliver 200-500 hours annually

On the Hangar

  • This hangar will put the Government of Canada in a very good position for the next 25-30 years. Iqaluit is a very strategic location as it is our gateway to the North
  • The facility will enable TC to operate year-round in the Arctic should the need every become a reality. As a first step it will allow TC to operate in the shoulder seasons of the Arctic shipping season and stretch operations from 4 months to 5-6 months.
  • The Hangar will support the operations of the new remotely piloted aircraft system.
  • This infrastructure can also enhance the support provided to the Arctic operations of other government departments on an as required basis.

Annex A – Reported Incidents

PNR/ARCTIC safety incidents from 2020 to present (November 2022)

Year

Number of Incidents

2020

21

2021

35

2022 (to date)

32

TOTAL

88

Region

Number of Incidents

PNR

86

QC

2

Type of Incident

Number of Incidents

Adrift Vessel

6

Allision  (running one ship up against another ship that is stationary)

1

Beset in Ice

1

Capsizing

1

Collision

2

COVID-19

3

Disabled or Damaged Vessel

9

Fire/Explosion

1

Grounding

4

Mechanical

1

Medical

16

Missing Person/  Search and Rescue

31

Sinking

1

Pollution

7

Striking

1

Other

3

Report a problem with this page

Date modified: